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Abstract 
 
 
The influence of Sir Francis Bacon on early modern science is widely recognized. 
His ideas regarding the utility of knowledge, value of observation, and benefits of 
cooperative research were widely adopted in the seventeenth century. But Bacon 
believed his chief contribution to the reform of knowledge was not these, but rather 
his proposal for a new kind of inductive reasoning. His theory of induction, 
however, is generally not thought to have had significant direct influence on 
subsequent developments in science. I argue in this dissertation, based on close 
reading of the relevant texts, that the conventional assessment is hampered by an 
inadequate understanding of Baconian induction, and that this misunderstanding can 
be corrected by considering Bacon’s proposal in the historical context in which it 
was presented. 
Bacon’s treatise on induction, the Novum Organum, was meant as an 
alternative to Aristotle’s Organon. The dissertation therefore begins by examining 
Aristotle’s views on induction. I propose a significant revision to the received 
interpretation of Aristotle’s position. I then argue that my interpretation was 
conventional until late antiquity when it was altered by Neoplatonic writers. The 
dissertation traces the transmission of the Neoplatonic interpretation through the 
major Islamic and Latin commentators. During the Renaissance, some humanist 
 v 
scholars realized that the scholastic interpretation of induction differed from that 
common in antiquity, and a debate ensued about its nature. One chapter here 
examines the contributions to that debate by four late sixteenth-century thinkers, 
Jacopo Zabarella, Everard Digby, William Temple, and John Case. Bacon’s 
proposal for a new kind of induction is then examined in the context of the 
contemporary and historical background. I argue that although Bacon’s theory of 
induction is more systematic than any that had gone before, it was in a sense a 
return to induction as it was understood in antiquity. In the final chapter, I argue 
that the work of William Harvey and Robert Boyle were good examples of 
Baconian induction in practice. 
I conclude that Bacon’s induction, and not only his general vision for reform, 
was well understood and in fact used by important seventeenth century scientists.  
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Notes on Typography, Translations, and Terminology 
 
 
This project relies heavily on a close, careful, and contextualized reading of texts, 
and presentation of its argument demands typographical care. American style 
guidelines allow the use of quotation marks and italics for multiple purposes, and 
following these guidelines can lead to important and misleading ambiguities. 
Consequently, the following practices have been adopted. 
Besides the names of journal articles and book sections, double quotation 
marks are used only for verbatim excerpts or translations thereof. All double-
quoted material has its source cited. Citations are primarily to original publications, 
rather than later collected editions, especially in the case of books published in 
England before 1700, as these are now readily available on-line.1 Translators and 
alterations of translations are identified in footnotes. Original-language source 
material is reproduced in footnotes, except for Greek passages from Aristotle and 
Plato for which Greek texts are readily available, for Arabic passages, and for a few 
other passages. Bekker numbers are provided for Aristotelian passages, Stephanus 
numbers for Plato. With Aristotle and Plato, I have taken the liberty of using 
                                                
1 Early English Books Online, http://eebo.chadwyck.com. 
 x 
different translations for different passages, choosing the one I believe presents the 
relevant idea most clearly for a given context. 
Single quotation marks are used for terms or phrases that have a technical or 
distinctive use by an author or authors but for which no specific passage is being 
cited. For example, 
 Digby deduced his conclusion from a ‘clear and distinct’ idea. 
 Bacon discussed four types of ‘idols.’ 
In such uses, the marks indicate that the author under discussion is using the term 
(or the term from which the quoted term is a translation) in a distinctive way, not 
that I am. I do not introduce any scare quotes (single or double) of my own. Single 
quotation marks are also used for definitions (unless being quoted verbatim from a 
cited dictionary or a cited author). For example, 
 The term came to mean ‘the essence of.’ 
In these, cases, the definitions are my own. (If not, they are set in double quotation 
marks and cited.) Single quotations marks are also used for quotations within 
quotations, according to standard practice. 
Italics are used when a word or phrase is functioning as a term or concept. 
 We seek to understand what is meant by induction. 
This may be read 
 We seek to understand what is meant by the term induction. 
or We seek to understand what is meant by the concept induction.  
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When both italics and single quotations marks could be justified by these rules, 
only the italics will be used. 
 Cicero used the term inductio for Aristotle’s epagōgē. 
Italics are also used occasionally for emphasis and, of course, for book titles. 
Non-English words are not by virtue of being non-English typographically 
distinguished, but are frequently set in single quotation marks for reasons above. 
For example 
 For Nifo, induction is a manner of speaking (oratio). 
  A principle true per se is also true de omni. 
but 
 Bacon surveyed four types of ‘idols,’ or ‘idola.’ 
 Aristotle believed the ‘archai’ of science are developed from experience. 
As here and above, Greek is transliterated into Latin characters unless quoted from 
Latin sources in which the Greek was printed as such. 
I do not consider natural philosophy and science (and their corresponding 
derivatives) interchangeable. One is not simply the old term and the other the new. 
Francis Bacon used both terms, and so will I. Without trying to state definitions for 
each that apply across all periods (which I am not convinced is possible), I will 
simply try to use the term I think appropriate for the context. By that rule, natural 
philosophy will be the much more common term. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Yes, We Use Induction: 
A Problem of Meaning 
 
 
 
In 1654, John Webster, a provincial English minister and schoolmaster with no 
known university experience, published an attack on university teaching. He called 
on the faculties of Cambridge and Oxford to reject centuries-old scholasticism and 
begin teaching the method of induction proposed earlier in the century by Sir 
Francis Bacon.1 Webster’s attack drew a sharp response from two Oxford faculty 
members, John Wilkins, Warden of Wadham College, and Seth Ward, Savilian 
Professor of Astronomy.2 Unlike Webster, both were active members in England’s 
major scientific, academic, religious, and political communities. Both were 
accomplished natural philosophers, and both would later be founders of the Royal 
                                                
1 John Webster, Academiarum examen, or, The examination of academies wherein is discussed and 
examined the matter, method and customes of academick and scholastick learning, and the insufficiency thereof 
discovered and laid open. (London: Giles Calvert, 1654), 32–40. 
2 The relevant documents with an introductory essay that cites previous discussions on this 
debate appear in Allen G. Debus, Science and Education in the Seventeenth Century: The Webster-Ward 
Debate (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1970). 
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Society. The theme and tone of their rebuttal were that Webster did not know 
what he was talking about, regarding what was indeed taught at Oxford and even 
regarding how to properly use the inductive method. They insisted that Baconian 
induction was taught at Oxford and that they and their colleagues—and not this 
provincial schoolteacher—were on the forefront of Baconian inductive science.3 
We would like to know if Wilkins’ and Ward’s claim was true. Were 
students in Oxford learning Bacon’s induction? We would like to know because 
Wilkins, Ward, and their colleagues and students went on to exert such remarkable 
influence on early modern natural philosophy in England. Were they using Bacon’s 
induction? They certainly claimed they were, but there are reasons to doubt that 
they meant that literally. Bacon’s Advancement of Learning had inspired a generation 
of reformers. At a time in England when reforms of secular learning were still held 
in suspicion, he defended such reforms against those who saw a threat to king and 
country. Webster, Wilkins, and Ward were all members of that generation and 
                                                
3 Seth Ward and John Wilkins, Vindiciae academiarum containing briefe animadversions upon Mr 
Websters book. (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield for Thomas Robinson, 1654), 25, 45, 46, 49. On Wilkins’s 
remarkable influence and career—in science, academia, religion, and politics—see Barbara J. 
Shapiro, John Wilkins, 1614–1672: An Intellectual Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1969). Ward was an accomplished mathematician and astronomer, the first to teach 
the Copernican system at Oxford. He made influential advances on Kepler’s laws. He was elected 
president of Trinity College in 1659. He resigned his astronomy post in 1660 and became Bishop of 
Exeter in 1662. Though an active member of the Royal Society in the 1660s, he made no more major 
scientific contributions and spent the rest of his career as a very capable church administrator. There 
is no full treatment of his life. John Henry, “Ward, Seth (1617–1689),” in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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shared an enthusiasm for new learning. But academics such as Wilkins and Ward 
need not have extended that enthusiasm to Bacon’s whole methodological proposal.  
Though Bacon had written a proposal for a new kind of induction, he was not 
after all an accomplished natural philosopher or trained academic. Wilkins and 
Ward, on the other hand, were establishment academicians, reared in the scholastic 
culture of university disputations and trained in the technical details of Aristotelian 
logic. Of course they would say that they taught induction. Any professor of logic 
anywhere in Europe would have said the same, for induction had been a stock part 
of the Aristotelian natural philosophy curriculum for centuries. It appeared in all 
introductory logic textbooks right after discussion of the syllogism. Did Wilkins 
and Ward really mean that they taught Bacon’s induction? One of their colleagues, 
Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford, perhaps the most talented English 
mathematician before Isaac Newton, and one of the central figures of the early 
Royal Society, John Wallis, wrote a thoroughly conventional, non-Baconian 
treatment of induction in a logic textbook he published in 1687.4 Did his colleagues 
in the Royal Society really mean by induction the procedure that Bacon advanced 
in his treatise on the subject? 
One reason to doubt it is that Wallis and his fellows were remarkably 
successful natural philosophers, and as modern philosophers of science regularly 
point out, Bacon’s induction—in all the technical details he proposed it—simply 
                                                
4 John Wallis, Institutio logicae ad communes usus accommodata (London: 1687), bk. 3, chap. 15, 
pp. 167–72. 
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does not work. In 1877, Charles Peirce wrote how “a modern reader is struck by the 
inadequacy of his [Bacon’s] view on scientific procedure.”5 Morris Cohen famously 
wrote in 1926 of the “utter irrelevance of Bacon’s ideas to the actual progress of 
science.” He claimed, “There is . . . not a single authenticated record of any one 
ever making any important discovery in science by following Bacon’s method and 
its mechanical tables and twenty-seven prerogative instances.”6 This assessment 
remains essentially unchallenged. Thus, it seems, the remarkable accomplishments 
of seventeenth-century natural philosophers could not have come from use of 
Bacon’s induction and when Wilkins, Ward, and the others said they were 
teaching or using induction, they must have meant something else. 
Though Bacon liked to call his philosophy one of induction, his treatise on 
induction per se, Novum Organum (New Organon, 1620), is a small fraction of his 
output. Much of the rest of his writings and the more popular parts of them, from 
the Advancement of Learning (1605) to the New Atlantis (published posthumously in 
1627), are non-technical calls for a new prosperity based on voluminous empirical 
observations, peaceful collaboration, and a rejection of past authorities. One could 
be a committed Baconian without being an adept in the details of Bacon’s 
seemingly idiosyncratic method of induction. 
                                                
5 Charles Peirce, “Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (1877): §2. 
6 Morris R. Cohen, “The Myth about Bacon and the Inductive Method,” The Scientific 
Monthly 23 (1926): 506, 507. 
 5 
The concept of induction has a long history. It goes back to Aristotle who said 
he got it from Socrates. The idea was discussed in late antiquity, got transmitted to 
Europe by both Latin and Arabic writers, became a topic of contention and 
confusion in the Renaissance, was venerated in Restoration England, and became 
positively fashionable in the Enlightenment. But it is not clear which, if any, of 
these groups were talking about the same thing. And the problem did not stop. It is 
now conventional wisdom that in the eighteenth century, the Scottish philosopher 
David Hume unanswerably refuted the validity of induction.7 Yet Hume would 
hardly recognize the claim, for he himself never wrote against what he knew by the 
term induction, he claimed to be using Bacon’s method, and he even appealed to 
induction to defend his own arguments. Whatever we think Hume refuted is not 
what in his day went by the name induction. If we are going to see a central role for 
induction in the history of science, and historians of science rightly do, we need to 
understand what the idea meant to people in the past. Figuring that out, at least up 
until the period of the early Royal Society, is the project for this dissertation. 
                                                
7 For informed introductions to the Humean criticism and attempts to skirt it, see John 
Earman and Wesley C. Salmon, “The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses,” in Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. Merrilee H. Salmon, et al. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1992), 55–
66; Martin Curd and J. A. Cover, eds., Philosphy of Science: The Central Issues (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1998), 409–547; and Ian Hacking, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 247–55. 
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In a sense this study joins other recent research on ideas fundamental to early 
modern science, ideas such as fact or experiment.8 But in another way, this project is 
very different. It is necessarily much more technical. Wilkins and Ward and their 
fellow Royal Society members—and Bacon himself—knew induction as a subject 
that appeared in logic textbooks beside now unfamiliar topics such as enthymeme 
and the syllogistic forms of Barbara, Celarent, and Darapti.9 Bacon, though a 
government official and not a university professor, began his treatise with a 
discussion involving such technical topics as major premises, minor premises, and 
redargutions.10 In short, the New Organon presupposes familiarity with the old 
Organon, that is, the collection of books that together describe Aristotle’s system of 
logic. To reconstruct the context for the debate between Webster and the Oxford 
natural philosophers, we have to immerse ourselves in technical subject matter and 
vocabulary that they and their colleagues shared and that draw on discussions about 
                                                
8 E.g., Lorraine Daston, “Baconian Facts, Academic Civility and the Prehistory of 
Objectivity,” Annals of Scholarship (1991): 337–63; Barbara Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–
1720 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000); Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The 
Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). 
9 An enthymeme is a syllogism in which one of the premises is left unstated. Barbara, 
Celarent and Darapti are mnemonic names for types of syllogisms. ‘All A is B; all B is C; therefore 
all A is C,’ for example, is a syllogism of form Barbara. ‘All A is B; some B are C; therefore some A 
are C’ is of the form Celarent. 
10 The roles of major and minor premises in deductions and inductions will be discussed at 
length. Redargutions are refutations of sophistical arguments. 
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induction that go back to Aristotle. The necessary background will be introduced 
as we proceed. 
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Aristotle’s Organon was 
still a best-seller. We judge a sixteenth-century textbook to be popular and 
influential if it went through twenty or thirty printings, fifty if it was extremely 
popular. But Renaissance editions of Aristotle’s logic works number in the 
hundreds. Virtually every man involved with early modern natural philosophy 
would have first met induction in an introductory textbook on Aristotelian logic. 
The better read would then have met it again in the Organon and other Aristotelian 
works. The most astute would have sensed a conflict between what Aristotle said 
and what the textbooks claimed Aristotle said. This conflict first became evident on 
the continent during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Whereas Aristotle had 
said that what induction is is obvious, by the 1540s, the Aristotelian commentator, 
Agostino Nifo, could say that there is much confusion over what induction is. This 
confusion is the background to a series of proposals and debates among 
Aristotelians in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. It was into the aftermath 
of these discussions that Bacon proposed his new kind of induction in 1620. Any 
educated natural philosopher of the mid-seventeenth century, even if he did not 
have advanced training in scholastic logic per se, would have known of the 
scholastic background to Bacon’s proposal. He could not have read the Novum 
Organum without noticing it. 
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We, on the other hand, might. The scholastic language of the late 
Renaissance is now unfamiliar to us, the debates of the 1580s forgotten. It is easy for 
us now—as it was perhaps as early as the eighteenth century—to view Baconian 
induction as a general preference for observation and experiment over the dictates 
of past authorities. But it was proposed as something much more specific, 
something that could challenge the chapter on induction in all those medieval and 
Renaissance textbooks. It is the goal of this dissertation to understand Baconian 
induction, its genesis, and its adoption against that background. 
To do so requires an unusually long time horizon. Bacon cast his proposal as 
an alternative to Aristotle’s. Bacon named his book a new Organon, after Aristotle’s 
work of that name. In Bacon’s day, the Roman Cicero was still the preeminent 
author of humanist study and he, too, had important things to say on induction. 
Moreover, the ancient ideas were not presented unfiltered, but interpreted by a 
long line of commentators. The important Alexandrian commentators of late 
antiquity were reaching Latin readers for the first time in the sixteenth century and 
important volumes of their works emerged from the presses in the 1590s. 
Availability of Aristotle and Plato in the original Greek was increasing. In the 
bookshops of Bacon’s formative years, Aristotle, Cicero, Boethius, Philoponus, 
Avicenna, Buridan, and Zabarella lived side by side. 
The historian of an idea has two options. The first is to look for instances of 
the idea regardless of the name by which it was known, studying, for example, the 
concept of a scientist throughout history, even though the word scientist is a recent 
 9 
invention. This approach runs the anachronistic risk of projecting our modern ways 
of thinking into the past. The second approach is to follow the history of a word 
and trace its conceptual evolution. This approach can make the historian blind to 
conceptual changes developing under a different vocabulary, but can help us better 
understand the way people of the past actually organized their thoughts. Historians 
of induction typically adopt the first approach.11 They presume that induction is 
about knowing whether the next swan will be white, whether a black raven 
confirms the theory that all ravens are black, whether and with what degree of 
confidence we are justified in believing the sun will rise tomorrow or a drug will 
always cure a disease. They then go looking for instances of similar topics. By this 
method historians and philosophers conclude, for example, that David Hume was 
the central figure in the modern history of induction since he wrote about whether 
                                                
11 There have been few such historians. Reference is often made to the final chapter, 
“Induction,” in Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about 
Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 176–185, 
but this is an example of the first approach. Hacking accepts that his task is to consider the history 
of what is now called the Humean problem of induction. J. R. Milton, “Induction before Hume,” 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38, no. 1 (1987): 49–74, does the same, though with some 
sensitivity to the shortcomings of the approach. The chapter “Induction in Early Modern Europe” 
in Dear, Discipline and Experience draws on these two earlier studies. In remarks about a scientist for 
whom induction was a big concern, David L. Hull, Darwin and His Critics: The Reception of 
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution by the Scientific Community (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1973), 19, defends the first approach. Comments on the history of induction most frequently occur 
when an editor or commentator remarks that induction as used by a writer under consideration 
should not be taken to mean what induction means today. I know of no history of induction like that 
attempted here. 
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we can logically expect the next billiard ball to behave like the last.12 But as 
mentioned, even though induction was a common word in Hume’s day, he did not 
use the word to describe these issues. This dissertation embraces the alternate 
approach of following a word. This approach that can be particularly rewarding 
when the word survives as long as induction has. Modern languages all use a 
vernacular version of the Latin inductio, which Cicero invented to translate 
Aristotle’s epagōgē. The pedigree is direct and unbroken. This essay will not go 
looking for our modern notion of induction by whatever name it was known, but 
will concentrate on how that word was actually used and understood. 
The dissertation contains five chapters. The first two address the ancient 
background. Understanding Aristotle’s idea of induction and how that idea was 
modified and transmitted to early modern natural philosophy is important for 
understanding the early modern context. The first chapter offers what may be the 
first-ever complete survey of induction, or epagōgē, in the Aristotelian corpus in an 
effort to understand what Aristotle meant by the term. Attention is usually 
concentrated on Aristotle’s one chapter dedicated to induction, Prior Analytics 2.23. 
But this passage, as conventionally understood, is inconsistent with virtually 
everything else Aristotle says about induction. I will conclude the first chapter by 
arguing that the conventional understanding of that famous passage is incorrect. 
                                                
12 The well-known and oft-cited example of the billiard ball appears in David Hume, An 
abstract of a book lately published entituled A treatise of human nature & c (London: C. Borbet, 1740), 
¶9; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 409. 
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The conventional understanding dates to late antiquity. The dissertation’s 
second chapter traces the history of the concept of induction (what little of it is 
knowable) from Aristotle to the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle in 
Alexandria around 500 A.D. It describes their reinterpretation of Prior Analytics 
2.23, their elevation of that passage to prominence, and the transmission of their 
interpretation into and through both Latin and Arabic commentary. It concludes 
with a look at the conflict that began during the Renaissance when Aristotle’s 
contrasting comments on induction came to be noticed. 
Once the medieval consensus collapsed, alternative understandings of 
induction emerged and were debated. Chapter 3 considers four of them, starting 
with that of Jacopo Zabarella. (1533–1589). Following the work of John Herman 
Randall in the mid-twentieth century, it has been widely believed that Zabarella 
made an important contribution to induction theory with his doctrine of 
‘regressus.’ Using a close reading of Zabarella’s texts, this widely held view is 
refuted. The work of three English writers, Everard Digby (c.1551–1605), William 
Temple (1555-1627), and John Case (1539/40?–1599) is then examined. Digby and 
Temple were on two sides of a pamphlet war in the 1570s in which they debated 
proper methods of teaching. For several reasons, including the fact that Bacon was 
a student at Cambridge in the early 1570s, it has been speculated that the debate 
may have had an influence on Bacon. The debate is here re-examined in light of 
Digby’s little studied Theoria Analytica (1579). John Case is representative of the 
Aristotelian scholarship that thrived in the last two decades of the sixteenth 
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century. He is important in the history of induction because in his writings, we 
find the first use of the concept idol, used in the distinctive way that Bacon 
famously used it. 
The final two chapters concentrate on the early seventeenth century. Chapter 
4 seeks a full reexamination of Baconian induction in light of the Aristotelian 
context in which it was developed. The proposal is made that Bacon was reviving 
Aristotelian induction, properly understood—that is, as it was understood before 
the reinterpretation of late antiquity. Bacon held that the only past view of 
induction close to his own was that of Socrates, and I will have argued in chapter 1 
that Aristotle thought the same of his own. Bacon’s induction is thus both new and 
old, a systematization and codification of the ancient induction of Socrates and 
Aristotle. Chapter 5 examines three scientific projects of the early and mid-
seventeenth century, Bacon’s own scientific work, that of the famously Aristotelian 
William Harvey (1578–1657) and that of Robert Boyle (1627–1691). It will be argued 
that all three are excellent examples in practice of Baconian induction, rigorously 
understood. 
The period may seem overly long. Is it really necessary to review the whole 
history of induction just to understand what men of the seventeenth century 
thought it was? Indeed it is, for though the writers of the past were long dead, their 
writings were very much alive in Renaissance and Restoration England. The best 
way to sort out the disagreements between all the works by which Bacon, Wilkins, 
Ward, Harvey, or Boyle would have learned about induction is to analyze them 
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historically. In the end we will find that at least some of those Oxford natural 
philosophers understood Bacon’s induction in the full sophisticated way Bacon 
intended it, and that Wilkins and Ward knew what they were talking about when 
they said that Bacon’s induction was being taught at Oxford. 
This conclusion may help us reassess the relative influence of Bacon’s 
induction on early modern natural philosophy. Scholars have been limited by not 
approaching Bacon’s induction as Bacon’s expected it to be. This dissertation is a 
contribution toward overcoming that limitation. 
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1 
 
Induction is Obvious: 
Aristotle’s Adoption of Socrates’ Invention 
 
 
 
Modern scholars have struggled to understand what Aristotle meant by epagōgē, or 
as we know it from the Latin-derived cognate, induction. He appears to say that 
induction is the opposite of deduction and elsewhere that it is a kind of deduction, 
that it is the process for forming universal propositions and elsewhere that it is the 
process for forming concepts, that it has inferential force and elsewhere that it does 
not. If there has been anything like a modern consensus it is that Aristotle has two 
conflicting views. One is that induction is a kind of deductive argument that 
proceeds by complete enumeration. If, for example, one wants to ascertain that 
something is true of all the planets, one must confirm that it is true for each planet 
individually. If the enumeration is not complete, the conclusion cannot be certain. 
Justification of this interpretation of Aristotelian induction is found in Aristotle’s 
only one chapter dedicated to induction, Prior Analytics 2.23. Aristotle’s other view 
has something to do with coming to hold universal concepts based on the 
experience of particulars. Exactly what is debated. Primary support for this view is 
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found in Posterior Analytics 2.19. In the late twentieth century, there has been no 
stable interpretation that reconciles these two views.1 
As we will see in the chapters ahead, the modern interpretations of 
Aristotelian induction are not the same as those of the past. Past interpretations 
have swung between the two modern views. At times a conflict between them was 
recognized. At other times one prevailed to the virtual exclusion of the other. In yet 
other times, as in Francis Bacon’s formative years, different groups of Aristotelians 
adopted different interpretations. I used to believe that for understanding the 
                                                
1 In twentieth-century examinations of Aristotelian induction, W. D. Ross, “Commentary,” 
in Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 47–51, 481–487, 
has been influential. The influence can be seen, for example, in the recent edition, Aristotle, Prior 
Analytics, trans. Robin Smith (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1989), 219–221. Recent research 
includes Kurt von Fritz, Die epagōgē bei Aristoteles (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1964); Walter Hess, “Erfahrung und Intuition bei Aristoteles,” Phronesis 15 (1970): 
49–50; Nelly Tsouyopoulus, “Die induktive Methode und das Induktionsproblem in der 
griechischen Philosophie,” Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (1974): 94–122; D. W. 
Hamlyn, “Aristotelian Epagoge,” Phronesis 21 (1976): 167–84; T. Engberg-Pedersen, “More on 
Aristotelian Epagoge,” Phronesis 24 (1979): 301–19; Jaakko Hintikka, “Aristotelian Induction,” Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 34 (1980): 422–39; Thomas Upton, “A Note on Aristotelian Epagōgē,” 
Phronesis 226 (1981): 172–76; Richard McKirahan, Jr., “Aristotelian Epagoge in Prior Analytics 2.21 
and Posterior Analytics 1.1,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983): 1–13; Terence Irwin, 
Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 32–33; Simo Knuuttila, “Remarks on 
Induction in Aristotle’s Dialectic and Rhetoric,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 47 (1993): 78–88; 
Ilkka Niiniluoto, “Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 
49 (1994/95): 49–61; Greg Bayer, “Coming to Know Principles in Posterior Analytics II 19,” Apeiron 
30 (1997): 109–42. Of these, the Finnish scholars draw conclusions closest to mine, though by 
different means. All the attempts to grant priority to the second view remain constrained by the 
conventional interpretation of Prior Analytics 2.23. I below propose an alternative interpretation that 
removes that constraint. 
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history of early modern induction it was not crucial to understand what Aristotle 
wrote on the subject, only what early modern writers thought Aristotle wrote on 
the subject. I have since changed my mind, for I found it increasingly difficult to 
understand early moderns thinkers without understanding Aristotle himself and the 
relevant background, if any can be known, in which he developed his theory. 
Virtually all early modern commentators, Bacon included, present their 
understanding of induction with reference to Aristotle, even when they disagree 
with one another. To understand the positions for which they seek Aristotle’s 
authority, we must understand Aristotle.  
The following analysis takes a fresh look at Aristotelian induction with several 
methodological principles in mind: 
(1) Take the easy cases first and leave the difficult ones for later. Throughout 
the history of commentary on Aristotelian induction, the two chapters mentioned 
above, Prior Analytics 2.23 and Posterior Analytics 2.19, have attracted the most, 
sometimes even exclusive, attention. Both passages are difficult. Both seem to 
contradict themselves, each other, and other passages in the corpus. Though they 
have received the most attention, these two chapters include only nine of the 
ninety-six occurrences of the word epagōgē in Aristotle’s works. Fortunately, the 
other eighty-seven are much easier to deal with. I will start with the easiest of the 
eighty-seven, work up to the more ambiguous or otherwise difficult, and leave the 
most problematic ones for last. 
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(2) Assume that Aristotle has one unified, coherent, and consistent concept of 
induction. Aristotle never suggests that his theory of induction is problematic, 
complicated, or controversial. He never presents a catalog of competing theories of 
induction (as he frequently does for other matters), never says there are multiple 
ways of understanding induction, never says he will consider a kind of induction 
different from that usually discussed, never even explains fully what induction is. 
When he uses the word, he assumes his reader (or listener) knows what he is 
talking about. He says that “What sort of thing induction is, is obvious.”2 I will 
presume that Aristotle has a single and consistent understanding of induction and it 
is our job to figure out what that is. I will do everything possible to avoid exiting 
some difficulty by saying that Aristotle had multiple, inconsistent views of 
induction. 
(3) Assume that Aristotle’s concept of induction may be different from ours. 
There is a tendency among modern commentators to judge Aristotelian induction 
against the modern concept—against what is considered a proper theory of true, 
real, and genuine induction. This leads to several practices better avoided. One is to 
divide Aristotle’s usage into technical uses (usually, ones recognizably like ours) and 
non-technical uses (usually, ones we cannot square with our understanding)—or 
worse into three, four, five, or six different uses, senses, or meanings.3 This often 
                                                
2 Topics, 8.1 157a8. 
3 Hintikka, “Aristotelian Induction,” 425, for example, lists four types, dubbing that of Prior 
Analytics 2.23, the “‘official’” account. 
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results in the impression, and sometimes the explicit claim, that Aristotle was 
hopelessly or sadly confused by the whole matter.4 Translators deal with this by 
trying to find alternatives (sometimes globally, sometimes selectively) for induction 
when translating epagōgē. Vlastos said that in the second half of the twentieth 
century, there is “no excuse” for using the cognate.5 Annas chose “arguments from 
particular to general,” explaining that Aristotle’s use is simply “not . . . the same as 
modern induction.”6 I agree with her, but the solution here is not to adopt different 
words for his different uses, but to do what Aristotle did, namely, use just one word 
and determine what he meant by it. I will follow the practice Cicero began and 
which was followed into the Renaissance. I will treat epagōgē, inductio, and induction 
as directly interchangeable. 
(4) Give priority to the noun induction over the verb induce. My analysis is 
broader than others in that I seriously consider the whole ninety-seven and not just 
the nine. Compared to others, however, it is narrower, for I consider just the noun 
epagōgē, and not all forms of the root verb epagein, ‘to induce, to bring in.’ Some 
scholars have made things needlessly difficult by starting with a survey of all 
                                                
4 Ross and Smith think that Aristotle’s “enthusiasm” got the better of him on the issue. Ross 
occasionally claims that some argument Aristotle says is inductive simply is not. Ross, 
“Commentary,” 50, 476, 506; Robin Smith, “Notes,” in Prior Analytics (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 220. 
5 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), 267. 
6 Julia Annas, “Notes,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books M and N (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 154. 
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Aristotelian uses of epagein, on the hope that an etymological analysis of this ancient 
word might help illuminate the new locution.7 But the verb has many uses (Homer 
used it for dogs rushing in8), and it is difficult to know when, if ever, Aristotle is 
using it in a newer technical sense. I propose that it is better to presume that the 
noun is always used technically, to figure out what induction means from these uses, 
and leave the verbs for later. To make a modern analogy: It would be of limited use 
and potentially misleading to begin with vacate when trying to understand vacation. 
(5) Consider the context of the work in which the term appears. Analysts of 
induction frequently support a contention by juxtaposing short excerpts from 
throughout the Aristotelian corpus, thus isolating each instance from the context 
that may offer better clues to Aristotle’s meaning than does the juxtaposition. (The 
practice is particularly detrimental once we begin an historical analysis, for not all 
of Aristotle’s works were equally read or available in all periods.) I will instead 
proceed through the corpus, volume by volume, considering all discussions of 
induction within one work before moving to the next. I will begin with the Topics.  
                                                
7 Ross, “Commentary,” 481-84 adopts this approach and it survives for example in Engberg-
Pedersen, “More on Aristotelian Epagoge,” 303. 
8 Odyssey, 19.445. 
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Topics and Rhetoric 
For three reasons, the Topics is the best place to begin an investigation of 
Aristotelian induction.9 First, the term appears more in this work than in any 
other. About a quarter of all Aristotle’s uses appear in it. Second, the work is a 
training manual of sorts for the kind of back-and-forth arguing associated with 
Socrates, and it is Socrates who Aristotle says introduced inductive reasoning.10 
Third and very importantly, Aristotle uses induction in passages whose overall 
meaning is relatively plain. Therefore we can understand the passages without fully 
understanding what Aristotle means by the term and thus use the passages to 
elucidate the term. This is in contrast to several passages in the Analytics, which are 
difficult to understand without first understanding what is meant by induction. The 
Topics thus provides solid initial ground on which to stand. 
Early in the Topics, Aristotle offers a chapter that makes four unambiguous 
claims, frequently repeated throughout the corpus. Here is the chapter in full, with 
the claims numbered: 
                                                
9 Only the Finnish scholars give the Topics much attention in discussions of induction. It 
features prominently, for example, in Knuuttila, “Remarks on Induction in Aristotle’s Dialectic and 
Rhetoric.” 
10 Metaphysics, 13.4 1078b24-30. More on this below. It is also possible that the Topics was 
written early in Aristotle’s career, perhaps while he was still at Plato’s Academy. Aristotle always 
writes of induction as if his audience already knows what it is. Writing for an audience for whom 
the inventor of induction was still discussed could help explain the frequency of induction in the 
Topics and the familiarity assumed in the audience. For summaries of the chronological theory, see 
introductory notes in Aristotle, Aristotle II: Topica, trans. E. S. Forster (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1960), 267.  
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With these things defined, then, we need to distinguish [1] how many 
kinds of dialectical argument there are. One kind is induction, another is 
deduction. Now what a deduction is has been explained earlier. [2] 
Induction, however, is proceeding from particulars up to a universal. [3] 
For instance, if the pilot who has knowledge is the best pilot, and so 
with a charioteer, then generally the person who has knowledge about 
anything is the best. [4] Induction is more persuasive, clearer, more 
intelligible in the way perception is, and commonly used by the public; 
deduction is more coercive and more effective with those skilled in 
contradicting.11 
Aristotle’s first claim is that deduction (sullogismos12) and induction (epagōgē) are 
the two kinds of dialectical argument (dialektikos logos). He makes the same 
claim—never ambiguously, sometimes incidentally, sometimes prominently—not 
just in the Topics, but at least twenty times across at least seven of his major 
works.13 Whatever exactly induction is, it is one of the two, and only two, kinds of 
                                                
11 Topics, 1.12 105a10-19, Smith’s translation. Aristotle, Topics: Books I and VIII, trans. Robin 
Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For citations of Aristotle, I will provide book and chapter, 
and where appropriate Bekker line numbers and translator. Full citations for the translations will be 
included in the bibliography and on first reference in the footnotes. It should be noted that the 
chapter quoted here is odd. Book 1 is well-structured and Aristotle maintains a running commentary 
on where in an outline of his material he is. Yet Chapter 12 does not have a place in the narrated 
outline. Nor does the content fit neatly. The chapter is also short and succinct, even perfunctory. It 
seems to me Aristotle may have added the chapter later, realizing he needed it for completeness and 
as preparation for forthcoming material. 
12 I follow Smith’s practice of using deduction for sullogismos. For justification, see Smith, notes 
to Prior Analytics, p. 106. 
13 E.g, Prior Analytics, 1.25 42a4; Posterior Analytics, 1.1 71a5; Sophistical Refutations, 1.4 165b27; 
Physics, 8.1 252a25; Nicomachean Ethics, 2.3 1139b28, and Rhetoric, 1.2 1356b1. 
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reasoning, and deduction is the other. In no unambiguous passage anywhere in the 
corpus does Aristotle waver on this. The second important claim is that induction 
is a proceeding from particulars to a universal. Again, this is repeated many times, 
in many different works, in several different contexts.14 Third, Aristotle gives us in 
this chapter one of his most cited examples of an induction. Note that there are only 
two instances, that of a pilot and that of a charioteer. From these Aristotle makes 
the tremendously broad statement that in any field the most knowledgeable person 
is the best in that field. Aristotle could not possibly have thought that these were 
the only two professions in the world or that a complete survey of all professions 
had been made in establishing this generalization. In every unambiguous example 
in the corpus, the particulars subsumed by the generalization are, as here, 
countless. Aristotle never provides an example of induction where the cases are odd 
and even, or north, east, west and south, or any other finite list that could be 
surveyed before making the generalization. Aristotle clearly believes that induction 
is a proceeding to a universal generalization that applies to particulars beyond those 
considered in forming the universal. Fourthly, Aristotle says that of the two forms 
of dialectical reasoning, induction is more persuasive, clearer, and more intelligible 
to laymen. Again, he repeats this throughout the corpus, in several contexts, never 
ambiguously. Thus, only if faced with the most unambiguous and forceful 
statements to the contrary should we abandon the belief that, whatever else it is, for 
                                                
14 E.g., Posterior Analytics, 1.1 71a6-9; Topics, 1.18 108b11; Topics, 8.1 155b34-156a5; Rhetoric, 1.2 
1356b; Rhetoric, 2.25 1402b. 
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Aristotle, induction (1) is different from and a counterpart to deduction, (2) is a 
proceeding from particulars to a universal, (3) results in a universal generalization 
that extends beyond the particulars that went into its formation, and (4) is generally 
easier for people to grasp than deduction. 
Remaining uses of induction in the Topics reinforce these four themes. 
Reinforcing the last, for example, Aristotle suggests that when arguing with others, 
one should use deduction with trained debaters, induction with the common 
crowd, deduction with a mature thinker, induction with a youth, induction to 
embellish a point.15 But even with the best trained debating opponent, induction 
has a crucial role to play. The Topics is a handbook for dialectics, for back-and-
forth, question-and-answer arguing with a skilled opponent. Much of it is a catalog 
of techniques and tactics for getting one’s opponent to agree on one point and then, 
based on that agreement, to a second. A common recommendation is to get 
agreement on the first point by induction and then the second by deduction. For 
example, establish by induction that courage is desirable and use deduction to then 
conclude that cowardice is undesirable, or secure the contrapositive of an intended 
statement by induction, then use modus tollens to establish the intended claim.16 
Aristotle offers about a dozen variations on this pattern, each using induction to 
establish the premise for a subsequent deduction.17 In these examples he reaffirms 
                                                
15 Topics, 8.2 157a19-20; 8.14 164a13; 8.1 157a6. 
16 Topics, 2.8 113b18–25. 
17 Topics, 2.5, 2.8, 2.10, 4.2, 4.3, 8.1. 
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that induction and deduction are complements and shows that induction is the 
more persuasive and can thus form, in dialectic, an effective starting point for 
subsequent deductions by providing deduction’s necessary and universal premises.18 
Passages in the rest of the Topics affirm and repeat the four claims made in the 
early chapter, but they also introduce another aspect of induction, similarity. “The 
study of what is similar [homoiou] is useful for inductive reasoning . . . . because it 
is by induction of particulars on the basis of similars that we claim to bring in 
[epagein] the universal.”19 Aristotle does not say that induction gains its force from 
the number of particulars but from their similarity. What is similarity and how does 
one recognize it? Aristotle says that things are similar “in as far as any attribute they 
possess is the same.”20 Things that are of the same genus, he says,—e.g., man, horse 
and dog, all of which are animals—are easy to compare. Discerning the similarities 
among things in widely separated genera—e.g., absence of waves in the water being 
like the absence of wind in the air—takes more practice. To discern the similarities, 
Aristotle offers little advice other than to look and see, using verbs such as skopein, 
skeptomai, or sunoridein, all of whose primary meaning is to look at carefully. (Nous, 
prominent in discussions of induction to be examined later, is absent here.) What 
makes an induction successful for Aristotle is not the number of particulars but the 
ease with which the similarities can be discerned. The particulars are the raw 
                                                
18 Topics, 8.1. 
19 Topics, 1.18, 108b7–12, my translation. 
20 Topics, 1.17, 108a18, Forster’s translation. 
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material for an induction, but it is the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the 
‘parabolai,’ that distinguish a good inductive reasoner.21 The identification of 
similarities seems, at least in the Topics, not to be primarily a contemplative process 
but a near-perceptual one. As Aristotle said above, induction is easier to grasp ‘in 
the way perception is.’ 
An ‘argument from likeness,’ however, is not, Aristotle explains, the same as 
an ‘argument from induction.’22 An argument from likeness is reasoning from 
similar particulars to other similar particulars without drawing a universal 
generalization. Induction, on the other hand, is reasoning from the similar 
particulars to a universal. Though the grasp of similarity may be perceptual, 
Aristotle does not believe that everyone will necessarily discern similarities the 
same way. For his debating student, he introduces this problem: What is one to do 
if he “has made an induction on the strength of several cases and yet the answerer 
refuses to grant the universal proposition?”23 The problem, Aristotle in effect says, 
may be that the questioner has not fully advanced from an argument by likeness to 
an argument by induction, for it is not enough to list particulars and then 
summarize with “the expression ‘So in all cases of this kind.’”24 It is necessary to 
have one more thing, a universal term to cover all the cases, and if such a term does 
                                                
21 Topics, 8.14 164a16. 
22 Topics, 8.1, 8.8. 
23 Topics, 8.2 157a34, Pickard-Cambridge’s translation. Aristotle, Topica and De sophisticis 
elenchis, trans. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928). 
24 Topics, 8.2 157a24, Forster’s translation. 
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not already exist, “One ought . . . to try oneself to coin a word to cover all things of 
the sort”25 and then to identify the particulars to which it applies (apparently with a 
definition or some other delimiting statement). If this has been done, it is fair to 
place the burden on the opponent to identify a contravening case. If he can, then 
the generalization must be modified accordingly, but if he cannot, if “you formulate 
the proposition [using a newly coined term if necessary] on the strength of many 
cases and he has no objection to bring, you may claim that he shall admit it,”26 and 
proceed in the debate, for a valid argument by induction (an argument that includes 
statement of the universal, anchored by a possibly new term) and not just an 
argument by likeness (an argument from similars to similar) has been made. 
Aristotle’s reference to a connection between induction and the universality 
of a newly coined term suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s earlier-cited 
example. He said that, “if the pilot who has knowledge is the best pilot, and so with 
a charioteer, then generally the person who has knowledge about anything is the 
best.”27 This could be understood in two ways. One is like a syllogism: An X1 who 
has knowledge is the best X1; an X2 who has knowledge is the best X2; therefore, 
any X that has knowledge is the best X. But this is casting the argument into a 
syllogistic framework familiar from the Prior Analytics but unlike the context of the 
Topics. If we read the passage without influence of the Prior Analytics a different 
                                                
25 Topics, 8.2 157a30, Pickard-Cambridge’s translation. 
26 Topics, 8.2 157b31-33, Pickard-Cambridge’s translation 
27 Topics, 1.12 105a10, Smith’s translation. 
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interpretation presents itself,28 an interpretation more closely related to definitions 
and the coining of terms than to syllogisms. On this interpretation, Aristotle is 
simply exploring what makes someone the ‘best’ in a profession and is concluding 
that it is not, for example, one’s ancestry, physical strength, or popularity, but one’s 
knowledge.29 This interpretation is consistent with the charter of the Topics. As 
mentioned, the work is a handbook for dialectical debate. The starting point of 
dialectical debate is not necessarily what is true but what is generally accepted as 
true, and a major task for the debater is to draw out the implications of such 
premises. If such debating were to proceed along Socratic lines, then a core task 
would be to identify the meaning of one’s opponent’s terms. To begin by 
identifying the nature or essence of the subject under discussion and then to work 
out implications would be to proceed first with induction then with deduction as 
Aristotle advises so many times in the Topics. Further supporting this interpretation 
of induction as a tool for identifying essence is the next occurrence of epagōgē after 
the chapter quoted above. In chapter 1.14, in a discussion about the nature of three 
kinds of arguments, Aristotle writes,  
                                                
28 Again, many believe the Topics was largely written before the Prior Analytics. On the 
possibility that the Topics was written before Aristotle developed his doctrine of the syllogism, see 
Forster’s introductory notes in Aristotle, Topics, 268and Smith’s Introduction in Aristotle, Topics, 
xxxiv. 
29 This interpretation is defended and explored in Tsouyopoulus, “Die induktive Methode 
und das Induktionsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie,” 107–14. 
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As for what each of the aforesaid kinds is like, it is not easy to state that 
in definitions about them, and one must try to recognize each of them 
with the familiarity which comes through induction, studying them in 
light of the examples given.30  
A connection between induction and identifying what makes something a kind of 
thing it is runs throughout not just Aristotle’s texts, but the whole subsequent 
history of induction, as we will see. 
After the Topics, the Rhetoric may be considered next.31 Like the Topics, it 
discusses methods of persuasion, and in it induction is treated frequently and 
plainly. Just as the Topics is a catalog of methods for dialectic, one-on-one arguing, 
the Rhetoric is a catalog of methods for public speaking in front of a large group, 
i.e., for arguing a case to an audience.32 Nearly all references to induction in the 
Rhetoric are to the following fact, stated early in the first book and repeated 
frequently and never ambiguously: “Just as in dialectic [covered in the Topics] there 
is on the one hand induction and on the other deduction . . . the situation is similar 
                                                
30 Topics, 1.14 105b25–29, Smith’s translation. 
31 For purposes here, particularly useful material on the Rhetoric appears in the introduction 
and notes to Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and in Keith V. Erickson, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Five 
Centuries of Philological Research (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975). 
32 Rhetoric, 1.1 1354a for Aristotle’s introductory remarks on the comparison of rhetoric and 
dialectic. 
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in rhetoric. . . . I call a rhetorical deduction an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a 
paradigm.”33  
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle calls a paradigm what in the Topics he called 
reasoning from likeness, i.e., reasoning from similars to similar with the universal 
left unstated. Because Aristotle holds that a paradigm is an induction in all but the 
way it is articulated, nearly everything he says about paradigm holds true also for 
induction. Unsurprisingly then, all the major points made about induction in the 
Topics are made again in the Rhetoric about paradigms.  
Occasionally in the Rhetoric, Aristotle also discusses induction directly, and at 
Rhetoric 2.23, he gives us the only surviving passage in the whole corpus in which 
he unambiguously presents several examples in a row of what he considers to be 
induction. Each includes a universal statement, and two to six particulars. The first 
is that all women can discern the truth about a child’s paternity, as happened in 
four particular cases Aristotle describes. The second example is that one should not 
entrust any property to someone who has mishandled horses and ships. The third is 
that all men honor the wise, no matter what their other shortcomings. The Parians 
honor the wise Archilochus though he was nasty, the Chians honor the wise but 
non-citizen Homer, the Mytilenaeans honor the wise Sappho though a woman, the 
Lacedaemonians the unschooled Chilon, and the Lampsacenes Anaxogoras though 
                                                
33 Rhetoric, 1.2 1356b1. Kennedy’s translation, but with deduction instead of his syllogism, for the 
reasons offered by Smith. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse . Note that Kennedy 
and I use paradigm for paradeigma instead of the more common Latin-derived example.  
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he was a foreigner. Fourthly, all people whose rulers are philosophers thrive, as 
Athenians did under Solon, Lacedaemonians under Lycurgus, and Thebes under 
its philosopher-rulers. As with the one example from the Topics it is inconceivable 
that Aristotle thought these inductions were legitimate only because he, or 
someone he trusted, had or even could survey all the women who spoke in 
paternity cases, all irresponsible custodians, all wise men honored, or all the cities 
in the world with philosopher-rulers. He never adds to his list of particulars a 
phrase such as ‘and so on in all cases of the kind.’ As he said above, such a 
statement adds nothing, for determining what particulars are ‘of the kind’ is the 
very question at issue. Yet he gives all indications that he believes these and every 
other inductively established universal is a generalization valid for cases beyond the 
particulars that went into the universal’s development. He cannot here believe that 
a valid induction applies only to the particulars enumerated. 
The Rhetoric introduces two further important statements about induction, 
both in Rhetoric 2.20. The first is that “induction is the beginning [archē].”34 
Throughout the corpus Aristotle usually lists induction first: ‘induction and 
deduction’ instead of ‘deduction and induction.’ In the Topics, Aristotle had said 
induction was a good place to begin a line of subsequently deductive arguments, 
but he did not describe induction as the foundation on which all reasoning rests. 
Here—depending what he means by archē—he may be saying just that. This theme 
                                                
34 Rhetoric, 2.20 1393a27, Kennedy’s translation. 
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that induction is or provides a beginning will be elaborated in other works. The 
second additional statement is a connection Aristotle draws between induction and 
Socrates. In the Topics, Aristotle had said that the mark of a good inductive reasoner 
was one skilled at drawing comparisons, ‘parabolai,’ between particulars. In the 
Rhetoric, he says that use of ‘parabolai’ was Socrates’ distinctive method. This 
association with Socrates deserves immediate attention.35 
Metaphysics Books 13 (M) and 14 (N): Socratic Induction 
The only reference to induction in the related books 13(M) and 14(N) of the 
Metaphysics is this:  
Socrates was occupying himself with the excellences of character, and in 
connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal 
definition. . . . It was with good reason that he should be seeking the 
essence, for he was seeking to argue deductively and the beginning 
[archē] of deductive arguments is the essence. . . . For two things may be 
fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive reasoning and universal definition, 
both of which are concerned with the starting point of science [archēn 
epistēmēs].36 
                                                
35 A third interesting observation about Aristotelian induction in the Rhetoric is that Aristotle 
seems to leave open the possibility of an induction based on only one instance when he uses the 
phrase “induction from what is like, whether one thing or more.” (2.25 1042b16, Kennedy’s 
translation). He implies the same at Sophistical Refutations, 15. Cicero and Thomas Reid, the 
nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher, also thought inductions from only one instance were 
possible. 
36 13.4 1078b24-30. Ross’s translation, slightly modified. Cf. a similar passage in Nicomachean 
Ethics, 6.3 1139b26–33. 
 32 
Aristotle says that Socrates realized that to successfully argue deductively one 
needed first principles that identified the essential nature of the subjects under 
discussion and that these first principles needed to be established by some means 
other than deduction. For this Socrates introduced the method of induction. 
Unfortunately, in none of the surviving Platonic dialogues does Socrates use the 
word epagōgē, so we are left to determine, of the many things Socrates did, which 
were the ones that Aristotle considered epagōgē . 
Scholars have differed over which Socratic discussion was an archetype of 
Socratic induction,37 but I believe it is easy to find instances of what Aristotle was 
referring to if we consider the following. First, by my methodological assumption, 
Aristotle always means the same thing by induction unless he tells us otherwise or 
we are unavoidably forced to conclude otherwise. Second, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
gave us the several examples described above of what he unambiguously considered 
cases of induction. By these two considerations, whatever Aristotle considers 
instances of Socratic induction must be similar to those examples in the Rhetoric. 
Third, Aristotle specifically says that Socrates used induction when investigating 
‘excellences of character.’ Finally, we will recall that a paradigm is a kind of 
induction (one with the universal left unstated). Thus, when Aristotle gives us a 
                                                
37 Hamlyn, “Aristotelian Epagoge,” 174, focuses on the sequence in the Meno where the slave 
boy comes to know how to double the size of the square, but McKirahan, “Aristotelian Epagoge in 
Prior Analytics 2.21 and Posterior Analytics 1.1,” 4, rightly observes that it is not clear that the method 
Socrates there uses is what Aristotle was referring to. 
 33 
characteristic example of a Socratic paradigm, he is also giving us a characteristic 
example of Socratic induction, and his example of Socratic paradigm is this:  
if someone were to say that officials should not be chosen by lot (for that 
would be as if someone chose athletes randomly—not those able to 
contest, but those on whom the lot fell); or [as if] choosing by lot any one 
of the sailors to act as pilot rather than the one who knew how.38 
Although this precise example does not survive in our descriptions of Socratic 
dialogue, it is similar to so many Socratic passages it is difficult to doubt what 
Aristotle had in mind. Xenophon reports, for example, “He [Socrates] dwelt on the 
folly of appointing state officers by ballot, a principle which, he said, no one would 
care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player or in any similar case.”39 By simply 
expressing the unstated universal, ‘All professionals should be chosen by 
competence instead of by lot,’ this paradigmatic argument becomes an inductive 
one and we have what Aristotle considered Socratic induction. Note how similar 
this is to Aristotle’s example with which we began, ‘if the pilot who has knowledge 
is the best pilot, and so with a charioteer, then generally the person who has 
knowledge about anything is the best.’ When Aristotle credits Socrates with 
introducing epagōgē, we do not have to suppose that Aristotle is using the concept 
differently than he does in his own writings.  
                                                
38 Rhetoric, 2.20 1393b, Kennedy’s translation and bracketed emendation. 
39 Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans. Henry Graham Dakyns (1897), 1.2.9. 
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Socratic induction has received little scholarly attention.40 I believe the most 
insightful understanding remains a short comment by Gregory Vlastos made in 1956 
and expanded upon in 1991.41 Vlastos uses Ion 540b-d to make his case. In that 
passage, Socrates argues as follows (quoting Vlastos’s paraphrase): 
(1) The pilot is the one who knows best what should be said to the crew 
of a storm-tossed ship. 
(2) The doctor is the one who knows best what should be said to the 
sick. 
(3) The cowherd is the one who knows best what should be done to 
calm angry cattle. 
(4) The expert in wool is the one who knows best what should be said to 
women working wool. 
(5) The military expert is the one who knows best what the general 
should say to his troops.42 
The universal conclusion is that the master of any craft “is the one who knows best 
matters falling within its subject-matter.”43 But on what authority does the 
universal statement rest? Vlastos observes that this is not a case of inferential 
                                                
40 There is a chapter on the topic in Richard Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialogue (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), and some material in Gerasimos Santas, Socrates, Philosophy in Plato’s 
Early Dialogues (London and Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1979), and Norman Gulley, The 
Philosophy of Socrates (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1968). Mark L. 
McPherran has shared with me his unpublished Mark L. McPherran, “Socratic Epagoge and 
Socratic Induction,” (2004), which he has presented at a few regional workshops. See also Hamlyn 
and McKirahan cited above. 
41 Gregory Vlastos, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Protagoras (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1956), xxix, n. 18. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 267–68. 
42 Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 267–68. 
43 Ibid., 268 
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induction as commonly understood today. It is not the case that all crafts have been 
surveyed, nor is it the case that some craft could possibly be found in which experts 
are not the ones who know best. There is no Humean fear that because they have 
not all been surveyed the next craft observed could refute the previously established 
universal conclusion. For the truth of the conclusion is built into the very meaning 
of what it is to be a ‘master.’ As Vlastos says, the instances in a Socratic induction 
do not prove the universal conclusion; they exhibit its meaning.44 When Socrates 
marshals a list of people demonstrating such ‘excellences of character’ as wisdom, 
virtue, or confidence,45 when he draws his Socratic comparisons, his parallel cases, 
his ‘parabolai,’ it is to find the essential commonality in all cases of wisdom or 
courage or confidence; it is not primarily to infer a propositional conclusion. When 
Aristotle said that ‘two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive 
reasoning and universal definition,’ he was not referring to unrelated inventions but 
to two aspects of the same process. This interpretation of Socratic induction by 
Vlastos is the same as the interpretation I proposed above for Aristotelian 
induction. By this interpretation, induction is a tool for making conceptual 
generalizations by identifying the essential nature of things. 
                                                
44 Ibid. Italics in Vlatos’s statement.  
45 Euthydemus, 279d–280a; Republic, I 352e–353e; Protagoras, 350a–351a. 
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The Rest of the Corpus, Except for the Analytics 
If the only thing you knew about Aristotelian induction was what you read in 
the Topics and the Rhetoric—perhaps because by the vagaries of history the other 
works were lost, inaccessible, banned, untranslated, incomplete, unstudied, 
untaught, or simply uninteresting—and if you read in the Metaphysics or in another 
ancient, non-Aristotelian source that the inductive method was introduced by 
Socrates, you would reasonably conclude that Aristotelian and Socratic induction 
were the same thing, a process involved in identifying essences and definitions. You 
would know that Aristotle thought induction and deduction were two separate 
kinds of reasoning, induction coming first and producing the universal 
generalizations on which deduction depends. You would understand that 
Aristotelian induction goes beyond the observed particulars that went into the 
formation of the inductive generalization, and which therefore enables universal 
statements about the unobserved. You would have no reason to think that Aristotle 
associated induction with so many things scholars later connected to Aristotelian 
induction. You would have no reason to think that Aristotle considered a valid 
induction to be a complete enumeration, that he thought an inductively formed 
generalization applied only to the observed particulars, or that he considered 
induction a form of deduction or deduction a form of induction; you would not 
associate induction with nous, with the difference between what is prior by nature 
and what is prior to us, with the difference between what is better known by nature 
and what is better known to us, or with the difference between proving the fact and 
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proving the reasoned fact. You would also have read nearly forty percent of the 
now-known references that Aristotle made to induction, and the least ambiguous 
ones at that.  
If you then gained access to and read Metaphysics, Physics, Nicomachean Ethics, 
Parts of Animals, indeed all the rest of the surviving Aristotelian corpus except the 
Prior and Posterior Analytics, you would find many references to induction that 
would confirm and reinforce what you had already learned about Aristotelian 
induction. In the Metaphysics and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle provides more 
examples of the Socratic arguments that he considers inductions, one regarding the 
deceiving, limping man46 and one regarding the Socratic search for the essence of 
aretē.47 In Parts of Animals, he repeats his claim that it was Socrates who introduced 
the method of identifying essences and definitions.48 In none of these does Aristotle 
suggest that his understanding of induction is any different from Socrates.’ Aristotle 
also repeats his claim that induction and deduction are the two kinds of reasoning,49 
that induction is the starting point from which subsequent deductions proceed,50 
and that induction is like perception.51 These are all consistent with Aristotle’s 
treatment of induction in Topics and Rhetoric. 
                                                
46 Metaphysics, 5.29 1025a2–13, referring to Socrates’ argument in Hippias Minor, 365–75. 
47 Eudemian Ethics, 1219a, referring to Socrates’ argument in the Republic, 353. 
48 Parts of Animals, 1.1 642a24–30. 
49 Sophistical Refutations, 1.4 165b28; Physics, 8.1 251a25. 
50 Sophistical Refutations 1.15 174a36; Nicomachean Ethics, 6.3 1139b26–30. 
51 Metaphysics 6.1 1025b14 and 11.7 1064a8; Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 1098b3. 
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Several occurrences of induction in the Physics, Metaphysics, and Eudemian 
Ethics add striking support to the theory that Aristotelian induction is a tool for 
identifying essences. The passages follow a pattern. Aristotle first makes a universal 
statement. He then says, ‘This is clear from induction, for . . . ’ ‘dēlon ek tēs 
epagōgē, gar . . .’ He then makes another universal statement, usually one 
indicating the essential reason for believing the first. He then proceeds with a list of 
illustrative examples. Translators and commentators typically translate ‘dēlon ek tēs 
epagōgē’ as ‘This is clear from a survey of examples,’ but that is not what Aristotle 
says, and what immediately follows is not a survey of examples, but a universal 
statement. The examples come later. A skeletal instance appears in Eudemian 
Ethics: 
Let it be assumed as to Goodness [aretē] that it is the best disposition or 
state or faculty of each class of things that have some use or work. This 
is clear from induction, for we posit this in all cases: for instance, there 
is goodness that belongs to a coat, for a coat has a particular function and 
use, and the best state of a coat is its goodness; and similarly with a ship 
and a house and the rest.52 
A universal statement is made, followed by ‘this is clear from induction,’ followed 
by another universal statement (a simple one in this case), followed then by the 
introduction of illustrative examples. Note that Aristotle is not claiming to have 
made a complete enumeration. He is not saying that he has surveyed examples of 
                                                
52 Eudemian Ethics, 1 1218b36–1219a3. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. H. Rackham 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1938). 
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aretē and found that every one was such a disposition, state, or faculty, and that 
therefore it is reasonable to expect that others, unsurveyed, would be the same. 
Rather Aristotle means that the very essence of aretē is such a disposition, state, or 
faculty. He is not leaving open the possibility that an unsurveyed instance of aretē 
would be discovered that is otherwise. The Physics offers an instance of the pattern 
in which the second universal is quite lengthy: 
Nor again is there anything intermediate between that which undergoes 
and that which causes alteration: this is clear from induction: for in 
every case we find the respective extremities of that which causes and 
that which undergoes alteration are adjacent.53 
A 178-word explanation follows justifying Aristotle’s identification of the second 
universal statement as the essential cause of the first. Only then are the examples 
given: 
Thus the air is continuous with that which causes the alteration, and the 
body that undergoes alteration is continuous with the air. Again, the 
colour is continuous with the light and the light with the sight. And the 
same is true of hearing and smelling: for the primary movent in respect 
to the moved is the air. Similarly, in the case of tasting, the flavour is 
adjacent to the sense of taste.54 
                                                
53 Physics, 7.2, 244b2–5. Rackham’s translation. Aristotle, “Physics,” in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 218–397. ‘This is clear from 
induction’ for Hardie and Gaye’s ‘this can be proved by induction’ for Aristotle’s ‘dēlon ek tēs 
epagōgē.’ 
54 Physics, 7.2, 245a5–10. Rackham’s translation. 
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In Metaphysics 10.3 and 10.4, Aristotle explores the nature of contrariety and 
concludes that contrariety is a kind of difference, specifically the maximum 
difference at two ends of a continuum. “This is clear from induction.”55 This 
conclusion is not an inference drawn from surveying all instances of contraries or 
even a finite number of categories of contraries and checking whether all or most 
confirm the hypothesis that all contraries are instances of maximum difference. 
Rather this is the identification of what it means for something to be a contrary. In 
Metaphysics 6.1 and again at 11.7, Aristotle describes how every field of study uses 
induction to delimit the genus that forms the subject of that discipline’s study. Such 
induction, he says, is not a demonstration (apodeixis) of the genus’s substance 
(ousia) or essence (ti estin) but a different manner of exhibiting it.56 In Metaphysics 
9.6, Aristotle leaves open the possibility that induction may make clear (dēlon) what 
something is, even if it is difficult or impossible to articulate a definition. For 
example, what we mean by potentiality57 is clear from an induction of particular 
                                                
55 Metaphysics 10.3 1054b33; 10.4 1055a6. 
56 Metaphysics, 6.1 1025b15 and 11.7 1064a9. ‘Such induction’ in the first passage does not refer to 
the induction across several disciplines, but the induction involved with identifying the essence of 
the discipline’s field of study. Translators and commentators often miss this and thus find Aristotle’s 
use of epagōgē here confusing. At 1025b16, Tredennick translated epagōgē as ‘method of approach,’ 
destroying Aristotle’s point. Ross kept ‘induction’ but then admitted he did not know how to 
interpret the passage. W. D. Ross, “Commentary,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1924), 1:351–2. Note also that Aristotle says induction ‘exhibits’ the essence. Vlastos 
said the same about Socratic induction. 
57 When Aristotle here says ‘Our meaning is clear,’ he is referring to the meaning of the word 
potentiality, not the general meaning of what he has been saying. 
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instances—sleeping as opposed to being awake, having one’s eyes shut as opposed to 
seeing, the material as opposed to what is made from the material—but it is not 
easy to define potentiality. These and other instances of Aristotle’s phrase ‘clear from 
induction’ in the Metaphysics, Physics and Eudemian Ethics reinforce the view of 
Aristotelian induction earlier found in the Topics and Rhetoric—that it is not a 
method of inference from complete enumeration. It is primarily a tool for 
identifying the essence of something. 
The works so far surveyed—each with its own fortuna in antiquity and 
since— account for about seventy percent of all the references to induction in the 
surviving Aristotelian corpus. They all suggest that Aristotle held a view of 
induction that, though maybe frustratingly incomplete, was consistent on several 
important issues, such as whether inductively achieved results extend to 
unobserved instances, whether valid inductions must be fully enumerative, 
whether induction is a kind of deduction, and in general whether his induction was 
significantly different from the induction Socrates introduced as part of his project 
to identify universal essences. Two works remain, the two usually most discussed 
in modern discussions of Aristotelian induction, the Prior and the Posterior 
Analytics. Let us consider the Posterior first. 
Posterior Analytics 
If one approaches the Posterior Analytics from the Topics, Rhetoric, and other 
works I have surveyed, rather than from the Prior Analytics, one could get the 
impression that the Posterior Analytics is all about induction. Aristotle begins by 
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again saying that deduction and induction are the two kinds of reasoning, but adds 
that the starting point of knowledge remains an open issue. Since all learning 
proceeds from pre-existing knowledge, how does one begin? In the second and 
third chapters, Aristotle rejects two theories, the theory that all claims to 
knowledge are false because of an infinite regress and the theory that all claims to 
knowledge are true because they are circularly reinforcing. He insists there must be 
some starting point, some hierarchy. In the next several chapters (4 to 12) he 
describes that hierarchy: By some process, one comes to know primary and 
universal principles, archai. These archai are true not just accidentally, but by the 
essential nature of the subject matter.58 These archai can form (though not all do) 
the premises of demonstrative deductions. By suitable arrangement of these 
demonstrations, one comes to know not just scientific facts but also the reasons 
why those facts are true (chapters 13 and 14). Several things can go wrong in these 
demonstrations (chapters 15 to 17), the most severe of which would be the loss of the 
senses (chapter 18). It is at this point that we get the most concentrated use of the 
word induction (epagōgē) in the whole Aristotelian corpus—six occurrences, over six 
percent of the corpus’s total, in a mere twelve lines.59 
The twelve lines are fairly unambiguous. Aristotle says that it is impossible to 
obtain universals without induction, that induction proceeds from particulars, that 
                                                
58 We will see later that it is from this passage in the Posterior Analytics, chapter 1.4, that 
Francis Bacon says he develops his thinking on the nature of induction. 
59 Posterior Analytics, 1.8 81a38–81b9. 
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particulars are apprehended by sense-perception, and so if one were to have no 
sense-perception, one could not grasp universals. This is consistent with all we 
have seen so far.  
What is more curious is why Aristotle invokes induction here at all. Except at 
the very beginning of the work, where Aristotle contrasts deduction and induction 
as the two kinds of knowledge, epagōgē in the Posterior Analytics seems to appear out 
of nowhere. It is never defined or described. It is always introduced to explicate 
some other subject, presumably one less clear to the audience than epagōgē. The 
context always suggests that Aristotle’s listener has the concept ready at hand. We 
must remind ourselves that the Posterior Analytics may be a collection of Aristotle’s 
lecture notes (or drafts to be filled in later), not a completed essay. It is likely that 
Aristotle would have been using epagōgē throughout the lecture whose notes we are 
reading. The term made fleeting appearances in chapter 12 and 13 in the explication 
of other subjects, and now in chapter 18, it is used to explain the dependency of all 
knowledge ultimately on sense-perception. It is possible that Aristotle would have 
thought of the Posterior Analytics as a lecture fundamentally about induction, that 
is, about obtaining archai from sense-perception. Book 1 introduces the fact that 
knowledge cannot be all deductive, for deductions need starting points. The bulk of 
the book explores aspects of demonstration, including features of deductions that 
follow from features of properly formed premises, or fail to follow if premises are 
not properly formed. Book 2 explores how to form these universal premises and 
their constituent universal concepts. Book 2 is more commonly read as being about 
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definitions and essential natures. But if Aristotle and his students understand 
definitions and essential natures to be the subject matter of epagōgē, Aristotle would 
have felt free to use the term whenever he needed to refer to the whole project 
under discussion. This would explain why the term pops up in the way it does 
throughout the Posterior Analytics. 
The second book is an extended treatment of the relations between 
demonstration, definition, essence, and causes. It ends with the frequently cited 
chapter 19, a chapter that directly recalls issues from the very beginning of the work 
regarding the ultimate starting points of knowledge. In this final chapter, Aristotle 
says that universal knowledge is not innate but is developed from sense-perception.  
Thus from perception there comes memory . . . and from memory 
(when it occurs often in connection with the same thing) experience; for 
memories which are many in number form a single experience. And 
from experience, or from all the universal which has come to rest in the 
soul . . . there comes a principle of skill or of understanding.60  
As he did in Book 1, chapter 18, he brings in the word induction as if it is what he has 
been discussing all along. “Thus it is plain that we must get to know the primitives 
by induction; for this is the way in which perception instils universals.”61 Except 
for one incidental use in chapter 3, this one mention at the very end of the work is 
                                                
60 Posterior Analytics, 2.19 100a3–9. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 
Second ed., Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
61 Posterior Analytics, 100b2–3, Barnes’ translation, second ed. 
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the only use of epagōgē in the second book. Again, Aristotle uses the term as if his 
reader, or listener, already knows what it means. 
A possible reference to induction in book 2, however, has the potential to 
confute the claim that induction is a process for identifying essence. In chapter 7, 
after surveying potential problems in identifying the essence and definition of 
something, Aristotle asks, “Then how will a definer prove the essence of something 
or what it is?”62 Aristotle says it cannot be by deduction and then seems to exclude 
induction as well. He writes, 
nor, as in an induction, will he show by way of the particulars, which 
are plain, that everything is thus-and-so inasmuch as nothing is 
otherwise (for an induction does not prove what a thing is, but rather 
that it is or is not).63 
This seems to directly and decisively contradict on two accounts the interpretation 
I have been proposing. First, Aristotle seems to equate induction with complete 
enumeration, an equation I have argued he elsewhere repeatedly and 
unambiguously rejects. Second, Aristotle seems to say that induction is not a 
process for identifying the essential nature of something. Recall, however, that by 
my methodological assumption, the noun epagōgē is to receive preference over forms 
of the verb epagein, a verb with many non-technical uses. That methodological 
maxim resolves the apparent contradiction here. Contrary to the impression left by 
                                                
62 Posterior Analytics, 2.5 92a34–5, Barnes’ translation, second ed. 
63 Posterior Analytics, 2.7 92b1, Barnes’ translation, second ed. 
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many translations, Aristotle does not in fact in this passage use epagōgē (induction), 
but the present participle epagōn (inducing). With this in mind, and considering the 
overall context of the passage, we can see that Aristotle intends to say the following: 
We cannot prove a particular attribute to be essential by deduction; nor can we 
prove it by bringing in (‘epagōn’) all instances and finding the attribute to be true of 
each, for that merely indicates that the attribute is held in common, not that it is 
essential. In 2.7, Aristotle does not say that induction (epagōgē) requires complete 
enumeration. 
To reinforce this interpretation of 2.7, and to provide background for the 
coming discussion of Prior Analytics, consider an earlier chapter in the Posterior 
Analytics, chapter 1.5. Here Aristotle gives one of his rare, maybe unique, examples 
of complete enumeration. He says that knowing something to be true of scalene, 
isosceles, and equilateral triangles is not sufficient for knowing it to be true of 
triangles qua triangles. It may be known of each triangle taken singly, but not of 
triangles “primitively and universally,”64 not “of triangles as trianlges.”65 By the 
common understanding of Aristotelian induction as complete enumeration this 
should be the ideal case. But Aristotle makes no mention here of epagōgē and 
positively rejects the possibility of proving that a characteristic is primarily and 
universally true of a kind of thing merely by finding it to be true of all kinds of 
                                                
64 Posterior Analytics, 1.5 74a13, Barnes’ translation, second ed. 
65 Posterior Analytics, 1.5 74a31, Barnes’ translation, second ed. 
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instances. This passage challenges the conventional interpretation of the chapter we 
will now examine. 
Prior Analytics 
In our survey of Aristotle’s use of epagōgē, the Prior Analytics is the only 
remaining work to consider. Epagōgē appears there twelve times. Four add nothing 
new and are consistent with everything discussed so far. The other eight appear in 
book 2, chapter 23. This chapter regularly is, and often has been since late antiquity, 
considered the most central and important treatment of induction in the 
Aristotelian corpus. In summaries of Aristotelian induction, it is frequently the 
only passage cited. If there is thought to be one chapter that presents Aristotle’s 
definitive statement on induction, this is it. Unfortunately, when treated in 
isolation it can create an impression of Aristotelian induction completely at odds 
with what I have presented so far. Also unfortunately, the Prior Analytics, like the 
Posterior Analytics, is cryptic, obscure, and often ambiguous. As I said I would at 
the beginning, I have left the most difficult passage for last. I have also left for last 
the passage for which I have an unconventional and revisionist interpretation. If the 
conventional interpretation is correct then either all I have argued for up to now is 
refuted or Aristotle held two conflicting views of induction. If my revisionist 
interpretation is correct, then the eight uses of epagōgē in Prior Analytics 2.23 are 
consistent with the other eighty-eight in the known corpus. 
The troublesome chapter appears near the end of the Prior Analytics, after 
Aristotle has presented an extended treatment of the syllogism and just finished a 
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discussion on conversion. In five short concluding chapters he relates other types of 
argument, such as induction and paradigm, to what has preceded. Aristotle begins, 
“It is evident, then, how terms are related with respect to conversions and with 
respect to being preferable or more to be avoided.”66 Aristotle continues, “But now, 
it should be explained that not only dialectical and demonstrative deductions come 
about through the figures previously mentioned, but also rhetorical ones, and 
absolutely any form of conviction whatever, arising from whatever discipline.”67 
Aristotle then repeats a claim made so many other times, “For we have conviction 
about anything either through deduction or from induction.”68 This concludes 
what is regularly treated as the first paragraph of the chapter. 
The next few sentences are the problem. Let me present the conventional 
interpretation first. The paragraph begins, “Induction, then—that is, a deduction 
from induction—is deducing one extreme to belong to the middle through the 
other extreme.”69 Aristotle presents this example:  
    (1) Man, horse, and mule are long-lived. 
    (2) Man, horse, and mule are bileless. 
By conversion of (2): (3) Bileless animals are man, horse, and mule. 
By (1) and (3):  (4) Bileless animals are long-lived.  
                                                
66 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b10–13, Smith’s translation. 
67 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b10–13, Smith’s translation. 
68 Prior Analytics, 68b13-14, Smith’s translation. 
69 Prior Analytics, 68b15–16, Smith’s translation. This is probably the most quoted passage on 
induction from Aristotle. 
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Aristotle is drawing a universal conclusion by deducing one extreme (long-lived) to 
belong to the middle (bileless) by means of the other extreme (particular types of 
animals). This is a simple syllogism—all C is A, all B is C, therefore all B is A, with 
C being the union of the types man, horse, and mule. The syllogism is valid as long 
as the conversion from (2) to (3) is valid, and that conversion is valid if the only 
bileless animals in the world are men, horses, and mules. Aristotle asks us to 
presume this is true for purposes of the illustration. The paragraph ends, “One 
must understand C as composed of every one of the particulars: for induction is 
through them all.”70 Aristotle is therefore saying that the only valid induction is a 
complete enumeration, and induction is ultimately just a kind of deduction. The 
conventional interpretation of this paragraph in Prior Analytics 2.23 then is that an 
inductive argument, if valid, can be reduced to a deductive one. 
The claim, however, that induction is a process of complete enumeration and 
is therefore a kind of deduction is an extraordinary one. Smith called it 
“surprising.”71 Ross called it “strange,” and chalked it up to Aristotle being 
overcome with “enthusiasm for his new-found discovery of the syllogism.”72 The 
claim is completely out of character with everything we have encountered so far in 
our survey of Aristotelian induction. Every example of induction Aristotle has 
given has been for a group of particulars that could not possibly be fully 
                                                
70 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b29, Smith’s translation. 
71 Smith, “Notes,” 220. 
72 Ross, “Commentary,” 50, 
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enumerated. All the way up to this very chapter (and continuing immediately after 
it), he has consistently, repeatedly, and unambiguously stated that there are two 
separate ways of acquiring knowledge, induction and deduction. He has repeatedly 
indicated that of the two, induction is more fundamental. If one depends on the 
other in some way, it is deduction that depends on induction, not vice versa. Even 
within the paragraph itself, the conventional interpretation is strained. Aristotle 
knew that other animals lack bile. In On the Parts of Animals, he lists several and 
gives no indication that the list is even numerable.73 If Aristotle had wanted to 
indicate that induction is ultimately just complete enumeration, why did he not 
choose an example of particulars that could plainly be completely enumerated, such 
as odd and even numbers or equilateral, scalene, and isosceles triangles? Read in 
isolation, this and other internal difficulties might be dismissible (maybe for 
example, he did believe the list of bileless kinds of animals was surveyable), but 
when the paragraph is considered in the full context of Aristotle’s other comments 
on induction, it seems best to suspect that another interpretation may be possible. 
An alternate interpretation can be found by reading the chapter from the 
outside in rather than from the inside out. Let me explain. The passage has three 
identifiable sections normally translated as three paragraphs, the first of which 
(68b8–b14) I quoted in full above and the second of which (68b15–29) is the 
substantive core whose conventional interpretation I summarized. The third 
                                                
73 On the Parts of Animals, 4.2 676a15-677b11, as Hintikka, “Aristotelian Induction,” 427 notes. 
Mention is made of the deer, camel, mouse, and dolphin, among others. 
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paragraph (68b30–38) is a concluding summary. The first and last paragraphs are 
typically read in light of the middle core. But instead, imagine that the middle 
paragraph has been lost and that we have to reconstruct it based on the surrounding 
sentences. What would we conclude it must have said? 
The first paragraph says that all knowledge comes to be such by means of the 
syllogistic figures that have been presented. The paragraph ends with the familiar 
statement, “For we have conviction about anything either through deduction or 
from induction.”74 There is no sign that a new understanding is to follow. Now 
skip the second paragraph, pretending its existence is known but its contents lost. 
The third paragraph begins, “This is the sort of deduction that is possible of a 
primary and unmiddled premise.”75 What did we miss? It sounds as if the second 
paragraph must have presented an example of something Aristotle is calling the 
‘deduction of an unmiddled premise.’ But what is that? The text continues, “for the 
deduction of those premises of which there is a middle term is by means of the 
middle term; but the deduction of those of which there is not a middle term is by 
means of induction.”76 So there are two kinds of deductions, deductions of middled 
premises and deductions of unmiddled premises. In the first, it appears, the premise 
is the conclusion of some syllogistic figure that has in it a middle term. In the 
second, the premise is also the conclusion of some syllogistic figure, but the role 
                                                
74 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b13-4, Smith’s translation. 
75 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b30–1, Smith’s translation. 
76 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b31–2, Smith’s translation. 
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earlier played by a middle term is now played by an induction. Let us call the first a 
deduction-from-a-middle and the second a deduction-from-induction. That second 
paragraph must have given an example of a deduction-from-induction, whatever 
that is, instead of the more familiar deduction-from-a-middle, which has been the 
subject of the previous chapters. 
Next comes a sentence I will skip and return to in a moment. It is followed by 
the final sentence of the chapter: “By nature, then, the deduction through the 
middle term is prior and more familiar, but the deduction through induction is 
clearer to us.”77 Here again, Aristotle is drawing a distinction between what I have 
called deduction-from-a-middle and deduction-from-induction. Now that 
intervening, penultimate, sentence is odd, for it presents a different dichotomy. All 
the rest of this paragraph concerns the dichotomy between deduction-from-a-
middle and deduction-from-induction, but that penultimate sentence presents a 
dichotomy between deduction and induction: “And in a way, induction is the 
opposite of deduction, for deduction proves the first extreme to belong to the third 
term through the middle, while induction proves the first extreme to belong to the 
middle through the third.”78 Ignore for now Aristotle’s description of the 
difference, with its ‘first extreme,’ ‘third term,’ and so on, and simply note that 
Aristotle contrasts deduction and induction while the surrounding sentences 
contrast deduction-from-a-middle and deduction-from-induction. How are we to 
                                                
77 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b36–8, Smith’s translation. 
78 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b33–6, Smith’s translation. 
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understand the discrepancy? Recall that the Prior Analytics is probably a lecturer’s 
notes or other outline material and not a polished treatise. I propose that Aristotle is 
here using a lecturer’s shorthand. By ‘deduction’ he means deduction-from-a-
middle (given what has come before in the Prior Analytics, interchanging 
‘deduction-from-a-middle’ and ‘deduction-from-deduction’ would be unsurprising) 
and by ‘induction’ here he means deduction-from-induction. Thus this third 
paragraph, even with the jarring name change in the center sentence, is about the 
contrast between deduction-from-a-middle and deduction-from-induction. Let us 
now return to the chapter’s central paragraph and see if we find there what our 
analysis of the outer paragraphs indicates should be there. 
Based on the report in the third, we now expect the second paragraph to have 
presented an example of a deduction-from-induction, that is, an example that, as the 
third paragraph describes it, ‘proves the first extreme to belong to the middle 
through the third.’ We now drop our pretense about losing the second paragraph 
and look at it. It begins,  “. . . a deduction from induction—is deducing one 
extreme to belong to the middle through the other extreme.”79 This is almost 
verbatim what the third paragraph said the second was about. There is, however, 
one small difference, the words I left out at the sentence’s very beginning. The first 
sentence of the central paragraph actually reads, “Induction then—that is, a 
deduction from induction— is deducing one extreme to belong to the middle 
                                                
79 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b15–16, Smith’s translation; “deduction from induction” is “ho ek 
epagōgēs sullogismos,” literally, “a from-induction deduction.” 
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through the other extreme.”80 Commentators have struggled with those first four 
words. It seems that Aristotle is saying that ‘induction’ is actually shorthand for the 
more precise ‘deduction from induction.’ But does he mean this shorthand to apply 
to the whole corpus, to everything else he has said about induction? Does he mean 
that the other eighty-eight instances of epagōgē we have surveyed are really to be 
understood as ‘deduction from induction’? I do not think so. I propose that the 
shorthand applies only to the few sentences that follow, including the one in the 
third paragraph where we have already seen this very shorthand. If epagōgē here is 
meant literally and not as shorthand, then without warning, Aristotle has proposed 
a new understanding of induction, inconsistent with the rest of the corpus and 
inconsistent even with the immediately preceding sentence. 
But is not the example that then follows an example of complete 
enumeration? Doesn’t the example that follows confirm the literal reading? Isn’t 
the example an exhibition of how an induction is turned into a deduction? I suggest 
not,81 and propose the chapter’s second paragraph should be understood in the 
following way. 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
81 Few agree with me on this. In 1850, William Whewell did. William Whewell, “Criticism of 
Aristotle’s Account of Induction,” in William Whewell’s Theory of Scientific Method, ed. Robert E. 
Butts (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 311-21. It appears that he was ignored 
on this, but a few Aristotle scholars have recently begun to entertain the possibility. Tsouyopoulus, 
“Die induktive Methode und das Induktionsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie,” 107–14; 
Engberg-Pedersen, “More on Aristotelian Epagoge,” 311–4; Hintikka, “Aristotelian Induction,” 427; 
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From the opening of the paragraph and from what Aristotle said in the 
preceding, introductory paragraph we know he wants to exhibit how a deduction-
from-induction “comes about through the figures previously mentioned,”82 that is, 
through the syllogistic figures. His tool for doing so will be conversion, the subject 
of discussion in the preceding chapter and the subject Aristotle mentioned right at 
the beginning of this one. His subject for the chapter’s middle paragraph, then, is 
how conversion is used to effect a deduction-from-induction. Aristotle will first 
present the relevant syllogistic figure using a simple example, an example in which 
the conversion is justified by a method other than induction, in this case by 
surveying one or a few particulars or kinds of particulars. He will then expand the 
example by replacing a conversion justified by survey with a conversion justified by 
induction. He will spend the bulk of the paragraph setting up the simple example 
and discussing the role that conversion plays. He will execute the expansion in the 
paragraph’s final words. 
Aristotle’s exhibition is an application of a conversion rule he introduced and 
proved in the preceding chapter: “When A and B belong to the whole of C and C 
converts with B, then it is necessary for A to belong to every B.”83 He begins his 
                                                                                                                                       
Niiniluoto, “Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction,” 54–60. None have precisely 
anticipated my interpretation regarding the changing meaning of C. 
82 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b11, Smith’s translation 
83 Prior Analytics, 2.22 68a21–24, Smith’s translation. Here is an illustrative example (not 
Aristotle’s): Having angles that sum to 180° (A) and having three sides (B) are both properties of all 
triangles (C); C converts with B, that is, not only do all triangles have three sides, but everything 
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exhibition: “Induction, then—that is, a deduction from induction—is deducing one 
extreme to belong to the middle through the other extreme, for example, if B is the 
middle for A and C, proving A to belong to B by means of C.”84 This, we see, is 
going to be an applciation of that earlier proved conversion. Continuing, Aristotle 
reminds us, “for this is how we produce [deductions-from-]inductions.”85 His 
example will be a biological one. “For instance, let A be long-lived, B stand for not 
having bile, and C stand for a particular long-lived thing, as a man, a horse, or a 
mule.”86 It is not fully clear whether Aristotle means one particular thing or several, 
and whether he means particular things or particular kinds of things. Translators 
have rendered various combinations.87 But Aristotle does not mean that men, horses, 
and mule are the only long-lived (or long-lived and bileless) animals in the world, 
nor does he want us to pretend that they are. C is a surveyable and finite list of 
things or kinds of things. We would call it a sample. Now for reasons that are not 
important here—maybe direct observation, maybe his biological studies—Aristotle 
knows that all particulars in his sample are both long-lived and bileless. In the 
                                                                                                                                       
with three sides is a triangle; therefore, it is necessary that having angles that sum to 180° (A) is a 
property of everything having three sides (B). A is proved of B by means of C. If there were three-
sided things (B) other than triangles (C), C would not convert with B and the conclusion that A is a 
property of every B could not be drawn. To validate the conclusion, one must have a way to validate 
the conversion, that is, show that B does not ‘reach beyond’ (as Aristotle says it, 68b24) C. 
84 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b15–19, Smith’s translation 
85 Prior Analytics, 2.22 68a19, Smith’s translation. 
86 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b19–21, Smith’s translation. 
87 The unclear Greek is ‘to kath’ hekaston makrobion hoion anthrōpos kai hippos kai 
hēmionos.’ 
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language of the conversion rule, “A and B belong to the whole of C.”88 Every 
particular in the list is both long-lived and bileless. Since the list is of finite size, and 
everything on it is bileless, it is valid to convert C with B.89 (It is also valid to 
convert C with A, but Aristotle chose B, being bileless, for reasons we will soon 
see.) By the conversion then, all B is C, and by the rules of the syllogistic figure, all 
B is A: 
    (1) All C is A. 
    (2) All C is B. 
By conversion of (2): (3) All B is C. 
By (1) and (3):  (4) All B is A.  
    (1) All particular things on the list are long-lived. 
    (2) All particular things on the list are bileless. 
By conversion of (2): (3) All bileless things are particular things on the list. 
By (1) and (3):  (4) All bileless things are long-lived.  
                                                
88 Prior Analytics, 2.22 68a21–24, Smith’s translation. Aristotle says it more verbosely in the 
passage we are analyzing, Prior Analytics 2.23 68b21–23, “Now, A belongs to the whole C (for every 
bileless thing is long-lived); but B (not having bile) belongs to every C.” Smith’s translation. The 
first parenthetical is a mystery. It seems it should explain how Aristotle knows that ‘A belongs to 
the whole C.’ ‘For every C is long-lived,’ might be expected, and Ross finds a little support in one 
manuscript for this. Of course, the reason Aristotle knows that everything in his list C is long-lived 
is that he picked them that way, so ‘by selection’ might also be expected. A more interesting 
question is how does he know that the ones he picked (man, horse, mule) are long-lived. I suspect in 
the parenthetical he is explaining how he knows that: it is because they have no bile, and it is well 
known that animals without bile are long-lived (Posterior Analytics, 2.17 99b5; Parts of Animals, 4.2 
677a30–35). This explanation for the parenthetical is generally rejected because it is assumed that 
Aristotle is building up to a proof that every B is A, and so it appears that the syllogism is circular, 
defending a premise based on the conclusion. But, I argue, this is to misunderstand Aristotle’s 
project in the paragraph. My analysis does not change if the phrase is altered as Ross suggested or 
excised as Tredennick suggested, but I see no devastating problem with leaving it as is. 
89 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b23–28. 
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That is, in the sample of particular things (or kinds of things) that Aristotle defined 
up front, everything bileless is long-lived. 
Aristotle has a deduction from a surveyed list. He does not yet have a 
deduction-from-induction, but he sees that as a simple extention. He wraps up the 
paragraph by redefining C: “But one must understand C as composed of every one 
of the particulars: for [a deduction-from-]induction is through them all.”90 But 
every one of which particulars? Earlier Aristotle had said that an induction-from-
deduction is deducing A to belong to B through C, and that C was “a particular 
long-lived thing, as a man, a horse, or a mule”91 He now means C to be all 
particular long-lived things, for a deduction-through-induction is not a deducing 
through just a surveyed list, but ‘through them all.’ Aristotle is finished and 
proceeds to the next paragraph, ‘This is the sort of deduction that is possible of a 
primary and unmiddled premise. . .’ He has exhibited how a deduction-from-
induction comes about through a syllogistic figure by use of a law of conversion. 
We, however, are left hanging. It seems we missed a step. How did Aristotle 
justify making C refer to all long-lived things, and exactly what conclusion were we 
supposed to have drawn from that redefinition? What is Aristotle taking for 
granted that we missed? Here is what he ended up with after his redefinition: 
                                                
90 Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b28, Smith’s translation, my insertion. 
91 or particular long-lived things or kinds of things, depending how you read ‘to kath’ 
hekaston makrobion hoion anthrōpos kai hippos kai hēmionos.’ 
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    (1) All particular long-lived things (men, horses, mules,  
     and others) are long-lived. 
    (2) All particular long-lived things (men, horses, mules,  
     and others) are bileless. 
By conversion of (2): (3) All things bileless are particular long-lived things  
     (men, horses, mules, and others). 
By (1) and (3):  (4) All things bileless are long-lived.  
Earlier, Aristotle had justified the conversion by surveying the particulars in his 
sample. Now he justifies it by induction. That justification lies completely outside 
this paragraph. Aristotle is not saying that because of the survey described earlier he 
is justified in extending his results to all particulars. He is saying that because of 
some induction performed elsewhere, he is justified in claiming that not only are all 
particular long-lived things bileless (2), but that every particular thing (or kind of 
thing) that is bileless is also long-lived (3). What could possibly justify that claim? 
What would justify it is if Aristotle believed that lack of bile was the essential cause 
of longevity in all particular animals. If so, the conversion would be valid, and the 
universal statement (rather than merely the sum of particular statements) would be 
true. Recall what Aristotle said about triangles. Even if one could know that 
something were true of all three kinds of triangles one could not conclude that it 
was true of triangles as triangles. The universal statement is not merely the union of 
particular statements. It must be justified by finding the essential nature of the 
universal. But, as we have seen from our survey of the rest of the corpus, to identify 
the essential cause of something being what it is is in fact what Aristotle believes 
induction is. It was an ancient view that lack of bile was the essential cause of 
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longevity in animals, and Aristotle agreed.92 That belief is the step that Aristotle 
presumed we knew, and that he presumed we knew was a discovery reached by 
induction. 
So a deduction-from-induction ‘comes about through’ the same figure and is 
validated by the same conversion rule as a deduction from a surveyed list but the 
justification for the conversion is completely different. That justification is by a 
process of induction. The result therefore of the syllogistic figure—of a deduction-
from-induction—is a universal statement justified because the component 
induction is valid for all particulars by their essential nature. The deduction-from-
induction is through all the particulars, not just some. Note that the inductive 
generalization is not ‘(4) All things bileless are long-lived.’ That is the deductive 
conclusion. Induction operates in the premises, not in the conclusion. Exactly how 
one comes to know these by induction does not concern Aristotle here. He simply 
means to show that once one knows the premises by induction, it is possible to 
form a syllogism, a deduction-from-induction, in which an induction does the work 
that a middle term does in a deduction-from-a-middle. That is what the chapter’s 
third paragraph said the second paragraph was about, and read correctly, that is 
what it is about. 
By this interpretation, Prior Analytics 2.23 is not about turning an induction 
into a deduction by presuming that men, horses, and mules are the only bileless and 
                                                
92 Parts of Animals, 4.2 677a30–35.  
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long-lived animals in the world. The passage is not a claim that an inductive 
conclusion is made valid by a complete enumeration. In fact, it is not about coming 
to an inductive conclusion at all. It is about the reason and method by which 
inductive conclusions, once reached, can provide the premises for syllogisms. The 
reason they can be is that conclusions reached inductively are universal. They apply 
to all particulars of a kind, not just those surveyed in performing the induction. The 
method by which they can be is the swapping of subject and predicate by 
conversion. 
Such conversion is the goal of identifying essence. If one can determine by 
Socratic induction that the essence of being the best is having the most knowledge, 
then one can convert ‘All men who are the best in a profession are the ones who 
have the most knowledge of that profession’ with ‘All men who have the most 
knowledge of that profession are the best in that profession.’ If, as in the 
Metaphysics, it can be claimed that contrariety is the maximum difference of two 
ends of a continuum, then ‘contrariety’ and ‘maximum difference of two ends of a 
continuum’ can be interchanged in a syllogistic premise. Induction, for Aristotle, is 
a process by which such equivalences can be reached, and thus premises for 
deductions generated. 
There are two lacunae here. The first is that Aristotle does not explain 
anywhere in the surviving corpus how one is actually to use induction to identify 
essence and to be sure that a correct result is obtained. He simply presumes that the 
student understands that this procedure is the one Socrates used when seeking the 
 62 
essence of courage, confidence, or aretē. To us this is frustrating, especially because 
in the surviving dialogues, Socrates always failed. All he ever achieved is convincing 
his interlocutors that their proposed definition was wrong. Yet Aristotle exhibits no 
reservation in claiming that the essence of aretē or contrariety is ‘clear from 
induction.’ We wish we knew more why he thought so. 
The second gap is that Aristotle does not explain the relation between, for 
example, using induction to identify the essence of contrariety and using induction 
to conclude that irresponsible custodians should not be trusted or that all wise men 
are honored. Does he believe that the latter conclusions are contained in or 
necessitated by the meanings of irresponsible, trust, wise, and honor? He believes that 
Socratic induction addresses the former but that the others can be addressed 
inductively, too. How precisely is the universal justified by identifying what makes 
the particular the kind of thing it is? Aristotle does not say. 
Summary of Aristotelian Induction 
Aristotle expected the concept epagōgē to be uncontroversial and for his 
listeners to know what he meant by it. But we now have two views of induction. 
By the first, induction is obtaining an open-ended universal based on observation of 
particulars and validating that universal by determining what makes the particulars 
the kinds of things they are. By the second, induction is a kind of deduction 
validated by complete enumeration. The two conflict. By the first, induction is 
more fundamental than deduction and provides the components of a deduction. By 
the second, induction is a kind of deduction, usually defective since a complete 
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enumeration is seldom possible. By the first a valid induction applies to particulars 
beyond those that went into its formation. By the second an induction validly 
applies only to the particulars that went into its formation. The first method was 
introduced by Socrates and adopted by Aristotle. Yet the second has often been 
considered Aristotle’s position. How could this happen? How could Aristotle’s 
view come to be considered the opposite of his true view? 
Only one passage has ever been used to justify the interpretation, Prior 
Analytics 2.23, and it contains a small fraction of Aristotle’s comments on induction. 
How could this passage come to dominate? Were the others corrupted, lost, 
ignored, mistranslated, banned? Why was the passage itself misread? I have 
proposed an interpretation based on a claim that when Aristotle wrote 
unambiguously that induction applies beyond the particulars that went into the 
universal conclusion that he meant it and that when he wrote the ambiguous and 
shorthand ‘deduction from induction’ he meant something that can be determined 
only by careful consideration of the surrounding passages and the rest of the 
Aristotelian corpus. How did a presumed meaning of the ambiguous overwhelm a 
plain meaning of the unambiguous? 
The short answer is that the interpretation I have proposed was accepted 
through antiquity and was then replaced in late antiquity by a group of Neoplatonic 
scholars in Alexandria. Their interpretation was passed on through Latin, Syriac, 
and Arabic study and became canonical when those lines of study united in 
thirteenth-century Latin scholasticism.  The long answer and evidence for these 
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ambitious claims are the subject of the next chapter. Once these claims are justified 
and the intellectual background established, we may look at alternative 
interpretations proposed during the late Renaissance. 
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2 
 
Confusion over Induction: 
Transmission into the Renaissance 
 
 
 
 
Many books on method, logic, rhetoric, or dialectics in the late sixteenth century 
had something to say about induction. Of course, books of the time were not all 
written in the time.1 From antiquity, Aristotle’s Organon, Cicero’s De Inventione and 
Topica, Boethius’s commentaries, translations, and treatise De Topicis Differentiis, 
and Galen’s collected works were all popular and contained important material on 
induction. Less popular, but generating remarkable interest were Greek 
commentaries on Aristotle written in late antiquity translated and published in the 
mid-sixteenth century. Treatises by Arabic commentators Avicenna and Averroës, 
                                                
1 For a succinct catalog, see Anthony Grafton, “The Availability of Ancient Works,” in The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 767–91. For a full, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed., Catalogus Translationum et 
Commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries, 8 vols. 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1960). Details on particular authors will 
be provided below when returning to the period. 
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scholastic logicians Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, and the humanists Buridan, 
Valla, and Agricola all continued to sell. A rash of new books on logic and rhetoric, 
many inspired by the continental reformer Peter Ramus, hit the English market in 
the 1570s and were joined by the latest Aristotelian treatises in the 1580s and 90s, 
such as the Paduan Zabarella’s logical works. All mentioned or discussed induction. 
But in these books one would find diametrically opposed views. In some, induction 
was a minor kind of deduction, to be mentioned after the syllogism was fully 
treated. In others, induction was a tool of oratorical persuasion. In others, 
induction was the method of identifying what makes something the kind of thing it 
is. These and all texts on induction written in the previous twelve centuries used 
Aristotle as their point of reference. All were available to influence a late-sixteenth-
century English student of intellectual method such as Francis Bacon or of natural 
philosophy such as William Harvey. 
In all these works, the treatments were important but perfunctory. Therefore 
a student faced with apparent contradictions would struggle to know whether the 
problem was his own understanding or a real inconsistency in the authors. It would 
be difficult to reconcile a mention of induction by Galen with one by Ramus, yet 
equally difficult to conclude that the two were irreconcilable. What Cicero said and 
what a typical dialectics textbook said seemed unambiguous and clear, but at odds. 
Avowed Aristotelians seemed to directly contradict their master. A student of the 
time would be confused and as we will see textbook writers resorted to eclecticism.  
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To this day, no order has been brought to these clashing ideas of induction. 
The only way to successfully do so, I propose, is historically, that is, not to stand in 
a Renaissance gentleman’s library and treat all these texts as timeless, but to walk 
through history from Aristotle to the sixteenth century, tracing the evolution of the 
idea of induction. This chapter will make the attempt. The goal will be to 
determine the main lines of transmissions, interpretations, and conflicts in 
understandings of induction from antiquity to the late Renaissance, using the 
previous chapter’s analysis of Aristotelian induction as the background. The result 
will be a mere schematic, but one in which I hope the main lines of transmission, 
points of departure, and shifts in understanding are sufficiently documented to 
validate the outline and to explain the source of competing ideas on a sixteenth-
century bookshelf.2 
There is a well-researched path by which Aristotle’s ideas reached the modern 
West.3 By the standard account, Aristotle’s writings and philosophy were 
                                                
2 I know of no similar attempt. The study, Milton, “Induction before Hume,” takes the 
approach of looking back in time for precursors of the modern Humean problem of induction rather 
than meeting past theoreticians on their own terms. E. P. Bos, “A Contribution to the History of 
the Theories of Induction in the Middle Ages,” in Argumentationstheorie, ed. Klaus Jacobi (Leiden: 
Brill Academic Publishers, 1993), 553–76, identifies important sources, but is cursory and not always 
accurate. Histories of Aristotelian transmission are valuable but give little attention to induction per 
se. Beyond these, there are only occasional mentions by scholars working in limited periods and 
lacking a sufficiently broad perspective necessary for the task at hand. This chapter is exhaustive in 
part to fill this lacuna in the scholarly literature. 
3 David C. Lindberg, “The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West,” in 
Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 52–
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effectively lost to Latin Europe after the decline of Roman civilization. They 
survived in the Islamic world, however, in Arabic translations and commentaries. 
By way of these Arabic works and in a revolutionary development, Aristotle was 
rediscovered in the twelfth century thanks to translation efforts in Italy and Spain. 
Western scholars then integrated Aristotelianism and Christian theology into a 
stultifying medieval scholasticism, against which natural philosophers and 
humanist scholars rebelled in the late Renaissance and early modern period. As true 
as this general account may be, it does not describe the path by which the concept 
of induction was transmitted. Minor events in this account are major ones for 
induction, and revolutionary events in the general transmission had no bearing at all 
on understandings of induction. 
From Aristotle to Late Antiquity 
The first stage in the transmission of the concept of induction is from fourth-
century B.C. Athens to sixth-century A.D. Alexandria. From what little we can 
discern, it appears that one view prevailed, that described in the last chapter. Let us 
consider Epicurean and Stoic views, then the influential view of Cicero, and then 
that of Galen. 
                                                                                                                                       
90; William A. Wallace, “The Philosophical Setting of Medieval Science,” ed. David C. Lindberg 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 91–119; David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western 
Science, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Edward Grant, The 
Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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The term epagōgē does not appear much in Hellenistic writing.4 Recall, 
however, that Aristotle used the phrase ‘argument from similarity [homoiotēs]’ for 
an induction in which the universal was applied to new particulars but was itself 
left unstated. This phrase did feature prominently in some Hellenistic writing, 
including a dispute between Stoics and Epicureans over the validity of universal 
statements. The use of the phrase and the nature of the dispute suggest that the 
Epicureans maintained a view of argument from similarity, if not also of induction, 
similar to that of Aristotle and Socrates. Our primary source for the dispute is De 
Signis or On Methods of Inference by the Epicurean Philodemus (c. 110–c. 40 B.C.)5 
Though the text was not available in the Renaissance, it will help us understand 
the texts that were. It is also valuable because of an hypothesized influence of 
                                                
4 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Translations of the Principal 
Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), though 
indexing the subject, lists no instances of the term. The cited passages concern subjects that we 
today call epagōgē, not what Hellenistic writers did. Epicurus (341–270 B.C.) uses epagōgē in only a few 
surviving fragments, the most complete of which merely indicates he understood induction to be a 
method by which a statement that applies to some things applies by extension to others. My thanks 
to James Lennox for translating for me Epicurus, Deperditorum librorum reliquiae fragment 31, 
section 16, line 11. 
5 “Controversy between Stoics and Epicureans” in Philodemus, On Methods of Inference, ed. 
Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle Allen De Lacy, trans. Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle 
Allen De Lacy, Rev’d ed. (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1978). The subject is treated at length in Elizabeth 
Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), especially the 
chapter “Philodemus: Inference by Similarity,” 197–211; and perceptively in Long and Sedley, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, 93-7, 261-6.  
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Epicureanism on Francis Bacon6 and the fact that the text has been called “the first 
sketch of an inductive logic . . . inspired and sustained by the breath of the truest 
Baconian spirit.”7 
According to Philodemus, at issue in the debate are two kinds of argument for 
universal statements, the argument from elimination (anaskeuē) and the argument 
from similarity (homoiotēs). In the dispute, both Epicureans and Stoics accept 
validity of the first, but Stoics reject validity of the second. Both kinds of arguments 
are ways to justify universal, hypothetical statements, i.e., statements of the form ‘if 
the first, then the second’ (using Philodemus’ language), or ‘if p then q’ (using 
modern symbols). Both sides accept that the statement ‘if p then q’ can be justified 
by validating ‘if not-q then not-p.’ This contrapositive can be justified by two 
different arguments. The first applies when there is a direct causal dependence. For 
example: In Epicurean physics, we know that if there is motion (p), there is a void 
(q), because if there were no void (not-q), there would be no motion (not-p). This is 
the ‘argument from elimination.’ But the Epicureans recognize a second type of 
justification, which the Stoics deny, the argument from similarity. Philodemus 
offers this example: We know that if Plato is a man (p), Socrates is a man (q), 
because if Socrates were not a man (not-q), Plato would not be a man (not-p). In 
this argument, there is no physical, causal connection between Plato and Socrates. 
                                                
6 Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 37–8. 
7 Theodor Gomperz, Philodem: Über Induktionsschlüsse (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1865), cited 
and translated in Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, 198. 
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Plato’s existence does not physically depend on Socrates’. Were there no Socrates 
there could still be a Plato. But, Philodemus argues, Socrates and Plato are so 
similar that “it is impossible that Socrates is not a man and Plato is a man.”8 For 
one to be a man and the other not to be is inconceivable, literally inconcep-
tualizable. One could not form the concept man without subsuming under it both 
Socrates and Plato. Philodemus stresses his point by asking how we can justify the 
claim that man is mortal. If it is merely that men familiar to us are mortal and 
therefore men everywhere are, then the justification is invalid, he says. But if the 
justification is that being mortal is an essential part of what it means to be a man, 
then the justification is valid. Philodemus goes further. He claims that the 
argument from elimination actually depends on the argument from similarity, for 
the very concepts and premises presumed in an argument from elimination are 
justified—and can only be justified—by arguments from similarity. Thus, 
Philodemus is following Socrates in claiming that a deductive argument (the 
‘argument from elimination’) is valid only to the extent that its component concepts 
are valid, and Philodemus says that the method of validating those concepts is the 
‘argument from similarity.’ He seems to use the phrase just as Aristotle did, and for 
Aristotle, the only difference between an induction and an argument from 
similarity is the form in which the conclusion is stated. If Philodemus is speaking 
for all Epicureans and if they use the phrase ‘argument from similarity’ the same 
                                                
8 Philodemus, On Methods of Inference, cols. 12.28–29, p. 105. 
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way Aristotle did, then their view of induction was like his and Socrates’. If 
Philodemus’s opponent is representative of Stoicism, then Stoics may have doubted 
that induction can obtain certainty, but they did not disagree with the Epicureans 
on what it is.  
Contemporary with Philodemus is one of history’s most influential writers on 
induction and partly a Stoic himself, Cicero (106–43 B.C.)—influential not only 
because he coined the term inductio, which has been universally adopted as the 
translation for epagōgē, but because of his prominence in Renaissance humanism. 
He treats inductio in two works, De Inventione (ca. 85 B.C.) and the Topica (ca. 44 
B.C.)9 While Aristotle’s treatments of induction are mostly incidental and often 
cryptic, Cicero’s is direct and straightforward. In the Topica, he offers an example of 
an inductive argument that will now sound familiar: Just as a guardian (tutor), an 
associate, and others must keep faith, so must an agent (procurator). He continues, 
“This procedure, which arrives at its aim from several instances, may be named 
induction, which in Greek is called epagōgē; Socrates made extensive use of it in his 
discussions.”10 Although Cicero said at the beginning of the Topica that he is 
specifically writing his work as a summary and guide to Aristotle’s Topics, he 
                                                
9 Ciceronian induction receives a short treatment in the commentary to Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, Topica, trans. Tobias Reinhardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 285-6. Aside from 
giving the concept its Latin name, Cicero’s contribution to both the theory and transmission of 
induction is unjustly overlooked. 
10 “Haec ex pluribus perveniens quo vult appelletur inductio, quae Graece epagōgē 
nominatur, qua plurimum est usus in sermonibus.” Topica, §42, Reinhardt’s translation. 
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associates induction not primarily with Aristotle but with Socrates. He does the 
same in De Inventione. 
In De Inventione, Cicero offers an orderly and extended treatment of what he 
says are the two ways in which to conduct an argument, induction and deduction 
(ratiocinatio). He associates induction “chiefly [with] Socrates and the disciples of 
Socrates,” while saying that deduction “has been exceedingly practiced by Aristotle, 
and the Peripatetics, and Theophrastus.”11 He treats induction first. He calls it a 
type of argument from similarity and gives an extended definition: “Induction is a 
way of speaking that first obtains assent to indisputable things from someone, then 
by those assents, establishes something else under discussion on account of its 
similarity to the first things.”12 He offers another example and describes why 
Socrates preferred this method. Cicero then explains that the force of an induction 
rests on the soundness of the particular instances and on the essential similarity 
between them and the new claim for which the induction is made. He asserts that 
if the resemblance can be reliably shown and no counterexamples found, the 
burden of proof shifts to him who would deny the proposition. Cicero then 
elaborates on the structure of an induction, saying it has three parts. The first is the 
                                                
11 “maxime Socrates et Socratici,” “summe est ab Aristotele atque a Peripateticis et 
Theophrasto frequentatum.” Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Inventione, trans. C. D. Yonge (London: 
George Bell & Sons, 1888), 1:35. Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle as head of the Lyceum. 
12 “Inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, quicum instituta est; 
quibus assensionibus facit, ut illi dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem earum rerum, quibus 
assensit, probetur.” De Inventione, 1.31, my translation. 
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group of instances.13 The second is the general principle. The third is the 
application of that principle to the particular situation at hand, which in Cicero’s 
examples is usually a legal case.14 Cicero gives one more example, one which 
highlights the comparison of instances, then the universal principle, then the 
application to a new situation. In this and all his examples he presumes that it is in 
the nature of induction that the validity of an inductively advanced claim extends 
beyond the instances that went into its formation. With this example, Cicero ends a 
discussion of induction longer, clearer, and more orderly than appears anywhere in 
the Aristotelian corpus, but one that is fully consistent with the interpretation I 
have proposed for Aristotelian induction. 
Cicero proceeds to describe deduction and along the way makes an important 
point about the relationship between deduction and induction. Cicero provides an 
extended discussion about whether a deduction properly includes three parts or 
five. Cicero acknowledges that the dispute might seem irrelevant, but insists it 
should not be omitted. He argues that the Aristotelians and “those rhetoricians 
who are accounted the most elegant and the most skilful”15 are correct that there are 
five parts to a deduction. This five-part structure is not explicitly described in the 
surviving Aristotelian corpus, suggesting that Cicero had access to works by 
                                                
13 As did Aristotle, Cicero accepts the possibility of induction from only one instance. 
14 Cicero does not give a separate name, as Aristotle did with paradigm or argument from 
similarity to an argument in which the universal is left unstated. Cicero uses induction for both. 
15 “deinde a rhetoribus iis, qui elegantissimi atque artificiosissimi putati sunt.” De Inventione, 
1.35, Yonge’s translation. 
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Aristotle or at least Peripatetics that we do not have. The five parts are the first 
premise, which he calls the propositio, and then its proof, then the second premise, 
which he calls the assumptio, then its proof, and finally the conclusion.16 Those who 
claim only three parts group each premise with its proof, but Cicero argues that the 
separate proofs are important. He acknowledges that sometimes these proofs are 
simple enough to go unstated, but the proofs are a crucial part of the deduction. 
Without them the deduction fails. In his several examples of such proofs, the proofs 
are all inductions. One is this: That house which is well-managed is one managed 
according to a deliberate plan; that army which is well-managed is one managed 
according to a deliberate plan; that ship which is well-managed is one managed 
according to a deliberate plan; the conclusion is that those things which are well-
managed are those which are managed according to a deliberate plan. Note the 
similarity to inductions seen earlier in Socrates and Aristotle. Cicero is not saying 
that he has checked several instances of well-managed operations, found that they 
were all managed according to a plan, and then predicts that the pattern will 
continue based on a presumption that instances yet to be surveyed will be like those 
that have been. He is instead saying that the very nature of being well-managed is 
to be managed deliberately rather than haphazardly. He is making a causal 
                                                
16 The terms proposition and assumptio for major premise and minor premise will be revived in the 
sixteenth century. 
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statement about what constitutes being well-managed.17 Cicero considers it a 
necessary part of a deduction to establish the essential meaning of the terms and 
truth of the premises on which the deduction depends. In other words, he treats 
induction as the foundation for deduction. By insisting that a deduction has five 
parts instead of three, Cicero insists that validation of a deduction necessarily 
includes validation of the inductive premises. 
In the first century A.D., Quintilian (c. 35–c. 100 A.D.) adopted not only 
Cicero’s neologism inductio, but at least one of his examples: “If a guardian (tutor) 
should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent (procurator).”18 
Like Cicero, he writes about induction directly and orderly. He introduces it as the 
method “chiefly used by Socrates.” “When he [Socrates] had asked a number of 
questions to which his adversary could only agree, he finally inferred [inferret] the 
conclusion of the problem under discussion from its resemblance to the points 
already conceded.”19 Like Aristotle and Cicero, Quintilian finds the crucial 
                                                
17 Cicero’s grammatical structure, a structure he uses consistently, supports this. He does not 
merely say that ‘all well-managed things are managed deliberately,’ i.e., that ‘all As are B,’ 
something that could be true accidentally rather than essentially. Instead Cicero says that ‘those 
things which are well-managed are managed deliberately,’ suggesting that what makes something 
well-managed is that it is managed deliberately, that ‘what makes an A an A is that it is B,’ that ‘it is 
in the nature of A that it cannot be an A without being a B.’ On the difference, compare the analysis 
of Aristotelian induction, as mentioned earlier, in Tsouyopoulus, “Die induktive Methode und das 
Induktionsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie,” 107–14. 
18 Quintilian, Quintilian I: The Insitutio Oratoria, trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1920), 5.10.73. 
19 Institutio Oratoria, 5.11.3, Butler’s translation. 
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component in induction to be the identification of essential attributes. “What is the 
finest [generosissimum] fruit? The best, I should imagine. What is the finest horse? 
The swiftest. So too the finest type of man is not he that is noblest of birth, but he 
that is most excellent in virtue.”20 Quintilian is not setting up a syllogism with one 
premise about fruit and another about horses, then presuming or pretending that 
these are all the instances to be surveyed, and then inferring a conclusion. Rather 
he is trying to identify the essence of what it means for something to be the finest, 
just as Socrates, Aristotle, and Cicero did. 
Like Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian wrote as if what induction is is obvious. 
None of the three claimed to recognize any controversy over induction’s nature or 
validity. None claimed to be an innovator on the subject. All wrote as if they were 
presenting conventional wisdom. If they were in fact doing so, then throughout 
Greek and Roman antiquity, induction was understood to be the procedure that 
Socrates used to make generalizations about the essential nature of things, and these 
generalizations were understood to provide the foundations and premises for 
deductive reasoning. All three discussed epagōgē or inductio primarily, though not 
exclusively, in an oratorical context. When the Epicurean Philodemus discussed 
what seems to be a related, if not identical, subject in a logical context, he used 
‘argument from similarity.’ Yet we should not conclude that epagōgē had 
                                                
20 Institutio Oratoria, 5.11.8, Butler’s translation. 
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importance only in an oratorical context. Aristotle incorporated it into his works on 
logic and natural philosophy. So too did Galen (129–c. 199 A.D.) 
 Galen’s treatment of induction is for us very frustrating. He says epagōgē is a 
subject of major importance and claims to have written extensively on it in his 
work Of Demonstration.21 Unfortunately, this magnum opus on scientific 
methodology, known to run to fifteen volumes, does not survive. In his works that 
do survive, we have about two dozen scattered uses of epagōgē. Although some of 
these are what we may now call conventional, a few suggest important new views 
on the subject. 
In De sophismatis seu captionibus penes dictionem, Galen says that induction and 
deduction are the two ways to establish a claim.22 In In Hippocratis librum de officina 
medici commentarii iii, he reports that many people associate induction with Plato, 
that is, with Socrates.23 But the most substantive surviving treatment of epagōgē is in 
De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus, and it is here that Galen 
suggests important new directions. He criticizes those who attempt to gain 
scientific knowledge by using what they call induction, for they fail to understand 
                                                
21 Ad Thrasybulum, 2:404, and De Simplicium Medicamentorum Facultatibus, 5:40, in Galen, Cl. 
Galeni Pergameni Asiani, ed. Janus Cornarius (Basil: Froben, 1549). For Galen’s works, I have used 
the digitized Latin facsimilies, Basil 1549 and Venice 1565, available at http://www.bium.univ-
paris5.fr/histmed/medica.htm, and the Greek text at Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), http://
www.tlg.uci.edu/. For extended passages, I have generally translated from the Latin, with 
occasional checking against the Greek as needed. 
22 TLG, Kühn, 14.584.9. 
23 TLG, 18b.909.4. 
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induction properly and thus they use it inappropriately. The misuse, he says, stems 
from failing to understand the difference between an argument from induction and 
an argument from examples.  
If someone makes a claim only from examples, it applies only to one or 
two of the same kind, or at any rate to a few others. But using induction, 
one tries to include all things open to experience, by attending as much 
as possible not to what is plain and obvious to everyone, but to what is 
obscure and less well understood.24  
If these hidden factors are properly identified, induction is binding (biaios) and 
persuades forcefully (peithei sphodrōs).25 Galen’s suggestion here is important and 
new. A remedy, for example, may cure a disease a few times or even many. But that 
is not enough to know that it will always be effective. To gain universal knowledge 
one must know why the remedy works, and the reason may be obscure. The proper 
use of induction, Galen seems to say, is to collect the examples but then, crucially, 
to identify the hidden causal factor. He says this can be done only by those “well-
trained in demonstrative methods”26 and that such methods are described in On 
Demonstration. The claim that induction can be made binding by identification of a 
causal factor, while pregnant, will not be encountered again until the modern 
period. 
                                                
24 Galen, Galeni Isagogici Libri, ed. A. Gadaldini (Venice: Giunta, 1565), bk. 2, ch. 4; TLG, 
11.470.16; my translation. 
25 TLG, 11.471.3. 
26 TLG, 11.471.4. 
 80 
With Galen we see the first suggestion that the nature and validity of 
induction is not obvious and may be subject to debate. Galen has added a normative 
element to the discussion. He says that there is a correct and an incorrect way to 
perform an induction, that there are methodological standards that should be 
followed, and that some practitioners are failing to recognize and follow these 
standards. We do not know what standards he advocated or precisely who he was 
criticizing. But we do know that an alternate understanding of induction was 
forming, especially in the schools of Alexandria. 
The Neoplatonic Reinterpretation 
Alexandria was in Galen’s day growing as a leading center for syncretic 
thought, where scholars sought to reconcile, for example, Stoicism with the 
emerging Christianity, or Christianity with Platonism, or Platonism with 
Aristotelianism. Around the 230s, Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus founded 
Neoplatonism, by which time the schools were already important centers of 
Christian theology. In this environment, a new understanding of induction arose. 
By the old understanding, universals were obtained by examining particulars. To 
gain universal knowledge of what courage is, for example, one looks at courageous 
men and identifies what they have in common that makes them courageous. The 
universal is empirically accessible. It can be discovered by observation, for it exists 
in observed reality. But the Neoplatonists (and the Christians of late antiquity) did 
not have this confidence that universals could be obtained by observation of 
particulars, for such universals do not have their primary existence in observed 
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reality. Obtaining universal knowledge by observing particulars was the process 
known as induction. That concept would either need to be rejected or 
reinterpreted. The conventional understanding could not stand. To keep Aristotle’s 
text and understand it Platonically, the text would need to be reinterpreted. 
The new interpretation of induction was the result of a cumulative series of 
altered readings of key passages in Aristotle by scholars with Neoplatonic 
sympathies and a general distrust in the possibility of obtaining universals by means 
only of observation. While each step claimed sanction in Aristotle, the series 
cumulatively amounted to a reversal of the previous established view. The change 
was gradual, beginning in the work of Clement in the late second-century A.D., 
spreading among Greek scholars, and reaching full systematization in Alexandria 
around 500 A.D. The new interpretation of induction became canonical all through 
the Middle Ages, in both Latin and Arabic schools. I will first describe its 
incremental emergence and then its transmission.27 
                                                
27 The transformative role of the Aristotelian commentators of late antiquity has become a 
significant topic of scholarly study in the last fifteen years, thanks largely to the efforts of Richard 
Sorabji. See, e.g., Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their 
Influence (London: Duckworth, 1990); Lawrence Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1994); Richard Sorabji, ed., The Philosophy 
of the Commentators, 200-600 AD, vol. 3. Logic and Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 2004). On-
going publication of English translations in the series Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, edited by 
Sorabji and published by Duckworth, is helping make the sources more accessible. The Greek 
sources appear in Reimer, ed., Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Edita consilio et auctoritate 
Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae., 14 vols. (1882-1909). Reprints of sixteen-century Latin 
translations appear in Charles Lohr, ed., Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Versiones latinae termporis 
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Clement was born in Athens around 150 A.D. and was exposed to multiple 
schools of Greek philosophy. He traveled widely, converted to Christianity, and 
became head of the Christian catechetical school in Alexandria in 180, where he 
actively sought to reconcile various aspects of Greek philosophy with Christianity. 
Clement, later St. Clement, greatly influenced the future of Christian theology.  
Clement discusses induction in book 8, chapter 6 of The Stromata.28 The 
chapter demonstrates familiarity with Plato and Aristotle as well as a desire to 
reconcile the two. But the attempt forces Clement to contradict or misread 
Aristotle. In the chapter, Clement discusses definitions and their source. He says, 
“Induction leads to the universal and the definition.”29 In this he is restating what 
we have seen to be the conventional understanding, articulated by Aristotle, going 
back to Socrates. But Clement then describes how definitions come to be, and the 
procedure he describes does not sound like induction at all. Clement says that the 
definition is the “summation resulting from Division.”30 Though Clement does not 
                                                                                                                                       
resuscitatarum litterarum (CAGL), 30 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990–). 
In this recent scholarship, induction has attracted little attention. The notable exception is Donald 
Morrison, “Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof,” in Method and Order in Renaissance 
Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, ed. Daniel A. Di Liscia, Eckhard Kessler, 
and Charlotte Methuen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 1–22, discussed more below. Sources are now 
available in English translation in chapter 9, “Induction and Certainty,” of Sorabji, ed., The 
Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD, 262–72.  
28 Clement of Alexandria, “Stromata,” in The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings 
of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325., ed. Alexander Robert and James Donaldson (1885). 
29 Ibid., 8.6. 
30 Ibid. 
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acknowledge it, his discussion comes right out of Posterior Analytics book 2, 
chapters 5–7, with similar language, structure, and phrases, but in those chapters 
Aristotle is stressing that definitions are not the result of division, not that they are. 
Indeed, Aristotle is specifically identifying the problems that arise from such a 
view, a view Plato had advocated. Clement is co-opting the style, structure, and 
language of Aristotle’s argument to defend a Platonic position, without recognizing 
or acknowledging that he is directly contradicting Aristotle. 
To defend his own position, Clement makes a subtle but important shift in 
the reading of one sentence in particular. He slightly alters one word in Aristotle’s 
sentence, and in so doing, inverts the meaning of the passage. Aristotle had written 
“inducing [epagōn] proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it has 
or has not some attribute.”31 Given the context, Aristotle clearly meant by epagōn a 
complete enumeration of all groups of individuals, but, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, he did not mean epagōgē. Doing so would contradict the thrust of the 
whole passage as well as the use of epagōgē in Aristotle’s other works. Aristotle 
meant exactly what he wrote, inducing, not induction. With no mention of Aristotle, 
Clement repeats Aristotle’s sentence verbatim, but he changes epagōn to epagōgē. 
Clement thus says that induction is a complete enumeration of groups of 
particulars, directly contradicting what Aristotle had said about the three kinds of 
                                                
31 Posterior Analytics, 2.7 92b1, Mure translation, but with inducing for Mure’s induction. 
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triangles and contradicting the very point Aristotle was making in the passage 
Clement appropriated. 
Clement is the first writer I have found to say that induction obtains its force 
from some kind of complete enumeration. We do not know if Clement believed he 
was articulating Aristotle’s own view or if he thought he was correcting it. Even 
though he makes no direct reference to Aristotle, by adopting the language and 
structure of Aristotle’s argument, Clement begins the process of associating this 
view with Aristotle. 
About twenty years after Clement became head of the ecclesiastical school in 
Alexandria, Alexander of Aphrodisias was teaching Aristotelian philosophy, 
possibly as head of the Lyceum in Athens.32 Galen was still alive, and the two 
disagreed over several philosophical issues. Though we do not know if they 
discussed it in writing as they did other issues, one such disagreement was over the 
nature of induction. Alexander is generally considered the last “thoroughly 
Aristotelian”33 philosopher of antiquity, but regarding induction he joined Clement 
and broke with his master. 
                                                
32 We know he had a senior position teaching Aristotle’s philosophy somewhere between 198 
and 209, but it could have been one of several places. Even if he was not in Alexandria, his thought 
has affinities with that emerging there. A good analysis of the issue is in the editor’s introduction to 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.1–7, trans. Jonathan Barnes, et al. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 1-2. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
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Galen had said that unlike a mere string of examples, a properly formed 
induction that identified relevant, non-obvious, causal factors could yield a binding 
conclusion. Alexander, however, unambiguously and repeatedly says that the 
conclusion of an induction, like the conclusion drawn from a string of examples, 
may be persuasive but it cannot be necessary, because it cannot be complete.  
For the universal does not follow by necessity from the particulars once 
these have been conceded, because we cannot get something through 
induction by going over all the particular cases, since the particular cases 
are impossible to go through.34 
He makes this point repeatedly while commenting on the Topics and makes it again 
in his commentary on the first book of the Prior Analytics. He there writes,  
Aristotle discusses these types of justification [induction and paradigm] at 
greater length in the second book [of the Prior Analytics], showing how 
they differ from syllogistic justification, that they too are useful, and how 
they are subsumed under syllogistic justification. Thus for our present 
purposes what we have said about them is enough.35 
Alexander marks another milestone in the history of the interpretation of 
Aristotelian induction. He agrees with Clement that induction gains force only by 
surveying all subsumed cases, but he takes a new step by shifting attention away 
from the Topics, the Rhetoric, the Posterior Analytics, and indeed all the rest of the 
                                                
34 Sorabji, ed., The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD, 262. 
35 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.1–7, 44,1-3, p. 104. 
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Aristotelian corpus, and toward Prior Analytics 2.23. Alexander considers that 
chapter to be Aristotle’s definitive treatment of induction. 
Writers on the subject before Clement held that a result obtained by 
induction applies to cases beyond those that went into the result’s formation. 
Clement and Alexander disagreed. Clement addressed situations where the 
particulars are themselves a countable number of groups of individuals, such as 
kinds of triangles. Alexander addressed situations of countless particulars. Both 
agreed that if an induction’s conclusion is to be universal, all subsumed particulars 
must be surveyed. The earlier thinkers held that universals are reached by 
comparing and contrasting a limited number of particulars and thus identifying the 
essential nature of all members of a kind. They believed Socrates’ search for 
essential natures was the model for induction. Now thinkers believed the archetype 
was what they took to be Aristotle’s attempt in Prior Analytics 2.23 to render an 
induction as a kind of deduction. 
In the third century, that following Clement and Alexander, Diogenes 
Laertius preserved the older view,36 but others adopted the new. The skeptic 
Sextus Empiricus, for example, offered this frequently cited treatment in his 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism: 
                                                
36 “Plato” in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (London 
and New York: William Heinemann and G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Loeb Classical Library, 1925), 3.53, 
p. 323. 
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It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of induction. For when 
they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of 
induction, they will effect this by a review either of all or of some of the 
particular instances. But if they review some, the induction will be 
insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may 
contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be 
toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite. 
Thus on both grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction is 
invalidated.37 
Sextus was concurring with the emerging view that universal knowledge could not 
be obtained by observation of a limited number of particulars. In the fourth 
century, the Greek commentator Themistius took the step that Clement had not, 
that of attributing to Aristotle the view that Posterior Analytics 2.5–7 claimed a valid 
induction is an enumeration of all subsumed particulars.38 
If an induction surveys all the particulars or kinds of particulars, then an 
induction can be reduced to a deduction. If something is true of each of the planets, 
then it is true of all planets. If the only particular kinds of triangles are isosceles, 
scalene, and equilateral, and all three kinds have angles that sum to 360 degrees, 
then it deductively follows that all triangles have angles that sum to 360 degrees. 
This recasting of Aristotelian induction as a kind of deduction was just one part of 
                                                
37 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book 2, chapter 15, as quoted in Milton, “Induction before Hume,” 
56.  
38 Analyticorum Posteriorum paraphrasis volume 5, 1, pages 44–50 in TLG; volume 2, chapter 8 
in CAGL. 
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an ongoing reinterpretation of Aristotle that came to maturity in the schools of 
Alexandria around 500 A.D., under the leadership of Ammonius Hermiae and his 
students Simplicius and John Philoponus. The scope of this reinterpretation has 
recently been articulated in an important article by Donald Morrison.39 He argues 
that by giving a Platonic reinterpretation to several Aristotelian doctrines, the 
Alexandrians integrated several distinctions that Aristotle had made but left 
unconnected, such as deduction vs. induction, ‘better known by nature’ vs. ‘better 
known to us,’ prior vs. posterior, and ‘knowing the fact’ vs. ‘knowing the reasoned 
fact,’ and that the Alexandrians integrated these pairs in ways Aristotle did not 
intend. We will see that this Neoplatonic synthesis had tremendous influence on all 
subsequent Aristotelian study, at least regarding induction, up to and including 
Paduan scholarship of the late sixteenth century. 
One of these distinctions was between ‘better known with respect to us’ and 
‘better known with respect to nature.’40 In Aristotle, that which is ‘better known 
with respect to us (pros hēmas or hēmin)’ is that which is nearer to sense-
perception; that is, it is knowledge of particulars. That which is ‘better known with 
respect to nature (phusei or haplōs)’ is furthest from sense-perception; that is, it is 
                                                
39 Morrison, “Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof.” I have deviated from 
Morrison where I think he erred. I, of course, may have added by own misinterpretations and other 
errors, and these should not be attributed to Morrison. 
40 Topics, 6.4 141b29–34; Physics, 1.1 184a16-21; Metaphysics, 7.3 1029b3–12; Nicomachean Ethics, 
1.4 1095b2–4; Prior Analytics, 2.23 68b38; Posterior Analytics, 1.3 72b29; and chiefly Posterior Analytics 
1.2 71b35–72a6. 
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knowledge of universals.41 Man learns first by moving “from the things which are 
more known and obvious with respect to us and towards those things which are 
clearer and more known with respect to nature.”42 By this process man comes to 
know what he experiences not as particulars but as instances of universals. He 
comes to know things generally (haplōs) or by their nature (phusei, literally ‘from 
the perspective of their coming to be what they are’). To know hēmin and to know 
haplos or phusei are two ways for us to know. 
Aristotle unambiguously and frequently says that induction is a movement 
from particulars to universal, and so in terms of the ‘better known,’ induction 
would be a movement from what is better known to us to what is better known by 
nature. It is the process by which we come to know the nature of something so that 
we may know it other than as the single particular by which it presented itself to 
our senses. We come to know it as a member of a group and we come to know 
what makes it such a member. 
Another of Aristotle’s distinctions is ‘prior’ vs. ‘posterior.’ These have many 
uses. In the Categories, Aristotle says there are four ways we use the term prior.43 
When finished describing them, he adds a fifth. He says the most proper meaning 
of prior is simply earlier in time. In a speech, the introduction is prior to the 
                                                
41 Posterior Analytics, 1.2 72a1–6. In this, Aristotle’s most succinct passage on the distinction, 
he does not mention the possibility that a universal might be closer to perception and a particular 
further away. 
42 Physics, 1.1 184a16–17, my translation.  
43 Categories, 12 14a26–14b23. See also Metaphysics, 5.8. 
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narrative. In an argument, some elements are prior, others posterior. The posterior 
that ends one argument might become the prior that begins another. All in all, the 
terms prior and posterior are for Aristotle highly contextual, hardly more technical 
than beginning and end. Only in an artificial or provocative construction would 
Aristotle say that an argument begins with a ‘posterior’ and ends with a ‘prior.’ 
Occasionally, instead of saying ‘better known with respect to us’ or ‘to nature,’ 
Aristotle says ‘prior and better known with respect to us’ or ‘to nature,’ treating 
‘prior’ and ‘better known’ as near synonyms. The Alexandrian Neoplatonist John 
Philoponus gave this locution both a new interpretation and elevated importance. 
Indeed, the whole concept of ‘better known with respect to nature’ took on 
for Philoponus and his colleagues a whole new meaning.44 For Platonists, 
universals have an existence outside human consciousness. For Philoponus, ‘better 
known with respect to nature’ did not mean ‘known by man with regard to the 
essential nature of his subject matter,’ but actually ‘known by nature.’ In other 
words, there are two kinds of knowers, two kinds of conscious beings, man and 
nature. For man, particulars are epistemologically prior. He knows them best and 
first. From them he seeks to grasp universals. For nature, on the other hand, 
                                                
44 For background see Richard Sorabji, ed., Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). The key texts for purposes here are Philoponus’s 
commentaries on the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, published in CAG. I will cite the translations 
in Morrison, “Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof.” Though it will not be discussed 
here, supporting evidence for my proposed interpretation of the Neoplatonic interpretation of 
induction is found in Simplicius’s commentary on the Physics. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physcs 7, 
trans. Charles Hagen (London: Duckworth, 1994), 24, 33-5. 
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universals are epistemologically prior. They are what nature knows first and best. 
To nature, particulars are posterior and derivative. Indeed, in Neoplatonism, it is 
the universals known by nature that give the particulars known to man their very 
existence. As the early Neoplatonist Plotinus had written, “In things in which 
there is a prior and a posterior the posterior gets its being from the prior.”45 The 
objects of nature’s knowledge, the universals, are the very causes of the particulars 
that humans must take as starting points on their attempted ascent to the 
knowledge of nature. Considered from the perspective of nature, of true reality, of 
that which man is trying to understand, human knowledge begins with posteriors. 
As Philoponus writes, “One produces conviction [pisteis] of the prior things out of 
posteriors.”46 
For a Platonist such as Philoponus, truly universal knowledge cannot be 
obtained by purely observational means. The inductive process of Socrates, 
Aristotle, and Cicero could not achieve the task given it of identifying universal 
knowledge that extends beyond the particulars surveyed in the induction. (Recall 
that Socrates and his interlocutors never succeeded in finding the essence of the 
virtues they examined.) But Socratic and Aristotelian understanding of induction 
had already been abandoned by Clement and Alexander. The new standard was 
                                                
45 Ennead, 6.1.25.17–8. Translation quoted in Lloyd Gerson, “Plotinus and the Rejection of 
Aristotelian Metaphysics,” in Aristotle in Late Antiquity, ed. Lawrence P. Schrenk (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1994), 8. 
46 Philoponus, In Analytica Posteriora, CAG vol. 13, pt. 3, 31, 9–11; Morrison, 8. 
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that validity of an induction extended only to the particulars surveyed. Where then 
did induction fit in Philoponus’s new synthesis? 
For Philoponus, as in a different sense for Aristotle, the universal is causal. 
For Philoponus, nature not only knows and makes universals, it knows and makes 
causes. For man to know the cause of something he must come to know what 
nature knows. He must come to know what cause (what ‘prior’) nature uses to 
effect some humanly perceivable phenomenon (some ‘posterior’). But direct 
knowledge of nature’s choice is unavailable to man. It is hidden. Thus the difficulty 
for induction mounts. For (on this perspective) an effect may have multiple causes. 
Induction alone becomes unable to determine which cause is operative. Indeed, the 
Neoplatonists gave a new vigor and importance to the distinction between manifest 
and hidden. Nature’s operation is hidden, obscure, occult. Man has access only to 
the revealed, exposed, derivative, which can serve only as imperfect indications of 
nature’s underlying operation. 
Sometimes, these indications can be reliable, as for example, that where there 
is ash, there was a fire47 or if a mother is giving milk she has recently or is about to 
give birth.48 Proofs based on these reliable indications Philoponus calls tekmeriodic 
(based on an idea in Aristotle). They are arguments not from cause to effect, but 
from effect to cause. Following this line of development, Philoponus can claim that 
induction is a form of proof, like deduction:  
                                                
47 Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, CAG vol. 13, pt. 2, 481, 11; Morrison, 8. 
48 Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, CAG vol. 13, pt. 2, 481, 12–13, 25; Morrison, 8. 
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The tekmeriodic proof establishes the things which are prior [according 
to nature] from those which are posterior. Of this sort is proof by 
induction, which establishes universals on the basis of particulars, that 
is, priors on the basis of posteriors.49 
Thus, if induction has force, it does so to the extent it is like deduction. This 
conforms to the idea introduced by Clement and advanced by Sextus: The only 
valid induction is a complete enumeration.50 
Philoponus and the other Alexandrian Neoplatonists crafted a neat synthesis, 
based on a reinterpretation of ‘known with respect to nature.’ The new synthesis 
had a striking unity and comprehensiveness. But it was not a simple adoption of 
Aristotle. It was a deliberate attempt to reconcile Aristotle and Plato. The result 
was neither Aristotelianism nor Platonism, but a Platonic interpretation of 
Aristotle’s often obscure texts. On the new interpretation, nature had been 
abstractly anthropomorphized; it was capable of knowing and of acting on its 
knowledge. Moreover, such concepts as species, essence, and substance were given 
a reified Platonic identity.51 Ambiguous passages such as Prior Analytics 2.23 were 
                                                
49 Philoponus, In Analytica Posteriora, CAG vol. 13, pt. 3, 49, 19–21; Morrison, 9, his insertion. 
50 This is how Philoponus interpreted Posterior Analytics 2.7. In Analytica Posteriora, CAG 
vol. 13, pt. 3, 358, 21–359, 11. 
51 David M. Balme, “Aristotle’s Biology Was Not Essentialist,” in Philosophical Issues in 
Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 291–312. “The extraordinary later misrepresentations of Aristotle, the magical 
entelechies and real specific forms, must be largely due to these imported concepts—Species, 
Essentia, Substantia—which presided like three witches over his rebirth in the Middle Ages, but 
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given a simple interpretation that was in fact not Aristotle’s. It is yet to be 
researched how pervasively and influentially the Alexandrian interpretation 
corrupted Aristotle’s view, but in the case of induction, it is clear. Clement had 
begun the reinterpretation of induction by saying induction is a process of complete 
enumeration, but his claim was isolated. Now it was part of a complete 
epistemological system. The new understanding of induction now had staying 
power, and it was transmitted to scholastic Europe through both Arabic and Latin 
channels. 
Transmission of the Neoplatonic Interpretation 
A primary vehicle for this transmission of the Alexandrian interpretation was 
the Organon, the collection of Aristotle’s writings on logic. The Alexandrians 
ordered the writings as follows:52 
   
1. Porphyry Isagoge 
2. Aristotle Categories 
3. Aristotle On Interpretation 
4. Aristotle Prior Analytics 
5. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 
6. Aristotle Topics 
7. Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 
8. Aristotle Rhetoric 
 
                                                                                                                                       
should be banished to haunt the neoplatonism from which they came.” p. 306. My thanks to Greg 
Salmieri for drawing my attention to this passage. 
52 Except for removal of Porphyry’s introduction and frequent exclusion of the Rhetoric, the 
arrangement remains standard today. 
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The order is important, both for what it tells us about how Aristotle was 
understood and for the role it played in the transmission of Aristotle’s ideas. In 
keeping with a Platonic perspective, the order is top-down, from more abstract and 
formal to more concrete and practical. The first work is an introduction by 
Porphyry, student of the Neoplatonist founder Plotinus. The second work, 
Aristotle’s first in the collection, is the Categories. It treats, among other things, the 
nature of substance, quantity, quality, time, relation, the five senses of the word prior, 
and various meanings of the verb to have. On Interpretation defines noun, verb, 
sentence, proposition, affirmation and denial. The final three works, on the other end, 
offer practical advice on how to win arguments with individuals and groups. 
Epagōgē is not discussed evenly throughout the Organon. Occurences of the 
word is distributed as follows: 
   
Instances of 
epagōgē 
1. Porphyry Isagoge 0 
2. Aristotle Categories 1 
3. Aristotle On Interpretation 0 
4. Aristotle Prior Analytics 
In bk. 1: 2 
In bk. 2: 10 
5. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 13 
6. Aristotle Topics 28 
7. Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 2 
8. Aristotle Rhetoric 13 
 
When I surveyed epagōgē in the previous chapter, I began with the most frequent 
and plain occurrences in the Topics and Rhetoric, worked through the Posterior 
Analytics, and ended with the difficult instances in book 2 of the Prior Analytics. 
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That is, I worked through the Organon backwards. After the Alexandrian ordering 
of the Organon, induction was approached from the opposite direction, if even 
reached at all, as we will see. This had a large effect on how induction was 
understood. 
The Alexandrian synthesis, and its interpretation of induction, spread in two 
directions, northwest through Rome into Latin Europe and east through Syria into 
the centers of Islamic culture. Let us consider the European transmission first. It is 
well known that with few exceptions, knowledge of Aristotle was lost in medieval 
Europe until the twelfth century. The exceptions were the translations, commen-
taries, and treatises on the Organon by Boethius (c. 476–524).53 
                                                
53 A comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of Boethius now appears in John Marenbon, 
Boethius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See especially the chapter “Boethius’s Influence in 
the Middle Ages,” 164–82. This joins the valuable collection Margaret Gibson, ed., Boethius: His 
Life, Thought and Influence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). Though Boethius’s Consolation of 
Philosophy has long commanded attention, his influence on the history of logic and the transmission 
of Aristotle has only more recently gained due attention. See especially Jonathan Barnes, “Boethius 
and the Study of Logic,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1981), 73–89, and the substantial article Osmund Lewry, O.P., “Boethian Logic in the 
Medieval West,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1981), 90–134. Much of this development is influenced by new attention given to the 
Topics tradition, as in Lisa Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 173-98; 
Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commentaries on 
Aristotle’s and Boethius’ ‘Topics’ (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984); and the essays by Stump 
collected as Dialectic in Ancient and Medieval Logic in Boethius, Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis, 
trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978). On the exclusive 
reliance on Boethius until the twelfth century for knowledge of Aristotle, see e.g., Lindberg, “The 
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Boethius was born into elite Roman aristocracy, was a contemporary of 
Ammonius and Philoponus, and may have personally studied with them in 
Alexandria.54 Like the Alexandrians, Boethius’ goal was to show fundamental 
agreement between Plato and Aristotle.55 Moreover, he wanted to bring this unified 
knowledge of Greek philosophy to Latin readers. He planned to translate all 
Aristotle’s works (as well as Porphyry’s Isagoge), write commentaries on them, and 
then do the same for Plato’s.56 He never completed this grand project, but his Latin 
translations of the Organon may have been the first ever.57 Except for that of the 
Posterior Analytics, which was lost, his translations became the standard, Vulgate, 
translations for the next thousand years.58 We learn little of Boethius’s own views 
from these translations. By his design, they are close, word-for-word renderings.59 
                                                                                                                                       
Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West,” 53–4. See also Ralph McInerny, Boethius 
and Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990). 
54 Marenbon, Boethius, 7, 11. 
55 Ibid., 18. 
56 Barnes, “Boethius and the Study of Logic,” 74. 
57 Ibid., 76. 
58 The twelfth-century translation by James of Venice became the Vulgate for the Posterior 
Analytics. It’s unfortunate for this study that Boethius’s translation did not survive. We would like 
to know whether in 2.5 and 2.7 he translated epagōn as the Latin for inducing or for induction. 
59 We do learn from these supposedly literal translations that in the phrase ‘better known with 
respect to nature,’ Boethius rendered Aristotle’s dative phusei with the Latin ablative natura rather 
then the dative naturae. Thus begins a long-standing challenge for translators. The choice a 
translator takes reflects in part whether he thinks the author believed nature was the object of man’s 
thought or was the knower. The translation problem and the interpretive aspect of it drew the 
attention of Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Physics and of Agostino Nifo in Expositio 
super libros de Physico (1552), 5r, both of which are discussed in Louis Aryeh Kosman, “The 
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We also learn little about how Boethius understood induction from his 
commentaries on the Organon. Only those to the Categories and On Interpretation 
and a few notes for the Prior Analytics survive. We do, however, have extensive 
material on the subject of the Topics. Besides translating Aristotle’s Topics, Boethius 
wrote commentaries on Cicero’s Topics and wrote his own treatise on the subject, 
De Topicis Differentiis, both of which survive and both of which had vigorous 
fortunes in the Middle Ages.60  
I have argued that there have been two conceptualizations of induction, one 
that finds its home in Aristotle’s Topics and Posterior Analytics and one that finds its 
home in Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 2.23. Further, I 
have argued that we can trace the historical dominance of one or the other in 
antiquity by surveying works of the period, and that one view of induction 
predominated from Socrates until the Alexandrian Neoplatonists and then the other 
view incrementally gained prominence. The following objection could be raised. Is 
it not possible that the historical picture that has emerged is merely an artifact of 
                                                                                                                                       
Aristotelian Backgrounds of Bacon’s Novum Organum,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
1964), 122. Thomas Fowler, “Introduction,” in Bacon’s Novum Organum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1878), 203, says the dative is a scholastic mistranslation and cites further bibliography. Antonio 
Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 229, mentions the instability that prevailed since Averroës. 
Though modern translators often use ‘by nature’ for succinctness, I have tried to capture the full 
ambiguity by using ‘with respect to nature.’ 
60 There is no up-to-date edition of Boethius’s collected works. For an inventory of the logical 
works that have survived (eighteen in all) and the best editions of each, see Barnes, “Boethius and 
the Study of Logic,” 85. For fortunes of them, see Lewry, “Boethian Logic in the Medieval West.” 
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the documents available? Cicero’s writings on induction appear in books like 
Aristotle’s Topics and contain no references to works on logic such as Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics. We should then not be surprised that Cicero’s view of induction is 
like that of Aristotle’s Topics. On the other side, the surveyed writings of the 
Alexandrians were logical texts. We could expect an understanding of induction 
like the one presented (on the Neoplatonic interpretation) in the Prior Analytics. 
Thus, might there not be two separate concepts of induction running in parallel, 
one a rhetorical view presented in works like the Topics, the other a logical view 
presented in commentaries on the Analytics? 
This is not the case with Boethius. He makes clear that the induction of the 
Topics is the same as the induction of Prior Analytics 2.23. When discussing 
induction in his treatise on the Topics, De Topicis Differentiis, he writes, 
And so there are two main species of arguing, one called syllogism, the 
other induction. Under these and, as it were, flowing from them are the 
enthymeme and the example. . . . 
Up to this point, the passage could have come from any discussion of Topics in 
antiquity. But Boethius continues: 
. . . All these are drawn from the syllogism and obtain their force from 
the syllogism. For whether it is an enthymeme, induction or example, it 
takes its force as well as the belief [it produces] most of all from the 
syllogism; and this is shown in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, which we 
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translated. So it suffices to discuss the syllogism which is, as it were, 
principal and inclusive of the other species of argumentation.61 
Boethius says unambiguously that enthymeme, induction, and example are all 
derivatives of deduction, and to the extent they are valid, they are valid because 
they can be reduced to forms of syllogisms. Here and throughout his writings, 
Boethius adopts the Neoplatonic interpretation of induction.  
Only the first three works of the Organon were known in early medieval 
Europe, but they had virtually nothing to say on induction. The Prior Analytics was 
largely replaced by Boethius’s own treatises on logic, especially his On Categorical 
Syllogisms. It said little on induction. Boethius’s translation of the Posterior Analytics 
fell into disuse and was lost. The only significant treatment of induction was in 
Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis.  
   
Instances of 
epagōgē 
Latin Transmission 
1. Porphyry Isagoge 0 
2. Aristotle Categories 1 
3. Aristotle 
On 
Interpretation 
0 
Survived in Boethius’s 
translations and 
commentaries 
4. Aristotle Prior Analytics 
In bk. 1: 2 
In bk. 2: 10 
Largely replaced by 
Boethius’s On 
Categorical Syllogisms 
5. Aristotle 
Posterior 
Analytics 
13 
Fell into disuse and 
lost 
6. Aristotle Topics 28 
Replaced by 
Boethius’s De Topicis 
Differentiis 
 
                                                
61 Boethius, Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis, 46, 1184D6–15, emendation the translator’s. 
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De Topicis Differentiis was a major text throughout the Middle Ages. Alcuin 
knew about it in the eighth century,62 Gerbert of Aurillac lectured on it in the 
tenth,63 Abelard paraphrased64 and commented on it in the early twelfth, all these 
before Aristotle’s logical works reentered Latin discourse. Even thereafter, 
Boethius’ treatise often eclipsed Aristotle’s own Topics,65 and was a subject of 
frequent commentary. In the thirteenth century it was used as an explanatory 
supplement to Aristotle’s treatment. In the early fifteenth century, humanists 
began to complain of the dominance of Boethius’ treatise, but it was frequently 
reprinted and was still commented on well into the sixteenth century.66 As we will 
see, Boethius’ claim in De Topicis Differentiis that enthymeme, induction, and 
example gain their force by being reduced to a syllogism (common even today) 
became a stock component of Latin scholasticism. But before examining treatment 
of induction in scholasticism, we must return to the other branch by which the 
Neoplatonic interpretation spread, Syriac and then Arabic study. 
                                                
62 Lewry, “Boethian Logic in the Medieval West,” 91. 
63 Ibid., 95. 
64 Ibid., 107. 
65 “About fifteen more or less complete commentaries [on De Topicis Differentiis] are known 
from the twelfth century, and six, of which two are only fragments, from the thirteenth. . . . none 
shows any knowledge of Aristotle’s Topics.” Ibid., 113. 
66 Ibid., 120–22. 
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Even in Greek, over time, each succeeding book of the Organon was read 
less.67 Already in sixth-century Alexandria, the study of the Prior Analytics was 
becoming more important and the study of the Posterior Analytics and the Topics 
less. This trend accelerated as the study of Greek philosophy and Aristotelian logic 
migrated from Alexandria to Baghdad, from pagan to Christian to Islamic thinkers, 
from Greek to Syriac to Arabic. Syrian Christians considered the latter works 
inappropriate on theological grounds. St. John of Damascus (c. 675–749) strongly 
disapproved of the Posterior Analytics.68 Syriac translations of the Organon began 
around 600, but the Posterior Analytics was not translated until around 850; for 
Arabic translations the dates were 820 and 900 respectively.69 Even after 
translations became available, both Christian and Islamic students typically stopped 
their study after the first four works. It was the mark of an expert to have studied 
even into the second book of the Prior Analytics:70  
                                                
67 For an overview of the Arabic transmission, see Lindberg, “The Transmission of Greek 
and Arabic Learning to the West,” 55–58, and the many works cited there. For details on 
transmission of the Organon, crucial to the history of induction, I have found Nicholas Rescher, “Al-
Farabi on Logical Tradition,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24, no. 1 (1963): 127–32, and Rescher’s 
extended introduction to Al-Fārābī, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, trans. Nicholas 
Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963), to be indispensible. The first of these 
articles by Rescher includes a translation of al-Fārābī’s account on the subject. 
68 Rescher, “Al-Farabi on Logical Tradition,” 131–32, citing Richard Walzer, “New Light on 
the Arabic Translations of Aristotle,” Oriens 6 (1953): 99. 
69 Rescher, “Al-Farabi on Logical Tradition,” 132. 
70 Ibid.:, and both the content and introduction to Al-Fārābī, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics. 
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Instances of 
epagōgē 
Syriac and 
Arabic 
study 
1. Porphyry Isagoge 0 
2. Aristotle Categories 1 
3. Aristotle On Interpretation 0 
In bk. 1: 2  
4. Aristotle Prior Analytics 
In bk. 2: 10  
5. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 13  
6. Aristotle Topics 28  
7. Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 2  
8. Aristotle Rhetoric 13  
 
Thus nearly the first encounter with induction—and for almost all students nearly 
the last—is the phrase ‘induction, that is, a deduction from induction,’ in Prior 
Analytics 2.23. Given the Alexandrian interpretation of this phrase and lack of any 
contravening word from Aristotle, it would be natural for a reader to believe 
induction was a kind of deduction. 
The first Islamic commentator to comment on and paraphrase the whole 
Organon was al-Fārābī (early 870s–950) in Baghdad.71 He was the first pivotal figure 
in the transmission of Aristotelian logic from its Syriac inheritors into Arabic and 
thus eventually back into Latin scholasticism. His renown gained him the title 
Second Teacher (Aristotle being the first). Al-Fārābī ’s commentary on the Prior 
                                                
71 A general introduction to al-Farabi is now available in Majid Fakhry, Al-Farabi, Founder of 
Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works, and Influence (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002). Detailed treatment is 
in Rescher’s articles cited above. Citations to al-Farabi will be to Türker numbers and to page 
numbers in Al-Fārābī, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. All translations, including 
emendations, are Rescher’s. 
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Analytics includes a considerable treatment on induction (six percent of the whole 
treatise), and his treatment is detailed, careful, and systematic. 
By all the conventional teaching to which al-Fārābī would have been exposed, 
induction was a kind of deduction effected by complete enumeration. But unlike his 
immediate predecessors, al-Fārābī read the books in the second half of the Organon 
and there found that Aristotle claims not that induction is a kind of deduction but 
that it is another waying of knowing that provides the premises for deductions. 
Regardless how frequently and forcefully Aristotle says this, al-Fārābī was working 
within an established understanding of induction, and he rejected Aristotle’s 
proposal.72 Given his starting position, his argument is acute and powerful. He 
offers the following explanation. “It may be intended to show something by an 
induction in order to use this thing as [a universal] premiss in a syllogism,”73 for 
example, “to show by induction that ‘Every motion takes place in time,’ in order to 
use this to show that swimming, for instance, takes place in time.” The resulting 
syllogism would be: 
  Every motion takes place in time 
  Swimming is a motion 
  Therefore, swimming takes place in time. 
To know the universal premise, however, one engages in an investigation of 
particulars, and it is not possible, al-Fārābī insists (and rightly so by the standard 
                                                
72 “Induction cannot serve to show the truth of a thing to be used as a [universal] premiss in a 
syllogism which is intended to prove its predicate to belong to something included within its 
subject.” Al-Fārābī, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, 7.266.8–9, p. 92. 
73 Ibid., 7.265.15–16, p. 90. 
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interpretation of Prior Analytics 2.23), to conclude that every motion takes place in 
time unless one has investigated every type of motion.74 Now in the investigation of 
motion, either swimming was included or it was not. If swimming was not 
investigated, then the universal premise ‘Every motion takes place in time’ cannot 
be known to be true, and the conclusion of the syllogism then does not follow. If, 
on the other hand, swimming was investigated, then the syllogistic argument is 
superfluous, and worse, there would be an improper attempt to show something 
better known by means of something less known. In either case, induction cannot 
provide the universal premise on which a proper syllogistic argument depends—
contra the position Aristotle frequently takes in the second four works of the 
Organon. 
What then does provide such premises? To address this, al-Fārābī offers the 
longest and most original sections in his commentary on the Prior Analytics. He 
introduces what he calls ‘inference by transfer.’ It is interesting to see what al-
Fārābī invented to do the job that Aristotle had assigned to induction.  
It is now necessary that we discuss the ‘transfer’ from a judgment by 
sensation in some matter . . . to another matter outside the realm of 
sensation. . . . what people of our time call ‘inference from evidence to 
the absent.’75  
                                                
74 Ibid., 7.265.3, p. 89. 
75 Ibid., 8.266.13–15, p. 93, without Rescher’s emendations. A similar phrase was used by 
Philodemus. 
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The problem, al-Fārābī explains, is to say reliably something about the unobserved 
given statements about the observed. The solution is to find similarities between 
the two, not just any similarity, but a “similarity . . . that is relevant to the 
characterization” of the observed, as having the property under investigation. This 
similarity must provide “some special form of connection.”76 The matter that forms 
this special connection “is called by the people of our time ‘the cause’; and it is [in 
actuality] the middle term [of the syllogism].”77 Thus the crucial element that makes 
it possible to say whether something unobserved has a particular property is to 
identify the cause of that property. If the unobserved has that cause, then it will 
have that property. His example is identifying ‘contingency’ as the cause of ‘being 
created’: 
Plants and animals are created. 
We know this because everything contingent is created and plants and animals 
are contingent. (That is, we have identified contingency as the cause.) 
Things in the heavens are contingent also. 
Therefore, things in the heavens are created. 
But how does one come to know the cause? Al-Fārābī  again considers induction 
and again insists that unless all cases can be investigated, the induction remains 
defective and “this method is useless in ‘inference from evidence to the absent.’”78 
He notes, however, that an inductive consideration can be useful in another way: It 
                                                
76 Ibid., 8.267.9, p. 95. 
77 Ibid., 8.267.13–4, p. 97–98.  
78 Ibid., 8.269.1–4, p. 99. 
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can refute a proposed universal by identifying a counter-instance.79 Al-Fārābī  then 
suggests a method that goes beyond anything in the Prior Analytics, though it 
recalls the Epicurean Philodemus. Al-Fārābī  calls his method ‘raising and finding,’ 
and it amounts to an instance of arguing by the contrapositive. His example is this:  
Whatever is not corporeal is not an agent. [What is not-q is not-p.] 
Therefore, every agent is corporeal.   [Therefore, every p is q.] 
If one can establish the first, the second is a necessary and universal statement that 
can then be used as a premise in a syllogism. Even better, al-Fārābī  says, is to use 
the contrapositive twice, once in each direction, and thus establish not just a cause-
to-effect relationship, but a one-to-one correspondence.80 But granted that one can 
get necessarily and universally from ‘whatever is not corporeal is not an agent’ to 
‘every agent is corporeal,’ how does one get the first part? It too is a universal claim 
needing justification. In his concluding remarks, Al-Fārābī surrenders and admits 
that the universal premises on which syllogisms depend simply cannot be known 
with “altogether perfect exactness.” These matters “require a great deal of laxity in 
order to be useful in providing knowledge.”81 
Recall that in our investigation of Epicurean induction we had to rely on 
Philodemus and that, though he did not explicitly use the term induction, we had 
reason to believe he was discussing induction in his contrapositive argument that if 
Socrates were not a man, Plato would not be a man either. Recall Galen also. What 
                                                
79 Ibid., 8.269.10–270.12, pp. 99–101. Cf. Karl Popper’s falsification. 
80 Ibid., 8.272.14–273.13, pp. 106-8. 
81 Ibid., 8.186.7–20, pp. 131–32. 
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little we have of his writings on induction indicates that he believed a valid 
induction requires finding the cause for a correspondence. Both of these have 
affinity with al-Fārābī, and as we will see, have echoes in the Renaissance, when 
like al-Fārābī, readers found a discrepancy between the established interpretation of 
Aristotle and what Aristotle says in the second four books of the Organon. 
Humanists will respond to the discrepancy differently. But that is to look ahead. 
For now the importance of al-Fārābī is this: He approached induction not from the 
Topics, Rhetoric, or Posterior Analytics, but by working through the Prior Analytics 
beginning to end. What he found at the end became the reference against which all 
subsequent discussion of induction had to conform. When it did not, he rejected 
the later discussion and proposed a new concept that performed the task Aristotle 
had assigneed to induction. 
Al-Fārābī had a general and widely recognized influence on the influential 
Arabic commentator Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) in Persia.82 Avicenna 
completed the transition by which induction came to be rendered into the language 
of deduction and by which Prior Analytics 2.23 came to be considered the most 
important Aristotelian text on induction. He also had his own way of dealing with 
the discrepancy between that crucial chapter and what he found in the second half 
of the Organon. Both elements of his thought were to prove influential. 
                                                
82 Avicenna’s writings on induction have been little studied and little translated, and I do not 
read Arabic. For my understanding of Avicenna’s induction I am relying exclusively on my 
understanding of Jon McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2003): 307–27, and subsequent discussions with the paper’s author. 
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Avicenna put induction fully into the language of the syllogism. 
[Induction is] like judging the middle term through the major term, 
because of the existence of the major term in the minor term; for 
instance, all long-lived animals are gall-less, since all long-lived animals 
are like human, horse and ox; and human, horse and ox are gall-less.83 
This is close to Aristotle’s language of Prior Analytics 2.23, but there are differences. 
The first is that Avicenna unambiguously says that induction is the drawing of (or 
an attempt to draw) a syllogistic conclusion. As discussed in chapter 1, Aristotle did 
not say this. Second, Avicenna introduces the phrases ‘major term’ and ‘minor 
term,’ where Aristotle had only said ‘the extremes’ and did not specify which he 
considered the major and which the minor. Avicenna resolved this ambiguity and 
thus completed the casting of induction as a kind of syllogism. Avicenna’s choice 
would go unchallanged until the nineteenth century.84 
Aristotle held, I have argued based on a reading of the whole Organon and not 
just the first half, that induction is used to identify the essential nature of 
something, and that it could thereby be used to establish the necessary and 
universal premises needed for certain deductive knowledge. Avicenna agrees with 
my interpretation and says that on this point Aristotle is wrong. Avicenna subjects 
Aristotelian induction to the following penetrating and seemingly devastating 
analysis. He asks, “How is the necessary and universal relationship between the 
                                                
83 Ibid.: 309, without McGinnis’ emendation “[and the like]” before “are gall-less” at the end. 
84 The first substantive argument in English over which term plays what role in an induction 
is Richard Whately, Elements of Logic, 4th ed. (New York: William Jackson, 1832), 184ff.  
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subject and predicate explained or made evident, when there is no middle term that 
links the two?”85 That is, how do we arrive at necessary and universal premises that 
are not themselves the result of other deductions? How do we arrive at the starting 
points? By induction, Aristotle says. But, Avicenna asks, by what means do we 
come to know that inductively established propositions are necessary and universal? 
It must be either by perception or the intellect. But, he continues, it cannot be by 
the first, for necessity is not perceptual; we do not perceive necessity.86 That leaves 
the intellect. Now, the properties known by the intellect are either essential or 
accidental, and accidental properties are in turn either necessary or not. Avicenna 
says none of these three can provide necessary and universal propositions. First, any 
predicate that is not necessary does not meet the requirement of universal and 
necessary that we are seeking. Second, necessary accidents can simply be reduced to 
essential properties, thus leaving essential properties as the last candidate. Can the 
intellect, Avicenna asks, amass several particulars of one kind and, by analyzing 
them, determine their essential commonality? He argues that this cannot be done 
because, without knowing what essential characteristic makes things all members 
of a kind, one cannot know which particulars to subsume in the induction in the 
first place. Aristotelian (and Socratic) induction is thus caught in a terrible 
circularity. To find the essence, for example, of aretē, we must be able to reliably 
identify instances of aretē; but without knowing the essence, we cannot be sure we 
                                                
85 McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” 310 
86 David Hume will later agree. 
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are examining true instances. This cuts to the very heart of Socratic induction. 
When Socrates wanted to find what made, say, courageous men courageous, he 
assembled a group of courageous men and examined them. Yet how could he be 
sure, without yet knowing the essence of courage, that these men were in fact 
courageous. Avicenna concludes that induction is incapable of providing the 
necessary and universal premises needed for deduction. It should not be surprising 
that if induction is a kind of deduction then it would be circular to try using it to 
ground deduction, but Avicenna was the first to work this out so forcefully.87 
The third of the major figures in the transmission and development of 
Aristotelian epistemology in Islamic culture was Averroës (1126–1198) in Spain. He 
fully adopted Avicenna’s syllogistic language for describing induction. “[Induction] 
is an argument which has the force of the syllogism in the first figure, since the 
minor term is that universal matter, the middle the particulars, and the major the 
judgment.”88 This statement comes not from Averroës’ discussion of Prior Analytics 
or Posterior Analytics, but from his commentary on the Topics. Discussions about 
induction in supposedly practical handbooks for debaters and orators, as the Topics 
and Rhetoric were intended, are now presented in the technical language of ‘major 
                                                
87 In the Topics, 8.2 157a25, Aristotle had recognized this problem, but since he did not think 
induction was a kind of deduction, he did not consider the problem devastating in the way Avicenna 
did. Avicenna, characteristically concentrating on the Analytics instead of the Topics, did not address 
Aristotle’s attention to the problem. 
88 Commentary on Topics in Averroës, Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s 
“Topics,” “Rhetoric,” and “Poetics,” trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1977), 48. 
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term,’ ‘middle term,’ ‘minor term,’ and ‘first-figure syllogism,’ rather than in the 
spirit of Socratic dialogue described in Aristotle’s Topics. Averroës rejected not only 
the characteristic debating style of Aristotle’s Topics, but its understanding of 
induction, also. Averroës writes,  
Induction—insofar as it is induction—does not by itself and primarily 
set forth the essential necessary predicate. For it is not possible for that 
universal to be a predicate of all of those particulars accidentally. . . . 
Induction used in demonstration is only used for guidance toward 
certainty, not for providing it primarily and essentially.89  
For all of Averroës’ empiricist sympathies, his view of induction remained that of 
the Alexandrian Neoplatonists. 
Induction was not known in early medieval Christian and early Islamic 
schools from its frequent mention in Aristotle’s Topics, Rhetoric, and Posterior 
Analytics. These works from the second half of the Organon were not read. In the 
Latin West, induction was known instead through Boethius’s De Topicis 
Differentiis. Following the Alexandrian synthesis, it described induction as a kind of 
deduction formed by a complete enumeration of particulars. Latin readers were 
unaware of an alternate view. Arabic readers became aware when, beginning with 
al-Fārābī, they began reading the rest of the Organon. They found there a proposal 
that induction was the method by which essence was identified. They insisted that 
on this point, Aristotle was wrong. They discovered Aristotle’s proposal with an 
                                                
89 Commentary on Topics in ibid., 50. 
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established view of induction already in hand. By that view, induction could not 
make universal statements applicable beyond the particulars surveyed. Though by 
different paths, Latin and Arabic readers both received the view of induction 
worked out by the Alexandrian Neoplatonists. Thus when Arabic scholarship 
entered Europe in the twelfth century, there was no immediate revolution there in 
the understanding of induction. 
Reunion of the Latin and Arabic Traditions in European Scholasticism 
By the beginning of the twelfth century, direct exposure to Aristotle was still 
limited. Boethius’s translations of the first three books of the Organon did survive 
and had been studied from the time of the Carolingian Renaissance.90 Though 
Boethius’s translation of the Prior Analytics survived, it was hardly studied if at 
all.91 Boethius’s own On Categorical Syllogisms substituted. His translation of 
Posterior Analytics had fallen into disuse and become corrupt and partly lost. For 
the next subject in the Organon, the Topics, the standard text was not Aristotle’s or 
Cicero’s but Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis. At the turn of the millennium, Greek 
manuscripts of the first two books of the Organon as well as translations of Arabic 
                                                
90 John Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480–1150) (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988), 47, 53, 82. Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 45–79 serves as a good overview to the Aristoteles Latinus collection, 
published under the direction of Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
91 Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480–1150), 130. 
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medical and other scientific works where entering northern Europe.92 Works on 
mathematics and astronomy continued to enter in the eleventh century and in the 
twelfth century, works of many types were translated from Arabic and Greek into 
Latin.93 During this time, virtually all of Aristotle’s works were translated, mostly 
from Greek originals. But the attention remained more on scientific works than on 
epistemological. While the Physics, On the Heavens, and On the Soul joined the 
works of Galen in having a large impact on European natural science, the books of 
the Organon attracted less attention. Though three new translations were done of 
the Posterior Analytics in the twelfth century, John of Salisbury (1115 or 1120–1180) 
said that few masters could deal with it, and his own exposition is the first in the 
Latin West. Commentary on Aristotle’s own Topics did not appear until the 
thirteenth century.94 Not until long after that did Aristotle’s work on the subject 
supplant Boethius’s. 
Thus study of logic changed surprisingly little during the inrush of twelfth-
century Aristotelian translations. The understanding of induction did not change at 
all. Indeed it got codified into the most popular and most emulated textbook of the 
late Middle Ages, Peter of Spain’s Tractatus (later called Summule Logicales), written 
                                                
92 Lindberg, “The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West,” 59–60. 
93 Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, 23. 
94 Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commentaries on 
Aristotle’s and Boethius’ ‘Topics’, 163, 216, 224 
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between 1230 and 1245 in southern France or northern Spain.95 The outline of the 
book’s first half directly follows that of the Organon. An introductory chapter is 
followed by one covering material from Porphyry’s Isagoge. The third treats the 
Aristotelian categories and is followed by a fourth chapter on syllogistic logic. 
Although it covers the subject of the Prior Analytics, it more closely follows 
Boethius’s On Categorical Syllogisms. Peter skips the subject matter of the Posterior 
Analytics altogether, and the fifth chapter is “On the Topics.” It is here that Peter 
says there are four kinds of argument: syllogism, induction, enthymeme, and 
example. His whole treatment of induction is, “Induction is a progression from 
particulars to universal. For instance, Socrates runs, Plato runs, Cicero runs, et 
cetera; therefore every man runs.”96 Aristotle’s frequent mention of induction in his 
own Topics has been replaced by a skeletal treatment derived from the last few 
chapters of the Prior Analytics, and Peter demonstrates no awareness of the 
ambiguity or complexities in that original. Peter does add one elaboration in 
chapter 7, the chapter on fallacies. He explains that only the syllogism is a perfect 
                                                
95 For Peter and the Tractatus, see Introduction to Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards 
Summule Logicales., ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), ix–cxx; Joke Spruyt, “Peter of 
Spain,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2001),; and “Peter of Spain on the 
Topics” in Boethius, Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis, 215–221. 
96 “Inductio est progressus a particularibus ad universale. Ut ‘Sortes currit, Plato currit, 
Cicero currit,’ et sic de singulis ‘ergo omnis homo currit.’” Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called 
afterwards Summule Logicales., 56.12–5, my translation. Peter demonstrates no awareness of 
Aristotle’s statement, “When people have to obtain the universal, they say ‘thus in all such cases’. 
But this is one of the most difficult of things, to determine which of the cases brought forward are 
‘such’ and which iare not.” Topics 8.2 157a25, Smith’s translation. 
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and complete way of arguing, that there are many ways an otherwise perfect thing 
can be deficient, and that induction, enthymeme, and example are three kinds of 
imperfect syllogism.97 This may have derived from Arabic influence, but it is in 
keeping with the common Alexandrian heritage. Though written in the century 
after Aristotle’s scientific works swept into Latin Europe, Peter’s Tractatus is more 
a continuation of Boethian logic than an adoption of Aristotle’s in its treatment of 
logic in general and of induction in particular. The structure and content of the 
Tractatus and its treatment of induction became the model for countless textbooks 
on logic all the way into the nineteenth century. In the Renaissance the Tractatus 
itself was reprinted more than a hundred and sixty times.98 When a Renaissance 
reformer complains about scholastic Aristotelian logic, it is usually not the original 
works of Aristotle that he has in mind but textbooks like the Tractatus that codified 
Boethius’s interpretation of Aristotle. 
A survey of the few most important scholastic thinkers from the mid-
thirteenth century to the mid-fourteenth indicates that scholasticism wholly 
adopted the now conventional view of induction. Let us briefly consider Albert, 
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. Each of them treated differently 
the conflict between that view and the one they found in Aristotle. Each made 
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small, though sometimes important, refinements to the conventional view without 
fundamentally altering it. 
Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280) probably first came into contact with the 
Organon just after Peter’s Tractatus was written, and he had the same 
understanding of induction as Peter did, i.e. that an induction is a defective 
deduction made perfect by addition of ‘et cetera’ (‘et sic de aliis’ or ‘et sic de 
singulis’).99 He summarizes, “An induction has no necessity unless turned into a 
syllogism,”100 and offers this example: 
  Everything that is this man, or that man, et cetera, is an animal; 
  Every man is this man, or that man, et cetera; 
  Therefore, every man is an animal.101 
Albert casts induction into a syllogistic form that will become standard and 
important: All of his particulars are of the same kind. In Aristotle’s passage on 
which Albert is commenting, the instances are three different kinds of animals, i.e., 
man, horse, and mule. Avicenna had followed Aristotle on this. But in Albert’s 
example there is just one kind. By the Socratic understanding of induction, the 
                                                
99 Previous work on induction in Albert includes Auguste Mansion, “L’Induction chez 
Albert le Grand,” Revue Néo-scolastique 13 (1906): 115–34, 245–64; and Bos, “A Contribution to the 
History of the Theories of Induction in the Middle Ages,” 562–65. The most important treatment in 
Albert is his commentary on Prior Analytics 2.23. Albertus Magnus, Opera Omni, ed. Auguste 
Borgnet (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–5), 2.7.4, p. 793–95. 
100 “inductio nullam necessitatem nisi a syllogismo.” Magnus, Opera Omni, 2.7.4, p. 794, my 
translation. 
101 “omne quod est iste vel ille, et sic de singulis, est animal : omnis homo est iste vel ille, et sic 
de singulis : ergo omnis homo est animal.” Commentary on Prior Analytics in ibid. 2.7.4, p. 794. 
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instances should be widely varied. To identify the essence of courage, for example, 
it is best to survey many kinds of courageous men. To understand longevity of 
animals it is best to consider several kinds of long-lived animals. But by the 
alternate understanding, induction is essentially enumeration (complete or 
otherwise), and the instances, as Albert understands them, should all be of the same 
kind. Thus the instances are man #1, man #2, man #3, etc. If the instances are all 
surveyed—or it is pretended so by adding ‘et cetera’—then the induction, i.e. the 
enumeration, is complete, and can be given the form and force of a syllogism. For 
Albert, variety in the instances in an induction is not required or desired. 
Under this interpretation, the concept of a ‘probable induction’ makes more 
sense than it does under Socratic induction. Albert uses the phrase inductio 
probabilis102 to refer to an argument in which many but not all instances of a kind 
have been surveyed, all have been found to have the property under investigation, 
and no counter-instances have been found. Of course, Albert’s concept of probable 
does not yet have the mathematical association that it will acquire in the 
seventeenth century, but it is indicative of the direction theories of induction can go 
once an induction is interpreted as a defective syllogism that can be made less 
defective by the inclusion of more instances. 
Albert, exposed now to more of the Aristotelian corpus that his Latin 
predecessors, recognizes the contradiction between his claim that induction can be 
                                                
102 Ibid., 2.7.4, p. 795 
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reduced to a syllogism and the frequent Aristotelian claim that induction and 
deduction are separate and distinct. While al-Fārābī and Avicenna had simply said 
that Aristotle was wrong about this, Albert attempts to preserve Aristotle’s claim 
by proposing a new distinction: “an induction is reduced to a syllogism materially 
but not formally.”103 That is, an inductive argument is reduced to a syllogism by 
taking the material of the argument—the constituent propositions—and arranging 
them in the form of a syllogism. But the form itself of a syllogism and the form itself 
of an induction remain opposed, since what was an extreme term when the 
argument had an inductive form (i.e., the particulars) takes on the role of a middle 
term when the argument is cast in syllogistic form. Induction and a syllogism, 
Albert says, are not considered opposites generally, but only in a narrow technical 
sense. Albert thus inverts Aristotle’s presentation, for in the Aristotelian corpus, 
induction and deduction are broadly and commonly set in opposition, and the 
contents of an induction are placed into the structure of a syllogism only in the 
narrow, technical sense of Prior Analytics 2.23. Finally, Albert does not comment 
on the contradiction between complete enumeration and the open-end nature of 
induction presented in Posterior Analytics 2.19. There, Albert paraphrases Aristotle 
and proceeds without comment. 
                                                
103 “inductio in syllogismum reducitur materialiter et non formaliter.” Commentary on Prior 
Analytics in ibid., 2.7.4, p. 794, my translation. 
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Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) agrees with his teacher, Albert, on the nature of 
induction.104 Also with his teacher, he is one of the first to give the Posterior 
Analytics serious study. His Commentary on it was extended and important. 
Commenting on book 2, chapter 5 of Aristotle’s text, Aquinas writes, 
[In induction it] is required to suppose that he has listed all the things 
contained under some general heading; otherwise, the person inducing 
could not conclude a universal from the singulars he assumed. . . . Thus 
it is obvious that one cannot in virtue of the fact that Socrates and Plato 
and Cicero run, induce of necessity the conclusion that every man runs, 
unless his audience concedes that nothing more is contained under man 
than the ones listed.105 
I argued earlier that this is a misreading of Posterior Analytics 2.5, and is inconsistent 
with, for example, Aristotle’s claim that one would not truly know something of 
triangles if it were known only by surveying equilateral, isosceles, and scalene 
triangles, even knowing these were the only three possible kinds. Moreover, 
Aquinas’ reading of the passage will be difficult to reconcile with the open-ended 
portrayal of induction soon to follow in Posterior Analytics 2.19. Aquinas is typically 
copious in his remarks in his Commentary, but when he gets to Aristotle’s mention 
of induction in 2.19, he, like Albert, is terse. He first describes the process that 
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Aristotle proposes for how we come to know open-ended universals, concluding 
with a paraphrase “He concludes that it is obviously necessary to acquire the first 
universal principles by induction. For that is the way, i.e., by way of induction, 
that the sense introduces the universal into the mind . . .”106 Many modern 
commentators have gotten to this point and realized that Aristotle cannot possibly 
be speaking here of complete enumeration, for the whole chapter has been about 
reaching open-ended universal knowledge. Many of these commentators, in order 
to preserve their belief that Aristotelian induction is primarily complete 
enumeration, posit a second kind of induction, often called ‘intuitive induction’ 
(from the translation of nous, Aristotle’s subject in this chapter, as intuition). 
Aquinas, however, does not make this move. Instead he extends the passage with 
this short comment, “. . . inasmuch as all the singulars are considered.”107 He thus 
repeats his belief that legitimate induction is complete enumeration, but in doing so 
he also makes it quite unclear what induction has to do with the open-ended 
process of forming principles through a rising from sense perception to memory to 
experience to universals by the ability of nous that Aristotle was discussing in the 
chapter. Aquinas does not linger to address this difficulty. 
In addition to the interpretation of induction as a kind of defective deduction, 
Aquinas adopted and somewhat streamlined the Neoplatonic integration of 
induction and deduction with, for example, the difference between prior to us and 
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prior in nature. “For demonstration proceeds from things that are prior absolutely, 
but induction from things that are prior in reference to us.”108 Though he rejects 
the fundmental notion that nature can know, Aquinas consistently uses the 
Alexandrian synthesis to explain how induction and deduction can be separate 
while at the same time induction is really a kind of deduction. 
John Herman Randall once wrote, “[The] process of learning archai Aristotle 
calls epagōgē, ‘induction.’ The Schoolmen, to distinguish it from another process 
Aristotle also calls epagōgē, and which we call ‘complete enumeration’, . . . called it 
‘abstraction.’”109 As we have seen this dichotomy is not in fact in Aristotle, but 
Randall is right that for the scholastics epagōgē and induction referred to a process 
of complete enumeration. Therefore coming to know universal principles from the 
particulars of sense experience was not known as induction. Duns Scotus (1265–
1308) is an example. He offered extended and important commentary on the nature 
and relationship of particulars and universals, but none of it is cast in the language 
of induction.110 When he does use the term, it always means surveying a finite list. 
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What Randall says of the scholastics goes back to al-Fārābī. Once complete 
enumeration was considered the only valid form of induction, discussions of 
coming to know open-ended universals had to be conducted with a different 
vocabulary—even though this was the use to which Socrates and Aristotle 
originally put the term.  
William of Ockham (c. 1285–?1349)111 continued the Scholastic understanding 
of valid induction as complete enumeration. “For whenever more can be contained 
in the subject of the universal than are contained in the induction, the consequence 
does not follow from the induction.”112 He cites as an example of a good induction 
an argument that demonstrates something to be true of the Father, of the Son, and 
of the Holy Spirit, and consequently true of God. An incomplete induction, he 
holds, must be perfected by addition of ‘et cetera.’ Ockham repeats the now 
                                                                                                                                       
throughout his description of Scotus’s position on universals. But in the original text Jones is 
glossing, the term inductio is nowhere to be found.  
111 For passing mention of Ockham’s induction, see Milton, “Induction before Hume,” 57. 
Ockham’s extended treatment of induction are chapters 31-5 in part three of the Summa Totius 
Logicae. The material is remarkably “unilluminating,” to use Milton’s apt summary. Much of it is 
dedicated to dealing with particulars that are predictions of the future. For example, it appears that 
the universal ‘I know it will happen’ may be true while the particulars ‘I know it will happen at time 
A,’ ‘I know it will happen at time B,’ etc. are all false. Ockham addresses this apparent paradox with 
reference to God’s omniscience about future events. I use as source for my own translations, 
William of Ockham, Summa Totius Logicae (Oxford: J. Crosley, 1675). 
112 “Ubicunque enim possunt plura contineri sub subjecto universalis quam continentur in 
inductione, non valet consequentia virtute talis inductionis.” William of Ockham, Summa Totius 
Logicae, 3.33, p. 470, my translation. 
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common example: Socrates runs, Plato runs, et cetera, and therefore all men run.113 
Thus, Ockham does not directly add anything to the theory of induction, but he 
does make an important indirect contribution. He challenged what he saw as a 
Neoplatonic strain in Aquinas, the view that universals are real (even if existing 
within individuals). Ockham held instead that only individuals are real, and 
universals are cognitive tools by which we grasp groups of individuals. This 
Ockhamite ‘nominalism’ included a new interest in the role and importance of 
particulars, which would be important for later interest in induction. But like 
Scotus, Ockham himself explored the role for particulars outside of the language of 
induction. Induction, for him, remained not a process of rising from sense 
perception of particulars to a cognitive awareness of universals, but rather a kind of 
(usually defective) deduction. 
Even after Latin theoreticians gained access to virtually the entire Aristotelian 
corpus, their understanding of induction remained remarkably conservative. They 
fully adopted the Alexandrian synthesis, held the Neoplatonic interpretation of 
Prior Analytics 2.23 to be Aristotle’s definitive treatment, and held that this chapter 
claimed induction gained its force by being rendered a syllogism. The few mentions 
of induction in the Posterior Analytics caused some difficulty, but the mentions were 
isolated and incidental enough that they could be addressed creatively or just 
ignored. A partial explanation for why access to the Aristotelian corpus did not pose 
                                                
113 Ibid., 3.32 p. 467–68. 
 125 
a greater challenge is that scholastics had relatively little interest in Aristotle’s 
Topics, the main source of the alternate view of induction. For that field, Boethius’s 
Topics remained dominant. There was much greater interest in Aristotle’s Physics, 
and this work indirectly supported the conventional understanding of induction 
because its prominent discussion of ‘better known with respect to us’ and ‘better 
known with respect to nature’ in book 1, chapter 1, was fully assimilated into the 
Alexandrian synthesis. So by a sort of package deal, induction got swept up into a 
comprehensive and largely Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotelian epistemology. 
Not until the Topics of Aristotle and of Cicero gained attention, and not until there 
was broader familiarity with Socratic induction, was the Alexandrian interpretation 
of induction challenged. That challenge was initiated by the arrival of Renaissance 
humanism. 
Renaissance Humanism 
Before introducing the humanistic logic of the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
and its traces in theories of induction, we must consider a special case, a younger 
contemporary of Ockham’s, John Buridan (c. 1300–1358/61). Buridan is special 
because although he wrote the first significant challenge to the 800-year-old 
consensus view of induction, his writings on the subject were largely lost. He is 
thus, regarding induction, both revolutionary and unimportant. Let us consider 
first the revolutionary part and then the issue of his influence. 
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Buridan114 agrees with his Scholastic predecessors that an induction can be 
turned into a deduction by adding ‘et cetera’ to the list of particulars. Like them he 
uses the example of Socrates and Plato running. But, he insists, the ‘et cetera’ can 
legitimately be added only when it serves as a shorthand for a finite and surveyable 
list, such as the list of heavenly planets.115 Unlike his immediate predecessors, 
however, Buridan does not think that the inability to legitimately add ‘et cetera’ 
and to thus convert an induction into a deduction poses any threat to the validity of 
inductive conclusions generally. For Buridan, an induction with a finite and 
surveyable list of particulars is hardly induction at all. If it is induction, it is a 
special case. Induction, properly, is not the process described by the now 
conventional understanding of Prior Analytics 2.23 but, Buridan insists, the process 
described in Posterior Analytics 2.19.116 For the first time, someone faced with the 
inconsistency between these two passages gives the second preference. 
On Buridan’s account, the primary meaning of ‘induction’ is not complete 
enumeration, but the process of coming to know universals in a hierarchical process 
of combining sensations to form memories, memories to form experiences, and 
                                                
114 The important text is John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, trans. Gyula Klima (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 6.1.4, 6.1.5, and 8.5.4. For background and historical context of 
the treatise and on Buridan’s general influence (not specifically regarding induction), see Klima’s 
valuable introduction. On Buridan’s induction, see J. M. M. H. Thijssen, “John Buridan and 
Nicholas or Autrecourt on Causality and Induction,” Traditio 43 (1987): 237–55. 
115 Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 6.1.5, p. 399. 
116 Ibid., 6.1.4, p. 396. 
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experiences to form universals.117 This is the hierarchy that Aristotle presents in 
Posterior Analytics 2.19. There, Aristotle says, “The soul is so constituted to be 
capable of this process.”118 Buridan calls that capability, “the intellect’s natural 
inclination toward truth.”119 It is by this process that  
we know the indemonstrable principle that every fire is hot, and that 
every magnet attracts iron, and that all rhubarb purges bile, and that 
everything that comes to be in nature comes to be from some preexisting 
subject, and so on for many other indemonstrable principles.120 
Buridan also brings back into the discussion of induction Socrates’ claim that just as 
we should appoint a helmsman, charioteer, and statesman based on prudence rather 
than chance, so we should choose any ruler.121 Buridan challenges the notion that 
there is one ‘primo principium,’ one first principle, from which all certain scientific 
knowledge is deduced. Rather, there are many universal, certain, and necessary 
propositions that are not derived deductively but are built up from sense 
perception. That every man has a heart is one.122 Buridan brought back to the 
discussion of induction the scientific epistemology more characteristic of Aristotle’s 
                                                
117 Buridan offers the same hierarchy in In Physica book 1, question 4, quoted in Thijssen, 
“John Buridan and Nicholas or Autrecourt on Causality and Induction,” 245. 
118 Posterior Analytics, 2.19 100a14. Mure translation.  
119 Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 6.1.4, p. 396, 6.1.5, p. 399. 
120 Ibid., 6.1.4, p. 396. 
121 Ibid., 6.1.4, p. 397. It is a Socratic example, even though Buridan gets it from Boethius’s 
retelling. 
122 In Physica, Book II q.4 (fol. 6ra), quoted in Thijssen, “John Buridan and Nicholas or 
Autrecourt on Causality and Induction,” 244. 
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Posterior Analytics and the rest of the Aristotelian corpus than the chapter in Prior 
Analytics that had occupied his predecessors since late antiquity. 
Buridan’s proposal was remarkable. Since the sixth century, it had been held 
that Prior Analytics 2.23 is the definitive statement concerning induction and that 
this statement defends induction on the grounds that it can be turned into a 
syllogism by complete enumeration (actual or pretended). The fact that this 
understanding conflicts with the portrayal of induction in the Posterior Analytics 
was ignored or treated as a minor oddity to be explained away. Buridan, however, 
claimed that it is the portrayal in the Posterior Analytics that is definitive and that 
Prior Analytics 2.23 must be understood in its light. Buridan’s comments were not 
incidental. He offered two thousand words of well-reasoned material on the 
subject. 
This view of induction was just a part of Buridan’s comprehensive empiricist 
philosophy, a philosophy highly influential across Europe during the late fourteenth 
and all through the fifteenth century.123 One might expect his writings on induction 
to have had equal influence, but they did not, because they got overlooked and 
misrepresented. They were little reproduced and never printed. Here is what 
happened: Buridan wrote the Summulae as a textbook in two interlaced parts. The 
first part is an edited, paraphrased, and in places much extended version of Peter of 
Spain’s Tractatus. The second part is a running commentary thereon. Buridan’s 
                                                
123 For a forceful presentation of this influence, see Introduction to Buridan, Summulae de 
Dialectica, xxviii–xxx. 
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changes to the Tractatus were significant enough that the result constituted an 
important treatise in its own right and was reproduced as such without Buridan’s 
commentary. It was published as John Buridan’s treatise on logic several times 
from 1487 into the sixteenth century. As a significant text on logic, it warranted an 
accompanying commentary, but the commentary that circulated was not Buridan’s, 
but a shorter commentary written by one John Dorp (fl. 1393–1405). On the passages 
relating to induction, Buridan had followed Peter of Spain without much change 
and placed his disagreements and new proposals in his commentary. But now his 
commentary was replaced by Dorp’s more conventional one. So what circulated as 
John Buridan’s view on induction was in fact Peter of Spain’s conventional view, 
and Buridan’s own radical view was set aside. (It has never been printed in Latin. 
The English translation was first published in 2001.124) Though Buridan’s views on 
induction achieved some exposure in his commentary on the Metaphysics125 and the 
Physics,126 his most cogent and forceful writings on the subject were effectively lost, 
and what was presented as his own views were in fact Peter of Spain’s. 
If Buridan is a special case because what he wrote on induction was 
revolutionary but ignored, he is also special for being a transition between 
scholasticism and humanism. His life overlapped that of Ockham, and also that of 
                                                
124 Several of the tracts with the Summulae have recently been published, but treatise 6, the 
important one for induction, has not yet. 
125 Book II q.1 (fol. 8va) cited and quoted in Thijssen, “John Buridan and Nicholas or 
Autrecourt on Causality and Induction,” 248. 
126 Book I q.4 cited and quoted in ibid.: 250. 
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Petrarch (1304–1374), often called the founder of humanism. That there was a 
change in the study of logic from the medieval paradigm to a humanist one in the 
fifteenth century is well known and established.127 The new logic was as 
disputatious as the scholastic, but instead of training a student to memorize the 
categories, moods, figures, forms, and rules by which a syllogistic conclusion is 
drawn, it trained the disputant in a broader project, which included not just 
drawing the conclusion but developing the premises, and not just using canonical 
syllogistic forms but marshalling other types of argument as well. The first was 
formalized, highly structured, and centered around rigorous syllogistic reasoning. 
The second was oriented toward persuasiveness rather than formal rigor, more 
toward rhetorical than dialectical argument. With a comprehensive record of the 
history of induction behind us, we will be able to readily see the implications of this 
shift for understandings of induction. 
Four aspects of the shift were important for the history of induction. The first 
was the increase in scope. Interest rose in kinds of arguments beyond the syllogism. 
                                                
127 For overview and introduction to the literature, see E. J. Ashworth, “The Eclipse of 
Medieval Logic,” in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Normal Kretzmann, 
Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 787–96; Lisa 
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The second was a change in pedagogic material. Medieval logic traced its roots, 
whether through scholastics, Islamic writers, Peter, Boethius, the Alexandrians, 
Epicureans, or Stoics, back to the first few books of Aristotle’s Organon, especially 
to the Prior Analytics. The new logic found its home instead in the Topics, the 
catalog, whether Aristotle’s, Cicero’s or Boethius’s, of tools for composing a 
persuasive argument. The centrality of the Topics has given the new logic the name 
‘topics-logic.’128 Third, the preeminence of Cicero in humanist scholarship and the 
injunction to return to ancient sources broke the monopoly that Boethius’s De 
Topicis Differentiis had on the field. Aristotle’s own Topics and Cicero’s Topics gained 
attention. Both presented a different view of induction than Boethius’s. It was in 
Aristotle’s Topics that we found what I argued was his true view of induction. The 
fourth important aspect of the shift was access to the Platonic dialogues, which first 
became accessible with the rise of Greek literacy in the early fifteenth century and 
accelerated with the Latin translations late in the century. No student of rhetoric or 
persuasion can help but take notice of the dialogues of Socrates, the man known 
throughout antiquity as the inventor of induction. The Topics of Cicero and 
Aristotle and the Socratic dialogues of Plato all presented an understanding of 
induction different than the received view. The result would be disagreement, 
confusion, and eclecticism. The most important agent of change toward this end 
                                                
128 For the term, see Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 182. 
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was the Italian Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457).129 He brought Socrates, the Topics, and 
Cicero fully back into the discussion of induction. 
Cicero, who recall coined the term inductio, had been absent from the 
discussion of the subject since antiquity, but Valla begins a full chapter on 
induction in Repastinatio Dialectice et Philosophie (1439)130 with this: “Cicero defines 
induction as follows, and offers the following example.”131 Valla quotes Cicero’s 
definition and one of Cicero’s examples, and then writes, “Boethius, who followed a 
different school, disagrees with this definition and example.”132 Valla insists that 
Boethius has stolen and corrupted the proper view of induction, a view Valla 
associates partly with Cicero, and even more so with Socrates. Valla says that 
Boethius acts like someone who has stolen a horse and tries to hide the theft by 
cutting and dyeing the horse’s hair.133 Valla criticizes those who try to get around 
the fact that they cannot enumerate all of induction’s particulars by adding ‘et ita de 
singulis’ to account for the unobserved. This is fatuous (stultum), he says, for if the 
                                                
129 Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Valla,” in Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 19–36; Lisa Jardine, “Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual 
Origins of Humanist Dialectic,” History of Philosophy 15, no. 2 (1977): 143–64; Jardine, “Humanistic 
Logic,” 178–181; Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric 
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130 Lorenzo Valla, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, ed. Gianni Zippel (Padua: Antenore, 
1982), 345-352. 
131 “‘Inductionem’ Cicero sic diffinit, et hoc pandit exemplo:” Ibid., 3.16.1 p. 345, my 
translation. 
132 “Ab huius et diffinitione et exemplo discrepant Boetius, diversam sactam secutus.” Ibid., 
3.16.3 p. 346, my translation. 
133 Ibid., 3.16.5 p. 346. 
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claim is true, then it is just a statement of the conclusion. He similarly dismisses 
those who add the premise, ‘And these are all the particulars.’ Indeed, he insists, all 
attempts at rendering an induction as some kind of deduction miss the point that 
induction and deduction are two completely separate things, neither a form of the 
other.134 No previous writer on induction treated his predecessors as dismissively as 
Valla does his. He says that there have been multiple proposals about the nature of 
induction and some of those proposals are simply wrong. Many of what others have 
called instances of induction are not actually so. The only style of arguing, Valla 
says, that can properly be called induction is that of Socrates. This is a striking 
claim, since as mentioned earlier, Socrates never uses the term induction (epagōgē). It 
is a tribute to Valla’s wide reading of pre-Boethian writers that, contrary to the 
whole medieval tradition associating induction with Aristotelian syllogism, Valla 
associates induction rather with Socrates’ characteristic method. In this, Valla is 
recalling what Aristotle and Cicero said about Socrates and what Aristotle said 
about induction in his Topics. The canonical view of induction is succumbing to 
interpretations informed by a broader exposure to ancient and late antique 
philosophy. 
Valla’s successor in the campaign to promote topics-logic was the Dutch 
humanist Rudolph Agricola (1443/4–1485),135 whose De Inventione Dialectica would, 
                                                
134 Ibid., 3.16.14 p. 349. 
135 Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 181–4; Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the 
Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. 
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decades after his death, become a very popular textbook across Europe.136 He was 
as innovative as Valla in directing attention away from syllogisms and toward the 
complete discursive enterprise, and as with other humanists, his point of reference 
was not Aristotle, but Cicero, Quintilian, and Socrates. Unlike Valla, however, he 
has nothing new to say about induction and even misunderstands Cicero on the 
matter. Agricola says there are two perfect forms of arguing, induction and 
deduction.137 His example of induction is that we see the moon eclipsed when full 
several times, never see it eclipsed when not full, and conclude that the moon is 
eclipsed only when full. The example is conventionally scholastic. The particulars 
have no variety and are mere repetitions. Indeed enumeration, for Agricola, is the 
essence of induction. “To me it appears most correct to call induction enumeration, 
just as Cicero said it is a certain argumentation by enumeration of all parts.”138 It is 
characteristic of the new view to cite Cicero as the authority on induction, but this 
is not what Cicero said. For Cicero, induction is an open-ended process that does 
not require an enumeration of all instances, and in fact Cicero uses enumeratio to 
refer to a different process, a process of elimination.139 Unsatisfied with what he 
thinks is Cicero’s view, Agricola offers this supposed improvement: “In fact the 
name ‘induction’ fits better to imperfect enumeration, where a listener is induced 
                                                
136 Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 181. 
137 It is a minor innovation that he treats them in the Aristotelian and Ciceronian order rather 
than the scholastic. 
138 Rudolph Agricola, De Inventione Dialectica (Cologne: 1539), 2.18, p. 265, my translation. 
139 De Inventione, 1.29 (45); 1.45 (84). 
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by means of two or three propositions to believe something to be true of all.”140 
Thus although Agricola does not seem to realize it, he does in the end endorse what 
Cicero in fact held. Agricola offers three more examples and then has little more to 
say on induction, until a small but surprising and important use of the word in the 
penultimate chapter of the third and final book. In an example intended to 
demonstrate Agricola’s whole method at work, he describes a debate between two 
disputants.  
[One] asks whether it is admitted that the soul is better than the body. 
But this also must be built up from a Socratic induction. It must be asked 
whether the driver is superior to his chariot, the helmsman to his ship, 
the master to his house, and the ruler to his people, or in general 
whether he thinks that that which commands is superior to that which 
serves, and whether he thinks the body is ruled by the soul. Which if he 
concedes it, it will be necessary for him to concede that the soul is 
superior to the body.141  
Nothing in Agricola’s earlier treatment of induction prepares us for what he here 
calls ‘Socratic induction.’ He may have misunderstood Ciceronian induction, but 
he understood Socratic induction very well. This is an ideal example. The 
particulars are varied, the results depend on coming to understand the essential 
nature of ‘to command’ and ‘to be superior,’ and the conclusion is valid for 
instances beyond those surveyed. It would have been natural to find this example in 
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141 Ibid., 3.15, p. 447. As translated by Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 183, punctuation 
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a Socratic dialogue or in Cicero’s Topics. Agricola says little on induction, but 
importantly, in this popular textbook, he holds that the authorities on the matter 
are Cicero and Socrates. 
When Arabic commentators discovered a difference between what Aristotle 
said on the matter and what they inherited from sixth-century Alexandria, they 
held to the Alexandrian interpretation and declared Aristotle to be wrong. When 
the scholastics spotted the difference, they either ignored it, adopted even more of 
the Alexandrian synthesis than Arabic commentators had, or creatively introduced 
some new distinction. But when Buridan saw a conflict between the canonical 
reading of Prior Analytics 2.23 and the view of induction he found in the 
increasingly studied Posterior Analytics, he challenged the canonical understanding. 
When Valla identified a conflict between Boethian induction and Socratic, he 
rejected the established Boethius. When Agricola sought an ancient authority for 
induction, he chose Cicero and Socrates and not the conventionally understood 
Aristotle. As these and other scholars turned increasing attention to the Topics, 
whether Aristotle’s or Cicero’s, they found a view of logic and of induction at odds 
with the established syllogism-centered view of both. In the sixty years after 
Agricola’s death in 1485, under the continued pressure of a humanist preference for 
Cicero and for original sources of later altered ideas, the centuries-old consensus 
regarding what induction is, what makes an induction valid, and the relationship 
between induction and deduction collapsed, and from Italy to England, the old 
stability gave way to disagreement, confusion, and eclecticism.  
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In the 1480s, thirty years after the invention of printing in the mid-fifteenth 
century virtually everything one would read on induction told a common story. In 
the late fifteenth century, the most popular logic textbooks were still Peter of 
Spain’s 250-year-old Tractatus (with its 160 Renaissance printings) and Buridan’s 
150-year-old Summulae de Dialectica (which recall was essentially an edited version of 
Peter’s Tractatus). These remained the model for many others, including the 
popular college epitomes Libellus sophistarum ad usum Cantabrigiensium and Libellus 
sophistarum ad usum Oxoniensium.142 The Boethian translations of the Organon were 
still standard,  Boethius’s treatise on the Topics was still widely preferred to Cicero’s 
or Aristotle’s, and Boethius’s logical treatises were still popular and remained so 
into the sixteenth century.143 All these, as well as scholastic treatises and Arabic 
commentaries still widely read, presented essentially one view of induction. 
Starting in the 1480s, texts emerging from the presses offered a different view. 
In 1484, all of the Socratic dialogues became available in Marsilio Ficino’s new 
Latin translation.144 It thus became easier to see what Aristotle meant when he said 
Socrates introduced induction. Soon after (1495–98), nearly the whole Aristotelian 
                                                
142 Cantabrigiensium: published four times 1497–1524. Oxoniensium: published seven times 1499–
1530. Ashworth, “The Eclipse of Medieval Logic,” 788. 
143 Anthony Grafton, “Epilogue: Boethius in the Renaissance,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought 
and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 410–15; Lewry, “Boethian Logic in the 
Medieval West,” 121; F. Edward Cranz, A Bibliography of Aristotle Editions: 1501–1600, ed. Charles B. 
Schmitt, Second ed. (Baden-Baden: Valentin Koerner, 1984), xii–xiv; Henri Durel, “Francis Bacon 
lecteur d’Aristote à Cambridge,” Nouvelles de la République des Lettres (1998): 48. 
144 Plato, Opera, ed. Marsilio Ficino (Florence: Laurentius de Alopa, 1484). 
 138 
corpus was published by Aldus in the original Greek,145 facilitating new translations 
and further consideration of everything Aristotle had to say on epagōgē. Starting in 
1493, commentaries began to deal with the Organon as a whole instead of with books 
in isolation.146 Ancient Greek commentaries by Alexander, Philoponus, Simplicius, 
and others began to appear in Latin translations.147 Though these presented the 
received view of induction, they added new perspectives that needed to be 
integrated and reconciled. Editions of Cicero’s Topics, with its thoroughly Socratic 
view of induction, were printed in Venice in 1480, 1484, 1485, 1488, 1492 and 1495. 
Valla’s Repastinatio Dialectice et Philosophie came into print, and Agricola’s De 
Inventione was finally published in 1515. In 1525, the Aldine edition of Galen’s works 
in Greek revealed his comments on induction. In the 1520s, Aristotelian texts and 
commentaries in the established model dropped sharply.148 But a new and vigorous 
humanist Aristotelianism emerged just as sharply starting with the Latin Opera 
published in 1538.149 The 1540s saw new translations, new commentaries, and new 
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concerns. Underexplored works in the corpus such as the Posterior Analytics, De 
Generatione et Corruptione,150 and the Rhetoric151 attracted new attention. In some 
quarters the Posterior Analytics came to be seen as the book about induction and the 
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Jardine, “Humanistic Logic”; Eckhard Kessler, “Metaphysics or Empirical Science? The Two 
Faces of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century,” in Renaissance Readings of the 
Corpus Aristotelicum, ed. Marianne Pade (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001), 79-100; 
Charles Lohr, “The Sixteenth-Century Transformation of the Aristotelian Natural Philosophy,” in 
Aristotelismus und Renaissance, ed. Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr, and Walter Sparn 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), 89–99; Charles H. Lohr, “Metaphysics and Natural 
Philosophy as Science: the Catholic and the Protestant Views in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries,” in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle, ed. 
Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), 280–95. 
150 Kessler, “Metaphysics or Empirical Science? The Two Faces of Aristotelian Natural 
Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century.” 
151 Erickson, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research, 12. 
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Prior Analytics the book about deduction.152 Study of Aristotelian induction could 
no longer be limited to simply what was found in Prior Analytics 2.23. 
Students of induction were now faced with multiple traditions and 
inconsistent interpretations. Those who noticed the inconsistencies, like Buridan or 
Valla, pointed out that the conventional view was inconsistent with itself, with 
ancient authorities, or with both. But they offered no comprehensive new theory 
that would fully reconcile or integrate the valid criticisms that were being raised. 
They had started to tear down the old, but not yet build up the new. We will see in 
the next chapter a few theories of induction that emerged in this environment. For 
now, we may concretize the collapse of the consensus by looking at two events, one 
quickly and one in more depth, the first in Italy, the second in England. 
In the last book of the Topics, Aristotle had said that what induction is, is 
obvious, and in a short chapter in the first book, Aristotle offered a seemingly 
unambiguous description. Because of its simplicity and clarity, that passage was the 
first considered in this study. In 1542, in his commentary on that same chapter, the 
prolific and influential Paduan commentator Agostino Nifo wrote that the nature of 
                                                
152 Evidence for this comes from a humorous and unusual source. In 1544 the Protestant 
apologist Celio Secondo Curione, an Italian professor living in Switzerland, published a defense of 
Protestant views in the form of a tale. In the tale the character Pasquine recounts a trip he made to 
heaven. Before he learns how to get to heaven, Pasquine comes upon a friar. “He [the friar] 
complained that his father Prior commended much more that part of Aristotle called Posteriora, than 
the other called Priora, and that being in this preposterous opinion, he never used demonstrations, 
but only induction.” Celio Secondo Curione, Pasquine in a Traunce (London: 1566), 10r. 
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induction was in fact not obvious.153 “There is uncertainty about the definition of 
induction.”154 Nifo cites Alexander, Boethius, Philoponus, and Averroës, and what 
Aristotle himself wrote in the Prior Analytics, and concludes that there is in fact no 
consensus regarding what induction is.  There seems to be at least two opposing 
views. Is, for example, induction a kind of deduction or is it something else? If 
something else, is that something a kind of reasoning? If induction is a manner of 
speaking (oratio), how can it be defined as a progression or accession, which are 
motions from one place to another? If the same road leads both from Athens to 
Thebes and from Thebes to Athens, and induction is a progression from singulars 
to a universal, is it not also a progression from a universal to singulars? Must all 
singulars be included or are merely some sufficient? Is the result of an induction 
categorical or hypothetical? Is an induction one proposition or many? If induction 
is an argument, what is the middle term? Where does it come from? By what 
ability does the mind form inductions? These questions, Nifo noted, had no single 
answer, and Nifo offered some of his own, the spirit of which we will see in Paduan 
regressus theory in the next chapter. What Aristotle found obvious, Nifo found 
                                                
153 Agostino Nifo, Aristotelis Stagiritae Topicorum libri octo (Venice: Girolamo Scotto, 1557), 
18v–r, first published 1542. On Nifo, see Schmitt et al., eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, 688–9, 828; Dictionary of Scientific Biography, (New York: Scribner, 1970-90), s.v. “Nifo”; 
E. J. Ashworth, “Agostino’s Reinterpretation of Medieval Logic,” Rivista Critica di Storia Della 
Filosofia 31 (1976): 355–74. 
154 “dubitatur circa definitionem inductionis.” Nifo, Topicorum libri octo, 18r. 
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conflicted. And he made the observations while reviewing not the Prior Analytics, 
but the Topics.155 
Further evidence for breakdown of the consensus is a popular logic textbook 
in England in the mid-sixteenth century. The book, John Seton’s Dialectica, was 
first published in 1545 and was frequently reprinted, eventually with commentary, 
into the seventeenth century.156 While previous textbook treatments of induction 
were short, simple, and nearly identical in content, Seton’s was long, eclectic, and 
unique. In the book’s preface Seton explains that he intends to use the new work of 
Melanchthon and Agricola to prepare the student for further study of Aristotle.157 
For each subject, Seton presents, in larger typeface, a conventional overview and 
follows it with an expository commentary, in smaller typeface.158 The three-page 
chapter on induction begins, “Induction is an argument from several singulars to a 
universal, or a progression from parts to a whole.”159 This conventional description, 
little different from Peter of Spain’s, appears in the conventional scholastic location, 
                                                
155 Nifo’s view on induction, and those of the Paduan line of thinkers in general, warrant 
considerable research.  
156 John Seton, Dialectica (London: 1545). Seton receives substantive treatment in Howell, 
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 49–56. The textbook is set within the context of logic 
textbooks emerging in the period in Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 
32–33; and Lisa Jardine, “The Place of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge,” Studies 
in the Renaissance 21 (1974): 54–57. 
157 Seton, Dialectica, prefatory epistle. 
158 In the many editions after the second (1574), Seton’s comments were followed by further 
commentary provided by Peter Carter.  
159 “Inductio est argumentation a pluribus singularibus ad vniuersale: vel, a partibus ad totum 
progression.” Seton, Dialectica, bk. 3, K2r, my translation..  
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i.e., after an extended treatment of the syllogism and before short chapters on 
enthymeme and example. Seton offers two examples and short elaborations. Then 
he begins to deviate from the scholastic treatment. In one of his examples, he adds, 
almost conventionally, “and in no others is the contrary to be seen,”160 but 
otherwise says nothing about whether or how the premises of an induction account 
for the unobserved, an issue previously considered crucial. He then compares 
induction to the syllogism, but instead of saying that an induction is a kind of 
abbreviated syllogism that gains its force by inclusion of ‘et cetera,’ he says, “It is 
said that induction is an inverted syllogism, because in a syllogism as such an 
argument descends from a universal and, on the other hand, in an induction the 
argument rises from singulars and ascends.”161 In this he is returning to a theme 
more typical of the Aristotelian corpus outside its Neoplatonic interpretations. He 
also recalls Aristotelian language in using inductio and epagōgē interchangeably, 
apparently comfortable that his reader is equally familiar with the Greek term. 
Multiple lines of thought become more apparent as we move through Seton’s 
commentary. He says that principles of sciences can be established only by 
induction, recalling the Posterior Analytics. Not fully consistent with that, however, 
he then says that “Induction is said by Agricola to be enumeration.”162 He returns 
to themes from Posterior Analytics 2.19 by saying that the universal is a notion 
                                                
160 “nec in caeteris est contrarium videre.” Ibid., my translation. 
161 “Dicitur inductio inuersus syllogismus, quia sicut in syllogismo ab vniuersali descendit, ita 
e contrario in inductione a singulari inchoatur, & ascendit argumentation.” Ibid., bk. 3, K3v. 
162 “Inductio dicitur ab Agricola enumeratio.” Ibid., bk.3, K3v. 
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(notio), developed by the mind (mens), which some sharpness (acrimonia) of the 
spirit (anima) can ascertain from similarities held in memory. His source for this, he 
says, is the ancient Greek commentator Themistius, whose paraphrase of the 
Posterior Analytics was printed many times from 1499 through 1560.163 Seton then 
attempts to place induction in the context of the new topics-logic, first using the 
language of the new humanist writings on invention and judgment, then 
paraphrasing passages from Aristotle’s Topics. He then says that “induction is called 
Socratic, because Socrates used it so frequently,”164 and gives a good example of 
Socratic induction involving whether the best of something is also the best stock. 
Seton paraphrases material Aristotle presented in the Topics and the Rhetoric about 
how to use induction most effectively and ends by referring to Plato and Cicero as 
the source for the best inductions. In Seton’s chapter on induction therefore, nearly 
all the traditions on induction make an appearance, but little attempt is made to 
reconcile them. It is not clear whether Seton recognized the incongruities. The 
multiple lines of thought were incorporated, but not integrated. Seton’s treatment 
is representative of the eclecticism and confusion that now prevailed regarding 
induction. 
 
                                                
163 Themistius, Expositiones in Posteriora Aristotelis (Venice: Bartholomeum de Zanis de 
Tortesio, 1499). 
164 “Inductio appellatur Socratica, propterea quod ea Socrates, creberrime usus est.” Seton, 
Dialectica, bk. 3, K3r. 
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3 
 
Debating Induction: 
Aristotelianisms of 1575–1600 
 
 
 
By the 1540s, the medieval consensus regarding the nature of induction had 
collapsed. This was not perceived to be a major problem warranting focused 
attention—not until the Novum Organum in 1620 would there be a treatise dedicated 
to induction—but it did leave theoreticians free to incorporate differing views of 
induction into their larger epistemological systems. This chapter considers aspects 
of four such systems of the late sixteenth century, four that are important (or 
proposed to be important) for the subsequent history of induction, viz., those of 
Jacopo Zabarella in Padua, Everard Digby and William Temple at Cambridge, and 
John Case at Oxford. Zabarella, whose logical works were published from 1578 to 
1590, was probably Europe’s leading Aristotelian. He was a major advocate for a 
methodology called ‘regressus,’ a system in which—it has been proposed—
induction played an important and influential role. Digby, though an avowed 
Aristotelian, in fact represents the beginnings of a new Neoplatonism at 
Cambridge. His ideas are likely the object of some of Bacon’s attacks. In 1580–82 
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Digby engaged in a pamphlet war with Temple, England’s leading advocate for the 
educational approaches of the continental reformer Peter Ramus. In the midst of 
that debate, Temple reveals stong views about induction that are not commonly 
associated with Ramus. Bacon later acknowledges that a core Ramist teaching lay 
at the foundation of his own thinking on induction. John Case represents humanist 
Aristotelianism in England in the 1580s and 90s. At least one of Bacon’s key and 
now famous ideas is first found in Case’s writings. These four thinkers represent 
leading factions in an epistemological debate underway while Bacon was developing 
his ideas for the Novum Organum. We can better understand Bacon’s contribution 
if we better understand the conversation he entered.1 
Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589) 
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Zabarella’s writings 
were well known throughout Europe and in England. He has also been well 
known in the twentieth century, largely because of an hypothesized influence on 
early modern natural philosophy. A component of that hypothesis is that natural 
philosophers at the University of Padua, especially Galileo, enthusiastically adopted 
Zabarella’s regressus, that induction is one half of a regressus (deduction being the 
other), and that therefore Zabarella in effect introduced induction into early modern 
                                                
1 A more comprehensive account would consider Protestant reformers in Germany such as 
Phillip Melanchton, the Portuguese Jesuit Collegium Conimbricenses such as Pedro Fonseca, and 
others in Padua besides Zabarella. Preliminary research suggests there was little development in 
induction theory in the first two schools that is not reflected in the Englishmen in our sample, but 
the third surely warrants further study. 
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natural philosophy. No survey of the history of induction would be complete 
without considering Zabarella. After reviewing his biography, the genesis of the 
twentieth-century interpretation will be examined. A close reading of Zabarella’s 
writings other than those typically considered and an examination of his views in 
light of the now understood medieval background will challenge the widely held 
view of induction’s role in regressus. This analysis will give a more accurate 
account of Zabarella’s contribution to the period’s conversation on induction.  
Jacopo Zabarella was born in 1533 in Padua to a wealthy family. He graduated 
from the University of Padua with his doctoral degree in 1553. He was appointed to 
the chair of logic at the university in 1564 and chair of natural philosophy in 1569. In 
his personal life, he inherited a sizable fortune; in his professional life, he inherited 
and brought to its most mature development a vigorous tradition of Paduan 
Aristotelianism. 
Padua had long been a great center of both scholastic learning and natural 
philosophy, especially medicine. Albert the Great studied there in the thirteenth 
century. Already then professors such as Peter of Abano were advocating the 
integrated study of logic and natural philosophy,2 and the study of Aristotle 
flourished. Over time Thomist, Scotist, Averroist, and Alexandrian interpretations 
of Aristotle were all represented. In the fifteenth century, with the rise of 
                                                
2 Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, 157; Pearl Kirbe and Nancy G. 
Siraisi, “The Institutional Setting: The Universities,” in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. 
Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 133–41. 
 148 
humanism and a growing awareness of Plato,  Aristotelian commentary was 
brought to bear on subjects such as the immortality of the soul. Leading 
Aristotelian commentators were Nicoletto Vernia (1420–1499), Pietro Pomponazzi 
(1462–1525), and Agostino Nifo (1473?–?1538). As the sixteenth century advanced, 
increasing attention was turned toward natural philosophy and Aristotle’s 
contribution thereto. Copernicus studied medicine in Padua in 1501–3, as later in 
the century did William Harvey. Vesalius taught there in the 1540s, Fabricius from 
1562 to 1613. Galileo taught mathematics from 1592 to 1610. In Zabarella’s days, 
Padua had a prominence in natural philosophy and scholastic study of Aristotle 
unmatched in Europe. Shakespeare called it “fair Padua, nursery of the arts.”3 
In the late sixteenth century, Zabarella was Padua’s most distinguished 
Aristotelian. His writings were extensive and widely read well into the seventeenth 
century. His most important works were on methods of logic and natural 
philosophy. They included Opera Logica (1578), Tabulae Logicae (1580), De Naturalis 
Scientiae Constitutione (1586), De Rebus Naturalibus (1590) and many commentaries on 
Aristotle. His works were well known in England. Zabarella died, in Padua, in 
1589.4 
                                                
3 The Taming of the Shrew, 1.2.2. Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 105. 
4 Brief biographical sketches appear in Dictionary of Scientific Biography,; and Schmitt et al., 
eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 841. The fullest available biographical material 
appears in William F. Edwards, “The Logic of Iacopo Zabarella,” (Columbia University 
dissertation, 1960), 1–82. 
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Through nearly the whole twentieth century, there has been a debate among 
historians and philosophers of science regarding the extent to which Zabarella’s 
ideas influenced early modern natural philosophers.5 Central to that debate has been 
induction and the way Zabarella incorporated it into his methodological system. 
                                                
5 Important documents in the debate have been, in chronological order (pro) Ernst Cassirer, 
Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit, 2nd, revised ed., vol. 1 
(1922; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), 136–44, first published in 1906; 
(pro) John Herman Randall, Jr., “The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 2 (1940): 177-206; (con) Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of 
Method (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1960); (con) Neal W. Gilbert, “Galileo 
and the School of Padua,” Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1963): 223-31; (pro) William F. 
Edwards, “Randall on the Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua—a Continuing 
Reappraisal,” in Naturalism and Historical Understanding: Essays on the Philosophy of John Herman 
Randall, Jr., ed. John P. Anton (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967), 53–68; (con) 
Harold Skulsky, “Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind,” Journal for the History 
of Philosophy 6, no. 4 (1968): 341–62; (con) Charles B. Schmitt, “Experience and Experiment: a 
Comparison of Zabarella’s View with Galileo’s in De motu,” Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969): 80–
138; Nicholas Jardine, “Galileo’s Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976): 277-318; (con) Paolo Rossi, “The Aristotelians and the ‘Moderns’: 
Hypothesis and Nature,” Annali Dell’Istituto e Museo di Storia Della Scienza di Ferenze 7 (1982): 3–27; 
Luigi Olivieri, ed., Aristotelismo Veneto e Scienza Moderna (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1983); (pro) 
William A. Wallace, Galileo and His Sources: The Heritage of the Collegio Romano in Galileo’s Science 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); (con) Heikki Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to 
Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences (Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura, 1992); (pro) William A. Wallace, “Circularity and the Paduan Regressus: From 
Pietro d’Abano to Galileo Galilei,” Vivarium 33, no. 1 (1995): 76–97. Surveys of the debate appear in 
Bruce S. Eastwood, “On the Continuity of Western Science from the Middle Ages: A. C. 
Crombie’s Augustine to Galileo,” Isis 83, no. 1 (1992): 84–99; H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: 
A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 279–84; and 
Sean Martin O’Connor, “Regressus and the Scientific Revolution: A Defense of Zabarella’s 
Contribution to Scientific Method” (Master’s Thesis, Arizona State University Department of 
Philosophy, 1995).  
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Given the prominence of induction in early modern natural philosophy, given that 
we can trace the idea back to Aristotle, given that the most advanced place for 
Aristotelian scholarship at the beginning of the scientific revolution was Padua, 
given that so many of the founders of that revolution, including Galileo and 
Harvey, taught or studied there, and given that at the time Zabarella was at the 
pinnacle of Aristotelian scholarship, it is natural to suspect we will find a new 
concept, theory, or prominence for induction in Zabarella’s writings. Indeed, 
induction does play a role in Zabarella’s scientific methodology, but it is not the 
role generally believed. To properly assess Zabarella’s influence on inductive 
science, we need to first understand Zabarella’s concept of induction. 
The core of Zabarella’s scientific epistemology6 is the theory of regressus, a 
two-part procedure for coming to know things in natural philosophy.7 One part, 
                                                
6 Considering how much interest Randall’s article has received in the English-speaking world, 
there is in that world surprisingly little literature dedicated to Zabarella. No English translations 
have been published. The only two monograph-length treatments in English are the unpublished 
dissertation, Edwards, “The Logic of Iacopo Zabarella,” and the Finnish work Mikkeli, An 
Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences . 
The Italian reprint of De Methodis and De Regressu, Jacopo Zabarella, De Methodis Libri Quatuor; 
Liber De Regressu (Venice: Paulus Meietus, 1578; reprint, edited by Cesare Vasoli, Bologna: 
CLUEB, 1985), contains an introduction in English. There is a German translation of De Methodis 
and De Regressu, Jacopo Zabarella, Über die Methoden (De Methodis); Über den Rückgang, trans. 
Rudolpf Schicker (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1995), which contains an introduction and also a 
bibliography. Though that bibliography is comprehensive and includes works in English, German 
and Italian, it lists only forty secondary works, many only tangentially related to Zabarella. 
Zabarella’s works other than De Methodis and De Regressu have received very little attention. 
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resolution, infers causes from observed effects. The other, composition, infers 
effects from causes. Resolution comes first, because—consistent with the 
Aristotelian tradition—it is by way of the senses that we come to know anything 
and what we perceive are the sensible effects of (sometimes hidden) causes. By 
resolution we infer those causes from what we perceive. Once we understand 
causes we, in the composition half of the regressus, infer effects from the causes and 
in so doing come to explain and understand those effects, for—again consistent with 
the Aristotelian tradition—to fully know something is to know its cause. 
Resolution infers causes from effects; composition infers effects from causes. 
Zabarella describes the combined use of these two in De Methodis and the shorter 
De Regressu, both published as part of Opera Logica in 1578. 
In 1906, Ernst Cassirer drew attention to the popularity in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century of Zabarella’s writings and especially those on 
regressus. He suggested a possible connection between that popularity and the rise 
of early modern scientific method, especially the method of Galileo. He also began 
an association between regressus and induction that is, in fact, not in Zabarella. 
Here is how the association got made. Cassirer dedicates several pages in Das 
                                                                                                                                       
7 A concise and informed treatment of regressus theory (not just Zabarellian) appears in 
Nicholas Jardine, “Epistemology of the Sciences,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 686–93. 
Extended and important treatments appear in Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, vol. 1: 1500-1640 
(Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1964), ch. 4-5; and Kosman, “The Aristotelian Backgrounds of 
Bacon’s Novum Organum.” The structure of regressus will be treated further below. 
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Erkenntnisproblem to Zabarella.8 He describes regressus and its complementary 
methods of resolution and composition. He then writes, 
The meaning of these remarks [Zabarella’s remarks] becomes clear as 
soon as we translate them into modern language. The distinction 
between the compositive and the resolutive methods is a matter of the 
contrast between deduction and induction.9  
A confusion ensues, for ‘deduction and induction’ are not just terms in ‘modern 
language.’ They are also terms Zabarella uses. Cassirer selectively quotes a few such 
uses10 and leaves the impression that Zabarella considers induction to be the same 
as resolution. He then credits Zabarella with “a reorganization and reinterpretation 
of the Aristotelian concept of experience into the modern concept of analytic 
induction.”11  
This near identification of the modern concept of induction with Zabarella’s 
concept of resolution pervades the twentieth-century debate on Zabarella’s 
influence on early modern science. Randall says, without citation, that induction 
was first formally identified with resolution (or actually, with ‘demonstratio quia,’ 
which Zabarella does regularly identify with resolution) by Zabarella’s teacher 
                                                
8 Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit, 136–144. 
9 “Die Bedeutung dieser Ausführungen Zabarellas ergibt sich uns sofort, sobald wir sie in 
moderne Sprache übersetzen. In der Unterscheidung von kompositiver und resolutiver Methode 
handelt es sich um den Gegensatz von Deduktion und Induktion.” Ibid., 137, my translation. 
10 Ibid., 138–40. 
11 “Eine Umbildung und Umdeutung des Aristotelischen Erfahrungsbegriffs in den modernen 
Begriff der analytischen Induktion.” Ibid., 140, my translation. 
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Bernardinus Tomitanus.12 Randall then says that Zabarella followed “his teacher 
Tomitanus in making ‘induction’ a form of the method of resolution.”13 There is a 
subtle and not inconsequential inconsistency here. John Herman Randall said that 
Tomitanus considered induction and resolution the same thing, then that Zabarella 
followed Tomitanus regarding this, but then that Zabarella identified induction as 
just one kind of resolution. I have not been able to find a relevant passage in 
Tomitanus to confirm which he held, but Zabarella certainly believed the second, 
that induction is just one kind of resolution, exactly what kind to be discussed 
below. But this subtlety was frequently overlooked by subsequent commentators,14 
and even the more careful commentators who maintain the distinction often leave 
                                                
12 Randall, “The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” 196. The claim 
is repeated, again without detailed citation, by Giovanni Papuli, “La Teoria del Regressus Come 
Metodo Scientifico Negli Autori della Scuola di Padova,” in Aristotelismo Veneto e Scienza Moderna, 
ed. Luigi Olivieri (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1983), 255; by Wallace, “Circularity and the Paduan 
Regressus: From Pietro d’Abano to Galileo Galilei,” who cites Randall and Papuli; and without 
reference by Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition .  
13 Randall, “The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” 198, emphasis 
added. 
14 This confusion pervades A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science, A.D. 
400–1650 (London: Falcon Press, 1952); A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of 
Experimental Science 1100–1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); and appears in Skulsky, “Paduan 
Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind,” 341; Edwards, “Randall on the Development of 
Scientific Method in the School of Padua—a Continuing Reappraisal,” 54, “the principia discovered 
by resolutive (inductive) method”; and Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s 
Knowledge Tradition, 232–36.  
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the impression that induction is the normal or most important kind of resolution.15 
But for Zabarella, induction is only a kind of resolution, and in fact, peripheral, 
positively powerless for the discovery of the most important scientific principles, 
and usually not even worth mentioning. As a component in a normal regressus, 
induction is no more a part of resolution than of composition. 
Commentators on the debate about the influence of regressus typically 
concentrate their attention on chapter 4 of the short De Regressus and on De 
Methodis, book 3, chapter 19. None of these commentators has drawn attention to 
the focused and extended treatments of induction in the Tabulae Logica, in 
Zabarella’s commentary on the Posterior Analytics, in De Methodis book 3, chapter 3, 
or in De Methodis book 4, chapter 13. To fully understand Zabarella’s view on 
induction let us consider these in turn.16 
                                                
15 Examples include Jardine, “Galileo’s Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” 277, 
and Wallace, “Circularity and the Paduan Regressus: From Pietro d’Abano to Galileo Galilei,” 92. 
Wilhelm Risse, “Zabarellas Methodenlehre,” in Aristotelismo Veneto e Scienza Moderna, ed. Luigi 
Olivieri (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1983), 155–72, further develops Cassirer’s idea that the first step 
in a regressus is what is now called analytic induction. 
16 Comments about what Zabarella thought of induction appear throughout the literature on 
regressus. Besides those mentioned in the text, concentrated treatments include Randall, “The 
Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” 203, in which Randall mistakenly treats 
induction as the paradigmatic case of resolution; Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, 286, in which Risse 
adopts Cassirer’s misassociation of resolution with analytic induction; Skulsky, “Paduan 
Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind”; Jardine, “Galileo’s Road to Truth and the 
Demonstrative Regress,” 299-300, in which Jardine describes Zabarella’s account as inconsistent, 
which I do not think is correct (it appears inconsistent only if we accept Caissirer’s attempt to equate 
induction and resolution); Risse, “Zabarellas Methodenlehre,” esp. 164, in which Risse pursues a 
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In a section of Tabulae Logicae entitled De Inductione, Zabarella writes 
(presented as he presents it), 
There is no one who denies induction to be a logical instrument by 
which, from better known particulars, an unknown universal is shown, 
and it is of two types:  
Perfect, which concludes 
necessarily, because it takes 
in all particulars; for 
example, if we suppose that 
there are no other 
individual men than these 
three, Peter, Socrates, and 
Plato, this will be a perfect 
induction. 
Imperfect, which does not 
conclude necessarily, because 
it does not take in all 
particulars; for example, if 
we suppose that there are 
other men than Peter, 
Socrates, and Plato, this will 
be an imperfect induction. 
Peter, Socrates and Plato are biped; therefore every man is 
biped. 
Following the wise Aristotle, considering the nature and force of 
induction, we say that induction shows the first term to belong to the 
                                                                                                                                       
promising approach in attempting to untangle Zabarella’s topology with distinctions between 
different kinds of induction; and Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo 
Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences, an admirable attempt to bring a fresh perspective and a 
close reading of Zabarella’s text to the debate. Also demonstrating much more attention to the texts 
and less reliance on the Randall thesis is the very recent James South, “Zabarella, Prime Matter, and 
the Theory of Regressus,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26, no. 2 (2005): 79–98. 
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middle through the third, and that a perfect induction is reduced to the 
correct form of the syllogism and to the useful mode of the first figure.17 
This is all a purely conventional scholastic understanding of induction, using 
language and structure of presentation that derive directly from the Alexandrian 
Neoplatonic interpretation of Prior Analytics 2.23. Zabarella continues at length 
along the same vein, drawing on the scholastic language of syllogistic figures and 
convertibility, stressing repeatedly that perfect induction concludes necessarily and 
imperfect induction does not, because a perfect induction can be rendered as a 
syllogism and an imperfect one cannot. He proceeds by saying there are two kinds 
of perfect induction. In the first, “all individuals are singularly and expressly 
named.”18 In the second, “not all are expressly named, but only a certain number 
are stated, and we briefly denote the rest implicitly by virtue of some distributive 
                                                
17 “Nemo est, qui ignoret inductionem esse logicum instrumentum, quo ex particularibus 
notioribus ostenditur vniuersale ignotius, eam que duplicem esse.  
Perfectam, quae necessario 
concludit, quia sumit omnia 
particularia, vt si supponamus non 
dari alium indiuiduum hominem 
praeter hos tres, Petrum, Socratem, 
& Platonem, haec erit inductio 
perfecta 
Imperfectam, quae non necessario 
concludit, quia non sumit omnia 
particularia, vt si supponamus dari 
alios singulares homines praeter 
Petrum, Socratem, & Platonem, haec 
erit inductio imperfecta 
Petrus, Socrates, & Plato sunt bipedes ergo omnis homo est bipes 
Sed cum Arist. profundis inductionis naturam, & vim consyderando dicimus inductionem 
ostendere primum inesse medio per tertium, & et inductionem quidem perfectam ad rectam 
syllogismi formam, et vtilem primae figurae modum redigi.” Jacopo Zabarella, Tabulae Logicae 
(Venice: Paulus Meietus, 1604), 66. All translations of Zabarella are mine unless otherwise noted. 
18 “nominantur singillatim, & expresse omnia indiuidua.” Ibid., 67. 
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statement, as saying, Peter is biped and Socrates is biped and any other individual 
man is biped; therefore every man is biped.”19 Zabarella’s view is not only 
conservative, but retrograde. He shows no sensitivity to the issues introduced by 
Buridan or Valla (e.g., how it is possible, if at all, to keep the argument from being 
question-begging), and whereas his fellow Paduan, Nifo, had earlier acknowledged 
debate over what induction is, Zabarella disregards any such disagreement.  
Note that, on Zabarella’s account, there is a difference between the following 
two arguments: ‘Peter is biped and Socrates is biped; therefore every man is biped.’ 
and ‘Peter is biped, Socrates is biped, and any other man is biped; therefore every 
man is biped.’ The first is an imperfect induction and thus invalid. The second is a 
perfect and legitimate induction. Though the particulars have not all been 
enumerated, the induction has been perfected by inclusion of the phrase ‘and any 
other man is biped.’ In summary, (assuming a population of A, B, C and D) there 
are, according to Zabarella, three kinds of induction: 
 
                                                
19 “non nominantur omnia expresse, sed aliqua tantum exprimuntur, reliqua vero implicite 
denotamus breuitatis gratia per dictionem aliquam distributiuam, vt dicendo, Petrus est bipes, & 
Socrates est bipes, & quilibet alius, seu singulus alius homo est bipes, ergo omnis homo est bipes.” 
Ibid.  
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A, B, C, D are biped. 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Perfect Valid 
A, B are biped; 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Imperfect Invalid 
A, B, etc. are biped; 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Perfect Valid 
 
For an example of the second type of perfect induction, Zabarella refers his reader 
to Aristotle’s argument in the first few sentences of the Posterior Analytics. As 
Zabarella wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics, we can follow his 
understanding of the passage. 
Aristotle’s work begins, “All teaching and all learning of an intellectual kind 
proceed from pre-existent knowledge. This will be clear if we study all the cases: 
the mathematical sciences are acquired in this way, and so is each of the other 
arts.”20 In his comments, Zabarella says that Aristotle’s argument here is an 
inductive one in which Aristotle intends to include such fields as arithmetic and 
geometry under the heading ‘mathematical sciences’ and then to complete the 
induction by adding ‘and so is each of the other arts,’ “just as when we might say, 
‘This man, and that, and any other one is risible,’ and it is to be assumed that none 
is left out, and it only remains for the universal to be inferred; ‘therefore, every man 
is risible.’”21 But, Zabarella asks himself, “how is Aristotle able to prove the 
                                                
20 Posterior Analytics, 1.1 71a1–5, Barnes’ revised translation. 
21 “vt quum dicimus, hic homo, & ille, & quilibet alius est risibilis, nil enim aliud 
assumendum relinquitur, sed solum superest vt inferatur vniuersale, ergo omnis homo est risibilis.” 
Jacopo Zabarella, “In Duos Aristotelis Libros Posteriores Analyticos Commentarii,” in Logica Opera 
(Venice: Paulus Meietus, 1604), 326. 
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universal proposition?”22 That is, what justifies sweeping all the unobserved under 
‘etc.’ or the like? Zabarella says the answer lies in the fact that the propositions here 
being discussed are a certain kind of principle, principles “which are called known 
‘per se.’”23 For more on principles known ‘per se,’ he refers the reader to the final 
chapter of the Posterior Analytics.24 
An understanding of the difference between the Scholastic concepts per se and  
de omni is crucial to understanding not only Zabarella’s concept of induction, but—
as we will see later—for understanding the genesis of Francis Bacon’s, too. The 
distinction derives from Posterior Analytics 1.4.25 An attribute applies de omni if it 
applies to a subject in each and every case; such perfect correlation may be 
coincidental or it may be necessary. On the other hand, an attribute applies per se if 
it applies by the essential natures of the subject and the attribute; the fact cannot be 
a coincidence. To use Aristotle’s examples,26 a line is an attribute of all triangles per 
se, because having lines is an essential characteristic of being a triangle; straight (or 
curved) is a per se attribute of line, for the very definition of straight includes the 
                                                
22 “quomodo potest Aristoteles illam propositionem vniuersalem probare.” Ibid. 
23 “quae per se nota dicuntur.” Ibid. 
24 Ibid. The final chapter in Posterior Analytics is book 2, chapter 19 in our numbering, book 2, 
chapter 15 in Zabarella’s. 
25 The distinction is a standard topic of Aristotelian and scholastic commentary. Barnes’ 
modern commentary on the chapter, Jonathan Barnes, “Commentary,” in Posterior Analytics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 110–22, runs about twelve pages as does Zabarella’s own. My 
introduction covers only the minimum required for following Zabarella and then later Bacon. I leave 
aside whether the understanding by Zabarella and the scholastics is a correct reading of Aristotle. 
26 Posterior Analytics, 1.3 73a14, 1.4 73a37, 73b22.  
 160 
concept of line. On the other hand, all men may be walking, but if so that is just a 
coincidence; such walking would be an attribute of man de omni but not per se. To 
follow Zabarella’s forthcoming logic, note that if something is true per se, it is also 
true de omni. 
Consider now that final chapter of Posterior Analytics. This is the chapter in 
which Aristotle describes how essential and universal knowledge is gathered from 
sense-perception and memories thereof. It is the core chapter in Aristotle that 
commentators find difficult to reconcile with the conventional scholastic 
interpretation of Prior Analytics 2.23. The chapter in Posterior Analytics seems to 
indicate that induction is an open-ended process that provides valid conceptual 
knowledge of things not observed, yet the conventional interpretation of Prior 
Analytics 2.23 is that induction is valid only if all particulars are observed. In a 
commentary on Posterior Analytics, Zabarella must reconcile these, for he considers 
Prior Analytics 2.23 the definitive statement of what induction is.27 Zabarella 
performs his reconciliation by introducing what he calls ‘demonstrative 
induction.’28 
Two steps are involved in demonstrative induction. In the first,  
                                                
27 Every one of Zabarella’s significant discussions of induction in the Opera Logica explicitly 
cites that passage as its point of reference. De Methodis 3.3, 3.19; Posteriores Analyticos Commentarii, 
1.1, 2.4, 2.15.  
28 He attributes the term to Averroës. De Methodis 3.14; De Regressu 4; Posteriores Analyticos 
Commentarii 2.15. 
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we do not enumerate all the singulars, because with only a few the 
intellect begins to observe the essential connection of the two terms 
[subject and predicate]. Thus while not enumerating the other 
individuals, the intellect immediately forms the universal based on the 
few.29 
The universal is grasped ‘immediately,’ that is, without the mediation of a middle 
term. The connection is simply grasped “by its own light,” “proprio lumine.”30 The 
result is that the mind comes to recognize that the attribute is true per se. Zabarella 
holds, for example, that being biped and being risible are per se features of man. 
After observing a few men, the intellect simply grasps that these features are a 
necessary aspect of man’s essence. The second step of a demonstrative induction 
uses the fact that what is true per se is true de omni to give the induction the same 
force as a demonstrative syllogism. It is thus legitimate to say, ‘Peter is biped and 
Socrates is biped and any other individual man is biped; therefore every man is 
biped,’ or ‘This man, and that, and any other one is risible; therefore, every man is 
risible.’ In the language of Prior Analytics 2.23, ‘Peter and Socrates and any other 
individual man’ is seen by an intellectual grasp to be convertible with ‘man,’ thus 
rendering the induction as a demonstrative, first-figure syllogism: 
                                                
29 “non enumeramus omnia singularia, quia in paucis intellectus incipit conspicari essentialem 
connexum duorum terminorum, ideo neglecta reliquorum indiuiduorum enumeratione statim ex 
illis paucis colligit vniuersale.” Zabarella, “In Duos Aristotelis Libros Posteriores Analyticos 
Commentarii,” 2.15, 650. 
30 De Methodis, 3.19 p.180; Posteriores Analyticos Commentarii, 1.2, p. 649. 
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  Peter, Socrates, and any other man are biped. 
  Every man is Peter, Socrates, and any other man. 
  Therefore, every man is biped. 
By the two steps,31 justified by the insight that being biped is essential to being 
man, an inconclusive induction has been rendered as a demonstrative induction. 
The requirement from Prior Analytics 2.23 for full enumeration has been reconciled 
with the open-end nature of induction of Posterior Analytics 2.19 by claiming that in 
the latter passage, Aristotle is discussing not induction in general, but 
demonstrative induction in particular.  
The kind of induction that is not demonstrative induction, Zabarella 
elsewhere calls “dialectical induction.”32 Dialectical induction requires all 
particulars to be observed to be valid. Demonstrative induction does not. Thus, the 
summary of kinds of induction is now: 
                                                
31 cf. Tabulae Logicae, 67. Stated more technically, the steps are the following. (Step 1) ‘Peter, 
Socrates, and any other man are biped; Peter and Socrates and any other man are men; therefore, 
every man is biped.’ This is a third-figure syllogism and as such is not valid. But a third-figure 
syllogism can be converted to a first-figure syllogism by conversion of the minor premise. 
Conversion of the minor (Step 2) is here justified by the recognition that biped is a per se attribute, 
and therefore a de omni attribute. The resulting syllogism, ‘Peter, Socrates, and any other man are 
biped; all men are Peter, Socrates, and any other man; therefore, every man is biped,’ is a valid first-
figure syllogism in Barbara. 
32 De Regressu, 1. 
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A, B, C, D are biped. 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Perfect Valid Dialectical 
A, B are biped; 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Imperfect Invalid Dialectical 
A, B, etc. are biped; 
Therefore, all are biped. 
Perfect Valid Demonstrative 
 
Zabarella’s defense of demonstrative induction is both circular and unoriginal. As I 
said above, Zabarella’s understanding of induction is not only not innovative, it is 
retrograde. Over 140 years earlier, Valla had mocked the very line of reasoning 
Zabarella is using. But these problems need not detain us, for our current task is 
not to evaluate whether Zabarella’s demonstrative induction is valid, but to identify 
its relation to Zabarellian regressus. 
Regressus is a combination of two procedures. “The one, which the Greeks 
call ‘curios apodeixin’ or ‘apodeixin tou dioti,’ and we commonly call ‘demonstratio 
potissima’ or ‘demonstratio propter quid,’ is called in the highest sense the 
demonstrative method.”33  Zabarella says it proceeds from cause to effect and may 
also be called compositio. The second proceeds from effect to cause and is called 
resolutio. “The Greeks call this method ‘sullogismon tou oti’ or ‘dia semeion’; it is 
commonly called by us ‘demonstratio quia,’ or the ‘syllogism a signo,’ or 
demonstration of the second grade.”34  The synonyms are important. They will 
                                                
33 “altera per excellentiam demonstratiua methodus dicitur, quam Graeci curiw~ ajpovdeixin, 
vel ajpovdeixin tou` diovti vocant, nostri potissimam demonstrationem, vel demonstrationem propter 
quid appellare consueuerunt.” De Methodis, 3.4, 134 [154]. 
34 “methodum hanc Graeci, sullogismo;n tou` o{ti, vel dia; shmeivwn, nostri demonstrationem 
quia, vel syllogismum a signo, vel secundi gradus demonstrationem.” De Methodis, 3.4, 134 [154]. 
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later help us understand the relationship between induction and regressus. (Note 
that inductio does not appear in either list.) The synonyms also help us understand 
the Aristotelian background. 
The distinction Zabarella is making goes back to Posterior Analytics 1.13,35 
where Aristotle distinguishes knowledge of the fact (hoti) from knowledge of the 
reasoned fact (dioti). He contrasts two syllogisms. 
Knowledge of the fact:  Knowledge of the reasoned fact: 
What does not twinkle is near. What is near does not twinkle. 
Planets do not twinkle.  Planets are near.  
Therefore, planets are near. Therefore, planets do not twinkle. 
In the first, we prove that planets are near by knowing that they do not twinkle. 
Not-twinkling may be the cause of our knowing that the planets are near, but it is 
not the cause of the planets being near. We have knowledge of the fact that planets 
are near, but our knowledge is incomplete. It is not by knowing why the planets are 
near that we have come to know that they are. That is, not-twinkling does not 
make something near. In fact, it is the other way around. Being near makes 
something not twinkle. This knowledge is articulated in the second syllogism. Here 
we do not know merely the fact. We know also why it is true; that is, we know the 
reasoned fact. In the first, we prove a cause (being near) by means of knowing an 
effect (not twinkling). In the second, we prove an effect (not twinkling) by means of 
the cause (being near). In Latin, these two syllogisms became known as 
                                                
35 Posterior Analytics, 1.13 78a23–78b12. 
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‘demonstratio quia’ and ‘demonstratio propter quid,’ or among regressus 
theoreticians such as Zabarella, as ‘resolutio’ and ‘compositio.’ 
Several things are important to note. The first is that in both cases, the 
knowledge is by means of a syllogism. In one the cause serves as the middle term; 
in the other the effect serves as the middle term. Both cases are deductions; neither 
is an induction. Second, the syllogisms may prove the cause or the effect, but 
neither proves that the cause is in fact the cause or that the effect is an fact an effect. 
Whether being near is really the cause of not twinkling is completely outside the 
scope of these two deductive syllogisms. How one discovers which is the cause and 
which is the effect is unaddressed. Lastly, nothing discussed so far addresses how 
one justifies the major premise, whether ‘What doesn’t twinkle is near’ or ‘What is 
near doesn’t twinkle.’ 
Though in what we have reviewed so far, Zabarella draws no connection 
between regressus and induction, in other writings he relates them in two ways, 
one treated primarily in book 3 of De Methodis, the other primarily in De Regressu. 
The treatment in De Methodis 3 begins in chapter 3. Here, Zabarella describes 
induction as a secondary kind of resolution. Zabarella writes, “There are said to be 
four instruments of logic, about which Aristotle speaks in the Prior Analytics: 
syllogism, enthymeme, induction, and example.”36 Zabarella says that the two kinds 
of knowing are by syllogism and by induction and that an enthymeme is a kind of 
                                                
36 “quatour dicuntur esse logica instrumenta, de quibus loquitur Aristoteles in prioribus 
Analyticis, syllogismus, enthymema, inductio, & exemplum.” De Methodis, 3.3, 152. 
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syllogism, an example a kind of induction, and an induction ultimately (if it has any 
validity) a kind of syllogism. “There is no conclusive force, except by means of 
usable syllogisms of the three figures, to which all methods making any valid 
assertion are reduced.”37  Zabarella’s treatment is perfectly canonical, familiar since 
Peter of Spain, and consistent with what Zabarella says in the Tabulae Logicae and 
his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. 
Following the substantive treatment of the syllogism and its kinds in chapter 
3, Zabarella introduces resolution and composition in chapter 4, in the passage 
quoted earlier.38 After giving the synonyms for resolution and composition, he 
mentions, in an aside, “Induction is contained under the resolutive method, as we 
will explain later.”39 The elaboration does not appear until near the end of the book, 
in chapter 19.40 
Chapter 19 is not large, merely two pages of the 105-page De Methodis, or 
prominent, appearing as the penultimate chapter of book 3, late in Zabarella’s 
treatment of resolution. It sits within a string of short chapters dedicated to 
cleaning up loose ends, integrating the main work with ancillary topics, or 
responding to possible objections. The chapter begins, “Regarding the indicated 
                                                
37 “nullam esse vim illatiuam nisi in syllogismis vtilibus trium figurarum, ad quos methodi 
omnes fidem aliquam facientes reducuntur.” De Methodis, 3.3, 153. 
38 Page 10 above. 
39 “sub resolutiuam methodum reducitur inductio, vt postea declarabimus.” De Methodis, 3.4, 
134 [154]. 
40 There are brief mentions of induction in 3.9 and 3.14. 
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nature of each method, it remains to be considered whether they are divided into 
kinds.”41 Zabarella says that there is no important division of the compositive 
method, but there is of the resolutive. 
The resolutive method divides into two kinds, differing greatly between 
themselves in efficacy. One is ‘demonstratio ab effectu’ [or ‘demonstratio 
a signo’42] which in the performance of its function is most efficacious 
and is used for the discovery of things that are very obscure and hidden. 
The other is ‘inductio,’ which is a much weaker kind of resolution and is 
used only for the discovery of things which are not entirely unknown 
and require a mere declaration.43 
The second kind, inductio, is of such low efficacy and marginal use that Zabarella 
earlier in the book treated the first kind, demonstratio a signo, and the broader 
class, resolutio, as synonyms. Induction was added only afterward for 
completeness. The difference between demonstratio a signo and inductio is the 
subject of the rest of Zabarella’s chapter.  
                                                
41 “Natura vtriusque methodi declarata consyderandum manet an hae in species diuidantur.” 
De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
42 Throughout this chapter, Zabarella uses ‘demonstratio ab effectu’ (as in this passage) and 
‘demonstratio a signo’ interchangeably and in equal number. 
43 “Methodus autem resolutiua in duas species diuiditur efficacitate inter se plurimum 
discrepantes, altera est demonstratio ab effectu, quae in sui muneris functione est efficacissima, & ea 
vtimur ad eorum, quae valde obscura, & abscondita sunt, inuentionem; altera est inductio, quae est 
multo debilior resolutio, & ad eorum tantummodo inuentionem vsitata, quae non penitus ignora 
sunt, & leui egent declaratione.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
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Back in chapter 3, Zabarella had stressed that any method that makes a valid 
assertion can be reduced to a syllogism.44 He now says the same here, claiming that 
both kinds of resolution are syllogistic. “Regarding the demonstratio a signo, no one 
can doubt, for it is a syllogism proceeding from the effect to the discovery of a 
cause.”45 But what of induction? As always, Zabarella turns to Prior Analytics 2.23 
and the conventional scholastic interpretation thereof. “Aristotle, in the second 
book of the Prior Analytics in the chapter on induction, says induction is in fact a 
syllogism.”46 So resolution and its two kinds are all syllogistic. But Zabarella then 
recognizes an inconsistency. “But Aristotle also says in many places . . . that 
induction is a tool for knowing principles.”47 How is it that induction is both a tool 
for coming to know principles and a syllogism based on those principles? Zabarella 
resolves the inconsistency by claiming Aristotle did not mean all principles are 
known by induction, only some—those which Zabarella calls ‘known according to 
                                                
44 Zabarella, De Methodis Libri Quatuor; Liber De Regressu, 153–54. 
45 “de demonstratione a signo nemo dubitare potest, est enim syllogismus procedens ab effectu 
ad inuentionem causae.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
46 “Inductionem vero esse syllogismum docet Aristoteles in secundo libro Priorum 
Analyticorum in capite de inductione.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
47 The omitted text is: “(such as the end of the second book of the Prior Analytics in the 
chapter on induction, in section 134 [Posterior Analytics, 1.18] in the first book of the Posterior 
Analytics, and in the third chapter of the sixth book of the Ethics.)” “quod autem inductio sit 
instrumentum cognoscendi principia Aristoteles multis in locis testatur, in calce secundi libri 
Priorum Analyticorum in capite de inductione, in contextu 134. primi Posteriorum, & in vltimo 
capite secundi, & capite tertio sexti libri de moribus.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
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nature’ (‘secundam naturam’ or ‘naturaliter’). Others, those ‘unknown according to 
nature,’ are known not by induction, but by ‘demonstratio a signo.’  
Those ‘known according to nature’ are the easy cases. They require no 
cognitive work beyond direct perception. “‘Man is biped,’ is said to be known 
according to nature, because whatever individual man is put forward, the sense 
immediately knows him to be biped.”48 Thus, “by induction no things are 
discovered except those principles, which are known according to nature, and 
require mere confirmation.”49 That is, once a few particulars have been observed, 
the conclusion needs merely to be stated. By merely making the statement, its truth 
becomes obvious. These principles are, of course, the same as the ones Zabarella 
elsewhere called ‘known per se.’ “‘Known according to nature’ and ‘known per se’ 
mean the same thing.”50 Because these principles are known per se, they are also 
known de omni, and thus the induction converts to a valid syllogism.  
The principles ‘unknown according to nature’ are the difficult cases, the ones 
normally under consideration when resolution is being discussed. Zabarella’s 
example involves triangles:  
                                                
48 “homo est bipes, dicitur nota secundum naturam, quia quocunque indiuiduo homine oblato 
statim cognoscit sensus eum esse bipedem.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. 
49 “inductione non inueniuntur nisi illa principia, quae sunt nota secundum naturam, et leui 
egent comprobatione.” De Methodis, 3.19, 180. “require mere confirmation” = “leui egent 
comprobatione”; cf. “require mere declaration” = “leui egent declaratione” above. This theme 
appears also in the commentary on the Posterior Analytics 2.5, 556. 
50 “notum secundum naturam idem significat ac per se notum.” De Methodis 3.19, 181. 
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This proposition, ‘A triangle has three angles equal to two right angles,’ 
is called unknown according to nature, because the predication of it can 
not be discerned by sense, but becomes known through another; indeed 
never do we learn that ‘Triangle has three angles equal to two right 
angles,’ by long inspection of the triangle; instead reason demonstrates it 
to us.51 
These principles require cognitive work and thus the other kind of resolution. 
“Demonstratio a signo is much more efficacious; for by it those principles are 
discovered which are unknown according to nature, for the discovery of which 
induction is utterly useless.”52 By the powerful, more useful type of resolution, a 
syllogism, such as the one proving that the moon is near by knowing that it is 
twinkling, is established, and reason demonstrates a cause from an effect. 
Zabarella’s distinction between known and unknown according to nature is 
not the same as the distinction between better known to nature and better known 
to us. Zabarella thoroughly rejects that long-standing dichotomy, for nature itself, 
                                                
51 “ita haec propositio, triangulum habet tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, dicitur ignota 
secundum naturam, quia eius praedicatum sensu discerni non potest, sed innotescit per aliud, ex 
longa enim trianguli inspectione nunquam cognosceremus tres illos angulos esse duobus rectis 
aequales, sed ratio id nobis demonstrat.” De Methodis 3.19, 180–1. 
52 “demonstratio a signo est multo efficacior, per eam enim illa principia inueniuntur, quae 
secundum naturam sunt ignota, ad quorum inuentionem inductio est prorsus inutilis.” Ibid., 181. 
“The other principles are naturally unknown, because unknownable by sense. Therefore for the 
discovery of them, induction has absolutely no effectiveness; they require demonstratio a signo.” 
“Alia vero principia sunt naturaliter ignota, quia insensilia, ideo ad eorum inuentionem inductio 
nihil penitus efficacitatis habet, sed egent demonstratione a signo.” De Methodis 3.19, 180. 
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he insists, knows nothing.53 It is important to recognize the difference between 
Zabarella’s distinction and the conventional one because failing to do so can 
reinforce confusion between resolution and induction. In both the conventional 
dichotomy and Zabarella’s, it is said that induction is used to discover what is 
known according to nature, given what is known according to us. But the 
alternatives are different. In the conventional approach, the alternative to induction 
is the other kind of knowing, i.e., deduction, by which we learn what is better 
known according to us, given what is better known by nature. In that approach, the 
two elements of the dichotomy are complementary, induction and deduction 
working together to provide complete knowledge. In Zabarella’s system, the 
alternative to induction is demonstratio a signo, i.e., the other kind of resolution, by 
which we come to learn what is unknown according to nature. In this system, the 
two elements are not complementary. Either one is used or the other, but not both. 
In the conventional approach, the opposite of ‘known according to us’ is ‘known 
according to nature’; in Zabarella’s, the opposite of ‘known according to us’ is 
‘unknown according to us.’ Overlooking this difference can encourage one to think 
that regressus is a combination of induction and deduction rather than of resolution 
and composition, and that induction is the same as resolution. In fact, induction is 
not the same as resolution but is a minor, special case of it, little treated by 
                                                
53 De Regressu 2; De Regressu 10; Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.2. Kosman, “The 
Aristotelian Backgrounds of Bacon’s Novum Organum,” 131-35. 
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Zabarella, and often not even mentioned. For obtaining the difficult principles of 
natural philosophy, it is positively useless. 
We might ask why Zabarella considers induction a kind of resolution at all. 
He answers this when he says that “induction is a progression from posteriors to 
priors, because the universal is by nature prior to the particulars, and accounts for the 
cause” (emphasis added).54 Recall that the defining characteristic of resolution is that 
it argues from effects to cause. But how does an induction do that? Consider 
Zabarella’s stock example: 
  Plato is biped.    an effect 
  Socrates is biped.   an effect 
  Each other man is biped.  an effect 
  Therefore, all men are biped. the cause 
What does it mean to say the conclusion is the cause that Plato is biped? It means 
that the following syllogism can be constructed: 
  All men are biped. 
  Plato is a man. 
  Therefore, Plato is biped. 
‘Man’ is the causal middle. That is, Plato is a biped because he is a man. The 
universal is the cause of the particular. “The universal is by nature prior to the 
particular.”55 This is a standard component of the Alexandrian Neoplatonic 
synthesis. 
                                                
54 “Est autem inductio processus a posterioribus ad priora, quia vniuersale est natura prius 
particularibus, & habet rationem causae.” De Methodis 3.19, 180, emphasis added. 
55 “quia vniuersale est natura prius particularibus.” De Methodis 3.19, 180.  
 173 
It is not, however, of any significance in regressus theory. Because induction 
includes the causal term in its result, induction can be classified as resolution. But 
such a resolution is not paired with a composition to form a full regressus. When 
resolution is paired with a composition, the resolution is not of the inductio type; it 
is of the demonstratio a signo type. As a matter of completeness, Zabarella notes 
that induction is a kind of resolution, but if he had not noticed or mentioned this, it 
would have made no difference to his regressus theory. 
There is a second way in which induction relates to regressus. It is explained 
in the fullest example of a regressus that Zabarella offers. The example appears in 
chapters 4 and 5 of the book dedicated to the subject, De Regressu,56 and refers to 
Aristotle’s demonstration in the first book of the Physics of the existence of prime 
matter.57  
Resolution, the first part of this or any regressus, is the inference of a cause 
from observation of the effect, i.e., a demonstratio ab effectu or demonstratio a 
                                                
56 The passage is treated in Jardine, “Epistemology of the Sciences,” 691–2; Edwards, “The 
Logic of Iacopo Zabarella,” 265–83; Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: 
Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences, 99 
57 Though Zabarella refers to “the demonstration of Aristotle in book 1 of the Physics, by 
which from the generation of substances he shows that prime matter occurs” (Jardine’s translation), 
Aristotle makes only a small mention of this (190b1–4) and presents little by way of demonstration. 
The argument that Zabarella presents is a sizable expansion beyond what Aristotle actually says in 
Physics 1. Indeed, Zabarella, like other Scholastics, is probably attributing to Aristotle a position he 
did not hold. See “Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter” and “Note on Recent Work” 
in W. Charleton, Aristotle’s Physics, Books One and Two (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 129–
47. (My thanks to James Lennox for this reference.) See also Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 
book 1, and Edwards, “The Logic of Iacopo Zabarella,” 262, 277. 
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signo. The ‘effectum’ or ‘signum’ here is the observed fact of generation and is the 
middle term of a syllogism. The cause being demonstrated, the major term, the 
predicate of the conclusion is ‘prime matter.’ The syllogism for the demonstratio is: 
  Where there is generation, there is prime matter. 
  In a natural body, there is generation. 
  Therefore, in a natural body, there is prime matter.58 
The minor premise, ‘In a natural body, there is generation,’ is known by 
observation. The major premise, Zabarella says, is known by demonstrative 
induction, i.e., an induction in which not all particulars are surveyed, but the 
intellect’s recognition that the subject and predicate are essentially connected 
justifies sweeping all the unobserved under ‘etc.’ (or the like) and thus converting 
an induction into a valid syllogism. Zabarella makes no mention here or anywhere 
in De Regressu of induction being a kind of resolution. Rather, induction is the 
means by which the major premise of the resolutive (and, later, compositive) 
syllogism is known. The syllogism would be equally valid, and the nature of the 
resolution would be no different, if the major premise were supplied some other 
way, such as by being the conclusion of an earlier demonstration.  
In this resolution, we observe generation or change, and infer there must be 
prime, underlying matter. But the generation or change is not what enables or 
causes the prime matter; it is the other way around—but we do not yet know this. 
Our knowledge is confused. In the second half of the regressus, i.e., composition, 
                                                
58 De Regressu, 4, 325. 
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cause and effect will be reversed in the syllogism and our knowledge will be 
distinct. But there is an intermediate step, by which the mind comes to see that the 
reversal is valid, that is, that prime matter is what causes or enables generation. 
This realization is arrived at not by any new observations or by any particular 
induction or deduction but by a ‘consideratio’ or a ‘mentale examen,’59 a turning of 
the matter in one’s mind. The obscurity of this intermediate step need not detain 
us.60 For us the important thing is the result, a new demonstrative syllogism: 
Where there is prime matter, there is generation. 
In a natural body, there is prime matter. 
Therefore, in a natural body, there is generation.61 
The middle and major terms, and respectively the cause and effect, have been 
reversed. From the cause, prime matter, the effect, generation, is concluded.  
Whereas the first stage of the regressus, the resolution, was (synonymously) a 
demonstratio ab effectu, or demonstratio a signo, or demonstratio quia, the second 
stage, the composition, is a demonstratio propter quid. Both stages are 
demonstrations, i.e., deductive syllogisms. Neither is an induction. In this example, 
                                                
59 For the name, see Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo 
Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences, 99. 
60 This step has been subject to vigorous, even mocking, criticism. Jardine, “Galileo’s Road to 
Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” 301–3, says it is marked by “startling illogicality.” “This 
example speaks for itself. . . . It is hard to see how anyone could possibly regard his regressus theory 
as anticipating an experimentally oriented, hypothetico-deductive approach to scientific inquiry.” 
See also Skulsky, “Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind,” 358–6; and Schmitt, 
“Experience and Experiment: a Comparison of Zabarella’s View with Galileo’s in De motu,” 125–126. 
61 De Regressu, chap. 5, pp. 327–28. 
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Zabarella’s fullest, presented in his one book dedicated to regressus, induction has 
only one role to play, the role of supplying a major premise, and it plays that role 
both in the resolution and the composition stages of the regressus. It has no unique 
relationship with resolution. 
The relation then between induction and regressus is not that proposed by 
Cassirer and presumed by nearly everyone working on the question of Zabarella’s 
influence on early modern science. Induction is not half of a regressus, deduction 
being the other half. Instead, both halves of a regressus are deductions. Induction is 
one procedure by which one can obtain the major premises of these two 
deductions, but it contributes nothing to the advance from the half of the regressus 
that deduces the cause to the half that deduces the effect. That transition is made 
possible by a contemplative insight, a middle step in the regressus. It is true that, 
according to Zabarella, an induction can be classified as a kind of resolution, but 
this is possible because, by adding ‘etc.’ to a surveyed list, an induction can be 
reduced to a deduction—just as Zabarella explained in his introductory textbook on 
logic. For Zabarella, induction is not a complement to deduction. It is a kind of 
deduction, and plays only an ancillary and inessential role in a regressus. There is 
one way, however, in which a regressus and induction are similar. Each is justified 
‘by its own light.’ That is, one simply comes to see, after sufficient contemplation, 
that adding ‘etc.’ to the surveyed list is justified, just as one comes to see that 
reversing the terms of the regressus is justified. Both induction and regressus obtain 
their validation by a contemplative insight. 
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By the conventional understanding, on the other hand, regressus is a 
combination of deduction and induction. Once this interpretation of Zabarella was 
proposed, and once it was accepted that this combination may have contributed to 
the scientific revolution, it was natural to begin looking for precursors. This was 
part of A. C. Crombie’s project, and it helped shape mid-twentieth-century 
discussions about whether the scientific revolution involved a methodological 
revolution or a continued application of past methodology. Crombie found the 
regressus combination as far back as the thirteenth century,62 and considered 
Robert Grosseteste (c.1175–1253) to be a prototypical practitioner.63 It was an interest 
in anticipations of regressus that led Don Morrison to find in the Greek 
commentators of Alexandria the Neoplatonic synthesis described in the previous 
chapter.64 Morrison concluded, “The theory of tekmeriodic proof which we find in 
Simplicius and Philoponus [the Alexandrian synthesis] is the earliest theory which 
deserves to be called an ‘early version’ of the regressus. . . . [T]ekmeriodic proof . . . 
performs the function of the methodus resolutiva portion of the regressus.”65 Neither 
seventeenth-century regressus nor its Alexandrian equivalent is a combination of 
deduction and induction, but a combination of two deductions, a (tekmeriodic) 
                                                
62 A. C. Crombie, The History of Science from Augustine to Galileo (New York: Dover, 1995), 
1:82. 
63 Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700, 25, 35, 52–53, 
61–90. 
64 Morrison, “Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof,” 17. 
65 Ibid. 
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syllogism in which the cause is the minor premise and a syllogism in which the 
effect is the minor premise. A contemplative insight obtained from outside the 
regressus validates obtaining one of the syllogisms from the other. At least 
regarding induction, Zabarella is not a revolutionary, but the leading representative 
of a tradition that goes back through medieval scholasticism to the Neoplatonic 
reinterpretation of Aristotle in sixth-century Alexandria. 
Though not a revolutionary regarding induction, Zabarella is important in the 
history of induction nonetheless. As probably the last of the great Aristotelians 
working in a recognizably scholastic framework, he serves as a foil for the next 
generation. Though Bacon does not name him, Bacon’s criticism of the established 
induction applies as much toward Zabarella as toward any medieval logician. 
Bacon’s insistence that induction be used not just for major but for minor premises 
is directed toward the kind of interlocking syllogistic reasoning exemplified by 
regressus. Zabarella’s system is, however, not Bacon’s only foil. Zabarella’s brand 
of Aristotelianism—precise, learned, steeped in traditions of detailed scholarship—
was just one of several in the late sixteenth century.66 A seemingly very different 
type was promoted by a professor in England named Everard Digby. 
                                                
66 On the theme of competing Aristotelianisms, see Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance 
Philosophy, 60–62. 
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Everard Digby (c. 1551–1605) 
The study of Aristotle had waned in the 1520s across Europe. It revived in the 
1540s with new translations, new commentaries, and a new humanist character. 
The revival in England, however, was delayed, for in the 1540s higher education in 
England began a decades-long decline.67 In principle, the ultimate charter of 
English universities was to train the clergy. They, therefore, fell under the 
dissolution efforts that Henry VIII began after his break with Rome. The first 
Chantries Act, passed in 1545, nationalized not just assets of chantries, but that of 
colleges and other institutions as well. A second act affirming and extending the 
first was passed in 1547, and special commissions were established to determine 
what to do with the assets of Oxford and Cambridge. By clever financial and legal 
legerdemain, both universities stayed open and independent,68 but several functions 
and faculties were eliminated, new religious directives were imposed, and the 
universities suffered in faculties, enrollment, finances, and scholarship. The presses 
at both universities were shuttered, the university libraries stopped acquiring 
printed books, and scholarly links with the continent declined. What few links 
existed were flows to, not from, the island. England had little to offer continental 
scholarship. Credit for being the first academic to make a serious attempt to 
                                                
67 Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 17-29; Norman Jones, The 
English Reformation: Religion and Cultural Adaptation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 176. 
68 They argued that their expenses matched or exceeded their income and that therefore there 
were no net assets to seize. Jones, The English Reformation: Religion and Cultural Adaptation, 75. 
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contribute significant scholarly work to European discourse may go to the young 
Cambridge professor, Everard Digby.69  
Digby’s treatise was entitled Theoria Analytica and was published in 1579, the 
year after Zabarella’s Opera Logica.70 In it, Digby describes the method by which he 
believes human knowledge is acquired. The treatise is not primarily a normative 
work, explaining how knowledge should be acquired, or pedagogic work, teaching 
the student practical methods for acquiring knowledge, but rather a psychological 
work, explaining how knowledge is acquired. Digby believes his theory is 
                                                
69 This Everard Digby was not the same as, nor was he lineally related to, the Everard Digby 
that was involved in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. After a long period of neglect, attention was first 
drawn to Digby by J. Freudenthal, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der englischen Philosophie,” Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie (1890-1): 4:450–77, 578–603; 5:1–41. Freudenthal suggested that more 
should be done to examine Francis Bacon’s forerunners. Freudenthal proposed to begin that 
examination by considering the debate between Everard Digby and William Temple, a debate that 
would surely have been known to Bacon. Freudenthal’s lengthy article remained the fullest 
examination of Digby for almost ninety years. After Freudenthal, Digby received a few pages of 
consideration by each of Gaston Sortais, La Philosophie moderne depuis Bacon jusqu’à Leibniz, 2 vols. 
(Paris: Paul Lethielleux, 1920), 1:53–55; Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 200–8; Lisa Jardine, 
Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 59–
65; and Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 47–52. The definitive 
treatment is now Shaan Akester, “The Life and Works of Everard Digby” (DPhil. dissertation, 
Oxford University, 1979). It contains the only full and accurate biographical study. Its chapter-by-
chapter analysis of Digby’s obscure text is indispensable for any study of Digby, including this one. 
The honor of being the first scholar to attempt a contribution to European scholarship is bestowed 
by Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 47, 50. 
70 Everard Digby, Theoria analytica viam ad monarchiam scientiarum demonstrans, totius 
philosophiae & reliquarum scientiarum, necnon primorum postremorumq[ue] philosophorum mysteria 
arcanaq[ue] dogmata enucleans (London: Henrici Binneman, 1579). Translations from Theoria 
Analytica are Akester’s unless otherwise noted. 
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thoroughly grounded in Aristotelian thought and he cites Aristotle more than any 
single author. The lengthy treatise is of little philosophical or scientific merit and 
has been described as on “the lunatic fringe of Renaissance thought.”71 It does, 
however, have historical importance. First, the book did find an audience on the 
continent and reveals therefore what could pass for Aristotelian scholarship among 
some European scholars at the time.72 Second is the relationship between Digby 
and Francis Bacon. There is a possibility that Francis Bacon was a student of 
Digby’s when Bacon was at Cambridge in 1572–74. Whether he was or not, 
criticisms Bacon later made against induction as it was taught in the universities 
sound targeted directly at Digby. In fact, some of Bacon’s attacks have little context 
unless we understand the thought of Digby or those who shared his views. Third, 
Digby got into a pamphlet war with another young Cambridge scholar, an advocate 
of Ramism named William Temple. Temple had very important things to say 
about induction, but they cannot properly be understood without reference to 
Digby’s Theoria Analytica. Finally, although Digby believes himself an Aristotelian, 
                                                
71 Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 200-9. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–
1700, 194-6, and Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 59-65, give the work little 
consideration. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 47, remarks on the lack 
of attention it has received. Digby was about twenty-eight when he wrote it. 
72 William Temple reports on its reception among theologians at the Sorbonne and over 
faculty members at European universities. William Temple, Francisci Mildapetti Nauerreni ad 
Euerardum Digbeium Anglum admonitio de unica P. Rami methodo reiectis Caeteris retinenda (London: 
Henricus Middletonus, 1580), 22. See also Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 232. 
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he is in fact the first in a line of Neoplatonists at Cambridge. In our sample of late 
century views on induction, he provides a mystically Platonic perspective. 
The tension in the Theoria Analytica is plain in the preface’s very first 
sentence: “Often reading through the excellent work of Aristotle on demonstration, 
after long consideration, I seemed to understand the great and almost mystical 
beginnings of knowledge.”73 Digby explains that in Aristotle something is hidden, 
something Digby himself has discovered. It is the divine, mystical component of 
knowledge.74 Although Digby cites Aristotle frequently, his real inspiration comes 
from the also-cited Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and a host of medieval and 
Renaissance, Neoplatonic and mystical writers.75 Although Zabarella accepted the 
Alexandrian understanding of induction, he rejected the foundation by which the 
Alexandrians reached it. He rejected that nature can know something and thus 
rejected the scholastic distinction between ‘better known to us’ and ‘better known 
to nature.’ Digby, on the other hand, adopts this distinction wholly and with gusto 
and makes it the foundation of his whole system. On this foundation he erects a 
                                                
73 “Saepe multumque eximium opus Aristotelis de demonstratione perlegens, post diutinam 
contemplationem magna multaque eademque paene mystica . . . comprehendere videbar.” Digby, 
Theoria analytica, A1v; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 84. 
74 Digby, Theoria analytica, A1v; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 85. 
75 The images that front each of the three chapters are right out of mystic traditions. The first 
(B2r), for example, depicts a man’s head surrounded by rings of fire or some sort of emanation, 
surrounded in turn by a supra-stellar ring labeled Universale. A sweeping, ethereal conduit, labeled 
Apprehensio, joins the man’s forehead and the outer reaches of the Universale. For an analysis of 
Digby in the context of medieval mysticism, see Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby”, 
especially chapter 4, “The Theoria Analytica: Divine Light,” 136–97. 
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bipartite epistemology, the first part of which he calls an ascent and the second a 
descent. In the first, man rises in thought from what is better known to him, that 
is, the observations of sense, to what is better known to nature, that is, universal 
abstract knowledge. In the second part, man descends in thought from that 
universal knowledge to the particulars of sense perception. Although Digby 
describes his system as essentially bipartite, it actually has three major parts, three 
phases one traverses on the way to true knowledge and in the Theoria Analytica 
Digby dedicates one book to each. 
The progression toward knowledge begins with a logically complete 
demonstration regarding some subject under investigation.76 The starting point in 
Digby’s system is not sense-experience, but an already crafted syllogism. Digby 
does not say precisely where this syllogism comes from. A person first presented 
with this demonstrative syllogism understands it only confusedly, for he does not 
fully understand its components, that is, the premises and their concepts, and the 
causes that make the demonstration true. In an effort to understand this 
demonstration, the person begins the process of cognitively ascending through a 
hierarchical field of abstract notions, what Digby calls the ‘intelligible realm’ 
(universam intelligentiam).77 As a person tries to navigate this realm, he realizes that 
there are causal connections between various concepts in the hierarchy, the causes 
needing to be understand before the effects, but that there must be one ‘first 
                                                
76 Digby, Theoria analytica, bk. 1, pp. 1–87. 
77 Ibid., B2v; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 93. 
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principle,’ which is the cause of all, and which must be understood fully if anything 
else lower in the hierarchy is to be understood. This ‘first principle’ is God, the 
source of all truth, including the truth of the demonstrative syllogism with which 
the process began. The first stage of Digby’s process is thus an ascending from 
consideration of that first demonstration to a consideration of higher- and higher-
level abstractions, what he calls ‘notions,’ to a consideration ultimately of God. The 
words ascent and ascending are frequent and central in Digby. He describes this 
ascent as a flight on swift wings to thresholds of the gods and palaces of the mind.78 
A person who has flown so swiftly to contemplation of the divine still has only 
a confused understanding of the notions traversed. He is not ready for the descent. 
Between the ascent and the descent lies the second of Digby’s three stages, the most 
important, the one where true knowledge is obtained.79 Here, one traverses the full 
hierarchy of the ‘intelligible realm,’ participating in the divine, the way illuminated 
by God’s light. By divine illumination, one comes to understand the cause of all 
causes, and thus the certainty of all conclusions. Here are Digby’s words: 
The human mind, refined through the goal of apprehension, and placed 
near the summit of the shining pyramid, now sees distinctly, by the 
miracle of its light, the reflected light in all intelligibles and sensibles, 
which formerly it had comprehended only confusedly. It discerns, 
distinguishes and demonstrates ideas, angels, pure acts, and at the same 
                                                
78 “Celeri ala deorum limina aduolat mentis pallatia pandens.” Digby, Theoria analytica, A2v 
[p. 3]; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 86. 
79 Digby, Theoria analytica, bk. 2, pp. 49[89]–287. 
 185 
time natural actions below it, as he who has gained the mountain peak 
with difficulty, through many stages and levels, when once he has 
mastered its height contemplates in a single vision every way on all sides 
leading to the summit, by the clear light.80 
Thus one understands by a clear light (clara luce) and distinctly (distincte) what 
was earlier understood only confusedly (confuse). This is the mystical component 
that Digby thought Aristotle had overlooked. 
Now endowed with this clear and distinct understanding of the first cause, 
i.e., God, one enters the third and final phase.81 “The human mind . . . descends 
from the lofty summit of the abundantly shining pyramid to its earthly dwelling 
place.”82 The original demonstration is now seen as one part of the whole fabric of 
truth that emanates from God. It is now fully understood, and its certainty assured. 
All aspects of the material world, all specific scientific conclusions are now 
comprehended as inescapable effects of God’s divine causal being. The three stages 
of Digby’s Theoria Analytica are thus complete: ascent, contemplation, and descent. 
                                                
80 Under the heading “Argumentum Libri secundi”: “Per metam apprehensionis sublimata 
mens humana, & prope summitatem lucibilis pyramidis locata, eius beneficio lucis, distincte iam 
videt lumen in omnibus intelligibilibus sensibilibusque, quod antea confuse tantum apprehenderat, 
Ideas, Angelos, actus puros, simul ac naturales infra se cernens, decernens, demonstrans, haud aliter 
atque is qui per multos gradus gressusque difficulter cacumen montis aduolaverit: cuius semel 
superata altitudine, uno conspectu omnem ad cacumen montis methodum undique dirigentem clara 
luce intuetur . . .” Ibid., 88; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 94. 
81 Digby, Theoria analytica, bk. 3, pp. 289–404. 
82 “A summo superlucentis pyramidis cacumine . . . descendit mens humana ad habitaculum 
suum terrestre.”Ibid., 288; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 95.  
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All this is similar to a whole tradition of Platonic, Neoplatonic and 
Cabbalistic, Hermetic and alchemical mysticism, and also to Descartes, whose use 
of ‘clear and distinct’ Digby anticipates. But there are also remarkable similarities 
to Zabarella’s regressus. Both begin with a demonstrative syllogism, the source of 
which lies mostly outside the described system. This demonstration is known 
confusedly because the causes are not fully understood. A second phase is needed to 
come to clear understanding of the causes. For both Digby and Zabarella, this 
phase is purely contemplative. It makes no appeal to further empirical or 
experimental evidence. What in Zabarella is a contemplative insight is in Digby a 
mystical revelation. What Zabarella grasped ‘by its own light,’ Digby grasps ‘by a 
clear light.’ Zabarella does not employ the metaphors of divine illumination that 
Digby uses, but in both systems the method and the results are the same. One 
simply thinks deeply and at some point comes to have a clear idea of the 
demonstrative cause. Confident of the truth of this cause, one can revisit (in the 
case of Digby) or reformulate (in the case of Zabarella) the original demonstrative 
syllogism, and come to fully understand that the observed effect is the result of a 
newly understood cause. What began as confused understanding of a syllogism, has 
by way of deep contemplation, resulted in clear and distinct understanding of a 
syllogism. In neither Digby’s analytic theory nor Zabarella’s regressus is the first 
phase induction and the final phase deduction. In both systems, both phases are 
demonstrations. 
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In Theoria Analytica, rooted in an Aristotelian framework but with a 
progression from ‘confused’ knowledge to ‘clear and distinct’ knowledge by way of 
contemplative enlightenment, we may be able to detect a transition from the 
scholastic epistemology of Zabarella’s regressus with its underlying vestiges of 
Alexandrian Neoplatonism to the more conspicuously Platonic epistemology of the 
seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists and European Cartesians. Though 
Digby does not draw much attention to induction until his later writings (when he 
suggests that the first phase is induction), his epistemology, with its flight to 
abstract notions, will be one target of Francis Bacon’s attack. In Digby’s own day it 
was the target of attack by another young Cambridge scholar, William Temple. 
William Temple (1555–1627) 
Digby had entered St. John’s College in 1567. William Temple entered Kings 
College in 1574.83 Though Temple was only a few years younger than Digby, the 
two were ideologically of different generations. For all his Platonic mysticism, 
Digby fashioned himself an Aristotelian working in the great tradition of Catholic 
scholasticism, and believed he was bringing to its greatest development the work of 
the ancient master. Temple, though he had been a student of Digby’s, was a 
Ramist, a follower of the sixteenth-century humanist, acclaimed anti-Aristotelian, 
and recently martyred Protestant, Peter Ramus. 
                                                
83 For biographical information on Temple, see Freudenthal, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
englischen Philosophie,” 2:1 ff.; Elizabethanne Boran, “Temple, Sir William (1554/5–1627),” in 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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In 1543, Ramus published a comprehensive attack on, he claimed, all things 
Aristotelian, Aristotelicae animadversiones.84 He proposed a wholesale rearrangement 
of the teaching of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic, which he believed were infected 
with Aristotelian exegesis. The most prominent aspect of his new pedagogy was the 
presentation of nearly all subjects in a distinctive hierarchical, define-and-divide 
arrangement. A Ramist logic textbook, for example, would began: ‘Logic is the art 
of disputing well. It is divided into two parts, invention and judgment.’ Invention 
would then be defined and divided into two kinds, artificial and without art. Each 
of these would be defined and then divided into two kinds, say, simple and 
complex. Ramus claimed that this kind of hierarchical presentation, starting with 
the general and subdividing down to the specific, was the single proper method for 
teaching any topic. The method gained a tremendous vogue, especially in England 
in the late 1570s and the 1580s,85 when English educational institutions were again 
beginning to prosper, and were doing so in a way that welcomed pedagogic 
innovation. 
                                                
84 Peter Ramus, Aristotelicae animadversiones (Paris: Jacques Bogard, 1543). Ramus and his 
school have been treated in several works. Particularly useful for purposes here are W. J. Ong, 
Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958); W. J. 
Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958); Gilbert, 
Renaissance Concepts of Method, 129–44; and for its coverage of Ramism in England, Howell, Logic 
and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 146-281. A more recent overview of high-quality appears in 
Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 184-86. 
85 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 146–281; Schmitt, John Case and 
Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 34-37. 
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William Temple was Ramus’s most vigorous champion in England. In 
published essays he defended Ramus against criticisms by Digby and by one John 
Piscator.86 In 1584 Temple published an edition of Ramus’ Dialecticae Libri Duo87 
with extensive commentary, and his Ramist scholarship gained him recognition 
even at the court of Elizabeth.88 His debate with Digby began after Digby 
published an attack on Ramism in early 1580. Over two years, Temple and Digby, 
both still in their mid to late twenties, attacked and counter-attacked in a total of 
four, often vitriolic pamphlets, two of them running to a hundred and twenty-five 
pages each.89 The debate was of interest as far away as Germany.90 
                                                
86 On Piscator, Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 195–96.  
87 Peter Ramus, P. Rami Dialecticae libri duo, scholiis G. Tempelli Cantabrigiensis illustrati, ed. 
William Temple (Cambridge: 1584). 
88 This by Philip Sidney and then the Earl of Essex, who then employed him as a secretary. 
Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 204-5; Schmitt et al., eds., The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, 837. 
89 The debate was treated in Freudenthal, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der englischen 
Philosophie,” but Freudenthal, on whom many relied, misunderstood the chronology. This 
confused his interpretation. A confused understanding persisted in Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of 
Method, 200–9. The basic outline of the debate was finally sorted out by Jardine, Francis Bacon: 
Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 59–65, but Jardine gave little consideration to the important 
background provided by Theoria Analytica. The first and still only detailed, comprehensive, and fully 
informed treatment is Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 198–247. Unfortunately, 
Akester failed to recognize the larger issue at stake and accepted without sufficient caution the 
prevailing interpretation that the debate was a semantic quibble over the meaning of method.  
90 The documents were reprinted in Frankfurt a few years later. Schmitt, John Case and 
Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 50. 
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The debate concerned method. Ramus was well known for his advocacy of 
the single, define-and-divide method described above. In the face of Ramism’s 
rising popularity in England, Digby attacked this core idea in the first pamphlet of 
the debate, De duplici methodo libri duo, vnicam P. Rami methodum refutantes,91 that is, 
Two books concerning the double method, refuting the single method of P. Ramus. Digby 
there argued that method is always and everywhere two-fold. This is evidenced, he 
claimed, by many dichotomies, such as ‘better known by us’ and ‘better known by 
nature,’ ‘prior to us’ and ‘prior by nature,’ Plato’s ‘genesis’ and ‘diaeresis,’ Galen’s 
‘synthesis’ and ‘analysis,’ Aristotle’s ‘induction’ and ‘deduction,’ and Digby’s own 
‘ascent’ and ‘descent.’92 Writing under a pseudonym, Temple countered his ex-
teacher and defended his master with Francisci Mildapetti Nauerreni ad Euerardum 
Digbeium Anglum admonitio de unica P. Rami methodo reiectis Caeteris retinenda,93 that 
is, An admonition . . . to retain the unitary method of P. Ramus. . . . Digby’s reply was a 
Response . . . to an admonition to retain the unitary method of P. Ramus94 and Temple’s 
                                                
91 Everard Digby, De duplici methodo libri duo, vnicam P. Rami methodum refutantes (London: 
Henrici Binneman, 1580). 
92 “Plato harum primam, appellat genesin, alteram diaresin. Galenus priorem synthesin, 
posteriorem analysin. Aristoteles, priorem inductionem: posteriorem resolutionem, seu 
demonstrationem.” Ibid., C1r-C2v [pp. 18–9]. 
93 Temple, Admonitio. 
94 Everard Digby, Everardi Dygbei Cantabrigiensis admonitioni F. Mildapetti navareni de vnica 
P. Rami methodo retinenda, responsio (London: Henrici Binneman, 1580). 
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final a Commentary in defending the unitary method against the double-lover. 95 The titles 
do not let us mistake the poles of the debate: Temple says method is unitary, and 
Digby says it is two-fold.96 
The debate has been characterized as an academic quibble over the meaning 
of the term method.97 By this interpretation, Digby and Temple agree that there are 
two separate processes, one for discovering new knowledge and the other for 
imparting existing knowledge to a student. Digby thinks both are subsumed under 
the term method, Temple that only the second should be. This interpretation, 
however, describes a disagreement that seems too trite to so provoke these man and 
hardly explains the interest that the debate garnered internationally. Once we see 
Digby’s larger system for what it is, Temple’s criticism appears more substantive 
and the debate more important, especially for an understanding of how knowledge 
was conceived and constructed at the end of the sixteenth century, and especially 
for how induction was conceived by the supposedly anti-Aristotelian Ramist 
school. 
                                                
95 William Temple, Pro Mildapetti de unica methodo defensione contra diplodophilum, commentatio 
Gulielmi Tempelli (London: Henricus Middletonus, 1581). 
96 The debate ended when Digby got a court injunction barring Temple from further attacks. 
Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 199. 
97 E.g., “It may readily be seen that, as with most Ramist-Aristotelian controversies, this one 
turns on the meaning to be assigned to methodus.” Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700, 
208. “Temple’s main argument with Digby is over what should and should not be called method.” 
Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 239, cf. 200, 234. “To us, this seems a mere verbal 
quibble.” Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 201. See also Jardine, Francis Bacon: 
Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 59-65. 
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To see why this was not a semantic quibble, it is important to note that 
Temple was responding not only to Digby’s 1580 pamphlet attacking Ramus, but 
also to Digby’s 1574 Theoria Analytica.98 Temple said that he had been willing to 
criticize the earlier work in private, but on reading the pamphlet, the public attack 
on Ramus, he decided a published response was necessary.99 
Recall that Digby adopts and then extends the long-standing understanding of 
the dichotomy ‘better known by man’ and ‘better known by nature.’ Digby 
believes that what is ‘better known to man,’ i.e., that which is known through the 
senses, is fleeting and uncertain, and that certain knowledge comes from mystical 
contemplation of the intelligible realm, the realm of that which is ‘better known to 
nature,’ i.e., that which is known by supra-human consciousness unconstrained by 
sense perception. Digby thinks that to man, particulars are clear and universals 
obscure, and to nature universals are clear and particulars obscure. Temple thinks 
this is nonsense.100 Temple rejects Digby’s claim that universal knowledge is 
obscure and instead believes that man’s clearest form of knowledge is the 
universal.101 For by the universal man understands causes and explanations. For 
Temple, that which is clear to man about something is that which is clear most 
                                                
98 Among commentators, only Akester makes this attempt. 
99 Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 232. 
100 Temple writes in the first person and addresses Digby in the second. His style is mocking. 
Though I cannot do it justice, I will try to suggest some of the attack’s spirit. All translations of 
Temple are mine unless otherwise noted. 
101 Temple, Admonitio, 47–56; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 233. 
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generally and by nature. Indeed, it is the core of the Ramist method to first identify 
the general as the easiest to grasp, and then to subdivide down to the particular. 
Temple thus rejects this very fundamental of Digby’s dichotomies. 
Indeed he points out that Digby himself is trapped in inconsistency when he 
tries to apply the distinction. For example, Digby says that the universal is obscure 
yet also that it is the most lucid and illuminates and renders certain all 
knowledge.102 This is a pervasive instability in the Theoria Analytica and only one of 
many inconsistencies Temple highlights. The most important for the study of 
induction and central to Temple’s attack is this: Although Digby parades his two 
methods of ascent and descent, they are in fact the same thing. Digby says that one 
is a progression from particulars to general and the other from general to 
particulars. Yet whenever he says he claims to provide an example of a progression 
from particulars to the more universal, Temple says, Digby does the opposite. He 
starts with the most general and proceeds to the less abstract.103 For example, 
Temple writes, “In grammar, you want the letter placed before the syllable, syllable 
before the word. . . . In geometry, you want to have the line precede the surface, 
the surface precede the object,”104 but the letter and the line are the more abstract, 
the word and the object closer to perception. Digby does the same with dialectic 
and arithmetic, confusing the concrete for the abstract and vice versa. Digby also 
                                                
102 E.g., Temple, Admonitio, 83. 
103 Ibid., 114.  
104 “In grammatica vis literam syllabae, syllabam voci . . . praeponi. . . . in Geometria vis ut 
linea superficiem, superficies corpus antecedat.” Ibid.  
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says that his ascent is an induction, his descent a deduction, but he gets this 
confused also. By his own logic, Temple notes, both must be demonstrative 
syllogisms, since both are aspects of method and Digby has equated method with 
demonstrative syllogism.105 Temple is right that both Digby’s ascent and the 
descent are syllogisms, but Digby might not acknowledge an inconsistency, for he 
believes that induction is a kind of confused deduction. That is, the supposedly 
inductive ascent is actually a confused syllogism, the supposedly deductive descent 
a clearly understood syllogism. But, Temple is arguing, there is nothing double 
about this. Confusion and understanding are not two kinds of knowledge.  
In his next pamphlet, Digby replies to Temple’s attack with fifty-two 
citations from Aristotle, all supposedly defending the two-fold nature of method.106 
In Temple’s response, he rebuts each citation in turn, describing the actual 
meaning of the passage and dismissing any claim that it describes a double 
method.107 The spirit of Temple’s response is that Digby is a terrible Aristotelian 
who misunderstands his master at every turn, reads into the text things not there, 
(“Where here is a double method?”108), fails to distinguish medieval commentary 
from Aristotle’s own work (“Oh, would that the interpreters of Aristotle’s teaching 
                                                
105 Ibid., 92; Akester, “Life and Works of Everard Digby,” 236. 
106 Digby, Responsio, f. A5v [p. 5]–A8r [p. 12]. 
107 Temple, Commentatio. 
108 “Vbi hic duplex methodus?” Ibid., 45[65]. Also “But in what way from this testimony can 
one conclude there is a double number of methods?” “Sed enim quomodo ex isto testimonio binarius 
methodorum munerus [sic; numerus?]concluditur?” 66. 
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had attended to this reasoning more carefully”109), and simply does not understand 
Greek (“I cannot even say what confusion your understanding of the Greek 
language produces”110). Temple is correct that this self-proclaimed champion of 
Aristotle is not a good Aristotelian. Once Digby decided that Aristotle had 
overlooked a mystical element of knowledge and that he, Digby, would correct the 
mistake by a wholesale grafting of medieval mysticism, there was little to keep him 
tethered to Peripatetic doctrine. The Ramist Temple emerges from the debate as 
the better defender of Aristotle. This becomes notably apparent when Temple 
explains induction to Digby. 
There are two important things on which Digby and Temple agree: Method 
is the progression from general to particular, and it is the appropriate procedure for 
imparting to an ignorant student knowledge that the teacher possesses. Their 
disagreement is over discovery of new knowledge. When Temple says that 
discovery is not part of method, it is not a quibble over the meaning of method. On 
that he and Digby basically agree. Rather it is a substantive and important claim 
that discovery cannot be effected by using demonstration, deduction, or syllogistic 
reasoning, not, in other words, by starting with the abstract.  Discovery of new 
knowledge—and therefore ultimately all knowledge—must begin with the 
particulars of sense perception. That is, Temple says, discovery of new knowledge 
                                                
109 “Vtinam Aristotelicae disciplinae interpretes istum soritem diligentius attendissent.” Ibid., 
62. 
110 “Tua . . . graecae orationis interpretatio nescio quam obscuritatem peperit.” Ibid., 56. 
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must be by induction. “Cognition of principles is not native but is received from 
somewhere else, from that progression of singulars through the senses by means of 
induction.”111 “For from observation and induction of observed things, precepts 
arise.”112 These precepts or principles are the result, not the starting point, of 
discovery. “Science . . . does not exist outside universals, nor is the universal 
reached without induction, nor is induction formed unless the sense is engaged. 
How long will you mock us for this induction? How long in the investigation of 
science will you deliberate with a precept?”113 This understanding of induction that 
Temple defends against Digby’s mockery is not the conventional scholastic view by 
which induction is a (usually defective) form of deduction, but that of the Posterior 
Analytics. It is there, Temple says, that Aristotle argues “elegantly,”114 “copiously, 
and magnificently”115 about the nature of proper induction, for there Aristotle 
explains how man develops universal notions by gathering sense-perceptions into 
memories and memories into experiences. So the essence of the disagreement 
between the scholastic Digby and the Ramist Temple is that Digby believes new 
                                                
111 “Cognitionem scilicet principiorum non esse natiuam sed ascitam aliunde, ab illa nempe 
singularium per sensus inductione profectam.” Ibid., 64. 
112 “Nam e quarum rerum observatione & inductione praecepta oriuntur.” Temple’s 
commentary in Ramus, P. Rami Dialecticae libri duo, scholiis G. Tempelli Cantabrigiensis illustrati, 2. 
113 “Scientia . . . non existit absque vniuersali nec vniuersale efficitur sine inductione, nec 
inductio efformatur nisi accesserit sensus. Quamdiu nos inductione ista eludes? Quamdiu in 
scientiae inuestigandae praecepto delirabis?” Temple, Commentatio, 63. 
114 “eleganter.” Ibid., 62. 
115 “copiose magnificeque.” Temple, Admonitio, 76. 
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knowledge can be discovered by some form of deductive reasoning and Temple 
insists that new knowledge can be discovered only by the inductive process that 
Aristotle describes in the Posterior Analytics. 
Inductio appears little in Ramist writing and it has been easy to believe the 
Ramists had little concern for the concept. The whole Ramist project was, after all, 
to promote a top-down approach to teaching that began with the most abstract and 
proceeded to the particular. Yet Temple seemed to claim for all Ramists a central 
role for induction when he wrote, ‘How long will you mock us for this induction?’ 
Moreover, Temple is adamant that induction is not a kind of deduction, as Digby 
believes, but a separate process that provides the abstractions from which 
deductions—and Ramist teaching of discovered knowledge—begin. Thus Ramism, 
at least as Temple represented it in England, not only does not ignore induction, 
but insists on its importance and its nature. For Temple, induction is the only 
means to discover new knowledge, is not reducible to a deduction, and is the 
process of forming abstractions from particular sense experience that Aristotle 
described in Posterior Analytics 2.19. If Zabarella is a scholastic Aristotelian and 
Digby a mystical Aristotelian, Temple should be seen—at least regarding 
induction—not as an anti-Aristotelian but as a classical Aristotelian. 
John Case (1539/40?–1599) 
Last in the sample of late sixteenth-century thinkers whose writings manifest 
discussions of induction which Bacon enters is John Case. Though, like Digby, 
Case is not of much philosophical interest, he is of an historical one. He is too 
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eclectic to warrant a detailed examination, but it is nonetheless useful to look 
quickly at his writings, for there we see not only affirmation of themes found in 
Zabarella and Digby, but suggestions for new themes that come to the fore in 
Bacon.116 
We may fairly characterize Case as an eclectic Aristotelian. He became a 
student at St. John’s College, Oxford, in 1564 and a fellow there in 1568. St. John’s 
was a new college, started in 1554 and offering a mix of traditional and humanistic 
learning. He resigned his fellowship in 1574 (in order to marry a local widow) but 
continued to teach logic in his home until at least 1590. He acquired a reputation as 
an outstanding teacher. Throughout the 1580s and 1590s he maintained good 
relations with St. John’s and a prominent position in Oxford intellectual circles, 
though he was occasionally suspected of Catholic sympathies also. He wrote several 
pedagogical works and commentaries on Aristotle that were published between 1584 
and 1599, the year he died. One of them was, in 1585, the first major publication by 
the newly opened Oxford University Press. During his life, he acquired some 
wealth and bequeathed much of it to St. John’s. About forty editions of his works 
were published through 1630, both in England and Germany, making them the 
                                                
116 After the mid-seventeenth century, Case received little attention until Schmitt, John Case 
and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, now the fullest treatment. Schmitt’s study is as much a 
portrayal of vigorous but eclectic Aristotelianism in late Renaissance England as a detailed study of 
Case. For biographical information on Case, see its chapter, “The Life and Works of John Case,” 
pp. 77–105; and also Edward A. Malone, “Case, John (1539/1540?–1599),” in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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most frequently reprinted British works of philosophy of the sixteenth century.117 
In 1632, he was described as “the greatest philosopher that our English universities 
have brought forth in this time.”118 
Three of Case’s works are important for a study of induction. His first 
publication, Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis, 
published in 1584 and reprinted several times over the subsequent twenty years, is a 
logic textbook that, like others of the late sixteenth century, such as Seton’s 
Dialectica, attempted to combine traditional and humanistic themes. The other two 
were published near the end of his life (one maybe posthumously) and were 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. One, Ancilla Philosophiae,119 was a short 
textbook, the other, Lapis Philosophicus,120 a full treatise. The second, in particular, 
shows Neoplatonic accretions (though not as mystical as Digby’s) on an 
Aristotelian frame. In all these works of Case’s we find, in inchoate form, three 
themes that will be central for Bacon. 
                                                
117 Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, 123. 
118 Though Case’s success in Oxford and his publication record support the sprit of the 
remark, it may fairly be accused of some exaggeration. It was not made by someone prominent, but 
by the translator (a Catholic priest) of Edmund Campion, Campian Englished or a Translation of the 
Ten Reasons in which Edmund Campian (of the Societie of Jesus) Priest, Insisted in His Challenge to the 
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, trans. Laurence Anderton (Cambridge: 1632). It is cited by 
Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 3. 
119 John Case, Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis (London: Thomas 
Vautrollier, 1584). 
120 John Case, Lapis philosophicus seu commentarius in 8 libros physicorum Aristotelis in quo arcana 
physiologiae examinantur (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1599). 
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The first such theme is the relationship between art and nature.121 The subject 
goes back to Aristotle’s comments in Book II of the Physics,122 and it is in his 
commentary on that book that Case develops his own views.123 Aristotle said that 
art imitates nature. This came to be interpreted (possibly as Aristotle intended it) as 
meaning that though the raw materials of practical human effort are natural, the 
process and the result are not. The wood from which a bed is constructed may be 
natural, but the construction process and the bed are artificial. Accordingly, 
something man-made can imitate, but can not be the same as, something natural. 
Bronze can imitate copper and tin, its constituent parts, but whereas they are 
natural, it is artificial, and there is an unbreachable, qualitative difference between 
the two. One cannot make gold, not for a scientific reason but for a philosophical 
one. The best one could hope for is artificial gold, a mere imitation of natural gold. 
The alchemical tradition challenges this, but it accepts the premise that a man-
made process can only produce something unnatural. It seeks a process that is 
beyond the constraints of the man-made, imploring the supernatural if necessary, in 
order to produce something natural and real and not imitative. John Case shares 
with the alchemists the belief that the produce of human effort can be natural, but 
does so by challenging the Aristotelian premise that human processes are unnatural. 
                                                
121 Schmitt has well explored this theme in Case, and I will follow what I understand to be his 
interpretation. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 191–216. The term art, 
of course, has the sense here of technē, craft, any human operative process, not the sense of fine art. 
122 Physics, 2.1–2 192b8–194b15. 
123 Case, Lapis Philosophicus, 2.1.3, pp.175–81. 
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He claims that in any productive activity it is nature not man which does the work. 
The process itself is fully natural. It is not the medicine itself, but the curative 
power of nature that heals. Neither the doctor, the architect, the alchemist, nor the 
sorcerer should take credit for the cure, the house, the gold, or the storm, for in all 
cases it is nature itself that deserves credit. With this idea, Case is only a short 
distance from Bacon’s ‘Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.’ 
Another seminal idea in Case that will be more fully developed by Bacon 
regards induction directly. Even a belief that practical results can be obtained by 
directing nature along its course leaves open a crucial philosophical question: How 
does one know that what effected a result in the past will effect the same result in 
the future? This is a problem of induction. Case treated induction fifteen years 
earlier in his 1584 logic textbook Summa veterum interpretum.124 The relevant part of 
that textbook follows the conventional outline for presentation of scholastic logic, 
though it includes a more generous use of the scholastic device of objection-and-
response than was typical for introductory textbooks and makes extensive use of the 
Ramist method of hierarchical division. Induction, as it normally does, receives 
short treatment immediately following the long exposition on the syllogism and is 
sandwiched between similarly short treatments of the enthymeme and example.125 
Indeed, the treatment is even shorter than is common, and there is no mention of 
some issues or examples often covered. There are, however, two new things. The 
                                                
124 Case, Summa veterum interpretum. 
125 Ibid., bk. 1, ch.19, pp. 36–37. 
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first is that Case prefaces the conventional definition of induction by saying that 
induction is better used by orators than by philosophers, better used than deduction 
to affect popular sentiment. This is an appeal to the way induction was treated in 
the Topics, the new humanist source, rather than in the Prior Analytics, the 
standard medieval source. Case then defines induction in a conventional way and 
gives a common example. He then offers this new contribution to the study of 
induction: 
In 
induction, 
these are 
considered: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The material, which is the singular things collected. 
The form, which is a sufficient enumeration of the 
particular things and their connection in 
something universal. 
The order of enumerating the propositions. 
The goal, which is a powerful persuasion of the 
masses.126 
The list clearly suggests the four Aristotelian causes—material, formal, efficient, 
and final. And if Case had explicitly said that validating an induction requires 
identifying an underlying cause, as Galen had, his treatment would have been 
revolutionary. But he does not. He says nothing more about the list, nothing about 
how these four are to be considered, only that they should be. It will be for Bacon 
to explicitly propose a relationship between induction and causality. 
                                                
126 Ibid., 37. 
“In inductione 
considerantur 
 
 
 
Materia, quae est res singularis numerose collecta. 
Forma, quae est sufficiens rerum singularium enumeratio 
connexioque in re universa. 
Ordo propositiones enumerandi. 
Finis, qui est firma persuasio multitudinis.” 
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The third theme inchoate in Case is not really a new theme but a new 
vocabulary applied to an old theme, an aspect of the earlier discussed epistemology 
of Zabarella and Digby. Zabarealla and Digby published their major works in 1578 
and 1579, as Case was establishing his teaching practice and before he had published 
anything. The Lapis Philosophicus was published twenty years later. In it we find 
the now familiar theme that abstract ideas are known at first only confusedly 
(confuse) and then after sufficient cogitation come to be known distinctly 
(distincte).127 This pattern is the same in both composition and resolution.128 What 
is important about Case’s presentation is not the content, but the terminology. 
Notio (and its cognate notitia) are used much more frequently than we have seen. 
The term will be central for Bacon. Furthermore, Case calls the ill-formed 
abstractions known only confusedly ‘abstract phantasms’ or ‘idols,’129 another 
concept central for Bacon. The word idol has two ancient senses, one as a distorted 
image in a mirror and the other as an object of veneration. Case alludes to both. In 
the Lapis Philosophicus, he describes how ill-formed concepts distort further 
thinking, and in the Ancilla, the shorter version of the same material, he writes, 
“He who, in scrutinizing the natural world, is content to be an idolater, is no 
                                                
127 See especially Case, Lapis Philosophicus, bk. 1, ch. 1, pp. 31–43, under the heading “Whether 
universals are better known to us than to nature.” “Utrium universalia nobis sint notiora quam 
naturae.” Also John Case, Ancilla philosophiae seu epitome in octo libros physicorum Aristotelis (Oxford: 
Joseph Barnes, 1599), 11. 
128 Case, Lapis Philosophicus, 37. 
129 E.g., ibid., 34, 202. Cf., 200–202. 
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Philosopher.”130 Case does not further develop idol as a technical philosophical 
term, but he does use it in the same sense Bacon will, for an idea reached without 
empirical foundations, like Digby’s mental flight to the summit. 
These three inchoate themes in Case, how man effects works by guiding 
natural processes, how the four Aristotelian causes have a role to play in performing 
valid inductions, and how ill-formed ideas must not be allowed to thwart one’s 
correct thinking, will all be developed into particular and crucial topics in Bacon’s 
Novum Organum. 
Summary 
Around 1580, Jacopo Zabarella, leading Aristotelian of his day, working at the 
center of Europe’s most advanced Aristotelian scholarship, argued for a two-fold 
procedure for coming to know, a procedure he calls ‘regressus.’ The first part, 
resolution, is a syllogism, but a syllogism that is inadequate, because it fails to 
explain something by its cause. The issue under discussion is thus understood only 
confusedly. The second part of the regressus, composition, is a new syllogism, one 
that identifies a cause and thus leaves one with distinct scientific knowledge. 
Between these two phases lies another, consideratio or a mentale examen. By this 
contemplation, what had been ‘confused’ knowledge becomes ‘distinct.’ 
                                                
130 “Si in rebus naturalibus scrutandis acquiescat Idololatra est nec Philosophus.” Case, 
Ancilla Philosophiae, 8. 
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Around the same time, Everard Digby, a young man living on the outskirts of 
European scholarship, but fashioning himself ready to make a big contribution to 
Aristotelian thought, argued for a two-fold procedure for coming to know, a 
procedure he identifies as ‘methodus.’ The first part, the ascent, is a syllogism, but 
a syllogism understood only confusedly, because the cause of its truth is not 
grasped. The second part is the same syllogism, but now fully understood. Between 
these two parts is a cognitive wandering through the ‘intelligible realm’ and a 
mystical consideration of God. By this contemplation, what had been ‘confused’ 
becomes ‘clear’ and ‘distinct.’ 
For these self-proclaimed Aristotelians, each attempting to advance scholastic 
thought as far as he could, the proper way to know is by demonstration, by the 
deduction of particulars from clearly and distinctly known universals. For each of 
these thinkers, each part of the double process is a demonstration. There is first a 
demonstration poorly understood and then a demonstration fully understood, with 
an enlightening realization intervening. In other words, for both Zabarella and 
Digby the so-called double processes are really a single process, the process of 
coming to understand a demonstrative syllogism. Neither thinker was a champion 
of induction nor a theorist offering a new understanding of induction. 
Opposing these and other Aristotelians were the followers of Peter Ramus, 
such as Digby’s adversary, William Temple. Like other Ramists, Temple defends 
not a double method, but a single one. He points out that what goes by the name 
method is a single procedure for going from a universal to particulars. Temple claims 
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this is the only proper way to teach. But though it is appropriate for imparting 
existing knowledge, it is not appropriate, Temple claims, for discovering new 
knowledge. For that, one must revive the system of true induction that Aristotle 
described in the Posterior Analytics and discard the errors on the subject of 
induction offered by past and current Aristotelian commentators. 
If in the late 1570s and early 1580s, Zabarella and Digby were representative of 
the forefront of Aristotelian thought, then the self-identified Aristotelians were 
neither championing induction nor offering anything new on the subject. In 
England, the champion of induction was William Temple, prominently known as 
an anti-Aristotelian but calling for the return in effect to a pre-medieval 
interpretation of Aristotelian induction. 
What the doctrines of Zabarella and Digby had in common was that the first 
stage toward epistemic knowledge is an immediate leap to a deductive syllogism 
whose components are only confusedly understood. John Case called components 
that make up these demonstrations ‘notions’ and ill-formed ones ‘idols.’ Temple 
said that the leap to abstract knowledge cannot be done successfully the way Digby 
proposed. Universal knowledge should be sought not by leaping to a deduction, but 
by incrementally using the process of abstraction that Aristotle described in 
Posterior Analytics 2.19, the process Aristotle called induction. Case suggested that 
such an induction could only be made valid by considering causes. These elements, 
lying scattered in the late seventeenth-century theories of a scholastic Aristotelian, a 
mystic, a reforming Ramist, and a humanist Aristotelian, form the bare outline for 
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Francis Bacon’s proposal for a new kind of induction, including what problems it is 
meant to address, from where in antiquity it came, how it is to be performed, and 
how it is to be made certain. Although none of the four views surveyed here 
included theories of induction, each one included elements that Bacon would either 
address or adopt. Bacon did not write a treatise on induction to rebut someone 
else’s treatise, but nor did his proposal enter a vacuum. It entered epistemological 
discussions underway in the last years of the sixteenth century. Induction was not 
central in those discussions. Bacon proposed that it should be. 
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4 
 
Induction New and Old: 
Bacon’s Rediscovery of Ancient Induction 
 
 
 
Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum is written in the language of Renaissance Aristo-
telianism. Its prefatory discussion of syllogisms, axioms, middle terms, and major 
and minor premises, its central topic of induction, its concern with redargutions, its 
core concepts of notions and forms, even its famous idols, and of course its title, 
come right out of contemporary Aristotelian discourse. Bacon expected his readers 
to understand that language and thus to have their reading informed by Aristotelian 
associations. This has generally been overlooked by scholars.1 From both an 
                                                
1 Exceptions are the unpublished Kosman, “The Aristotelian Backgrounds of Bacon’s Novum 
Organum”; the little noticed Robert E. Larsen, “The Aristotelianism of Bacon’s Novum Organum,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 23, no. 4 (1962): 435–50; and Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science 
and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, chs. 15–17. Although containing much good material, the first is 
unfortunately shaped by an acceptance of the Randall thesis regarding Paduan Aristotelianism that 
was rejected in chapter 3 above. The second discusses similarities between Bacon and Aristotle, but 
has little historical context. Neither benefited from the subsequent discovery by F. Edward Cranz, 
E. J. Ashworth, Charles H. Lohr, Charles B. Schmitt, and others of just how vigorous Aristotelian 
scholarship was on the Continent after 1540 and in England starting about the time Bacon arrived at 
Cambridge. Neither study benefited from the fuller understanding of the Temple-Digby debate 
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historical and a philosophical perspective, that is unfortunate. For if we do not 
recognize this Aristotelian context, we will fail to fully understand Bacon’s 
contribution to the development of early modern natural philosophy and we will 
fail to fully understand his proposed method. This chapter seeks to situate and 
interpret the Novum Organum in its intended Aristotelian context.2 It is hoped that 
this will provide new insight into Bacon’s proposal for a new kind of induction. 
                                                                                                                                       
presented in Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse; in Akester, “Life and Works 
of Everard Digby”; and in the previous chapter above. Perez-Ramos’s short chapter on Aristotle is a 
very valuable contribution but the chapter on medieval and Renaissance induction shaped, like 
Kosman’s treatment, by adoption of the Cassirer/Randall interpretation of Renaissance induction. 
2 No attempt will be made to review and evaluate the vast—and partisan—secondary 
literature on Bacon. Particular works will be cited as needed. In general the important works for 
this study include the main philosophical examinations made in the twentieth century: Cohen, “The 
Myth about Bacon and the Inductive Method”; B. Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: an 
Essay on its Development from 1603 to 1609 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964); Mary Hesse, 
“Francis Bacon,” in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. D. J. O’Connor (New York: Free 
Press, 1964), 141–52; Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); Mary Horton, “In Defence of Francis Bacon: A 
Criticism of the Critics of the Inductive Method,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 4 (1973): 
241–78; Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse; L. Jonathan Cohen, “Some 
Historical Remarks on the Baconian Conception of Probability,” Journal of the History of Ideas 41 
(1980): 219–31; Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science; Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of 
Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition; the several valuable articles in Brian Vickers, ed., 
Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon (Hamden, CT: 1968) and Markku Peltonen, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Bacon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); as well as editors’ 
commentaries in Francis Bacon, The Collected Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert 
Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, New ed., 14 vols. (London: Longmans & Co., 1857–70); in 
Francis Bacon, Selected Philosophical Works, ed. Rose-Mary Sargent (Indianapolis and Cambridge: 
1999); and in Francis Bacon, Bacon’s Novum Organum, ed. Thomas Fowler (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1889). 
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I do not suggest that Aristotelianism is the only context in which Bacon 
should be read. Indeed, fruitful results have been obtained in the last few decades 
by situating Bacon’s work in the contexts of law,3 politics and society,4 natural 
                                                                                                                                       
Citations to Bacon’s work other than the Novum Organum and the Advancement of Learning 
will be to volume and page number in the standard (London, not American) Spedding edition. 
Citations to Novum Organum will be by book and aphorism, to Advancement of Learning by book, 
chapter and paragraph. Under the editorship of Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine, a new critical 
edition of Bacon’s complete works is being published by Clarendon Press. It is expected that this 
Oxford Francis Bacon will supplant the Spedding edition as the standard reference. Thankfully, it 
includes a high-quality Latin transcription with a modern English translation on facing pages. 
Unfortunately, the new translation of Novum Organum, prepared by Rees, is not sufficiently literal 
for detailed textual analysis. Rees’s standard is “‘How would you say this in modern English?’” (p. 
cxxvii). To take a few examples, Rees translates Bacon’s “In Logica enim vulgari opera fere vniuersa 
circa Syllogismum consumitur” (Distributio Operis) as “For in the common logic the syllogism takes 
up practically the whole field,” Bacon’s “praesertim cum hoc vocabulum inualuerit, & familiariter 
occurrat” (2.2) as “especially as this term is current coin and crops up all the time,” and Bacon’s 
famous “praerogativae instantiae” as “instances with special powers.” His translations of “confusius” 
as “haphazardly” and “Artes populares & opinabiles” as “popular arts and matters of opinion” in the 
passage analyzed below mask the references to contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. I will instead 
use the recent translation by Michael Silverthorne in Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa 
Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
modified as noted where necessary. Silverthorne’s translation of the above are “For in ordinary logic 
almost all effort is concentrated on the syllogism,” “especially as this word has become established 
and is in common use,” “prerogative instances,” “in confusion,” and “popular arts which are based 
on opinion.” I will include Bacon’s Latin in footnotes. For translations of other Baconian works, 
unless otherwise indicated, I will use Spedding, or Farrington for the three works for which 
translations are not in Spedding. 
3 E.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, Francis Bacon, ed. William Twining and Neil MacCormick, 
Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); and Shapiro, A 
Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720. 
4 E.g., Daston, “Baconian Facts, Academic Civility and the Prehistory of Objectivity”; Mary 
Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and 
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history,5 rhetoric and humanism,6 and natural magic and crafts.7 These last are 
particularly important, for Bacon was much impressed by advances in the mining, 
agricultural, navigational, and mechanical arts of his time and admired some of the 
work of nature philosophers such as Telesio, whom he called the “first of the 
moderns.”8 It was central to Bacon’s project to learn and show how natural 
philosophy could be applied to improving the material conditions of life. But Bacon 
considered something else more fundamental. For his magnum opus he did not 
write a New De Rerum Natura or a New Magia Naturalis. He wrote a New 
Organon. He saw the need to fashion a new epistemology, which would be built not 
around deduction as the old Organon was, but around induction. His insight here 
                                                                                                                                       
Julie Robin Solomon, Objectivity in the Making (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998). 
5 E.g., Virgil K. Whitaker, “Francis Bacon’s Intellectual Milieu,” in Essential Articles for the 
Study of Francis Bacon, ed. Brian Vickers (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968),; and Paula Findlen, 
“Francis Bacon and the Reform of Natural History in the Seventeenth Century,” in History and the 
Disciplines, ed. Donald R. Kelley (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 239–60. 
6 E.g., Craig Walton, “Ramus and Bacon on Method,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 
(1971): 289–302; Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse; and John C. Briggs, Francis 
Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
7 E.g., Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science; and Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of 
Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition. 
8 On possible influences of Telesio on Bacon, see Brian P. Copenhaver, “Astrology and 
Magic,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 296–300; Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the 
Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 179–180; 
Graham Rees, “Bacon’s Speculative Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku 
Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 121–45. 
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was correct and important. For knowledge to be power, one most know what will 
be effective, what will work. One must know, of the things that worked in the past 
which will work in the future, of the things that worked in some cases which will 
work in all cases. Knowledge of the past is not knowledge of the future unless one 
can legitimately form universal statements based on past particulars. Thus, one 
must discover the conditions for a valid and certain induction, just as Aristotle 
discovered and explicated in the Organon the foundations and conditions of a valid 
and certain deduction. Bacon can and should be read within different contexts, but 
the one most fundamental for understanding the Novum Organum as Bacon meant it 
to be understood is the Aristotelian. 
Bacon’s Early Aristotelian Exposure 
Francis Bacon’s father, Nicholas Bacon,9 was one of the nouveau riche of 
Renaissance England. Born a commoner, he received a good education, became a 
talented and hard-working lawyer, acquired property in the reorganizations of land 
that followed Henry VIII’s dissolution of religious institutions in the 1530s and 40s, 
and rose through administrative ranks to be knighted and made Lord Keeper by 
Elizabeth upon her accession in 1558. His rise was attested and advanced by his 
second marriage in 1553 to Anne Cooke, a young woman well known at court and 
well connected with several important families. Anne was very well educated, 
                                                
9 Robert Tittler, “Bacon, Sir Nicholas (1510–1579),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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independent-minded, and a devout Calvinist.10 Her husband Nicholas was a 
lifelong enthusiast for education and educational reform and a committed if 
politically moderate Protestant. Francis was born to the couple in 1561 and educated 
by tutors at home starting at age five.11 He was a gifted young student, and in 1573, 
when he was twelve, and when his father was at the height of his national 
prominence, Francis was sent with his older brother to Trinity College, 
Cambridge. There he was under the direct care and supervision of John Whitgift, 
Master of the college, humanist scholar, leading intellectual defender of Elizabeth’s 
Church, and future archbishop of Canterbury.12 Bacon arrived on campus just as 
prospects for Cambridge and Oxford, and the study of Aristotle there, were 
beginning to improve. At Oxford, John Case was becoming a popular teacher of 
logic, and at Cambridge, the young Everard Digby was beginning to teach, not yet 
having written his Theoria Analytica. Bacon’s own master was particularly active in 
helping rebuild Cambridge. 
                                                
10 She knew Latin, Greek, and Italian and had a published English translation of the Italian 
sermons of Bernadino Ochino to her credit. The first of several editions was printed when she was 
twenty. 
11 On Bacon’s early education, see Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The 
Troubled Life of Francis Bacon (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 32; andBrian Vickers, “Bacon and 
Rhetoric,” in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 205. 
12 William Joseph Sheils, “Whitgift, John (1530/31?–1604),” in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Books were one casualty of the mid-century decline. In early 1573, Whitgift 
was seeking donors who could help the university library acquire books again. One 
man who responded to the appeal was Sir Nicholas Bacon. In the first year of his 
sons’ enrollment he donated ninety-nine books,13 including complete works of 
Aristotle in both Greek and Latin. If these were the same editions that Whitgift 
bought for the Bacon brothers in late 1573 (and there are reasons to believe they 
were14) then Francis’s first close encounter with Aristotle’s collected works was 
with handsome Greek and Latin editions published in Basel. The impression they 
made on Francis, however, was not good. The edition claimed to be a complete 
repository of all natural knowledge.15 That claim alone would have disquieted a 
smart young man raised in a maternal culture of independent thinking and a 
paternal culture of respect for material progress. Francis’s exposure to the 
traditional way the book’s contents were still taught would have confirmed the 
impression. There is no reason to doubt the biographer William Rawley’s 
statement that “Whilst he was commorant in the university, . . . he first fell into 
the dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle.”16 Many a second-year Cambridge 
                                                
13 Oxford DNB says “some seventy.” I take ninety-nine from the detailed study in Durel, 
“Francis Bacon lecteur d’Aristote à Cambridge,” 39. 
14 Ibid.: 31–45. 
15 Ibid.: 44. 
16 Rawley’s full comment is “Whilst he was commorant in the university, about sixteen years 
of age, (as his lordship hath been pleased to impart unto myself), he first fell into the dislike of the 
philosophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ever ascribe all 
high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way; being a philosophy (as his lordship used to say) 
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student, especially those tutored in progressive households, must have felt the same 
way. But Francis’s dislike did not keep him away. 
Bacon’s study of Aristotle continued beyond his Cambridge days,17 and his 
mature understanding of Aristotle was neither shallow nor merely second-hand. 
More examples will be seen, but one will suffice for now. In the unpublished 
Redargutio Philosophiarum (1608), Bacon writes, referring to Aristotle’s two works, 
“I appeal to your memories, sons, and ask whether, in his Physics and Metaphysics, 
you do not hear the voice of dialectics more often than the voice of nature.”18 This 
is an insightful observation that could only be made by someone who has read (or 
tried to read) the Physics and the Metaphysics. Bacon was also familiar with 
Aristotelian commentaries, and he sometimes failed to distinguish Aristotle’s own 
                                                                                                                                       
only strong for disputations and contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of 
the life of man; in which mind he continued to his dying day.” (Spedding 1:4.) The account is 
sometimes ridiculed, for surely a twelve-year-old could not have had such a mature reaction. That 
Rawley got Bacon’s age wrong further taints the account. But, first, Rawley’s estimate on Bacon’s 
age is not far off. Bacon was “commorant in the university” until just before his fifteen birthday. 
Second, Rawley does not say that the young man articulated at the time the initial impression that 
he later came to better understand. For other defenses of Rawley’s account, see Farrington, The 
Philosophy of Francis Bacon: an Essay on its Development from 1603 to 1609, 30; and Gaukroger, Francis 
Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy, 39–40, which includes a reference to a 
Oxford statue which fined students who deviated from Aristotle’s Organon. 
17 For which of Aristotle’s works Bacon surely, probably, and possibly read while still at 
Cambridge, see Durel, “Francis Bacon lecteur d’Aristote à Cambridge,” 32. Durel concludes that 
Bacon certainly read the Topics, probably the Analytics, possibly the Physics, and not the Metaphysics. 
18 “memoriam vestram, filii, testamur, si in physicis ejus et metaphysicis non saepius 
dialecticae quam naturae voces audiatis.” Redaurgutio Philosophiarum, Spedding, 3:566; Farrington, 
112.  
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words from that of his Scholastic commentators. The above quoted passage is 
followed by this question intended to be about Aristotle: “Who describes the 
nature of the soul in terms of second intention?”19 The correct answer is not 
Aristotle, but Aristotle’s scholastic commentators, for the concept second intention is 
their creation not his. Bacon’s occasional confusion aside, he clearly had first-hand 
exposure and moderately advanced knowledge of Aristotle and Aristotelian 
scholarship of both medieval and contemporary commentators when he was 
developing his own ideas for a new Organon. 
After almost three years at Cambridge (interrupted twice by plague in the 
town), Bacon spent two and a half years in France as a member of the English 
ambassador’s house. Upon his father’s death in 1579, he returned to London and 
began study of law at Gray’s Inn. Through his twenties and even beyond, he 
appears to us as a stereotypical youngest son of a nouveau riche government 
official—spoiled, financially irresponsible, dabbling in international intrigues, 
asking for favors from his extended and powerful family, and trying to get 
government positions for which he was too young. He would not have a full-time 
job until he was in his forties, but by the time he was thirty, he had found both a 
patron and a passion. The patron was the successful military commander Robert 
Devereux, second earl of Essex. The passion was the reform of learning, especially 
in natural philosophy. In 1592, he wrote to his uncle, “I confess that I have as vast 
                                                
19 “qui animae genus non multo melius quam ex vocibus secundae intentionis tribuerit?” 
Redaurgutio Philosophiarum, Spedding, 3:566, Farrington, 112. 
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contemplative ends, as I have moderate civil ends; for I have taken all knowledge to 
be my province.”20 He was frustrated in his political ambitions and thought of 
abandoning them. Instead he fell into a pattern of providing council and help to 
Essex, taking on projects for the Queen and her administration, and pursuing his 
studies during out-of-town retreats to Twickenham Park, an eighty-five-acre family 
estate.21 Later comments suggest these studies included experimentats in natural 
philosophy, but we know neither the seriousness nor subject matter.22 In 1594, 
Bacon made the acquaintance of the Ramist William Temple, who had left behind 
his feud with Everard Digby and joined Essex’s circle as secretary. Both he and 
Bacon were in their thirties, both worked directly for Essex, and both had a passion 
for the reform of human learning. It is hard to imagine Bacon not arguing 
philosophy with the country’s most prominent Ramist while Bacon developed the 
core of his own philosophical system. From the nominally anti-Aristotelian 
Temple, Bacon could have heard an insightful understanding of Aristotelian 
induction. 
At the end of 1594, Bacon wrote the script for some Christmas festivities at 
Gray’s Inn. They included a speech to the queen explaining that she should take 
responsibility for advancing natural philosophy in the kingdom and giving her 
                                                
20 Jardine and Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon, 134. In 1620 he 
wrote the king that he had been “about some such work near thirty years.” October 12, 1620, 
Spedding, 14:120. 
21 Ibid., 121–208. 
22 Ibid., 138. 
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specific advice on how to do so.23 In the speech, Bacon included themes that would 
recur in the later “Parasceve” of the Novum Organum and in the New Atlantis. 
Court activities took Bacon away from his studies in the few years around 1600. 
The queen had given him an informal position as Learned Counsel after he helped 
her prosecute his own patron Essex for traitorous actions. When James acceded to 
the thrown after Elizabeth’s death in 1603, James let Bacon keep the position, but it 
had no formal responsibilities. So Bacon again had time to think and write. 
Bacon’s Start in the Posterior Analytics 
In the eight years from 1603 to 1611, Bacon wrote published or unpublished 
works that included nearly all the main themes and tropes of the Novum Organum. 
One of the first of these works was Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature: 
with the Annotations of Hermes Stella, written around 1603.24 This text is particularly 
important for revealing both the progression of Bacon’s thought and his sources. 
He begins this draft of an essay by recognizing that the pursuit of knowledge is 
subject to moral evaluation, and he claims that such pursuit is proper only if it is 
                                                
23 Spedding, 8:355; Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern 
Philosophy, 72. 
24 This manuscript, in English, is carefully transcribed by one of Bacon’s servants and has 
edits and rearrangements marked by Bacon in his own hand. Many of the sections are left 
incomplete. The title suggests that Bacon was experimenting with a genre that he would use in the 
New Atlantis, an account by a fictional character commented on by another fictional character. The 
text is reprinted in Spedding, 3:215–252, rearranged as Bacon’s edits indicate he intended. 
 219 
directed toward one end, “the endowment of man’s life with new commodities.”25 
Such knowledge properly seeks to return man to his prelapsarian state of full 
control over nature. In the pursuit of knowledge for other purposes, such as to 
satisfy curiosity or to gain fame, the resulting knowledge may not be untrue, but 
the pursuit is “inferior and degenerate.”26 Even the pursuit of knowledge of God is 
improper. God should be the object of awe or wonder, not of rational inquiry. 
Knowledge should be pursued for the “discovery of particulars not revealed before 
for the better endowment and help of man’s life.”27 
One way to discover new particulars is by chance. Bacon writes in another 
draft of the same year, “Everybody stumbles on some truth sooner or later.”28 In 
several of his writings, Bacon cites the compass and gunpowder as examples of such 
serendipity. But these are “contradictory and solitary. . . . If gunpowder had been 
discovered, not by good luck but by good guidance, it would not have stood alone 
but been accompanied by a host of noble inventions of a kindred sort.”29 Bacon’s 
                                                
25 Spedding, 2:223. Said in different words: “the benefit and relief of the state and society of 
man,” 2:222; “new experiences and inventions,” 2:232; “to increase and multiply the revenues and 
possessions of man,” 2:233; “the revealing and discovering of new inventions and operations,” 2:235. 
26 Spedding, 2:222. 
27 Spedding, 2:233. 
28 “Nemo enim non quandoque in aliquod verum impingitur.” Temporis Partus Masculus, 
Spedding, 3:537; Farrington, 70. 
29 “haec discors et solitaria. . . . Pulvis tormentorum si ductu, non casu (ut loquuntur) et 
impactu inventum fuisset, non solitarium, sed cum multa inventorum nobilium (quae sub eundem 
meridianum cadunt) frequentia prodisset.” Temporis Partus Masculus, Spedding, 3:358; Farrington, 
71. 
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project is to provide such good guidance. He says this guidance will have two 
crucial characteristics. “The fulness of direction to work and produce any effect 
consisteth in two conditions, certainty and liberty.”30 The first, certainty, is “when 
the direction is not only true for the most part, but infallible.”31 Thus, if one seeks 
to bring about some material condition, it is best if the actions taken are known to 
lead always to the result intended. The second condition ensures that one is free to 
take action under the most diverse conditions and still be assured of the desired 
result. Bacon offers the example of whiteness. Maybe one knows how to froth 
water with air to produce whiteness. “This direction is certain, but very particular 
and restrained, being tied both to air and water.”32 A second direction (we might 
say ‘degree of freedom’) would be to do the same with egg whites instead of water. 
Further liberty would ensue if one could move beyond clear liquids to dark ones, 
then to finely-ground solids, then to hard solids, then to all bodies of any type. 
What is sought is a method for producing whiteness that works always and in all 
cases without exception, no matter how different the new situation is from any that 
have gone before. Unless the two requirements of certainty and liberty are met, the 
discovery of new particulars relies on luck. 
To develop the philosophical underpinnings for a method that meets these 
requirements, Bacon turns to Aristotle.  
                                                
30 Spedding, 2:235. 
31 Spedding, 2:235. 
32 Spedding, 2:236. 
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This notion Aristotle had in light, though not in use. For the two 
commended rules set down by him, whereby the axioms of science are 
precepted to be made convertible, and which the latter men have not 
without elegancy surnamed the one the rule of truth because it 
preventeth deceit, the other the rule of prudence because it freeth 
election, are the same thing in speculation and affirmation which we 
now observe.33 
The ‘rule of truth’ and the ‘rule of prudence’ are the Ramist’s name for the two 
Aristotelian principles from Posterior Analytics 1.4 that were known in Latin as ‘de 
omni’ and ‘per se.’ Recall that by the rule of ‘de omni,’ a relationship holds in every 
case, though possibly only by coincidence. By the rule of ‘per se,’ a relationship 
holds necessarily, because it holds by the very nature of the things involved. Bacon 
continues to endorse the “received philosophies,”34 in arguing that the way to 
ensure these two rules are met is to identify “the form or formal cause”35 of the 
attribute, such as whiteness, that one wants to impart to new particulars. It is not 
just a cause that one must find, but the formal cause, and for any attribute there is 
only one formal cause. Again, Bacon draws this doctrine from Aristotle.  
Aristotle’s school confesseth that there is no true knowledge but by 
causes, no true cause but the form, no true form known except one, 
which they are pleased to allow; and therefore thus far their evidence 
standeth with us, that both hitherto there hath been nothing but a 
                                                
33 Spedding, 2:236. Italics in Spedding. 
34 Spedding, 2:239. 
35 Spedding, 2:239. 
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shadow of knowledge, and that we propound now that which is agreed 
to be worthiest to be sought, and hardest to be found.36 
Aristotle’s error, as Bacon see it, is not that Aristotle had the principles incorrect, 
but that he or at least his followers failed to articulate exactly how to identify 
formal causes or forms. Some, Bacon says, despaired of the attempt, considering 
forms to be outside the “compass of human comprehension.”37 Other relied on 
“anticipations,”38 the products of reason formed with little regard for observation. 
Some few geniuses seem able to succeed with antipications, and they “cannot 
receive too high a title.”39 But mostly anticipations lead to fictions in the mind, 
fictions which Bacon calls ‘idols.’ These ill-formed ideas infect all future thinking. 
Anticipations therefore lead mostly to error, contention, and the “infinite detriment 
of man’s estate,”40 instead of to identification of the true, formal causes that 
Aristotle said was the important goal. Bacon says a new method of finding formal 
causes is needed. He calls it “the interpretation of nature.”41 Valerius Terminus ends 
with an outline of subjects that will need to be covered in a full treatment of this 
new method. 
                                                
36 Spedding, 2:239. 
37 Spedding, 2:239. 
38 Spedding, 2:239–41, 244. 
39 Spedding, 2:239. 
40 Spedding, 2:244. 
41 Spedding, 2:244 ff. 
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In Valerius Terminus, Bacon hardly mentions induction. He also hardly 
mentions it in the Advancement of Learning (1605), but in this published work the 
few mentions are in contexts more like those that will follow in Novum Organum. 
Bacon lists induction and deduction together as two kinds of demonstration, for 
example.42 He says that the form of induction used by the logicians is “utterly 
vicious and incompetent.”43 Induction may have little prominence, but other 
themes first seen in Valerius Terminus and to be central in Novum Organum receive 
full force. For example, the Ramists are to be commended for reintroducing 
Aristotle’s rules of de omni and per se (though for little else),44 the highest and most 
urgent form of knowledge is the finding of formal causes,45 and current methods of 
doing so are corrupt. One important new development in this 1605 work is a 
sentence that Bacon will simplify and later use repeatedly: “For arguments consist 
of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are but the current tokens or 
marks of popular notions of things.”46 The relations between this and induction, to 
be central in Novum Organum, are left unexplored. For the first time also, Bacon 
                                                
42 Advancement of Learning, 2.14.12. His inclusion here of “demonstration in orb or circle” 
requires further research. I think he is referring to regressus. 
43 Advancement of Learning, 2.8.3. 
44 Advancement of Learning, 2.17.12. Here Bacon uses Aristotle’s Greek terms rather than 
Ramist’s modern ones. 
45 Advancement of Learning, 2.7.5–6. 
46 Advancement of Learning, 2.8.4. 
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associates induction with Socrates, “a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth,”47 but 
finds Socrates’ use of induction unstructured. 
From 1603 to 1607, Bacon developed in his writings the ideas that the material 
conditions of life can be advanced by attending to Aristotle’s rules of ‘de omni’ and 
‘per se,’ that these rules can be followed by identifying formal causes, that 
‘certainty’ and ‘liberty’ in action will result, and that the previous method of 
identifying formal causes, ‘anticipation,’ should be replaced by a new methodology, 
the ‘interpretation of nature.’ Induction was on the sidelines and its relationship to 
all this, if any, was left unclear. But that changed in 1607, in the manuscripts Partis 
Instaurationis Secundae Delineatio et Argumentum and Cogitata et Visa de 
Interpretatione Naturae. Induction took a prominent role and Bacon started 
referring to his whole doctrine as “my inductive philosophy.”48 The themes and 
positions presented in these two works are similar enough to those in Novum 
Organum, on which Bacon began work in 1608, that we may examine them in the 
mature work, published in 1620. 
The Novum Organum 
When Bacon’s magnum opus was published he was the king’s Lord 
Chancellor, and this fact is prominently announced on the book’s title-page. Indeed 
on that elaborately engraved page, printed by the king’s printer, Bacon’s title is 
                                                
47 Advancement of Learning, 2.1.6 
48 Cogitata et Visa, Farrington, 100. 
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elegantly set larger than the book’s own. The image of a ship between two pillars 
recalls England’s mighty maritime successes. Appearing just after this title-page, 
but before the dedication to the king is a short encomium, reading like a modern 
dust-jacket blurb. In it, the Lord Chancellor calls for a “wholesale Instauratio 
[Renewal] of the sciences, arts and all human learning.”49 The book has the grand 
title, Instauratio Magna [the Great Renewal]. It is written in Latin. It appears 
splendid, weighty, and authoritative,50 reminiscent perhaps of that edition of 
Aristotle’s Organon that so offended Bacon when he first arrived at Cambridge. 
The work must have appeared a disappointment, however. The first thirty-six 
pages of the encomium, dedicatory letter, preface, and Distributio Operis (Outline of 
the Work) refer to a forthcoming six-part Instauratio. But these are followed by a 
one-page announcement that the first of the six parts is missing and that the second 
part will be presented only in summary form. A look at the back of the book shows 
that the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth parts are also missing. The second part, and 
thus virtually the whole of the Instauratio Magna, is entitled Novum Organum.51 It 
                                                
49 “Scientiarum, & Artium, atque omnis Humanae Doctrinae, in vniuersum Instauratio.” 
50 For details on the first printing and bindings, see “Introduction,” xcviii–cxxiii, in Francis 
Bacon, The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum Organum and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees, vol. 
11, The Oxford Francis Bacon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). See especially xcix for the solemnity of 
the first large-paper copies. 
51 It was not long before the work was commonly called by the name of its largest part. The 
1650 edition is entitled Novum Organum Scientiarum. Bacon’s editor Rawley referred to the work as 
Instauratio Magna in 1657, in Francis Bacon, Resuscitatio, or, Bringing into publick light severall pieces., 
ed. William Rawley (London: Sarah Griffin for William Lee, 1657), b2v–c4r. Just a year later, 
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appears that the Lord Chancellor believed that the great renewal of all human 
learning comes down to the need to replace Aristotle’s Organon. 
The new Organon, however, is not a complete rejection of the old. In fact, 
Bacon begins by situating his whole project in an Aristotelian context, as can be 
seen by examining the language of the outline that Bacon offers in the Distributio 
Operis and reading it in the context of our earlier discussions of Zabarealla, Digby, 
Temple, and Case, that is, in the context of contemporary Aristotelian discourse. 
Note that this outline is the reader’s first introduction to the main section of the 
book. The book is written by a senior government official. It concerns a subject, 
the advancement of knowledge and learning in the kingdom, that should make the 
book widely read. Considering all this, it is remarkable how much technical 
Aristotelian vocabulary and how many technical Aristotelian issues Bacon broaches 
without introduction, explanation, or reminder. He clearly expects the reader to 
have a general knowledge of the old Organon. 
Without delay, Bacon announces in this outline that he will propose a 
doctrine for “a better and more perfect use of reason, in the investigation of 
things.”52 His proposal is thus for a new kind of logic, similar in some ways to the 
old, but in other ways, he says, separated by a great and even vast difference. The 
                                                                                                                                       
however, a Latin edition appeared in Francis Bacon, Opuscula varia posthuma, philosophica, civilia, et 
theologica, ed. William Rawley (London: R. Danielis, 1658), 3v–**7r, and in this edition, Rawley 
referred to the work as Novum Organum. 
52 “de meliore & perfectiore vsu rationis in Rerum inquisitione.” Silverthorne, 15.  
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old type “claims to devise and prepare assistants and supports for the intellect”53 and 
in this way is like Bacon’s new logic, but the new differs from the old in three 
primary ways. The first is in its end. The end or goal of the old logic is disputatious 
argumentation. The goal of the new is practical application. While the old is 
capable of only “probable reasonings,”54 the new seeks reliable and certain guides to 
action. 
Out of context, it might be unclear at this point which old logic Bacon is 
attacking, whether Aristotelian logic, scholastic logic, humanist topics-logic, or 
Ramist define-and-divide logic. The reference to ‘probable reasonings’ might 
suggest he is attacking the humanist methods that emerged in the previous century 
and that focused more on non-demonstrative tools of oratorical influence, tools that 
could be criticized for their lack of rigor. But the title and what soon follows make 
it clear. The new Organon is a direct alternative to the old, and the disputatious 
argumentation of the old Organon is not humanist, Ciceronian oratory. It is the 
academic exercise that was still the mainstay of academic training in Aristotelian 
logic. Such disputations were a stock object of humanist criticism, and Bacon is 
joining the humanists in the attack. Also situating himself with the humanists, he 
says his new logic will be used in “what we are accustomed to call the Interpretation 
                                                
53 “auxilia & praesidia Intellectui moliri ac parare profitetur.” Silverthorne, 15.  
54 “Rationes probabiles.” Silverthorne, 16. Note the inversion of modern understanding. For 
Bacon, deduction can generate only probable conclusions. Induction can generate certain ones. 
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of Nature.”55 The italicized phrase becomes prominent in the Novum Organum, and 
Bacon is famous for it.56 But Bacon does not say it is original with him. In fact, Pico 
della Mirandola had said in 1486 that many people were calling man the “interpreter 
of nature,”57 and this was a common theme in several Renaissance sources.58 Bacon 
thus appears at this point as just another humanist educational reformer, and in a 
way he is. But unlike some such reformers, he conspicuously situates his new logic 
within the established Aristotelian framework. 
The second difference between the old logic and his new one, Bacon says, is in 
the order of demonstration. He explains this in paragraphs so packed with 
Aristotelian reference, so crucial for situating Bacon’s project in its Aristotelian 
                                                
55 “quam Interpretatione Naturae appellare consueuimus.” My translation. 
56 The Oxford English Dictionary gives Bacon’s use pride of place, noting it immediately after 
the first definition of interpretation and suggesting Bacon as the originator: “Interpretation of Nature: 
a phrase used by Bacon to denote the discovery of natural laws by means of induction.” q.v. 
“interpretation.” 
57 “On thinking over the reason for these sayings, I was not satisfied by the many assertions 
made by many men concerning the outstandingness of human nature: that man is the messenger 
between creatures, familiar with the upper and king of the lower; by the sharpsightedness of the 
senses, by the hunting-power of reason, and by the light of intelligence, the interpreter of nature; 
the part in between the standstill of eternity and the flow of time; and, as the Persians say, the bond 
tying the world together, nay, the nuptial bond; and, according to David, ‘a little lower than the 
angels.’” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 3. My thanks to Sophie Weeks of Leeds University for pointing 
this out to me. 
58 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 16. Paolo Rossi, “Bacon’s Idea of Science,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 31 
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framework, and so easily overlooked, that it is worth quoting the passage in full and 
glossing it in detail. I italicize phrases or terms that refer to specific and technical 
topics in Aristotelian scholarship, pedagogy, or contemporary debate. Note how 
many there are. For now I excise sentences in which Bacon elaborates on why he 
rejects the syllogism. We will return to those later. 
The nature and order of our demonstrations agree with such an end 
[practical use instead of disputation]. For in ordinary logic almost all 
effort is concentrated on the syllogism. The logicians seem scarcely to 
have thought about induction. They pass it by with barely a mention, and 
hurry on to their formulae for disputation. But we reject demonstration by 
syllogism, because it operates in confusion . . . . We reject the syllogism; and 
not only so far as principles are concerned (they do not use it for that either) 
but also for intermediate propositions, which the syllogism admittedly 
deduces and generates in a fashion, but is incapable of producing works, 
quite divorced from practice and completely irrelevant to the active part 
of the sciences. For even if we leave to the syllogism and similar celebrated 
but notorious kinds of demonstration jurisdiction over the popular arts which 
are based on opinion (for we have no ambitions in this area), still for the 
nature of things we use induction throughout, and as much for the minor 
propositions as for the major ones. For we regard induction as the form of 
demonstration which respects the senses, stays close to nature, fosters 
results and is almost involved in them itself. 
And so the order of demonstration also is completely reversed. For the 
way the thing has normally been done until now is to leap immediately 
from sense and particulars to the most general propositions, as to fixed 
poles around which disputations may revolve; then to derive everything 
else from them by means of intermediate propositions; which is certainly a 
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short route, but precipitate, inaccessible to nature and inherently prone 
to disputations. By contrast, by our method, axioms are gradually elicited 
step by step, so that we reach the most general axioms only at the very 
end; and the most general axioms come out not as notional, but as well 
defined, and such as nature acknowledges as truly known to her,59 and 
which adhere in the core of things. 
By far the biggest question we raise is as to the actual form of 
induction, and of the judgement made on the basis of induction. For the 
form of induction which the logicians speak of, which proceeds by simple 
enumeration, is a childish thing, which concludes precariously, is exposed to 
the danger of instant contradiction, observes only familiar things, and 
reaches no result. 
What the sciences need is a new form of induction.60 
                                                
59 I will not discuss this reference. It is explored by Kosman, “The Aristotelian Backgrounds 
of Bacon’s Novum Organum,” 172–179. 
60 “Atque cum hujusmodi fine conveniunt demonstrationum ipsarum natura et ordo. In logica 
enim vulgari opera fere universa circa Syllogismum consumitur. De Inductione vero Dialectici vix 
serio cogitasse videntur; levi mentione eam transmittentes, et ad disputandi formulas properantes. . . 
. Rejicimus igitur syllogismum; neque id solum quoad principia (ad quae nec illi eam adhibent) sed 
etiam quoad propositiones medias, quas educit sane atque parturit utcunque syllogismus, sed 
operum steriles et a practica remotas et plane quoad partem activam scientiarum incompetentes. 
Quamvis igitur relinquamus syllogismo et hujusmodi demonstrationibus famosis ac jactatis 
jurisdictionem in artes populares et opinabiles (nil enim in hac parte movemus), tamen ad naturam 
rerum Inductione per omnia, et tam ad minores propositiones quam ad majores, utimur. 
Inductionem enim censemus eam esse demonstrandi formam, quae sensum tuetur et naturam 
premit et operibus imminet ac fere immiscetur. 
“Itaque ordo quoque demonstrandi plane invertitur. Adhuc enim res ita geri consuevit; ut a 
sensu et particularibus primo loco ad maxime generalia advoletur, tanquam ad polos fixos circa quos 
disputationes vertantur; ab illis caetera per media deriventur: via certe compendiaria, sed praecipiti, 
et ad naturam impervia, ad disputationes vero proclivi et accommodata. At secundum nos, axiomata 
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In this passage, so very early in the book, Bacon uses a wealth of Aristotelian 
vocabulary without preface or introduction. He presumes his reader is familiar 
with these terms. Three of these terms are demonstration, syllogism and induction.61 
Bacon claims that syllogism and induction are two kinds of demonstration. The 
relation between induction, syllogism, and demonstration had always been a 
                                                                                                                                       
continenter et gradatim excitantur, ut nonnisi postremo loco ad generalissima veniatur: ea vero 
generalissima evadunt non notionalia, sed bene terminata, et talia quae natura ut revera sibi notiora 
agnoscat, quaeque rebus haereant in medullis. 
“At in forma ipsa quoque inductionis, et judicio quod per eam fit, opus longe maximum 
movemus. Ea enim de qua dialectici loquuntur, quae procedit per enumerationem simplicem, 
puerile quiddam est, et precario concludit, et periculo ab instantia contradictoria exponitur, et 
consueta tantum intuetur, nec exitum reperit. 
“Atqui opus est ad scientias inductionis forma tali.” 
Silverthorne, pp. 15–16. “is incapable of producing works” for Silverthorne’s “without effects” 
for Bacon’s “operum steriles.” “adhere in the core of things” for Silverthorne’s “live in the very heart 
of things” for Bacon’s “rebus haereant in medullis.” “reject demonstration by syllogism” for 
Silverthorne’s “reject proof by syllogism” for Bacon’s “demonstrationem per Syllogismum 
reijcimus.” “precipitate” for Silverthorne’s “dangerously steep” for Bacon’s “praecipiti.” On this last, 
I adopt Spedding’s translation. Bacon’s choice is powerful but difficult to render in current English. 
English now has two words, precipitous meaning ‘steep’ and precipitate meaning ‘headlong,’ the first 
a property of the decline, the second a property of someone falling down it. Into the nineteenth 
century, each could carry the other’s meaning. It might seem precipitous is the more natural, but a 
subtlety in Bacon’s statement is then missed. In the Latin, “praecipiti” is genitive, not nominitive, as 
the noun it modifies is. That noun, “via,” is by the end of the sentence slightly anthropomorphized, 
being prone to argument. Though slightly Victorian and admittedly anachronistic, I have adopted 
Spedding’s choice in an effort to capture what I think is Bacon’s intent. 
61 When Bacon sent King James a copy of the Novum Organum, he provided this overview, 
“The work . . . is no more but a new logic, teaching to invent and judge by induction, (as finding 
syllogism incompetent for sciences of nature),” (Spedding 14:120) as if the King of England needed 
no introduction to the concepts or importance of syllogism and induction. Based on the reply, it 
seems the King had no difficulty understanding (Spedding 14:122).  
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contentious issue, but never was induction considered to have the demonstrative 
certainty that Bacon is now claiming for it. Bacon’s claim that he will leave the 
syllogism and other celebrated kinds of demonstration (cataloguing the various 
forms and derivatives of the syllogism was a staple of scholastic training) to ‘popular 
arts which are based on opinion’ is a reference to university training in dialectics. A 
theme of dialectics, going back to Aristotle’s Topics, is that in one-on-one debate 
one should get an opponent to first accept some commonly held belief, an ‘opinion,’ 
and then to argue deductively from it. Broadly, this is the method of the common 
university disputation (with the emphasis on the deductive part) and, approached 
from a different direction (with an emphasis on the appeal to persuasion and 
opinion), the theme of Ciceronian oratory so popular in Renaissance humanism. 
Bacon is proposing a remarkable inversion here (and particularly remarkable for a 
lawyer). He says that the syllogism can be left to the less rigorous field of popular 
persuasion or to the common and frivolous university disputations, but for the 
reliability and certainty desired in natural philosophy, induction is the proper type 
of demonstration. 
Bacon does not claim to introduce induction for the first time. He recognizes 
that it is already a standard part of logic. But the logicians ‘pass it by with barely a 
mention.’ He has textbooks on Aristotelian logic in mind. Since at least Peter of 
Spain’s textbook in the thirteenth century, induction had a canonical place in 
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scholastic pedagogy. Thomas Wilson’s Rule of Reason (1551),62 the first logic book in 
English and a popular one in Bacon’s school days,63 is representative of the objects 
of Bacon’s attack. In Wilson’s text, after extensive treatment of the syllogism and 
its forms, figures, moods, rules, conversions, etc. across many pages, there are just 
two-and-a-half short pages on induction. An induction is described as a kind of 
argument that reaches a universal conclusion by gathering a sufficient number of 
particulars. Wilson’s example is this: “Rhenyshe wine heateth; Maluesey [wine] 
heateth; Frenche wine heateth, neither is there any wyne that doth the contrary; 
Ergo all wine heateth.”64 The only guidance Wilson offers regarding whether such 
an argument is valid is that “if any [of the particulars] be found contrary, the 
Argument is of no force.”65 As an example of an invalid induction, he presents the 
example of unmarried bishops. He lists several who were unmarried and draws the 
conclusion that all were. But the argument is instantly refuted when it is discovered 
that several bishops in the early church were unmarried. It is this ‘simple 
enumeration’ that Bacon said is a ‘childish thing which concludes precariously.’ It 
‘reaches no result’ because the conclusion cannot be applied to unobserved 
                                                
62 Thomas Wilson, The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe (London: 
Richard Grafton, 1551). 
63 Bacon himself probably used Seton, Dialectica, since this was what Whitgift usually used 
with his students. Jardine and Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon, 35. 
Seton is in Latin and follows the same basic canonical pattern though, as discussed earlier, with 
some eclecticism and humanist accretions. 
64 Wilson, The rule of reason, H5r. 
65 Ibid., H6v. 
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instances without  ‘the danger of instant contradiction.’ Bacon will propose a new 
kind of induction that safely goes beyond the instances observed. 
A repeated theme of this early passage in the Distributio Operis is that Bacon 
will use induction not just for major premises (‘principia,’ ‘mairoes,’ or ‘maxime 
generalia’), but for minor propositions (‘propositiones medias,’ ‘minores,’ or 
‘media’) as well. Bacon is here referring to a specific technical issue in 
contemporary Aristotelian scholarship and is contrasting himself with men such as 
Zabarella and Digby. To see what Bacon means, recall Zabarellian regressus. A 
regressus is composed of two syllogisms, such as these:   
Knowledge of the fact:   Knowledge of the reasoned fact: 
MAJOR:What does not twinkle is near. MAJOR: What is near does not twinkle. 
MINOR: Planets do not twinkle. MINOR: Planets are near. 
Therefore, planets are near.  Therefore, planets do not twinkle. 
Each syllogism has a major proposition, a minor proposition, and a conclusion. In 
both syllogisms, as we saw in Zabarella, the major is obtained by induction. (As 
Bacon says, ‘They do not use [deduction] for that either.’) But deduction is used to 
obtain the minors. For the conclusion of one syllogism ‘deduces and generates in a 
fashion’ the minor premise of the other. The conclusion of one becomes the minor 
of the other.  In the common logic, therefore, induction is used to obtain the major, 
deduction to obtain the minor. Bacon says he instead will use induction for both.66 
                                                
66 Bacon is responding to Renaissance Aristotelians, not Aristotle himself. I do not claim they 
were interpreting Aristotle correctly on this point. For an ‘inductive middle’ in Aristotle, cf. 
Posterior Analytics, 1.12, 77b35, and Prior Analytics, 2.23, as discussed in chapter 1. 
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The problem with the common system, Bacon says, is that it is incapable of 
guiding practical works. One reason is that it is incapable of ascertaining what is an 
effect and what is a cause. Consider an example widely discussed in the twentieth 
century, a flagpole casting a shadow.67 Knowing the shadow is long, one can 
conclude that the flagpole is tall; and similarly, knowing the flagpole is tall, one can 
conclude that the shadow is long. But for practical works, it is important to know 
that the height of the flagpole causes the long shadow and not the other way 
around.68 The method of natural philosophy advocated by Renaissance 
Aristotelians such as Zabarella and Digby cannot determine which is the cause. 
Their whole process, says Bacon, ‘operates in confusion,’ (‘confusius agat’). Indeed 
Digby and Zabarella admit as much. They say their systems begin with a syllogism 
understood confusedly (‘confuse’). They both claim to escape the confusion by the 
experience of a contemplative insight that leads to clear and distinct knowledge. By 
that insight, they say, one sees which is cause and which effect. Bacon finds this 
proposal empty and useless. As far as he is concerned the syllogistic process, as 
advocated by Aristotelians of the time, is infected with confusion from beginning to 
end, and thus wholly incapable of satisfying the proper goal of knowledge: practical 
works. 
                                                
67 An example attributed to Sylvain Bromberger.  
68 Bacon gives an example of a shiny and smooth stone. It is crucial, he says, to recognize that 
being smooth is the cause, being shiny is the effect. Valerius Terminus, Spedding 2:240. 
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Moreover, Bacon contends that not only development of the minor 
propositions, but even development of the major—the part of the process 
supposedly inductive—is flawed. It begins in sense and particulars and leaps 
(‘advolat’) to the most general principles or axioms. This is precisely how Digby 
described his system, using this very vocabulary. But while Digby considered this 
leap to be one of the highlights of his theory, Bacon attacks it as rash, wholly 
separated from nature, and subject to instant contradiction by a single observation 
(as with discovering a married bishop). Instead, Bacon insists, a new kind of 
induction is required by which propositions can be obtained incrementally and 
cautiously, reaching ‘the most general axioms only at the very end.’ 
This brings us to the sentences, excised from the passage above, in which 
Bacon elaborates on why the syllogism has the problems it does. Instead of 
italicizing all the Aristotelian vocabulary again, I will emphasize one important 
statement. 
But we reject demonstration by syllogism, because it operates in 
confusion and lets nature slip out of our hands. For although no one 
could doubt that things which agree in a middle term, agree also with 
each other (which has a kind of mathematical certainty), nevertheless 
there is a kind of underlying fraud here, in that a syllogism consists of 
propositions, and propositions consist of words, and words are the tokens and 
signs of notions. And therefore if the very notions of the mind (which are 
like the soul of words, and the basis of every such structure and fabric) 
are badly or carelessly abstracted from things, and are vague and not 
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defined with sufficiently clear outlines, and thus deficient in many ways, 
everything falls to pieces. And therefore we reject the syllogism.69 
The statement I have italicized is central to Bacon’s thought. He made the claim 
earlier in the Advancement of Learning,70 repeats it in the body of the Novum 
Organum,71 and again later with fuller treatment in De Augmentis.72 The statement 
introduces the term notion or notio, a term too often overlooked by Bacon’s 
commentators. An understanding of what Bacon means by notion is crucial for 
understanding his induction as well as his ‘forms’ and ‘idols,’ to understanding 
what he is railing against in contemporary Aristotelianism, and to understanding 
how he proposes to give induction demonstrative certainty. As with other 
vocabulary in this section of the Distributio Operis, Bacon is using, in notio, a term 
out of Aristotelian scholarship of the 1580s and 1590s. 
                                                
69 “At nos demonstrationem per Syllogismum reijcimus, quod confusius agat, & Naturam 
emittat e manibus. Tametsi enim nemini dubium esse possit, quin, quae in medio termino 
conueniunt, ea & inter se conueniant, (quod est Mathematicae cuiusdam certitudinis), nihilominus 
hoc subset fraudis, quod Syllogismus ex propositionibus constet, propositiones ex verbis, verba 
autem notionum tesserae & signa sint. Itaque si Notiones ipsae mentis (quae verborum quasi anima 
sunt, & totius huiusmodi structurae ac fabricae basis) male ac temere a rebus abstractae, & vagae, 
nec satis definitae & circumscriptae, denique multis modis vitiosae fuerint, omnia ruunt.” 
Silverthorne, p. 16., italics added. “tokens” for Silverthorne’s “counters” for Bacon’s “tesserae.” 
Bacon himself uses “tokens” when he makes the same statement in English in Advancement of 
Learning, 2.13.4. 
70 Advancement of Learning, 2.13.4.  
71 Novum Organum, 1.14. 
72 De Augmentis, 5.2, 4:411, 1:621. 
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The term notio comes from discussions about the problem of universals. The 
problem is to identify to what universal terms refer, and discussion of the problem 
goes back to Socrates. Plato held that the universal is a real but incorporeal 
exemplar, an exemplar which Augustine later located in the mind of God. Aristotle 
proposed that the universal is inherent in all individual members of the group. Both 
proposals have problems that attracted the attention of several medieval thinkers. 
One difficulty early medieval philosophers had in exploring the issue was a paucity 
of vocabulary. They found no well-defined equivalent in Aristotle for what we 
today call a concept, the unit of thought that corresponds to a word.73 The 
investigations were greatly aided in the early twelfth century by availability of 
Avicenna’s commentary, for Avicenna did have a word for concept. Latin translators 
translated it as intention, and that term was commonly used through the remaining 
scholastic period. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, however, a 
few other words came to replace it. By then Plato had become better known and 
among his sympathizers, ideas was used. Cicero, favorite of the humanists, had used 
notio,74 and this gained currency among Aristotelians, Ramists, and theologians. In 
1584, the continental writer Julius Pacius, in commentary on the Organon, equated 
                                                
73 It seems that noēma might qualify. But the only time it appears in the Organon, at De 
Interpretatione 1.2, 16a10 and 16a14 (a part of the Organon to which early medieval thinkers had access), 
it clearly includes propositions, a unit of thought larger than that of a word. Outside the Organon 
(i.e., in parts of the corpus only later rediscovered), Aristotle discusses noēma at De Anima 3.6, De 
memoria et reminiscentia 450b29 and 451a1, Metaphysics 981a6, 990b25, 1009b25, and 1079a21, and 
Politics 1259a7. My thanks to Greg Salmieri for discussion on this issue. 
74 See Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, s.v. “notio” for several examples. 
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notio and intentio,75 and John Case used notio in his 1599 Lapis Philosophicus.76 Bacon 
picked up this term and it became central to his project.77 (He occasionally used 
conceit, conception, and conceptus, also.78) 
Though Bacon adopted the term notion, he took discussion of it in a new 
direction. He notices that concept-formation is a normative process. It can be done 
properly or improperly. For Bacon, there is such a thing as a poorly formed 
concept. As he said above, ‘If the very notions of the mind . . . are badly or 
carelessly abstracted from things, and are vague and not defined with sufficiently 
clear outlines, . . . everything falls to pieces.’ Specifically what falls to pieces are 
propositions and anything—including syllogisms—that are based on them. Thus 
Bacon rejects the syllogism as the foundation of reasoning in natural philosophy. 
The correct foundation is the proper formation of notions. 
It should be made clear that Bacon does not reject syllogistic reasoning 
altogether. In this very passage he points out that it can have mathematical 
certainty, and he gives an example where its use is appropriate. In de Augmentis, he 
                                                
75 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition 1989, s.v. “intention,” cites this as possibly 
the earliest such equation in print. 
76 Case, Lapis Philosophicus, 35. 
77 Until the late sixteenth century, notio simply meant ‘understanding’ or ‘knowledge,’ as 
evidenced, for example, by many dictionaries. Then, Francis Gouldman, A Copious Dictionary in 
Three Parts (London: John Field, 1664) s.v. “notio,” says that in philosophical contexts, notio is a 
technical term equivalent to the Greek noēma. (See footnote above.) Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
Draft Revision Dec. 2003, s.v. “notion,” says that the new usage was very common in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in the phrase “under the notion of.” 
78 E.g., Advancement of Learning, 2.16.3, 2.7.2; Cogitata et Visa, Spedding, 3:607, respectively. 
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provides a short inventory of kinds of reasoning, including the syllogism, and the 
situations in which each is best used.79 In the Preface to the Novum Organum, he 
says he does not intend to discourage use of syllogistic reasoning where it is 
appropriate.80 After the Novum Organum was published Bacon replied to an Italian 
reader, saying he “does not propose to give up syllogism altogether. . . . In the 
Mathematics [for example] there is no reason why it should not be employed.”81 
The context for his attack must be remembered. Bacon is offering a replacement to 
the old Organon, and the old Organon was understood to be the document that laid 
out the syllogism as the foundation for scientific reasoning. Bacon is not challenging 
the validity but merely the role of the syllogism. 
The third way in which Bacon says his logic is different from the old is the 
starting points of inquiry. It is here that Bacon explains the typical causes and the 
pernicious effects of poorly formed notions. He calls poorly formed notions idols, 
another word he uses without introduction or explanation and the word John Case 
used in 1599 with the same distinctive meaning.82 Bacon then explains how notions 
can be properly formed, that is, how idols can be avoided, by adopting the proper 
starting points of inquiry. Since this proposal is the core of the Novum Organum, it 
will be examined in detail below. Bacon closes the outline of the Novum Organum 
                                                
79 De Augmentis, 5.4, Spedding 4:434, 1:646. 
80 “Preface,” Silverthorne, 29. 
81 “Non est meum abdicare in totum syllogismum. . . . Ad Mathematica quidni adhibeatur?” 
Letter to Father Redemptus Baranzan, July, 1622, Spedding 14:375. Spedding’s translation. 
82 Case, Lapis Philosophicus, 34. 
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by saying that his system consists of three redargutiones. Though typically translated 
as refutations, the choice masks the reference. Though Bacon uses it many times, 
redargutio was an uncommon Latin word. Its most prominent medieval use was as 
translation for the Greek elenches in the title of the last book of Aristotle’s Organon, 
the book called Peri Sophistikōn Elenchēōs, or On Sophistical Refutations. Bacon thus 
ends the outline of his new Organon where Aristotle’s ended, with redargutions. 
From beginning to end, this short outline of the New Organon that Bacon 
provides in his prefatory material is steeped in the Aristotelian language and 
discourse of the 1580s and 1590s. It is Bacon’s intention to challenge the foundation 
of that Aristotelian scholarship and he expects his work to be read by those familiar 
with it. 
Notions and Idols 
The fundamental concept of the Novum Organum is not induction, form, idol, 
interpretation of nature, or prerogative instance. All these are important, but they can 
be properly understood and interrelated only by reference to the more fundamental 
notion. A notion, for Bacon, is a unit of thought signified by a word.83 That is, its 
scope is smaller than that of a treatise, a paragraph, or a proposition, and broader 
than that of a sense-perception. Its foundation, however, is sense-perception. Bacon 
                                                
83 This is not strictly true. There are a few cases where Bacon cites a notion marked by a two-
word phrase. For example, in Novum Organum, 2.19, he gives this list of “vague and poorly defined” 
notions: “the notion of an elementary nature, the notion of a heavenly nature, the notion of rarity.” 
Also, see below about ideograms and gestures. 
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recognizes no other source of knowledge about nature. In the very first aphorism of 
the Novum Organum, Bacon says that man can understand no more than what he 
has observed or what he has derived from what he has observed.84 At the same 
time, Bacon acknowledges that the senses are limited. The eyes cannot see things 
far away or things very small. The skin is limited in its ability to detect differences 
in temperature. But from this fact he does not draw the conclusion of  “Sceptics 
and Academics” that no knowledge is possible beyond “appearances and 
probabilities.”85 “Their great error was, that they laid the blame upon the 
perceptions of the sense, and therefore pulled up the sciences by the very roots. . . . 
They ought rather to have charged the defect upon the mind.”86 For the senses are 
fully capable of certifying and reporting truth, if they are properly aided.87 
Instruments such as telescopes, microscopes, and thermometers are one kind of aid, 
but not the most important. The most important is a proper method by which the 
mind processes the evidence of the senses, that is, the method by which the mind 
forms notions. 
                                                
84 “Homo Naturae minister, & Interpres, tantum facit, & intellegit, quantum de Naturae 
Ordine, re vel mente, obseruauerit, nec amplius scit, aut potest.” “Man is Nature’s agent and 
interpreter; he does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of nature in fact 
or by inference; he does not know and cannot do more.” Novum Organum, 1.1. 
85 “Academici . . . et Sceptici.” “verisimilitudinem aut probabilitatem.” De Augmentis, 5.2, 
4:411–2, 1:621 Cf. Advancement of Learning, 2.13.4. 
86 “Verum in hoc maxime ab illis peccatum est, quod sensuum perceptions calumniabantur; 
unde Scientias radicitus evellebant. . . . Debuerant autem potius defectum hac in parte imputasse 
mentis.” De Augmentis, 5.2, 4:412, 1:622. 
87 Preface, Silverthorne, 28. 
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A few pages into the Novum Organum, Bacon repeats what he said in the 
Advancement of Learning and the Distributio Operis, “The syllogism consists of 
propositions, propositions consist of words, and words are the tokens of notions. 
Hence if the notions themselves . . . are confused and abstracted from things 
without care, there is nothing in what is built on them.”88 Note Bacon’s use again 
of ‘confused,’ and also his use of the modern ‘abstracted.’ Abstraction is not the 
common scholastic verb for the process of developing concepts from sense-
perceptions, but Bacon uses it frequently for this, and the term became standard 
after him. Bacon believes that this process can be done well or poorly. That is, 
abstraction is a normative process. Without well-defined concepts, Bacon believes, 
not only can one not communicate clearly, one cannot think clearly. This is the 
fundamental idea of the Novum Organum, the one that makes it possible to fully 
understand Bacon’s ‘induction,’ ‘idols,’ ‘forms,’ ‘tables,’ ‘instances,’ and so on.  
Bacon justifies this position by appealing to a combination of a basic fact 
about nature and a basic fact about the mind. The first is that “nothing exists in 
nature except individual bodies.”89 (Bacon rejects the possibility of Platonic ideals 
or attributes without bodies.) The second is that the human mind has a difficult 
time dealing with a large number of individual bodies. So, Bacon says, the mind 
                                                
88 “Syllogismus ex Propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba Notionum tesserae 
sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsae . . . confusae sint, & temere a rebus abstractae, nihil in ijs, quae 
superstruuntur, est firmitudinis.” Novum Organum, 1.14. Again, “tokens” for Silverthorne’s 
“counters.”  
89 “Licet enim in Natura nihil vere existat praeter Corpora individua.”Novum Organum, 2.2.  
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tries to find order among the many and then to group individual bodies or their 
properties into “bundles,”90 the mental units that Bacon calls notions. But notions 
too are difficult to retain. So the mind associates with each notion an ‘emblem.’ “An 
emblem reduces the intellectual to the sensible.”91 These sensible images could be 
the hieroglyphics of Egypt, the ideograms of China, the gestures of speechless 
people,92 anything that “can be divided into differences sufficiently numerous to 
explain the variety of notions (provided those differences be perceptible to the 
sense).”93 A word is one kind of emblem. 
The definition of a word or of a notion identifies contents of the bundle, but if 
the definition is confused, attempts to use the word or notion—not just in practice 
or communication, but even in personal thought—fail. Consider, for example, the 
concept wet. Bacon says it is poorly defined. “The word ‘wet’ is simply an 
undiscriminating token for different actions which have no constancy or common 
denominator.”94 Bacon gives several definitions, all of which sound plausible, but 
he then points out that by one definition flame is wet, by another glass is, by 
another a speck of dust is. This confusion hinders clear thinking. 
                                                
90 “manipulos.”De Augmentis, 5.5, 4:436–7, 1:648–9. Novum Organum, 2.25.  
91 “Emblema vero deducit intellectuale ad sensible.” De Augmentis, 5.5, 4:437, 1:649. My 
translation. 
92 Advancement of Learning, 2.16.3. De Augmentis, 6.1, 4:439–40, 1:651–2. 
93 Advancement of Learning, 2.16.2. 
94 Novum Organum, 1.60. “Humidum, nihil aliud quam nota confusa diuersarum actionum, 
quae nullam constantiam aut reductionem patiuntur.” 
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Though Bacon adopted Case’s term idol for an ill-formed notion, he gave the 
term a new precision and centrality. Before examining what idols are, it is worth 
discussing what they are not, for the meaning of the term has been confused in the 
history of Baconian scholarship and is getting more so as we become further 
removed from the Aristotelian context in which Bacon wrote. Latin idolum is a 
transliteration of the Greek eidolōn, and was understood to be so in the seventeenth 
century.95 The standard dictionary definition was ‘image.’96 Plato uses eidolōn for a 
shadow on the wall in his parable of the cave. John Case uses idolum as a synonym 
for phantasma. Bacon equates idola with imagines.97 In medieval Christianity, idolatry 
is the worship of images, and by extension, an idol could be a ‘false god.’98 But in 
the late sixteenth century and continuing into the time of Bacon’s writings, ‘false 
god’ was a derivative and secondary meaning. It is certainly not the meaning that 
would first come to mind if the word were used without prefatory remarks in a 
philosophical treatise written in Latin and claiming to be the new Organon. The 
association might not go unnoticed, however, especially after Bacon describes the 
                                                
95 E.g., Francis Holy-Oke, Dictionarium Etymologicum Latinum. (London: Adam Islip and 
Felix Kyngston, 1633); Gouldman, A Copious Dictionary in Three Parts; Elisha Coles, A dictionary, 
English-Latin, and Latin-English (London: 1679); s.v. “idolum.” 
96 E.g., John Veron, A dictionarie in Latine and English. (London: Rafe Newberie and Henrie 
Denham, 1584); Holy-Oke, Dictionarium Etymologicum Latinum.; Gouldman, A Copious Dictionary in 
Three Parts; Coles, A dictionary, English-Latin, and Latin-English; s.v. “idolum.” 
97 De Augmentis, 5.4, 1:643;. 
98 Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, s.v. “idol,” claims that this was the more common 
Middle English use and that the meaning discussed here entered English in the mid-sixteenth 
century with increased interest in ancient Latin and Greek philosophy. 
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problems that these false notions can cause. Bacon’s choice demonstrates his talent 
as a writer, but it did lead to future confusion. By the time of Johnson’s Dictionary 
of the English Language (1755), the literal Greek and Latin meaning for the English 
idol had become secondary. Henry Hallam in 1872 and Thomas Fowler in 1889, both 
scholars of early modern Latin literature, took their colleagues and recent 
predecessors to task for reading Bacon’s ‘idola’ as nineteenth-century ‘idols.’99 By 
the twentieth century, the literal meaning was largely forgotten, but commentators 
knew that Bacon did not take idola to literally mean a false god. To understand 
what he did mean, they read about the damage caused by Baconian idols, and 
inferred what Bacon could have meant by the term. In doing so, they read back into 
Bacon a much broader meaning that he intended. They concluded that idols is 
Bacon’s name for a whole host of problems that hinder clear thinking, including 
“paradoxes,”100 “prejudices and preconceptions,”101 and incorrect “philosophical 
systems,”102 to take just a few from the recent Cambridge Companion to Bacon, or to 
take the grab-bag that Graham Rees uses, “pernicious illusions, prejudices, mental 
                                                
99 Henry Hallam, Introduction to Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth 
Centuries, New ed., 4 vols. (London: John Urray, 1872), 3:44–6; Bacon, Bacon’s Novum Organum, 
204. 
100 Sachiko Kusukawa, “Bacon’s Classification of Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63. 
101 John Channing Briggs, “Bacon’s Science and Religion,” Ibid., 196. 
102 Ian Box, “Bacon’s Moral Philosophy,” Ibid., 260. 
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habits and false perceptions.”103 Idols may cause all these, but the idols themselves 
are not these. Idols are something quite specific. They are poorly-defined concepts 
or notions. If we fail to recognize this, we will not understand exactly why Bacon 
thinks his new induction will solve the problems of idols. 
Across all his writings, Bacon identifies five kinds of idols, three of one type, 
two of another.104 Sometimes, as in Novum Organum, he treats each of the first three 
individually and leaves the other two grouped as one.105 He thus describes four 
kinds of idols in the Novum Organum, and he gives each a name. Idols of the first 
kind are called ‘idols of the tribe.’106 These “are founded in human nature itself and 
in the very tribe or race of mankind.”107 Bacon identifies seven attributes of human 
nature that lead to this kind of idol. The first two108 are a tendency to suppose a 
                                                
103 Graham Rees, “Introduction [vol. XI],” in The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum Organum 
and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees, vol. 11, The Oxford Francis Bacon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), li. 
104 Idols are discussed in Temporis partus masculus (c.1602) Spedding 3:536; Valerius Terminus 
(c.1603) Spedding 3:241–5; Advancement of Learning (1605) 2.14.11; Partis instaurationis secundae 
delineation (c.1606–7) Spedding 3:547–557; Novum Organum (1620), 1.38–59; De Augmentis (1623), 5.4, 
1:641–6, 4:431–4. 
105 For the taxonomy, see Walter H. O’Briant, “The Genesis, Definition, and Classification of 
Bacon’s Idols,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1975): 347–57; and Rees, “Introduction 
[vol. XI],” li–lvii. 
106 Novum Organum, 1.41, 1.45–52. 
107 Novum Organum, 1.41. “sunt fundata in ipsa Natura humana, atque in ipsa Tribu seu gente 
hominum.”  
108 Novum Organum, 1.45, 1.46. In 1.45, Silverthorne falls into the trap of misunderstanding the 
precise meaning of notio. He generally and rightly reserves notion as the translation for Bacon’s notio. 
But in this passage, in which Bacon refers to the ‘commenta’ that all heavenly bodies move in 
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greater uniformity in things than actually exists and a tendency to fit new 
experiences into judgments already made. The third cause109 of idols of the tribe is 
that the mind’s ability to categorize can be impaired by perceptions that leave 
overwhelming impressions, encouraging the mind to ignore less prominent 
subsequent experiences, but ones that that might be just as important. The fourth 
cause110 is restlessness to order things into familiar categories. Bacon says this is 
particularly visible in the eagerness to find final causes in things for which no final 
cause exists. Fifth,111 human understanding is subject to the influence of emotions. 
The sixth cause112 is a failure to recognize the limitations of the senses and to 
sufficiently structure experiences and experiments to overcome these limitations. 
The seventh cause113 is a tendency to fly off to high-level abstractions instead of 
looking to the material world for the essence of things. All seven of these tendencies 
are, Bacon believes, part of universal human nature, part of the very nature by 
which the mind performs its organizing function, but the prejudices, the 
                                                                                                                                       
circles, Silverthorne translates commenta as notions, overlooking the fact that for Bacon, a notion has 
the scope of a word, not a proposition (for which Bacon typically uses axioma) or complete theory 
(for which, in this passage, Bacon uses dogma). Fictions or false dogmas would have been a better 
translation for commenta. 
109 Novum Organum, 1.47. 
110 Novum Organum, 1.48. 
111 Novum Organum, 1.49. 
112 Novum Organum, 1.50. 
113 Novum Organum, 1.51. 
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susceptibilities, the restlessness, and so on are not idols. They are the causes of 
poorly formed notions, but not the poorly formed notions themselves.114 
Idols of the second kind have their origin not in universal human nature, but 
in the particulars of each individual’s life and character.115 Some people, by training 
or disposition, are better at noticing differences, others at noticing similarities. 
Some admire antiquity, others novelty. Some are prone to concentrate on the 
simplicity of things, others on the complexity. All of these tendencies, if taken to 
extremes, can impair one’s judgment. All can cause the formation of poorly defined 
notions. Such notions, when caused by these tendencies, are called ‘idols of the 
cave,’ so-called because they emerge from the idiosyncrasies of the little world in 
which each person lives. 
Idols of the third kind have their source not in the individual life but in the 
communal. They arise not from life inside one’s one cave, but from life out among 
others. These are called ‘idols of the marketplace,’116 and Bacon calls them the 
“biggest nuisance of all.”117 They arise as follows. One goes out into the world and 
finds people using words. One assumes that these words refer to things that actually 
exist and that the words are the signs of well-abstracted notions. Both assumptions 
are too often false. Of the former sort, Bacon says, are fortune, the first mover, 
heavenly spheres, fire as an element, and similar fictions. The notion wet, discussed 
                                                
114 Novum Organum, 1.52. 
115 Novum Organum, 1.42, 1.53–58. 
116 Novum Organum, 1.43, 1.59–60. 
117 “omnium molestissima.” Novum Organum, 1.59.  
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earlier, is an example of the latter. One encounters the word and assumes its 
meaning is clear. But “words are mostly bestowed to suit the capacity of the 
common man, and they divide things along the lines most obvious to the common 
understanding.”118 The definition may be fine for the common understanding 
applied to common situations. But “when a sharper understanding, or more careful 
observation, attempts to draw those lines more in accordance with nature, words 
resist.”119 It is difficult to give words new meanings, so these words and their 
notions linger, “confused and badly defined, being abstracted from things rashly 
and unevenly.”120 These pernicious notions are idols of the marketplace. 
Idols of the fourth kind, ‘idols of the theater,’ are different in several ways.121 
Unlike idols of the first three types, for example, idols of the theater have active 
proponents. In the marketplace, a person hears a word and just assumes it means 
something. No subterfuge was intended. But in the theater, actors make it their 
business to get people to believe things that are not true. With the name of this 
fourth kind of idol, Bacon is again being linguistically clever. Etymologically, a 
theoria or theory, as in Everard Digby’s Theoria Analytica, is something presented 
in a theatrum or theater. Bacon is saying that for centuries, scholastic philosophers 
                                                
118 “Verba autem plerunque ex captu vulgi induntur, atque per lineas vulgari intellectui 
maxime conspicuas, res secant.” Novum Organum, 1.59. “divide” for Silverthorne’s “dissect.”  
119 “Quum autem Intellectus acutior, aut obseruatio diligentior, eas lineas transferre velit, vt 
illae sint magis secundum naturam, verba obstrepunt.” Novum Organum, 1.59.  
120 “confusa, & male terminata, & temere & inaequaliter a rebus abstracta.” Novum Organum, 
1.60.  
121 Novum Organum, 1.44, 1.62–67. 
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like Didgy have played the role of actors, foisting on their students such false 
notions as actuality, potentiality, the Aristotelian categories, specific motion, corruption 
and the medieval elements. To Bacon, these are all idols of the theater, that is, idols 
placed in men’s mind by the dogmas of beguiling philosophers like Everard Digby. 
Another difference is that idols of the theater are the easier to identify and get 
rid of. They do not enter one’s mind “by stealth.”122 Their source is plain and in the 
open. But plain or not, all the idols “must be rejected and renounced and the mind 
totally liberated and cleansed of them,”123 so that a person may enter into the 
sciences as if a baby. For all idols, all ill-defined notions, whatever their cause, not 
only impair one’s ability to communicate. They also corrupt ones thinking. The 
most fundamental tool, Bacon is saying, for the successful understanding of nature 
is a set of well-defined concepts. The method of reaching well-defined concepts is, 
he says, a new kind of induction. Though the causes of idols may never be 
removed, true induction can eliminate and prevent the idols themselves. 
Bodies, Natures, and Forms 
Bacon proposed a natural science influenced by both Renaissance natural 
magic (as Rossi and others have argued124) and scholastic natural philosophy (as I 
have been arguing). From the first he draws language about man being the 
                                                
122 “insinuate occulto.” Novum Organum, 1.61.  
123 “omnia constanti & solenni decreto sunt abneganda, & renuncianda, & Intellectus ab ijs 
omnino liberandus est.” Novum Organum, 1.68.  
124 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science; and e.g., Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of 
Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition. 
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interpreter of nature and the themes of effecting change by understanding the ways 
of nature. From the second he draws the philosophical underpinnings for proposing 
how such change may be reliably brought about. In the first nine aphorisms of 
book 2 of the Novum Organum, he explains how this philosophical foundation will 
support putting knowledge to practical use. The aphorisms recall material that 
Bacon presented in the Advancement of Learning, book 2 and would later expand in 
De Augmentis, book 3, chapter 4. As elsewhere, Bacon builds on contemporary 
Scholastic language and develops it in new directions. Again, an understanding of 
this background is crucial for understanding Bacon’s new induction. 
A view of nature commonly held by scholastic natural philosophers was that 
there are two fundamental categories of being: substance and accidents. Accidents 
are qualities or attributes that we perceive. A substance is what underlies those 
attributes. The attributes may change—something cold may become hot, 
something brown may become red—but the substance remains the same. This 
taxonomy, adapted from the Categories, the first book of Aristotle’s Organon, caused 
no end of difficulties for Christian scholastics. A general problem is that these 
thinkers accepted the existence of a host of immaterial beings, such as human souls, 
angels, and God. If these beings are to have attributes it must be possible for 
attributes to exist without underlying material substance. Only in a strained way 
can Aristotle’s view of accidents then apply. The Eucharist presented a particularly 
difficult problem. Here, the substance was material and the accidents perceptible. 
The priest began with the substance of bread and the substance of wine, each 
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having the common accidents of each. But by consecration, the accidents remained 
while the substance changed from bread and wine to the body and blood of Christ. 
The way to explain this and the general difficulties was to attribute to substance 
and accidents virtually independent reality. Scholastic natural philosophers came to 
view accidents as having a reality effectively independent of substance and 
substance as without perceivable properties in and of itself. That is, substance 
acquired its perceptible identity only by the acquisition of perceptible accidents. A 
taxonomy in which what had the taste, texture, color, and all perceivable attributes 
of wine could actually be blood was fraught with difficulties. Bacon was one of 
several early modern natural philosophers who tried to move away from this 
taxonomy. 
But Bacon did not move away from the Scholastic paradigm without situating 
his new taxonomy in it. Instead of substance and accident, Bacon uses body and 
nature. But his two do not have independent and equal reality. “Nothing really 
exists except individual bodies.”125 Natures, that is, do not exist independent of 
bodies. To think about them independently, we must mentally separate them from 
the bodies of which they are attributes. Bodies, Bacon says, are “concrete,” but 
natures are “abstract.”126 A ball, a concrete body, rolls because of its roundness, an 
abstract nature, but it is the ball, not the roundness, that rolls. Bacon relates his 
taxonomy to the scholastic one as follows: study of bodies concerns “substances, 
                                                
125 “nihil vere existat praeter Corpora indiuidua.” Novum Organum, 2.2. My translation 
126 De Augmentis, 3.4. 4:347; Novum Organum, 2.5. 
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with every variety of their accidents”; study of natures concerns “accidents through 
every variety of substances. For example, if the inquiry be about a lion, or an oak, 
these support many different accidents; if contrariwise, it be about heat or gravity, 
these are found in many different substances.”127 
Bacon’s use of the term nature can be confusing. As we do, he uses it in 
several ways. He sometimes uses it to mean ‘all of physical reality as we find it,’ 
saying, for example, “some things in nature are so common”128 or “the force of 
poisons in nature.”129 This meaning is familiar to us. But when he pairs body and 
nature, his meaning is slightly and importantly different from ours. We think of 
something as having one nature, one inherent and essential property or set of 
properties. Bacon thinks of things as having many natures. If we were to heat a ball 
and set it rolling, we would not say we have changed the ball’s nature. But Bacon 
would say we have added two natures—heat and rotation—to those the ball already 
had. We do well to think of nature, when paired with body in Bacon, as simply 
attribute or property.  
                                                
127 “de accidentibus, per omnem varietatem substantiarum. Veluti, si inquiratur de leone aut 
quercu, illa complura diversa accidentia suffulciunt: contra, si inquiratur de calore aut gravitate, illa 
plurimis distinctis substantiis insunt.” De Augmentis, 3.4, Spedding 1:551, Spedding translation 4:437. 
128 Advancement of Learning, 2.5.2. 
129 Advancement of Learning, 2.6.2. 
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 “The task and purpose of human Power is to generate and superinduce on a 
given body a new nature or new natures.”130 Thus begins book 2 of the Novum 
Organum and thus Bacon puts his theory squarely in the tradition of craft or magic. 
It is the practical art of magic,131 he says, to know how to reliably change a body 
from silver to tawny, light to heavy, and one grade of ductility to another. Indeed to 
change a body into gold would mean changing its color, weight, ductility, melting 
point, solubility, and all its other natures into that of gold.132 But what does it mean 
to change color or weight or ductility? How does one know what these attributes 
are? How would one know how to effect such a change? How does one know that 
what has effected such change in the past will do so in the future or that what 
worked in some instances will work in all? Bacon presents his answer to these 
questions in the rest of book 2 and begins that presentation in the second sentence 
of the book: “The task and purpose of human Science is to find for a given nature 
its Form, or true difference, or causative nature or the source of it coming-to-be 
(these are the words we have that come closest to describing the thing).”133 Bacon is 
going to claim that finding the ‘form’ of a given nature is what is necessary in order 
to know how to reliably effect that nature in a given body. He will claim that if and 
                                                
130 “Super datum corpus novam naturam sive novas naturas generare et superinducere, opus et 
intentio est humanae potentiae.” Novum Organum, 2.1. 
131 Novum Organum, 2.9. 
132 Novum Organum, 2.5. 
133 “Datae autem naturae Formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam naturantem, sive 
fontem emanationis (ista enim vocabula habemus, quae ad indicationem rei proxime accedunt) 
invenire, opus et intentio est humanae scientiae.” Novum Organum, 2.1. 
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only if the ‘task and purpose of human Science’ is achieved can the ‘task and 
purpose of human Power’ be achieved, and he will conclude that ‘the task and 
purpose of human Science’ can be achieved only by means of his new kind of 
induction. 
In the book’s first sentence, Bacon situates his theory in natural magic 
tradition. In the second, he situates it in the Aristotelian tradition. But, remarkably 
he places it far from the normal place for induction in that tradition. He does not 
place it in the context of the syllogism or other types of demonstration. Instead he 
says the task of science is to identify the ‘Forma’ of something. Form is a stock 
element of ancient philosophy, Aristotelian, Platonic, or otherwise. Paired with 
matter, little in Scholastic thought was more prominent. But Bacon admits his 
meaning may not be clear and offers three synonyms, unsure that any one is ideal. 
The first, ‘true differentia’ or ‘Differentiam veram,’ appeals directly to a tradition 
going back to Socrates in which a term is defined by identifying its genus and 
differentia.134 His second synonym ‘naturam naturantem’ (or in the nominative 
‘natura naturans’) is a very specific Scholastic term that came into use with Michael 
Scot’s translation of Averroës in the mid-thirteenth century.135 It is a very artificial 
construction, equivalent to ‘nature naturing,’ ‘nature coming to be what it is.’ 
Scholastics identified this with God and opposed it to ‘natura naturata,’ ‘nature 
                                                
134 For parallels in Aristotle, cf. Metaphysics 7.12 and Posterior Analytics 2.3, 2.7, 2.10, 2.13. 
135 Lucy K. Pick, “Michael Scot in Toledo: Natura naturans and the Hierarchy of Being,” 
Traditio 53 (1998): 93–116. 
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having come to be what it is.’ Bacon breaks the identification with God, but retains 
the core meaning, thus making an important metaphysical statement, that the form 
of something is that by which it comes to be what it is.136 Bacon’s fourth synonym, 
‘fontem emanationis’ ‘source of coming to be,’ captures this sense in (what I think 
is) an original formulation.137 After appealing to this set of scholastic themes, Bacon 
shifts to a less obscure one, Aristotle’s four causes. 
Bacon now introduces what is his most lasting contribution to induction 
theory, the association of causality with induction.138 John Case had hinted in this 
direction, but Bacon makes the connection explicit. He says it is correct that to 
truly know something is to know its cause (a common Aristotelian adage). Bacon 
then asks which of the four Aristotelian causes, material, efficient, formal, and final, 
is the important one for natural philosophy. He rejects final as applicable only to 
human actions.139 He rejects material and efficient because “he who knows only the 
                                                
136 Graham Rees says that Bacon “simply swept aside traditional usage and identified natura 
naturans with ‘form.’” I would rather say that Bacon swept aside the association with God but 
retained the most important core meaning of the phrase. 
137 For parallels in Aristotle on the nature of something being the source of its coming to be 
what it is, cf. Physics, 1.1–2. 
138 As we will see in the Epilogue, the association of induction with causality outlasted the 
association with concept-formation. 
139 “But of these, the Final is a long way from being useful; in fact it actually distorts the 
sciences except in the case of human actions.” “At ex his causa finalis tantum abest ut prosit, ut 
etiam scientias corrumpat, nisi in hominis actionibus.” Novum Organum, 2.2. Recall that in Valerius 
Terminus (and then again in Advancement of Learning), Bacon claimed it was inappropriate to subject 
God and his actions to rational inquiry. In his discussion of idols of the tribe, Bacon criticized the 
universal eagerness to seek final causes in all natural phenomena (Novum Organum, 1.48). For Bacon, 
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Efficient and Material causes . . . may achieve new discoveries in material which is 
fairly similar . . . , but does not touch the deeply rooted ends of things.”140 For 
example,141 heat melts butter. The material cause is butter, the efficient is heat. But 
heat hardens clay. Maybe one can be confident that heat will melt cheese, since 
cheese is like butter, but what of wax or wood? Knowledge of material and efficient 
causes does not provide true, universal knowledge and is of limited practical use. 
“True Thought and free Operation result from the discovery of Forms,”142 or 
formal causes. Bacon no longer uses the terminology he used in Valerius Terminus, 
but he will now elaborate on both how to find the formal cause and how it provides 
certainty and liberty. 
To have universal knowledge and universal power one must know, in the case 
of butter, what melting is. In general, one must have a sound notion for any nature 
(any attribute) one wants to effect. If the notion is false, if it is a mere idol, there 
will be neither true knowledge nor reliable power. Some notions, Bacon says, do 
not cause much trouble. “The notions . . . of the immediate perceptions of sense, 
                                                                                                                                       
God’s actions as final cause (if indeed Bacon even acknowledged them) were outside the scope of 
natural philosophy.  
140 “At qui Efficientem & Materialem Causam tantummodo nouit . . . is ad noua Inuenta, in 
Materia aliquantenus simili . . ., peruenire potest, sed rerumTerminos altius fixos non mouet.” 
Novum Organum, 2.3.  
141 Adaptation of an example given in Advancement of Learning, 2.7.4.  
142 “Quare ex Formarum Inuentione, sequitur Contemplatio vera, & Operatio libera.” Novum 
Organum, 2.3. 
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hot, cold, white, black, do not much mislead.”143 But “all the others (that men have so 
far made use of) are aberrations, not being drawn and abstracted from things in the 
proper ways.”144 These include “the notions of logic and physics: neither substance, 
nor quality, nor action and passion, nor being itself are good notions; much less heavy, 
light, dense, rare, wet, dry, generation, corruption, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, 
form, and so on; all fanciful and ill defined.”145 These are, of course, the stock 
components of Aristotelian natural philosophy in the late Renaissance. That whole 
science collapses if these notions are mere idols. 
As he had in Valerius Terminus, Bacon identifies two ways in which notions 
(and principles based on them) can be formed: the wrong way, ‘anticipation,’146 and 
                                                
143 “Notiones infimarum Specierum, Hominis, Canis, Columbae, & prehensionum 
immediatarum sensus, Calidi, Frigidi, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere.” Novum Organum, 1.16. 
144 “reliquae omnes (quibus homines hactenus vsi sunt) aberrations sunt, nec debitis modis a 
rebus abstractae, & excitatae.” Novum Organum, 1.16. 
145 “In Notionibus nil sani est, nec in Logicis, nec in Physicis; non Substantia, non Qualitas, 
Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, bonae notiones sunt; multo minus Graue, Leue, Densum, Tenue, Humidum, 
Siccum, Generatio, Corruptio, Attrahere, Fugare, Elementum, Materia, Forma, & id genus; sed omnes 
phantasticae & male terminatae.” Novum Organum, 1.15. 
146 This word, too, comes out of contemporary readings of ancient philosophy. Recall that 
Aristotle did not have a word for concept. This stymied medieval commentators, who adopted intentio 
in translating Avicenna. One word in ancient Greek that came close was prolepsis. (My thanks again 
to Greg Salmieri for this.) This is the word Epicurus used. In his philosophy, a prolepsis is a 
universal image acquired by repeated exposure to multiple instances of something. This image then 
serves as a container into which future observations are sometimes inappropriately forced. It thus 
acts as a Baconian idol. Lucretius used notities or notitia (considered an alternate spelling of notio in 
the seventeenth century) for the Epicurian prolepsis, but the more common translation in Bacon’s 
day was anticipatio. For Bacon, then, an Epicurian anticipatio is an idol. He adopts the term, but 
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the right way, interpretation. Both start with “senses and particulars and comes to 
rest in the most general,”147 but the first flies there (again using Digby’s term, 
advolat148) and “merely brushes experience and particulars in passing.”149 The other 
rises slowly and methodically. The method Bacon proposes is a new kind of 
induction, one that he calls “true,” “legitimate,” and “perfect.”150 He describes this 
new induction in the rest of book 2. 
Induction 
Bacon proposes that if one can know the formal cause, or form, of a nature, 
one can obtain a universal principle. His example is heat. If one can know the form, 
the essence, of heat, if one’s notion of heat is well-abstracted and well-defined, if 
the notion of heat is not a mere idol, then one can know how to ‘generate and 
superinduce’ heat on any body, at any time, anywhere. Bacon proposes a three-step 
process: a comprehensive natural history, an orderly arrangement of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                       
shifts its meaning slightly (staying truer to the Latin). He uses it to refer to the process by which the 
idol is formed rather than to the idol itself. For the relationship between anticipatio in Bacon and 
prolepsis in Epicurus, see Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, 37–8. 
147 Novum Organum, 1.22, “via orditur a sensu & particularibus, & acquiescit in maxime 
generalibus.” 
148 Novum Organum, 1.19. 
149 Novum Organum, 1.22. “cum altera perstringat tantum experientiam & particularis cursim.” 
150 Novum Organum, “vera”: 1.14, 1.40, 2.7, 2.10, 2.16, 2.19, 2.21; “legitima”: Distributio Operis, 
2.10; “perfecta”: 2.21. Note that, for Bacon, “perfect” does not mean that the induction fully 
enumerates all particulars, as it does in modern theories of induction. For Bacon, if an induction 
could not be applied to new, unobserved instances, it would not be perfect. 
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parts of that history, and finally, a “true and proper induction.”151 To the Novum 
Organum, Bacon appends guidelines on how to collect that natural history and what 
should be in it. In the Novum Organum itself, he concentrates on the second and 
third steps. 
To order the observations of natural history (what we would call the facts), 
Bacon proposes using three tables: a table of instances where the nature under 
investigation is present (“Tabulam Essentiae & Praesentiae”152), a table of instances 
that are like the first but in which the nature is not present (“Tabulam declinationis, 
siue Absentiae in Proximo”153), and a table of instances where the nature varies 
(“Tabulam Graduum, siue Tabulam Comparatiuae”).154 The first should include “all 
known instances which share in the same nature, however disparate the materials 
may be.”155 Bacon’s sample table for heat includes the sun’s rays, lightning, flames, 
boiling liquids, hot smoke, air trapped in caverns, bodies brought near a fire, a body 
forcefully rubbed, animals, animal excrement, wet plants compacted, quicklime 
sprinkled with water, hot spices, and many other things. There are twenty-eight in 
total. The most remarkable feature of the list, for one accustomed to theoretical 
discussions of induction in the twentieth century, is the variety. The canonical 
                                                
151 “inductio legitima et vera.” Novum Organum, 2.10. 
152 Novum Organum, 2.11.  
153 Novum Organum, 2.12. 
154 Novum Organum, 2.13. 
155 “omnium Instantiarum Notarum, quae in eadem Natura conueniunt, per Materias licet 
dissimillimas.” Novum Organum, 2.11. Rees’s “share” for Silverthorne’s “meet. 
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example of what Keynes called ‘pure induction’ is a series of identical white 
swans.156 Bacon mocks such an example as puerile and insists that a valid induction 
must include ‘contradictory instances.’157 What Bacon means by ‘contradictory 
instances’ can be seen in his second table. It includes moonlight and starlight, 
which are like sunlight but different; sheet lightning, which is like regular 
lightning; liquids in a natural state, corresponding to boiling liquids; insects, 
corresponding to animals; and so on, each absence of heat corresponding to an 
instance of heat. All told, Bacon lists thirty-two instances in the second table.158 
The third table includes seasons, some of which are hot and some cold; flames of 
different temperatures; fish, which appear to have varying temperatures; and so on 
for a total of forty-one instances. Many items in all the lists are tentative, and Bacon 
says more research would need to be done were this not a mere illustration. Only 
some of the instances result from experimentation. In fact, most are common 
observations, merely organized carefully. Though historians and philosophers of 
science sometimes ridicule Bacon’s tables, many a practicing scientist would find 
                                                
156 “The Value of Multiplication of Instances, or Pure Induction” in John Maynard Keynes, 
A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan and Co., 1921), 233–41. 
157 “to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no 
conclusion, but a conjecture.” Advancement of Learning, 2.13.3. 
158 To again invoke modern discussions: Bacon would accept that a non-black, non-swan can 
confirm the hypothesis that all swans are white, if but only if it helps us identify what makes 
something a swan and what makes something white. Thus various colored pigeons may help us 
understand whether color is essential to species, and a red truck may help us understand the nature 
of specific colors and therefore of white and black. Observation of a gray pigeon or a red firetruck 
can therefore contribute to confirming whether all swans are white. 
 263 
the underlying strategy familiar, even if now buried within a regimen of statistical 
experimentation. To eradicate malaria, increase adhesive strength, predict interest 
rates, or even repair a squeak, one begins by identifying instances, similar absences, 
and related variations. 
With his observations collected and organized, Bacon moves on to the third 
phase, a ‘true and proper induction.’ His goal is to define heat, that is, to discover 
the essence or form of heat. His induction has four stages. In the first Bacon calls 
on the mind to identify possible candidates and then to exclude candidates refuted 
by some instance or instances. For example, many of the instances of heat involve 
light. Might heat be a form of light? No, for dark things can be hot, too. Might heat 
be something celestial? No, for terrestrial things can be hot, too. Might heat be a 
kind of expansion? Boiling water, smoke, and many other instances involve 
expansion. But some do not. Might heat be a kind of rarity? Some instances refute 
that. Might heat be a kind of motion? Bacon concludes that it is. Every instance of 
heat involves some kind of motion. The second stage, identification of a genus, has 
thus been reached. But this is not complete, for although all instances of heat 
involve motion, not all instances of motion involve heat. There is not a one-to-one 
correspondence. The two are not “convertible.”159 The true differentia must still be 
identified. The third stage is like the first. By a process of comparing and 
                                                
159 Novum Organum, 2.4. This is another technical Aristotelian term. On convertibility in 
general, see Prior Analytics 2.22. On convertibility in relation to identifying a cause, see Posterior 
Analytics, 2.15–17. On convertibility in relation to induction, see Prior Analytics, 2.23. 
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contrasting, it proposes and excludes possible differentia. The fourth stage is 
reached once the differentia are found. Bacon concludes that heat is a motion of 
small particles with certain qualifications involving direction, enclosure, speed, and 
force. The genus and differentia have been specified. The true form of heat has 
been identified. The true and proper induction has been completed. 
The result, of course, looks nothing like a scholastic or modern example of 
induction. It looks instead like what Bacon intended it to be: a definition, that is, a 
genus and differentia. From this, Bacon can now make the statement of certainty 
and liberty that he sought in Valerius Terminus. He first emphasizes that he is not 
claiming that the identified kind of motion generates heat or that heat generates this 
kind of motion, but that this kind of motion is heat and heat is this kind of motion. 
The two are logically convertible. Then, based on this convertibility, he can 
conclude the following: 
If in any natural body you can arouse a motion [of this certain type], you will 
certainly generate heat. It is irrelevant whether the body is elementary (so-
called) or imbued with heavenly substances; whether luminous or 
opaque; whether rare or dense; whether spatially expanded or contained 
within the bounds of its first size; whether tending toward dissolution or 
in a steady state; whether animal, vegetable or mineral, or water, oil or 
air, or any other substance whatsoever which is capable of the motion 
described.160 
                                                
160 “Si in aliquo corpore naturali poteris excitare Motum . . . proculdubio generabis Calidum: non 
habita ratione, siue corpus illud sit Elementare (vt loquuntur) siue imbutum a Coelestibus; siue 
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Bacon has drawn a universal conclusion, but how he or anyone else could have 
thought of this whole process as induction may be unclear. An example might help. 
Consider the following observations. 
  Ignited French gunpowder is hot. 
  Ignited German gunpowder is hot. 
  Ignited English gunpowder is hot. 
The conventional inductive question is: Is all gunpowder hot when ignited? Bacon 
would say that if one knows the material cause, gunpowder, and the efficient cause, 
ignition, then one might be able to conclude that Italian gunpowder is hot when 
ignited, for Italian gunpowder is ‘fairly similar’ to the others. But the conclusion 
would be tenuous and subject to instance contradiction. Bacon wants a conclusion 
with certainty and liberty. To accomplish this, he shifts attention from the 
particular subjects to the universal predicate. Bacon does not first ask, ‘What can be 
said about all gunpowder?’ but ‘What can be said about all heat?’  Bacon looks at 
the argument this way: 
  Ignited French gunpowder is hot. 
  Ignited German gunpowder is hot. 
  Ignited English gunpowder is hot. 
                                                                                                                                       
luminosum, siue opacum; siue tenue, siue densum; siue localiter expansum, siue intra claustra 
dimensionis primae contentum; siue vergens ad dissolutionem, siue manens in statu; siue Animal, 
siue Vegetabile, siue Minerale, siue Aqua, siue Oleum, siue Aer, aut aliqua alia substantia 
quaecunque susceptiua Motus praedicti. Calidum autem ad Sensum, res eadem est, sed cum 
analogia, qualis competit Sensui.” Novum Organum, 2.20. The first sentence is one of the very few in 
the Novum Organum that Bacon italicized. 
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If asked, ‘Is all ignited gunpowder hot?’ Bacon would not reply, ‘That depends on 
how many kinds have been observed.’ Instead he would reply, ‘That depends on 
what heat is.’ ‘To identify what heat is’ means to identify the formal cause or form 
of heat. To do so, one should use an exhaustive process of comparing and 
contrasting instances of the widest possible variety, first identifying the genus, and 
then identifying the true differentia. The result will not be an idol but a well-
formed notion. With this well-formed notion in hand, the inductive conclusion 
follows directly. If igniting gunpowder arouses motion of a certain type, then 
igniting gunpowder will generate heat. For “heat itself . . . is [such] motion and 
nothing else.”161 The conclusion is inescapable, and the inductive inference is 
certain. 
Bacon’s goal was to find a way with certainty and liberty to effect designated 
natures (properties) in bodies (substances) of wide variety. This led him to shift 
attention from the subject of the inductive observations to the predicate, and to 
seek the formal cause thereof, to ask, for example, what makes heat heat. An 
obvious extension presents itself: What makes gunpowder gunpowder? Must one 
not also identify the formal cause of gunpowder? How does one know that the 
observed particulars are gunpowder? Is the ability to become hot a defining 
characteristic? As we will see in the next chapter, Bacon does not make this 
                                                
161 “quod ipsissimus Calor . . . sit Motus, & nihil aliud.” Novum Organum, 2.20. 
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extension in the Novum Organum, but does, at least implicitly, in his own research 
projects in natural philosophy. 
At this point in the Novum Organum, Bacon is only sixty percent of the way 
through the presentation of his new system of induction. He has much more to say. 
The first thing to say is that the example of heat is merely illustrative and 
preliminary. Since this whole approach is new, many of the needed observations are 
still unavailable. Moreover, only the “first harvest”162 has been finished. Bacon says 
he has yet to describe further aids and supports for the process and how the results 
are to be refined, adapted, limited, used, and extended to higher-level principles.163 
Unfortunately, in the rest of the Novum Organum as published, Bacon only gets to 
the very first of these.  
The whole process of the first harvest was rather haphazard, even arbitrary. 
Any and all observations were put into the tables with little priority or focus. All 
instances were treated equally. To improve the process, Bacon says, one should give 
some instances more attention than others. Bacon calls these ‘praerogativae 
instantia’ ‘privileged instances.’ Privileged instances help one find the form and 
thus reach a universal conclusion quicker and more reliably. Bacon lists twenty-
seven kinds of privileged instances, some having many subdivisions. A few 
examples will suffice. The first kind are ‘solitary instances.’ These are instances that 
have nothing in common with other instances except the one nature under 
                                                
162 “Prima Vindemiatio.” Novum Organum, 2.20. 
163 Novum Organum, 2.21. 
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investigation. To investigate the nature of orange, for example, it is useful to 
consider orange flowers and burning orange logs. But the flowers and the logs have 
several things in common other than color. It is better to include the orange color 
produced by a prism. The only thing the orange of a prism-produced rainbow has 
in common with the flower is the color itself. A prism, therefore, can be very useful 
in investigating the form of color. Another kind of privileged instance is the ‘unique 
instance,’ such as quicksilver among metals or the magnet among stones. 
‘Borderline instances’ such as the bat or the flying fish can be very helpful. 
‘Bundled instances’ are instances that are different but seem always to go together. 
When investigating the nature of taste, for example, one should consider the sense 
of smell. ‘Crucial instances’ or ‘instances of the signpost,’ the most famous of 
Bacon’s privileged instances, can help one decide between two competing 
candidates. For example, an investigation into the nature of gravity may suggest it is 
either a natural inclination downwards or an attraction between bodies. A crucial 
instance would be the behavior of a weight-driven clock when placed deep in a 
mine and when placed high on a mountain.164 Bacon lists over twenty types or sub-
types of ‘mathematical instances,’ instances of measurement or numeric comparison 
that can greatly help in identifying the essence of some property. (The extent of this 
discussion is overlooked when Bacon is criticized for failing to appreciate the 
importance of mathematics.) Bacon’s final privileged instances are ‘magical 
                                                
164 Novum Organum, 2.36. Bacon offers these two theories and the test to choose between them 
sixty-seven years before Newton’s Principia and many years before Galileo’s Dialogo or Discorsi.  
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instances,’ instances in which a small event causes a large one, such as an explosion. 
If understood, these can suggest possibilities for great human benefits. These and 
all the privileged instances help develop and then refine one’s notions of particular 
natures. 
The pattern of a Baconian inductive inference is thus the following: 
(1) Collect observations. 
(2) Arrange them in a way that facilitates comparing and contrasting: 
 Positive premises  Contrary instances Varying instances 
 . . . is hot.   . . . is not hot.  . . . is seldom hot. 
 . . . is hot.   . . . is not hot.  . . . is sometimes hot. 
 . . . is hot.   . . . is not hot.  . . . is somewhat hot. 
(3) Identify the formal cause of the nature under investigation. 
 (a) By comparing, contrasting, suggesting, and excluding,  
 (b) identify the genus. 
   Heat is motion . . . 
 (c) By comparing, contrasting, suggesting, and excluding,  
 (d) identify the differentia. 
   . . . of a certain type. 
(4) Draw the universal conclusion. 
   Heat is a certain type of motion. 
  by conversion (justified because the essence has been identifed): 
   Anything with this certain type of motion is hot. 
   All bodies of a certain kind have this certain type of motion. 
   Therefore, all bodies of this kind are hot. 
The crucial part of the inference is getting the definition of the conclusion’s 
predicate right. If heat is correctly defined, that is, if heat really is a motion of this 
certain type, then all exploding gunpowder is hot, for all exploding gunpowder has 
this motion. Bacon is saying that an inference is only as good as the concepts that 
compose it, but is as good as the concepts that compose it. A modern scientific 
example might clarify. Tetracycline cures cholera in Peter, Paul, and Mary. But 
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does it always cure cholera? By the Baconian method the proper procedure is not to 
simply amass cases where tetracycline cures cholera, but to ask: What is cholera? 
The goal is to find the cause of cholera—not just the material cause (say, dirty 
water) or the efficient cause (drinking that water), but the formal cause, the 
essential cause, that which makes cholera cholera. The inductive conclusion will be 
justified if cholera can be correctly defined. If cholera is merely defined as an 
intestinal disease accompanied by diarrhea and vomiting, then the induction will 
not be valid, but if cholera is defined as an intestinal disease caused by a certain 
bacteria and if tetracycline kills that bacteria, then the inductive inference will 
always be certain. Tetracycline will always cure cholera. If definitions are arbitrary, 
then this whole system of induction falls apart, but Bacon is saying that definitions 
are not arbitrary. He is saying that, at least with concepts in natural philosophy for 
which inductive universality is desired, definitions must be carefully discovered, 
not rashly chosen based on a few instances. The proper procedure requires careful 
and extensive comparing, contrasting, suggesting, and excluding. At bottom, this 
procedure—and not an enumeration of similar instances—is what induction is. 
Bacon’s proposal, of course, raises a tremendous number of questions. Maybe 
all heat is that kind of motion, but how does one know that all gunpowder creates 
that kind of motion? Killing the cholera bacteria will certainly cure cholera, but 
how does one know that tetracycline always kills the cholera bacteria? The answers 
depend on the meanings of gunpowder, tetracycline, bacteria, and kills. And how does 
one know if enough instances have been surveyed and enough comparisons and 
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exclusions made? How can one be sure the definition was reached correctly? What 
if a mistake is made? Bacon excluded expansion as the essence of heat because he 
thought hot iron did not expand. We now know it does. He considered spicy foods 
to be instances of heat. We now say that the meanings of hot in ‘hot chili pepper’ 
and ‘hot molten iron’ are different. How can an inductive inference be certain if 
definitions change? If Bacon is right, then would discovering new scientific 
principles be simply be a matter of defining new scientific concepts? All these 
questions raise even more.  
Regardless whether the answers to all these questions support or refute 
Bacon’s method, his proposal that induction is at bottom a procedure for 
identifying the essence of a concept (or, the ‘form’ of a ‘notion’) was a major 
departure from the Aristotelian scholasticism out of which it developed. It was a 
return to induction as it was understood in the ancient world. 
Induction Old and New 
Bacon did not set out to reinvent induction. He set out to invent the means by 
which to effect change with certainty and liberty. The change he had in mind was 
giving to a body a property, or ‘nature,’ it did not have. This goal led him to 
Aristotle’s four causes. Bacon concluded that it was crucial to determine what 
would cause a body to have the desired property but that determining the material 
and efficient causes was not sufficient. Knowing these, one might be able to effect 
the desired property in bodies similar to those in which it had already been 
observed, but one could not be confident in effecting the change in all sorts of 
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bodies. One might have certainty within a limited range not not liberty to go 
outside that range. Drawing on the scholastic vocabulary Bacon said that he wanted 
to discover how to ensure that the property would apply ‘per se,’ that is, by the very 
essence of the property, and not merely ‘de omni,’ by a universal coincidence. To 
reach this goal, he concluded, one has to find not merely the material or efficient 
cause, but the formal cause. For the formal cause is the very essence of the 
property, that which makes the property what it is. If the formal cause exists, then 
the property necessarily exists. If the property exists, the formal cause necessarily 
exists. 
This then will have to be our declaration on the true and perfect precept 
of operation: it should be certain, free and favourable to, or tending towards, 
action. And this is the same as the discovery of true Form. For the form 
of a nature is such that if it is there, the given nature inevitably follows. 
Hence it is always present when the nature is present; it universally 
affirms it, and is in the whole of it. The same form is such that when it is 
taken away, the given nature inevitably disappears. And therefore it is 
always absent when that nature is absent, and its absence always implies 
the absence of that nature, at it exists only in that nature.165 
                                                
165 “Itaque de praecepto vero et perfecto operandi, pronuntiatum erit tale; ut sit certum, 
liberum, et disponens sive in ordine ad actionem. Atque hoc ipsum idem est cum inventione formae 
verae. Etenim forma naturae alicujus talis est ut, ea posita, natura data infallibiliter sequatur. Itaque 
adest perpetuo, quando natura illa adest, atque eam universaliter affirmat, atque inest omni. Eadem 
forma talis est ut, ea amota, natura data infallibiliter fugiat. Itaque abest perpetuo, quando natura illa 
abest, eamque perpetuo abnegat, atque inest soli.” Novum Organum, 2.4. Emphasis in Bacon’s 
original. 
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Thus if the form of the desired property can be found and brought into existence, 
the property itself can be brought into existence with certainty and liberty.  
He who knows forms comprehends the unity of nature in very different 
materials. And so he can uncover and bring forth things which have 
never been achieved, such as neither the vicissitudes of nature nor 
experimental efforts nor even chance have ever brought into being and 
which were unlikely ever to enter men’s minds. Hence true Thought 
and free Operation result from the discovery of Forms.166  
The above passage from the Novum Organum articulates the principle with which 
Bacon began in Valerius Terminus in 1603: It is knowledge of formal causes, or 
forms, that will give man power.  
“The task and purpose of human Science is to find for a given nature its 
Form.”167 A method for doing so was the task Bacon set for himself in the years 
after 1603. The result would be, by 1620 at the latest, a remarkable synthesis. Bacon 
had found in Aristotle and in Ramus the first crucial principle, per se predication, 
and in Aristotelian scholasticism the second principle, formal cause. Bacon also 
adopted the Aristotelian adage that a definition, that is, the statement of an essence, 
should be in terms of a genus and differentia. “And so our declaration and precept 
                                                
166 “At qui formas novit, is naturae unitatem in materiis dissimillimis complectitur; itaque 
quae adhuc facta non sunt, qualia nec naturae vicissitudines, neque experimentales industriae, neque 
casus ipse, in actum unquam perduxissent, neque cogitationem humanam subitura fuissent, detegere 
et producere potest. Quare ex formarum inventione sequitur contemplatio vera, et operatio libera.” 
Novum Organum, 2.3. 
167 “Datae autem naturae Formam . . . invenire, opus et intentio est humanae scientiae.” 
Novum Organum, 2.1. 
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about the true and perfect axiom of knowledge is this: find another nature that is 
convertible with a given nature, and yet is a limitation of a better-known nature, as of a 
true genus.168 Bacon did not find in Aristotle the next crucial step, the procedure for 
identifying the genus and differentia. He did find them, however, in Plato, or rather 
in Socrates. In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates sought the essence of courage, 
virtue, temperance, or wisdom by an iterative process of proposing, comparing, and 
excluding. By 1607, Bacon had adopted this procedure and identified it as a kind of 
induction. The correct procedure, he said, “has not yet been done, nor even 
certainly tried except only by Plato, who certainly makes use of this form of 
induction to some extent in settling on definitions and ideas.”169 Bacon’s induction 
is a codification of Socrates’. 
It is difficult to know where Bacon got the idea that finding the essence by a 
Socratic process is a procedure that should be called induction—possibly from 
humanist writers such as Valla or Agricola, possibly from Cicero, possibly from 
Peter Ramus via William Temple, or possibly from his own recognition of the 
similarity between what he was attempting and induction as conventionally 
presented. Conventional presentations attributed a property to several observed 
                                                
168 “Itaque de axiomate vero et perfecto sciendi pronuntiatum et praeceptum tale est; ut 
inveniatur natura alia, quae sit cum natura data convertibilis, et tamen sit limitatio naturae notioris, instar 
generis veri.” Novum Organum, 1.4. Emphasis in Bacon’s original. 
169 “Quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad 
excutiendas definitiones et ideas hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur.” Novum Organum, 
1.105. 
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subjects. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle run. French, German, and Cretan wine 
heateth. Bacon wanted to know how a property could be effected not just in already 
observed bodies but in unobserved as well. Though he approached it from the 
direction of practical use rather than logic, the problem he was trying to solve was 
the same as that presented in logic textbooks right after the syllogism and 
enthymeme. But the concept of induction he found there, he found puerile. The 
change Bacon proposed was revolutionary. 
No one had ever connected induction to causality as Bacon did. We saw a 
shallow anticipation in John Case’s treatment of induction, and Galen suggests that 
he made this connection in his lost treatise on demonstration. We do not know 
what Galen had to say, but Case certainly offered nothing near the force and 
precision with which Bacon argued that an induction can be justified by identifying 
the cause of a predicate. It has become a stock part of training in scientific method 
(or at least was until recently) that to draw a universal conclusion, one must 
identify a cause. To know that the medicine will always cure the disease, we need 
to know what causes it to work. To know that the transistor will always have the 
transfer coefficient that others have had, we need to know what factors determine 
transfer coefficient. To know two chemicals will combine and always form a third, 
we need to understand the causes of chemical combination. ‘Correlation is not 
causation,’ as the engineer is taught. ‘Per se is not de omni,’ as Bacon would have 
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put it.170 No matter how many bodies have taken on a given property, one cannot 
with certainty and liberty know that a dissimilar body will take on that property 
until one understands the cause of the property. A mere repetition of instances, 
Keynes’s ‘pure induction,’ is, Bacon says, ‘puerile’ and ‘subject to instant 
contradiction.’ 
The need to find causes to validate an induction is now a familiar part of 
Bacon’s proposal. Less familiar is his focus on formal cause and his belief that by 
correctly identifying formal cause one can make an inductive inference that is as 
binding as a syllogism. Inductive arguments are now called ampliative, deductive 
arguments non-ampliative. In a deductive argument, such as ‘All men are mortal; 
Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal,’ the conclusion does not say 
anything that was not already contained in the premise ‘All men are mortal.’ 
Nothing new is added. Some component of the premise is merely being made 
manifest. The situation is different in inductive arguments, such as ‘Socrates is 
mortal; Plato is mortal; Aristotle is mortal; therefore all men are mortal.’ Here, the 
universal conclusion makes a claim that extends beyond the claims made in the 
particular premises. The inference is ampliative. What justifies this ampliation? 
After the Alexadrian synthesis of late antiquity, it was held that induction is 
justified only by a complete enumeration of particulars. A shorthand may be used 
                                                
170 A colleague recently told me that when he was a boy in Vermont, he figured out that when 
the cows were lying down, it was going to rain. So he knew that if he saw the cows lying down, he 
should hurry up and get some stones to throw at them. 
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by adding ‘etc.’ as a premise, but if this justifies the conclusion it is only because it 
stands in for a number (possibly countless number) of propositions. By this 
understanding of induction, an ampliative induction, i.e., one that does not include 
a complete enumeration cannot be certain. Bacon argues against this whole 
approach. (Buridan and Valla had partly anticipated him here). He argues, in effect 
(now going well beyond Buridan or Valla), that in a valid induction, ampliation 
occurs not at the propositional level but at the conceptual level. An open-ended 
induction is made valid not by adding more propositions, but by properly 
identifying the formal causes of the constituent concepts. If mortality is ‘being 
subject to the cessation of life,’ then all men are mortal. This is assured not by 
surveying many men, but by correctly identifying the essence of mortality. 
Consider the case of the white swans. A series of white swans are observed, 
and it is concluded that all swans are white. A black one appears. Is the hypothesis 
refuted? That depends on what is meant by black, white, and swan. A defender of 
the hypothesis could reply, ‘That black thing is not a swan,’ or ‘That swan is not 
black; it is white.’ If all sea-level samples of water boil at 212°F, and then one is 
found not to, do we conclude that not all water boils at 212°F, or do we conclude 
that the sample is not water? Bacon is claiming that an hypothesis is only as good as 
its constituent concepts. There can be no method for determining whether an 
inductive conclusion is true or false that does not also address whether the concepts 
are correctly defined. Moreover, Bacon says not only that an inductive inference is 
only as good as its constituent concepts but also that an inductive inference can be 
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fully as good as its constitutent concepts. An inductive inference can be as certain as 
the meaning of the terms it uses. If the terms are properly defined, the induction 
can be certain. 
For Bacon, induction is not primarily about propositions. It is about concepts. 
For him, induction is not the inference of a proposition from other propositions. It 
is the identification of the essence of concepts. If the concepts are ill-formed, that is, 
if they are mere idols, they corrupt all thinking. But if they are well-formed and 
their essences properly identifed, propositional inferences can be drawn with 
certainty and liberty. At one level, then, Bacon is returning to a conception of 
induction that predominated in antiquity, invented by Socrates, adopted by 
Aristotle, articulated by Cicero. In it, a conclusion can be drawn that applies 
beyond the particulars that went into its formation because a concept can be 
formed that refers to particulars other than those that went into its formation. But 
in another sense, Bacon went well beyond any of his predecessors. His proposed 
integration of concept-formation, propositional inference, causation, practical 
efficacy, and a methodical approach to identifying the essence of properties was a 
remarkable synthesis. Baconian induction was something old, but on both a 
practical and theoretical level something very new. 
 
 279 
5 
 
Regula Socratis: 
Baconian Induction in Practice 
 
 
 
About thirty years ago, to help settle debate about the extent to which Francis 
Bacon did or did not influence early modern science, Theodore Brown pointed out 
that to be a follower of Bacon meant different things to different people at different 
times.1 His reminder has been heeded ever since, and it is now standard to trace the 
influence of various Baconianisms rather than one Baconianism. Brown himself 
identified three, the Baconismism of Protestant educational reformers in the late 
1630s through 1650s including especially Samuel Hartlib, the Baconianism of 
physicans and natural philosophers at the London College of Physicians and the 
University of Oxford during in the latter part of the same period, and the 
Baconianism of the Royal Society soon after its founding in 1662.2 Subsequent 
                                                
1 Theodore M. Brown, “The Rise of Baconianism in Seventeenth-Century England,” in 
Science and History: Studies in Honor of Edward Rosen (Wroclaw: Polish Academy of Sciences Press, 
1978). 
2 Ibid., 505. 
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studies have added the Baconianism in England in the late 1620s and early 30s,3 the 
Baconianism of Descartes, Marsenne, and Gassendi in France during the two 
decades after Bacon’s death, the Baconianism of Voltaire, D’Almbert, and others of 
the French Enlightenment, and the Baconianism of William Whewell, John Stuart 
Mill, and Bacon’s editors in Victorian England.4 While the current study has 
examined alternate meanings of induction, it must now recognize multiple meanings 
of Baconianism, in order to understand the influence of Baconian induction on early 
modern natural philosophers. 
Bacon thought of his published works as falling into three groups.5 He 
considered his chief work to be the Novum Organum,6 but he recognized that this 
work was challenging. He feared it “flies too high over men’s heads.”7 The second 
group comprised works that support, build upon, and/or help people understand 
                                                
3 M. L. Donnelly, “Francis Bacon’s Early Reputation in England and the Question of John 
Milton’s Alleged ‘Baconianism’,” Prose Studies 14, no. 1 (1991): 1–20. 
4 Chapter 2, “The Meanings of Baconianism,” 7–31, in Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of 
Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition; and Antonio Pérez-Ramos, “Bacon’s Legacy,” in 
Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 311–34. Brown’s basic outline survives in William T. Lynch, Solomon’s Child: Method in the 
Early Royal Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 4–33. 
5 I adopt the taxonomy but slightly modify the assignments proposed by Donnelly, “Francis 
Bacon’s Early Reputation in England and the Question of John Milton’s Alleged ‘Baconianism’,” 4–
5. A fourth group of professional legal writings should probably be added. 
6 Rawley reported that “in his own account,” Bacon considered Instauratio Magna “the 
chiefest of his works.” William Rawley, “The Life of the Honourable Author,” in Spedding 1:11. 
Bacon said of the Novum Organum, that it is “the work, that in my own judgment I do most 
esteem.” Dedicatory Epistle to “Advertisement Touching an Holy Warre,” Spedding 7:13. 
7 Ibid. 
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the Novum Organum. The Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis Scientiarum, 
for example, “may be some preparative, or key, for the better opening of the 
Instauration.”8 They exhibit “a mixture of new conceits and old.”9 The natural 
histories, such as the Historia Ventorum and Historia Vitae et Mortis, help draw the 
elevated argument of the Novum Organum “down to the sense.”10 Though it was 
published posthumously, the Sylva Sylvarum would fall into this second category, 
also. All these supporting works make the Novum Organum more accessible. Of the 
third group Bacon wrote, “As for my Essays, and some other particulars of that 
nature, I count them but as . . . recreations.”11 De Sapientum Veterum would also fall 
into this last category, as would the New Atlantis. This last was never finished, and 
Bacon was not actively seeking its publication. Of this group of recreational 
writings, Bacon added, “I am not ignorant that those kind of writings would with 
less pains and embracement (perhaps) yield more lustre and reputation to my 
name.”12 This comment was prescient, for although Bacon was universally known 
as the author of the Instauratio Magna, many followers had little knowledge of its 
content and crafted their own Baconianism from what they found in Bacon’s 
recreational and secondary works. 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Spedding, 7:14. 
12 Spedding, 7:15. 
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From the time of its publication in 1620 until Bacon’s death in 1626, the 
Novum Organum attracted more attention on the continent than in England. Bacon 
received more approving comments “from many parts beyond the seas” than he 
expected for “so abstruse an argument.”13 Though in England the Essays were 
widely admired, the Instauratio was little read or recommended. In the books 
Cambridge graduate John Harvard gave in 1638 to the college that now bears his 
name, the Advancement of Learning and Sylva Sylvarum were included, but the 
Novum Organum was not. In Richard Holworth’s manuscript of around the same 
time offering “Directions to Students,” the Essays and Sylva Sylvarum are 
recommended, but not the Novum Organum. The list of books purchased by Joseph 
Mead’s Cambridge students through 1637 includes Advancement of Learning, the 
natural histories, and De Sapientia Veterum, but not the Instauratio.14 A tally of 
editions in Gibson’s bibliography15 helps confirm generally what was true for these 
Cambridge students in particular: Into the 1630s, several of Bacon’s writings were 
well published and widely read, but the Novum Organon was not one of them. 
One of the most prominent champions of Bacon in the 1640s was the German-
Polish immigrant and energetic educational reformer, Samuel Hartlib. Hartlib’s 
influence on young and soon-to-be-prominent natural philosopers such as Robert 
                                                
13 Spedding, 7:13. 
14 These three examples are presented in Donnelly, “Francis Bacon’s Early Reputation in 
England and the Question of John Milton’s Alleged ‘Baconianism’,” 4–8. 
15 R. W. Gibson, Francis Bacon: a bibliography of his works and Baconiana to the year 1750 
(Oxford: Scrivener Press, 1950). 
 283 
Boyle has been the subject of scholarly study and debate.16 Even if that debate 
continues, it is now clear that Hartlib’s enthusiasm for reform under a Baconian 
banner did not extend to Bacon’s theory of induction. Theodore Brown suggested 
this, and more recently Stephen Clucas17 has shown that Bacon’s proposal for 
inductive logic simply had no significant role in Hartlib’s circle. Indeed, the 
continental logicians and methodologists on whom Hartlib relied dismissed 
Baconian induction. For Hartlib, Baconianism was an anti-authoritarian 
educational reform that included the empirical study of nature. His image of Bacon 
was what one would gather from the Advancement of Learning, De Augmentis 
Scientiarum, and to a lesser extent the natural histories, not from the Novum 
Organum. 
The French thinkers Descrates, Mersenne and Gassendi were similarly 
enthusiastic about parts of Bacon’s doctrine and similarly dismissive of his 
induction.18 Descartes and Mersenne admired the natural and experimental 
histories and the revolutionary, anti-authoritarian spirit of Bacon’s project, but 
Descartes ignored Baconian induction and Mersenne rejected it. Gassendi did the 
                                                
16 The central study is Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 
1626–1660 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975). 
17 Stephen Clucas, “In Search of ‘The True Logicke’: Methodological Eclecticism among the 
‘Baconian Reformers’,” in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation: Studies in Intellectual 
Communication, ed. Mark Greengrass, Michael Leslie, and Timothy Raylor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 51–74. 
18 Pérez-Ramos, “Bacon’s Legacy,” 312–14. 
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same and said that “induction is unable to prove anything except by virtue of the 
syllogism.”19 
Accepting yet another Baconianism is the group introduced at the outset of 
this study, the leading scientific thinkers in England in the 1650s. Here the situation 
is more complicated and ambiguous. Neither Hartlib’s circle nor Mersenne’s 
claimed that they made important advances in natural philosophy based on Bacon’s 
epistemology. But leading members of the communities of natural philosophers in 
the 1650s and 60s centered at Oxford, the London College of Physicians, Gresham 
College, and the Royal Society of London did. Many claimed familiarity with all of 
Bacon’s works and a wholesale commitment to Bacon’s program. John Wilkins and 
Seth Ward insisted that Baconian induction was in fact taught in Oxford. By the 
time Thomas Sprat published his History of the Royal-Society in 1667,20 Bacon was 
treated as the chief intellectual progenitor of the Society and of England’s most 
progressive scientific pursuits. Bacon’s appeal for educational reform, his 
commitment to the practical application of knowledge, his vision of a peaceful 
community of cooperative researchers, his insistence on observation, and his 
particular method of induction were all endorsed. The difficulty comes in sorting 
out what parts of this endorsement were informed and sincere.21 
                                                
19 Syntagma philosophicum 1.6, quoted in ibid., 313. 
20 Thomas Sprat, The history of the Royal-Society of London for the improving of natural knowledge 
(London: Royal Society, 1667). 
21 Brown stated the question this way: “Did Ent and Glisson of the College of Physicians, or 
Wilkins and Willis of Oxford, really understand the intentions of Bacon’s Novum Organum . . . ? 
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Brown proposed that, though this new generation included “truer 
representatives of Lord Verulam’s program,” the program was adopted primarily 
for political cover.22 In the early days of the royal Restoration, it was more prudent 
to identify one’s roots in the loyal Lord Chancellor of a previous royal 
administration than in the activities of innovative academics of revolutionary 
interregnum years.23 Charles Webster concluded that “Bacon’s philosophy was the 
most effective façade for the Royal Society, . . . . adopted as a defensive mechanism 
against critics,” and in fact masked “diverse philosophical outlooks.”24 By this 
interpretation, the Baconianism that this generation shared was not rooted in the 
Novum Organum, but in the New Atlantis and its vision of progressive, apolitical, 
and non-authoritarian cooperation among natural philosophers. 
This interpretation has continued to attract sympathy but it has failed to fully 
satisfy. There is something unsettling about a hint that some of history’s most 
successful scientists touted a particular methodological doctrine as a conspiracy and 
a sham. Other proposals have tempered or augmented Brown’s. One recent line of 
research has considered Bacon’s background in law, a profession in which one is 
trained to establish a ‘matter of fact’ by convincing a small group of those deemed 
                                                                                                                                       
This is an important question, although the evidence for its answer is fragmentary at best.” Brown, 
“The Rise of Baconianism in Seventeenth-Century England,” 517. 
22 Ibid., 517, 519. 
23 Pérez-Ramos, “Bacon’s Legacy,” 315. 
24 Charles Webster, “The Origins of the Royal Society,” History of Science 6 (1967): 115–16. 
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qualified to judge.25 Thomas Sprat’s account of how the Royal Society actually 
worked and reports on how Robert Boyle’s ideas were promulgated have been 
taken as evidence that it is in this sense that mid-century natural philosophers 
should be considered Baconians. Another, perhaps more widely shared, line of 
thinking has been that mid-century Baconianism can be equated with an 
experimental methodology. Here, the term experiment creates a problem, for in the 
mid-seventeenth century, the term had not unambiguously taken on its current 
meaning. Bacon himself still used experimentum and experientia interchangably. 26 If 
experiment means an operation carried out under artificial conditions, then it is 
misleading to call Baconian induction an experimental philosophy, for experiments 
in this sense are not an essential part of Bacon’s induction. In his example of the 
three tables for discovering the form of heat, the instances are of the most mundane 
type—sunlight and moonlight, animals and insects, burning wood, and fetid caves. 
Some of the prerogative instances are experiments, but only some. The Parasceve 
appended to the Novum Organum calls for an active collection of observational data, 
but only some of the observations are to be collected under artificial and controlled 
conditions. If, on the other hand, a call for experiments is merely a call for 
observation over the dictates of past authorities, Bacon is an experimentalist but not 
                                                
25 Studies in this ‘matters of fact’ research include Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985); Daston, “Baconian Facts, Academic Civility and the Prehistory of 
Objectivity”; Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720; and others. 
26 Bacon, The New Organon, 57. 
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notably innovative. The beginnings of early modern observational natural 
philosophy date back at least to the 1540s. If Baconian induction is a general respect 
for exhaustive collection of observational data and cautious development of theories 
based on that data, then natural philosophers at Oxford and Gresham College, 
members of the Royal Society, progressive physicians of the College of Physicians, 
and educated virtuosi in London may indeed have been adopters of Baconian 
induction. But in this case, the term is more a banner under which they marched 
than a new logic. Baconian induction would be little more than a name for 
humanist natural philosophy and Bacon little more than the master promoter. 
What has not been entertained is the possibility that successful natural 
philosophers of the mid-seventeenth century understood the details of Bacon’s 
induction and used that induction to obtain the results they did. A good reason this 
has been overlooked is that, according to philosophers of science, it is just not 
technically possible for successful scientific discoveries made by Boyle, Hooke, and 
others to result from the use of Baconian induction. Recall that Charles Pierce 
described Baconian induction as inadequate for making scientific progress and 
Morris Cohen called it utterly irrelevant. This assessment has not changed. In the 
1960s it was advanced by Paolo Rossi in his influential, sophisticated, and generally 
sympathetic treatment Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science,27 and by Mary Hesse 
                                                
27 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science. 
 288 
in her widely followed assessment of Bacon’s induction.28 In the 1970s, Imre 
Lakatos wrote, “among philosophers of science Baconian method is now only taken 
seriously by the most provincial and illiterate.”29 The majority of recent works on 
Bacon gives his theory of induction no attention. In one of the few that do, Stephen 
Gaukroger equated Baconian induction with “eliminative induction”30 and 
concluded his analysis this way: “In sum, it is difficult to find a case where 
eliminative induction does real work.”31 Robert Ellis’s 1857 assessment stands 
virtually unchallenged:  
It is neither to the technical part of his method nor to the details of his 
view of the nature and progress of science that his great fame is justly 
owing. His merits are of another kind. They belong to the spirit rather 
than the precepts of his philosophy.32 
                                                
28 “To summarize, many things may be said in criticism of Bacon’s method: he made little 
first-hand contribution to science by means of it, and his successors did not use it.” Hesse, “Francis 
Bacon,” 152.  
29 I. Lakatos, “Popper on Demarcation and Induction,” in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. 
P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), 259, cited by Barry Gower, Scientific Method: A 
Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996), 12. 
30 i.e., a disjunctive syllogism: The cause is A, B, or C; it is not A or B; therefore the cause is 
C. The problem is knowing whether A, B, and C exhaust all possibilities. 
31 Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy, 152. 
32 Spedding 1:64. One exception to the consensus has been Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy 
of Science, which tries to recast Bacon as a proto-Popperian, against Popper’s own claim that his 
doctrine directly opposed Bacon’s. A succinct summary of the modern assessment of Bacon’s 
induction and insightful explanation of the cause are provided in Lynch, Solomon’s Child: Method in 
the Early Royal Society, 2. Lynch begins his study of Bacon’s influence in the early Royal Society 
with an understanding of Baconian induction directly opposed to mine: “Unlike Aristotle’s forms, 
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With the new understanding of Baconian induction developed in the previous 
chapter, this chapter considers the overlooked possibility that some natural 
philosophers in the mid-seventeenth century were using Bacon’s induction as he 
intended it to be used—that they understood it as I have proposed and that they 
effectively put it into practice. Three cases will be considered. The first choice may 
seem odd; it is Bacon’s own work on the nature of the tides. Though we are not 
accustomed to viewing Bacon as a practicing scientist, his work on tides presents a 
valuable case, for here we get to see Bacon trying to apply his own theory. It helps 
us understand what Baconian induction in practice would look like. The second 
case is William Harvey. He is widely considered to have dismissed Bacon’s 
methodology, but I will show that the circumstantial evidence for this dismissal is 
weak and is contradicted by direct statements Harvey makes. I will argue that in 
fact Harvey’s work is a fine example of Baconian induction in practice. The third 
case is Robert Boyle. In hitherto overlooked ways, Boyle draws directly on details 
of Bacon’s theory of induction and claims to model his most important own work 
on Bacon’s induction of the form of heat. The chapter cannot hope to be 
comprehensive, but merely to broach the possibility that some successful and 
important mid-century science was conducted not only according to the spirit but 
also according to the detailed precepts of Bacon’s proposal for a new kind of 
induction. 
                                                                                                                                       
Bacon does not seek the essential characteristics invariably associated with particular natural kinds” 
(9). I have argued that this is precisely what Bacon’s forms are.  
 290 
Bacon’s and Galileo’s Theories of the Tides 
Bacon intended the Instauratio Magna to be a comprehensive renewal of 
natural learning and philosophy built around the new epistemology presented in 
part II, the Novum Organum. That part was published in 1620, Bacon was forced 
out of his position as Lord Chancellor the following year at age sixty, and he died in 
1626. In his final six years, he wrote and published a remarkable amount, both 
material related to the Instauratio and material that he considered recreational. In 
1623, he published a much-expanded Latin translation of the Advancement of 
Learning, titled De Augmentis Scientiarum, as in effect part I of the Instauratio. It was 
a comprehensive and orderly survey of the state of learning in all branches of 
knowledge and an identification of those branches most in need of a new inductive 
methodology. Part III was to be a collection of natural histories. In October or 
November, 1622, Bacon published the first, Historia Ventorum (History of the Winds). 
To it he appended abstracts for five more, which he intended to publish at the rate 
of one per month. The second, Historia Vitae et Mortis (History of Life and Death), 
was published in January or early February, 1623. Drafts for the third, Historia 
Densi et Rari (History of Dense and Rare), were never completed and were published 
only posthumously in 1658. Bacon abandoned this goal of short and methodical 
treatments in Latin and substituted a less structured collection in English of one 
thousand observations, published for Bacon by his chaplain and amanuensis 
William Rawley in 1627 just after Bacon died. The collection was titled Sylva 
Sylvarum, or A Natural History in Ten Centuries, and was frequently thereafter 
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known as Bacon’s Natural History. These natural histories, both this one and the 
earlier ones on winds and on life and death, were examples of the surveys of 
observational data that Bacon believed provided the starting points for the inductive 
search for forms. 
Part IV of the Instauratio was to provide examples of the new epistemology in 
practice, but nothing was completed or published. Only fragments survive. This is 
frustrating because the only example Bacon provided in the Novum Organon was 
that of finding the form of heat, and even he admitted it was only skeletal and 
illustrative. The longest of the part IV drafts, Topica Inquisitionis De Luce et Lumine 
(Topics of Inquiry Concerning Light and Luminosity), includes incomplete tables of 
presence, related absences, and degrees, nine short chapters on prerogative 
instances, and nothing more. I suggest that better examples of Bacon applying his 
own method may be found in notes on particular topics in natural philosophy that 
he made earlier while writing the Novum Organum.33 
                                                
33 Of the later works, the Historia Densi et Rari deserves more attention. It was written 
around 1622–24 but according to Bacon recounts experiments done much earlier. It begins with a list 
of measurements that Bacon made of the weight of seventy-seven materials relative to gold of the 
same volume. He describes in reproducible details the methods by which he took the 
measurements, and he tabulates his results orderly. He explores many facets of the density and rarity 
of solids, liquids, and ‘pneumatic bodies’ such as flame, air, and breath. The analysis runs to sixty-six 
pages in the Oxford Francis Bacon edition (vol. XIII). Bacon ends with provisional conclusions, the 
first of which is that “The sum of matter in the universe stays the same; and there is no transaction 
which either comes from nothing or gets reduced to it.” (“Summa Materiae in Vniverso easem 
manet; neque fit transactio, aut a Nihilo, aut ad Nihilum.”) If the experiments themselves were 
made when Bacon was at Twickenham Park, then they preceded by at least five years the folios in 
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Particularly interesting from that period is De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris (On the 
Ebb and Flow of the Sea), written around the end of 1611. It is interesting for three 
reasons. First, it shows us Bacon at work on a contemporary problem in natural 
philosophy. Second, the draft was published in 1653,34 the beginning of the period in 
which the Baconianism of the Oxford circle and of the future Royal Society was 
taking shape. Third, it allows a direct comparison to Galileo’s contemporary theory 
on the same subject and to Galileo’s method. Galileo’s theory is a good example of 
Zabarellian regressus in practice, Bacon’s theory a good application of his own 
method. The comparison further highlights the difference between Zabarella’s 
(purportedly inductive) method and Bacon’s. A look at Bacon’s theory of the tides 
will show us what natural philosophy done according to Bacon’s method would 
look like. This will help us when we consider the work of mid-century natural 
philosophers in order to determine the extent to which they used Baconian 
induction. 
Daily periods of the tides, monthly correlations with the moon, and annual 
variations were known in Hellenistic, Roman, and Islamic times and were known 
in the Renaissance through the works of Pliny, Strabo, and other ancient or 
                                                                                                                                       
Galileo’s famous manuscript 72 on which Galileo recorded experiments on free fall and from which 
scholars have tortuously and only tentatively reconstructed Galileo’s experiments and results. It 
appears Bacon kept much better lab notes than Galileo did. 
34 Francis Bacon, Scripta in natvrali et vniversali philosophia (Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1653). 
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medieval writers.35 Sixteenth-century global exploration increased interest in the 
tides and by 1600, rules-of-thumb and almanacs gave fairly reliable forecasts for the 
tides based on geographic location and phase of the moon. There was no crying 
need for better predictions, but there was increasing interest in understanding the 
causes of the ebb and flow. Three types of possibilities were discussed:36 Animistic 
or vitalistic theories, such as that water flowed in and out of underground chasms as 
if the earth were breathing; naturalistic, non-astronomical theories, such as that the 
tides were the effect of winds or river flows; and astronomical explanations, such as 
that the moon had some kind of affinity with the seas by which the moon pulled the 
seas as it circled the earth. Exactly how such an affinity caused the observed 
phenomena was more difficult to identify. Theories and methods varied. The first 
to achieve some success was Federico Chrisogono in a work published in Venice in 
1528.37 Chrisogono used observations and well-established correlations to identify a 
few key assumptions from which he deduced the daily and monthly cycles. Several 
Venetians adopted his ideas. Another theoretician, Simon Stevin, used a more 
                                                
35 David Edgar Cartwright, Tides: A Scientific History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Federico Bonelli and Lucio Russo, “The Origin of Modern Astronomical Theories of 
Tides: Chrisogono, de Dominis and Their Sources,” The British Journal for the History of Science 29 
(1996): 385–401; W. R. J. Shea, “Galileo’s Claim to Fame: The Proof that the Earth Moves from the 
Evidence of the Tides,” The British Journal for the History of Science 5 (1970): 112–3. 
36 Bonelli and Russo, “The Origin of Modern Astronomical Theories of Tides: Chrisogono, 
de Dominis and Their Sources,” 386–87. 
37 Federico Chrisogono, Tractatus de occulta causa fluxus et refluxus maris (Venice: Joan. Anto. 
de Sabbio, 1528). 
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Euclidean method in a work published in 1608.38 A third method, one of 
hypothesis-testing, was used by Marco Antonio de Dominis (1560–1624). His theory 
was published in 1624.39 
De Dominis and Bacon had much in common. De Dominis was born to a 
prominent Dalmation family the same year Francis Bacon was born to England’s 
Lord Keeper. De Dominis had a strong interest in natural philosophy early in life, 
publishing on optics and teaching mathematics at the University of Padua, but 
spent most of his career in legal and church affairs. Trained by the Jesuits, he 
abandoned the Catholic Church and moved to England where he became 
prominent at court while Bacon was serving James. De Dominis eventually 
returned to the continent and to Catholicism, but died out of favor with both the 
English and Italian churches in 1624, two years before Bacon’s death. When De 
Dominis came to England in 1616, he was already an admirer of Bacon; he had 
published an Italian translation of De Sapienta Veterum in 1609. Maybe inspired by 
discussions with Bacon on the topic or reading Bacon’s writings on it, de Dominis 
returned to his old interest in natural philosophy with his short book on the tides, 
entitled Euripus seu de fluxu et refluxu maris sententia. From observations, de 
Dominis developed multiple hypotheses, then eliminated (sometimes erroneously) 
those whose implications failed to match other observations. Several features of his 
resulting theory were not improved upon until Newton. Most notable is his 
                                                
38 Simon Stevin, Van de Spiegheling der Ebbenvloet (Leiden: 1608). 
39 Marco Antonio De Dominis, Euripus seu de fluxu et refluxu maris sententia (Rome: 1624). 
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recognition that action of the sun and moon raises seawater not only on the side 
toward the luminary bodies but on the opposite side as well. De Dominis’s theory 
attracting Galileo’s criticism in 1632.40 
In the 1610s, first Bacon then Galileo wrote unpublished accounts of their 
respective theories. Bacon wrote De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris around the end of 1611. 
He probably intended it for use in the Instauratio Magna, but as it comes down to 
us, the essay is a tentative and preliminary draft. Some ideas from it were revised 
and included in the Novum Organum in 1620, but the whole was not printed until 
1653 when it was included as part of a posthumous transcription of several 
unpublished papers.41 In 1616, Galileo wrote a letter to Cardinal Orsini (1593–1626) 
in which he put into writing the theory of the tides that he had recently recounted 
to the cardinal in person. The letter was never published but circulated throughout 
                                                
40 In the Dialogo, Galileo refers to de Dominis as “a certain prelate.” Galileo Galilei, Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, trans. Stillman Drake (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 
487. 
41 Bacon’s theory has drawn little comment. The lengthiest treatment remains Robert Leslie 
Ellis’s Preface to De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris, Bacon, Works, 3:39, which places Bacon’s theory in its 
historical context. Graham Rees’s introduction to the essay, Francis Bacon, Philosophical Studies 
c.1611–c.1619, ed. Graham Rees, vol. 6, The Oxford Francis Bacon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
xxiv–xxv, offers less on the tidal theory itself but places it within Bacon’s overall natural philosophy. 
Cartwright, Tides: A Scientific History, 26–28, considers Bacon’s proposal as a scientific theory, offers 
a respectful treatment, and gives it nearly as much coverage as Galileo’s. Shea, “Galileo’s Claim to 
Fame: The Proof that the Earth Moves from the Evidence of the Tides,” contrasts strengths in 
Bacon’s proposal with corresponding weaknesses in Galileo’s. 
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Europe.42 A copy made its way to Bacon in 1619, by which time Galileo had read 
and commented on Bacon’s proposal.43 Slightly revised and expanded, the material 
from Galileo’s letter to Orsini became the topic of conversation in the climactic 
fourth day of the 1632 Dialogo.44 We are reminded disciplinary lines were fluid in 
                                                
42 Galileo Galilei, “Discourse on the Tides,” in The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History, ed. 
Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989), 119–
33. 
43 It is frustrating that little is known of this interchange. Our only substantive evidence is one 
short letter of April 4, 1619, from Tobie Matthew to Bacon. The two maintained a friendship since 
their joint residence in Gray’s Inn in 1595. Matthew came from a clerical family but converted to 
Catholicism and spent much of his adult life in the courts of Europe, including Florence and Rome, 
publishing religious essays and translations of other writers’ works (including a translation of 
Bacon’s Essays into Italian). Matthew appears to have been on familiar terms with Galileo. They 
may have first met in Florence in the summer of 1608. In the letter of April 4, 1619, Matthew reports 
that Galileo had read and reviewed Bacon’s “discourse concerning the flux and reflux of the sea.” 
Galileo’s response was given to one Richard White for transmission to Bacon, but the response was 
so plainly in error regarding the period of tides that White was not forwarding it. Matthew reported 
that he himself would go talk with Galileo. Matthew also reported that White was now on his way 
to London, carrying several of Galileo’s published and unpublished works, which he was sure Bacon 
would want to read. Matthew urged Bacon to see White when he calls. For the letter and a small 
amount of background, see Bacon, Works, 14:36–7. The interchange is mentioned in Jardine and 
Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon, 306–7, and explored in some depth in 
Paolo Rossi, Aspetti della rivoluzione scientifica (Naples: Morano, 1971), 163–9. Rossi includes 
speculation on what may be Galileo’s only mention of Bacon. 
44 Galileo’s theory drew comment from the time of his unpublished manuscript, then less 
after Newton’s Principia explicated the essentially correct theory, but then more again after Ernst 
Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 6th ed. (La Salle, IL: 1960), 262–4 (first published in 1883), criticized 
Galileo’s theory in modern frame-of-reference language. In the second half of the twentieth century, 
Galileo’s theory was a subject for historians of science beginning especially with E. J. Aiton, 
“Galileo’s Theory of the Tides,” Annals of Science 10, no. 1 (1954): 44–57. Harold L. Burstyn, 
“Galileo’s Attempt to Prove That the Earth Moves,” Isis 53, no. 2 (1962): 161–85, made an attempt to 
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the Renaissance. De Dominis and Bacon, both involved in matters of church and 
state at the highest levels, were also involved in a discourse on the nature of tides, 
and the contributions of these statemen were of sufficient quality to warrant 
comment by Italy’s prominent mathematician. A comparison of Bacon’s theory and 
Galileo’s and especially of the methods implicit in them, is instructive. I will note 
some similarities, summarize each theory along with its strengths and 
shortcomings, then examine the method behind each. 
The most notable thing about both theories is that they are wrong.45 Galileo 
denies that the moon has any role to play in the tides, and Bacon denies that the 
earth moves. Both theories, however, are advances on previous theories in one 
important way: both focus on the dynamic behavior of moving water rather than on 
static forces. Both hold that there is one main daily tidal motion and that the rises 
and falls of less than daily period are the result of water shifting around within its 
containing bodies and bouncing off coastlines. Neither theory, even if the 
                                                                                                                                       
claim that Galileo was in fact correct in many essential ways. The attempt largely failed, though 
Stillman Drake expressed some sympathy in Stillman Drake, “Galileo’s Theory of the Tides,” in 
Galileo Studies: Personality, Tradition, and Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1970), 200–13, and Stillman Drake, “Galileo Gleanings X: Origin and Fate of Galileo’s Theory of the 
Tides,” in Essays on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science, ed. N. M Swerdlow and T. H. 
Levere, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 97–106, as recently has Paolo Palmieri, 
“Re-examining Galileo’s Theory of Tides,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 53 (1998): 223–375. 
The most important article for purposes here, since it looks at Galileo’s method instead of his 
conclusion, is Shea, “Galileo’s Claim to Fame: The Proof that the Earth Moves from the Evidence 
of the Tides.” 
45 This partly explains the little interest in Bacon’s theory. Galileo’s theory too would have 
raised little interest were it not for his other achievements in natural science.  
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fundamental flaws were corrected, had any hope of accuracy without major 
advances in the science of fluid dynamics.46 But both rightly gave such dynamics a 
central role. 
Galileo accepted Copernicus’s theory that the earth rotates on its axis and 
revolves around the sun. By this theory, a point on the earth’s surface—considered 
from the perspective of a viewer far north of the earth’s orbital plane looking on a 
counter-clockwise orbit and a counter-clockwise rotation—moves at different 
speeds at different times of the day. When the point on the surface is directly on the 
orbital path, its tangential movement is at the same speed as the earth’s rotation. 
But at other times, the speed is greater or less. At midnight, when the point on the 
surface is away from the sun, the point is moving faster, because the speed of 
revolution around the sun combines with the speed of rotation around the axis. 
Twelve hours later, the speed of that same point is lower, because the speed of 
revolution counters the speed of rotation. A sea basin on the globe’s surface thus 
speeds up and slows down at different times of the day, and Galileo compares the 
resulting phenomenon to water in a barge.47 When the barge slows down, the water 
rushes to the front, rising there and falling at the back. When the barge speeds up, 
water rushes to the back, rising there and falling at the front. Analogously, as the 
sea basin speeds up and slows down, the sea waters slosh back and forth creating 
                                                
46 For an attempt to cast Galileo’s theory in terms of modern fluid dynamics, see Palmieri, 
“Re-examining Galileo’s Theory of Tides.” 
47 Galilei, “Discourse on the Tides,” 121; Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, 493. 
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tides on eastern and western shores. Unfortunately, this whole theory contradicts 
Galileo’s own theory of inertia, and it was not long before his readers were pointing 
out that the speed of a point on the earth’s surface relative to a point far off in space 
is unimportant.48 In all relevant ways, the speed of the sea basin is constant. There 
is no speeding-up and slowing-down to cause the tides. 
It may seem inappropriate to criticize Galileo too harshly for his mistake. The 
whole science of inertial mechanics—which Galileo himself was inventing—was in 
its infancy, and how inertial frames of reference do and do not combine is a subtle 
and sophisticated issue. What is not subtle, however, is abundant contradiction 
between Galileo’s theory and well-known observational evidence. One particularly 
glaring discrepancy is that according to Galileo’s theory there should be only one 
tide per day.49 Moreover, high tide should be at noon, low tide at midnight. There 
are, though, two tides per day and their times lag fifty minutes each day, making a 
full cycle though the day in a lunar month. Between 1616 and 1632 Galileo modified 
his theory to try accounting for this well-known lunar correlation and another well-
known solar cycle, but by his updated theory tides should be greater at new moon 
than full moon and greater at solstices than equinoxes. Neither is true. All told, 
Galileo’s theory contradicted more than ten simple, well-established, and well-
                                                
48 The first to observe this in writing may have been Jean-Jacques Bouchard, in a letter to 
Galileo in 1633 on behalf of a group of French physicists. We do not know Galileo’s response. The 
letter is quoted in Shea, “Galileo’s Claim to Fame: The Proof that the Earth Moves from the 
Evidence of the Tides,” 116. 
49 This is the error that Richard White found embarrassingly egregious. 
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known facts.50 After a summary of Bacon’s theory, we will consider what 
methodology would allow such a talented natural philosopher as Galileo to overlook 
such contradictions. 
Bacon’s theory of the tides did not depend on Copernican cosmology, about 
which Bacon was unconvinced.51 Instead Bacon held that there was a universal, 
daily, cosmological, east-to-west motion around the earth. The motion is strongest 
in the celestial bodies, shared to some extent by the clouds and trade winds, and is 
most attenuated in the waters of the earth. It may be that the water is pulled along 
by an attraction with the celestial bodies, or it may be that the earth itself is rotating 
as the Copernicans say. Either way, Bacon claims, because of this universal motion, 
if the earth were covered by water, the water would simply flow evenly east to west 
around the globe. If instead there were one large landmass running north and south 
on the globe, the water’s flow would be thwarted and there would be one large 
daily wave hitting that shore. But the earth in fact has two large north-south 
landmasses standing in the way of the water’s flow, the Eurasian-African landmass 
                                                
50 Shea, “Galileo’s Claim to Fame: The Proof that the Earth Moves from the Evidence of the 
Tides,” 125. 
51 Bacon was suspicious of mathematical constructs that could not claim physical correlate. 
He was thus unwilling to accept a theory merely because it saved the phenomena better. Novum 
Organum, 2:36, includes as an example of a ‘crucial instance’ a particular celestial observation that 
would help decide in favor of the physical reality, and not just the mathematical excellence, of the 
helio- or the geocentric theory. See also Novum Organum, 2:5 and 2:48. For Bacon’s preferred 
cosmology, see Graham Rees, “Introduction [vol. VI],” in Philosophical Studies c.1611–c.1619, ed. 
Graham Rees, vol. 6, The Oxford Francis Bacon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), xxxvii–lii. 
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and the American landmass. These create two daily waves, and thus two tides per 
day. The fact that the landmasses have irregular shapes creates all sorts of variations 
on the basic twice-daily tidal pattern. 
Bacon’s theory has several problems. Its failure to accept Copernican helio-
centricism is the most glaring, but not the most egregious. Bacon thought his 
theory was compatible with either the Copernican or the Ptolemaic model, and in 
fact a roughly correct theory of the tides can be developed within a Ptolemaic 
framework.52 The most egregious error in Bacon’s system is that it fails to show 
how a constant east-to-west motion would result in an inconstant water level. 
Constant water pressure against an obstruction does not itself produce a periodic 
wave. Bacon recognized the possibility of an attraction between a heavenly body 
and the seas, but he failed to focus attention on how the moon could provide the 
inconstant motion he was implicitly presuming. Moreover, Bacon (like Galileo) 
failed to distinguish tangential movement of a wave from tangential movement of 
the water itself, another concept difficult to grasp without a better understanding of 
fluid dynamics. The strength of Bacon’s theory, on the other hand, is that it 
generally coincides with observations. 
                                                
52 In a three-body universe of earth, moon, and sun (the bodies important for tides), the two 
models are not very different. It is with the consideration of the planets (of no importance for tides) 
that the Ptolemaic system shows it weakness. Kepler’s proposal for the tides, which is based on a 
Copernican cosmology, attributed the tides to attraction from the moon and is more like Bacon’s 
theory than like Galileo’s. On the other side, some thinkers of the late sixteenth century, though 
they still accepted the Ptolemaic system, were nonetheless on the right track toward the correct 
solution.  
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Bacon and Galileo got to their theories in different ways. Bacon used his own 
induction, and, I propose, Galileo used Zabarellian regressus. Bacon’s project was 
to construct a sound notion of the tides by discovering the concept’s essence, using 
an extended process of comparing and contrasting observational evidence. Galileo’s 
project was to construct mutually linked proofs, the cause (Copernican cosmology) 
explaining the effect (the tides) and the effect confirming the cause. Let us examine 
each thinker’s method by following his argument. 
Bacon begins De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris by summarizing well-known 
observational evidence and stressing the importance of identifying which 
phenomena are and which are not under investigation.53 The focus of attention, he 
says, is motion that is “natural and universal.”54 It is not the currents that are 
specific to local conditions, such as flows down inclines, disturbances along 
protruding rocks and uneven sea bottoms, and interferences from winds.55 Bacon 
recognizes that often these local conditions hide or destroy the natural ebb and 
flow, but it is the constant and universal motions that are tides. Bacon explains, 
again recognizing well-known observations, that these universal motions are of four 
types, each on its own cycle. By the first motion, the seas approach and recede from 
the shores about twice a day. The frequency is not exactly twice a day, for each rise 
occurs twelve hours and twenty-five minutes after the previous. After one lunar 
                                                
53 Spedding, 5:443. 
54 Spedding, 5:444; “de motibus oceani naturalibus et catholicis,” 3:48. 
55 Bacon excludes interferences from winds even when the winds are seasonally periodic. 
Periodicity is not the essential and sufficient characteristic. 
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month, the times of rising and falling are again the same. This monthly cycle is the 
second motion.  The third is a half-monthly cycle by which tides are increased at 
new and full moons. The fourth is a half-yearly cycle whereby tides are increased in 
equinoxes. These four motions are observed, to some extent and unless hidden by 
local currents, everywhere in the world. The first motion is the strongest and the 
other three are modifications of it. These universally observed motions are what 
Bacon seeks to explain. They are what he calls tides. His task is to find their cause, 
their essence, their ‘form,’ that is to find what makes a tide a tide. 
Bacon starts his search by drawing a conclusion from the fact that the tides 
are global.56 Either there must be a global increase and decrease in the volume of 
water, or the same amount of water must be moving from place to place.57 Working 
as de Dominis did, eliminating candidates refuted by observations, Bacon 
eliminates the first possibiliy primarily because tides occur at different times in 
different parts of the world. He provides many examples. He notes, secondarily, 
                                                
56 “It is unusual to find someone of that epoch without professional experience of the sea 
taking such a global view of the ocean tides.” Cartwright, Tides: A Scientific History, 27. It is unclear 
to me precisely where Bacon got his data. Most of it would have been readily available in almanacs 
and natural histories. How the tides moved along the coasts of the British Isles and northwestern 
Europe, on which Bacon placed great importance, was well known. Bede recorded this in the eighth 
century for the coast along which he lived. Cartwright, Tides: A Scientific History, 13–14. Bacon also 
used recent data from overseas travelers, probably gathered sporadically. Sir Francis Drake returned 
to England from one of his voyages the year Bacon went to Cambridge. We know that Bacon was 
familiar with at least some reports of Portugese explorations. Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: 
Philosopher of Industrial Science (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 41. 
57 Spedding, 5:445. Bacon also considers and rejects the possibility that the water lifts up off 
the seafloor.  
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that it is very difficult to imagine a cause for a global increase and decrease. One 
possibility is an expansion by heating. Another is a source that constantly adds and 
removes water from the seas. A third is an attraction between the water and one of 
the heavenly bodies. None of these possibilities is incredible, Bacon says, but the 
sheer volume of water and speed with which it would have to increase and decrease 
weighs against them. But regardless whether a reasonable cause for a global 
increase and decrease can be envisioned, observation that tides occur at different 
times in different places precludes this candidate. Tides, Bacon concludes, must be 
a movement of water from place to place.58 
It is next necessary to find the cause of that movement. This is the second 
stage of Baconian induction as articulated in the Novum Organum. In the first stage, 
Bacon has identified the genus of the nature under investigation. By next 
identifying the specific cause, he will have identified the differentia. This second 
step requires a careful and extended process of comparing and contrasting abundant 
and varied observational evidence. It requires, in effect, a creation and working of 
the three Baconian tables. But before proceeding, Bacon warns that correspondence 
is not the same as causality.59 This is particularly to be heeded in the case of 
celestial correspondence. The fact that tidal motion corresponds to the motion of 
the moon, or the half-yearly motion to that of the sun, is insufficient for claiming 
that one causes the other. Other correspondences must be researched (i.e., the table 
                                                
58 Spedding, 5:447. 
59 Spedding, 5:448. 
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of instances must be expanded), similar but non-corresponding instances must be 
sought (the table of contradictory instances must be populated), and the instances of 
variation must be explored in detail. Bacon then proposes specific questions and 
experiments that will form the basis for a methodical investigation.60 The first is 
whether the daily motion of the heavens, which appears to have a correspondence 
with the tides extends to other non-celestial bodies. Second, Bacon proposes to 
research the extent to which the waters of the earth move from east to west. This 
will require collecting evidence from around the globe, and Bacon cites the need in 
particular for data from Gibraltar, Cape St. Vincent, Ile de Ré, Cape Finisterre, 
Normandy, the Indian Sea, the German Sea, the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, 
Norway, the Baltics, and sites in America, Africa, and China, all because of their 
distinctive conditions or relations. The result would be the kind of data that in the 
Novum Organum Bacon calls evidence from prerogative instances. Third, Bacon 
insists on detailed analysis of the fact that the daily cycle has a period of twenty-four 
hours and fifty minutes and not exactly twenty-four hours. Based on the partial data 
he has, Bacon proposes that the tides are a reverberation of the sea’s daily east-west 
motion off the globe’s two north-south landmasses. But this is a tentative proposal, 
what in the Novum Organum is called the ‘first harvest.’61 Bacon insists much more 
data is required to confirm, refine, or replace this proposal. At the end of his essay, 
Bacon includes first a reminder that this research project must not be satisfied with 
                                                
60 Spedding, 5:449. 
61 Novum Organum, 2.20. 
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finding correspondences when those correspondences might have an underlying 
common cause, second a directive to integrate research on tides into the broader 
question of whether the earth rotates, and third a list of thirteen observations that 
are most urgently needed.62 
By Bacon’s inductive method for developing a theory of the tides, a 
preliminary grouping of observations is made, and a genus—motion of water from 
place to place on the globe—is identified. By a broad and iterative integration of 
data not just on tides but on comparable and contrasting phenomena, the tide’s 
differentia within that genus is identified. Thus the essence, or ‘form,’ or formal 
cause of the tides is identified. Bacon, that is, was using his own inductive 
method.63 Galileo’s project was different. He set out not to identify what makes a 
tide a tide, but to prove the Copernican heliocentric theory.  
A long-standing weakness of the Randall thesis that Galileo used Zabarella’s 
system of regressus (mistakenly understood as a combination of induction and 
deduction) is lack of an example. The tone of the thesis has been that the crucial 
component of regressus is arguing from observed effects to causes, that Galileo’s 
experiments were aimed at such inference, and that therefore Galileo used 
regressus. But it has not been shown how the methodology actually applied to 
                                                
62 Spedding, 5:457–58. 
63 He is also using (as James Lennox reminds me) a method strikingly similar to that of 
Posterior Analytics 2. 8-10, 15-18. There too the genus is identified, and the cause serves as the 
differentia. To know what thunder is is to know that it is a noise in the clouds (genus) caused by the 
quenching of fire (the cause and the differentia).  
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specific Galilean theories, such as pendular motion, free fall, or inertia. In a hitherto 
unexplored way, Galileo’s theory of the tides offers such an example. Like Bacon, 
Galileo did not believe that definitive proof of the Copernican theory had yet been 
presented. Unlike Bacon, Galileo set out to provide that proof. His proof would be 
that Copernican heliocentricism provides an explanation for the tides. Thus his 
theory of the tides would provide the evidence for the Copernican theory, and the 
Copernican theory would in turn provide evidence for Galileo’s theory of the tides. 
As a postil claims at the beginning of day four of the Dialogo, “The tides and the 
earth’s mobility reciprocally confirm one another.”64 This is a straightforward 
summary of Zabarellian regressus.65 
Galileo’s Zabarellian framework can be seen by examining the argument he 
presents in the 1616 Discourse on the Tides and in the voice of Salviati on the fourth 
day in the 1632 Dialogo. In the Dialogo, Galileo announces, in Zabarellian fashion, 
that one must begin with knowledge of the effects and proceed to discovery of the 
cause.66 He admits that he has limited direct evidence about the tides and that the 
indirect evidence he has is largely unreliable. But, he claims, he does have sufficient 
sensory experience to know the possible causes for movement of water. These 
include an inclined plane as of a river bed, motion of surroundings such as wind, 
                                                
64 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 483. 
65 . . . or more accurately a straightforward application of Paduan regressus. As discussed 
earlier, Zabarella contributed little that was new to regressus theory, but since he became its leading 
spokesman, I will continue to associate regressus with him.  
66 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 484. 
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and expansion caused by heat. Galileo brusquely dismisses all of these, as well as 
the theory that the tides could be caused by an attraction to the moon. The only 
way the tides could possibly occur, he affirms, is if the earth moves, and moves with 
a non-uniform acceleration, like the barge slowing down and speeding up. Galileo’s 
argument is a Zabarellian ‘resolutio’ or ‘demonstratio quia,’ a ‘demonstration of the 
fact’: 
  If there are tides, the earth must move in a certain non-uniform way. 
  There are tides. 
  Therefore, the earth moves in a certain non-uniform way. 
Of the two types of Zabarellian resolution, this one is a ‘demonstratio a signo,’ not 
an ‘inductio.’ In the 1616 Discourse, Galileo says that the tides are “a sign of and an 
argument for” the motion.67 Neither the argument for the major premise (an 
argument by elimination) nor the ‘demonstratio’ itself is an induction. Galileo’s 
argument for the earth’s motion is a straightforward syllogism. 
At this point, Galileo has established that the earth must move in a certain 
non-uniform way, a way that makes a sea basin act like a barge speeding up and 
slowing down and throwing its water back and forth. If the earth did not so move, 
there could not be tides. But Galileo wants more. He said that the tides and the 
earth’s mobility confirm each other, and he has only half of the regressus. He has 
only the ‘demonstration of the fact,’ the ‘resolutio.’ He still needs the 
‘demonstration of the reasoned fact,’ the ‘compositio,’ the ‘demonstratio propter 
                                                
67 Galilei, “Discourse on the Tides,” 131. 
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quid.’ He has a valid syllogism, but the effect not the cause is the minor premise. 
This is where one starts in a regressus, but the goal is a syllogism in which the 
effect is a conclusion, not a premise. To accomplish this, some new insight is 
required, an insight achieved by what the Paduan Aristotelians called ‘consideratio’ 
or ‘mentale examen’ and Galileo calls “reflection” (“speculazione”).68 After “many 
days and . . . many more nights”69 of such reflection, Galileo came to believe that 
under the Copernican system, the earth has the non-uniform motion necessary to 
cause the tides. 
This insight, he believes, justifies substituting ‘according to the Copernican 
theory’ for ‘in a certain non-uniform way’ and turning the syllogism around as 
needed. The result is a demonstration of the reasoned fact, a Zabarellian ‘resolutio,’ 
a ‘demonstratio propter quid,’ the second half of a regressus: 
  If the earth moves according to the Copernican theory, there are tides. 
  The earth moves according to the Copernican theory. 
  Therefore, there are tides. 
Galileo acknowledges that there is no physical evidence to justify the major 
premise. In the Discourse on the Tides, he says he is building a physical model, but 
that for now, “let us be satisfied with what each can conceive with his 
imagination.”70 Galileo’s only evidence is the contemplative reflection he has done 
                                                
68 E.g., Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 487, 516, 518. 
69 Ibid., 518. 
70 Galilei, “Discourse on the Tides,” 127. In the 1632 Dialogo, Salviati says “I have a mechanical 
model in which the effects of these marvelous compositions of movements may be observed in 
detail.” There is no evidence for this model, and we do not know what Galileo had in mind. In the 
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and the earlier demonstration of the fact of the tides. This is all in keeping with 
regressus methodology. One begins with the effect as a minor premise. By some 
method outside the regressus, one composes a major premise. The conclusion of the 
syllogism is the cause. One has argued from effect to cause. Then by some 
contemplative insight, one gains a clear and distinct idea that the major premise can 
be inverted. The cause becomes the other premise, and the effect becomes the 
conclusion. The researcher now has an irrefutable syllogistic proof that the cause 
causes the effect, in this case, that the Copernican motion of the earth causes the 
tides. Galileo’s basic theory of the tides has been completed. 
Though contradicting observed facts, Galileo’s theory is a paradigmatic 
instance of Zabarellian regressus and fits the task Galileo assigned it, that is, 
confirming the Copernican heliocentric theory. As he said, the theory of the tides 
and the heliocentric theory mutually confirm each other. Each serves as evidence 
for the other. The criticism that has always been leveled against regressus 
methodology—that it is circular and arbitrary—is here on display. Galileo’s theory 
was mutually reinforcing but it was not self-correcting. As is manifest in his failed 
attempts (added in the 1632 tract) to explain the monthly and annual tidal periods, 
no further applications of Galileo’s Zabarellian regressus method could get him out 
of the vicious circle he had created. No more disregard for observations and reliance 
                                                                                                                                       
dialogue, Salviati continues, “But so far as our present purpose is concerned, what we have grasped 
intellectually up to this point is sufficient” (500). That is, even if there is such a model, it is 
superfluous since our mental insight is sufficient. 
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on contemplative insight and mutually reinforcing syllogisms would get Galileo 
closer to a correct theory of the tides.71 
Bacon’s theory, on the other hand, was not mutually reinforcing, but it was 
self-correcting. His theory could not survive the empirical tests of it that he himself 
set for it. At every turn, Bacon proposed additional observations that would be 
needed before his theory could be accepted. He explained what parts of his theory 
would need to be abandoned or modified if investigations he insisted were necessary 
yielded results different than he expected. He was prepared to abandon his theory, 
but not his method. The goal of the project, he maintained, was to discover what 
tides are. The difference between this and the goal of regressus is important. Galileo 
and other practitioners or theoreticians of regressus speak of causes and effects. 
Given an effect, they want to find a cause. By their thinking, a cause and an effect 
are different things. Bacon, on the other hand, speaks of causes and natures. Given a 
nature, he wants to find its cause, but a particular kind of cause, the formal cause, 
or ‘form.’ By this thinking, a nature and its formal cause are the same thing, in the 
way that a definition and the thing it defines are the same. Bacon wants to learn 
what causes tides, but only in a specific sense of ‘cause.’ Fundamentally he wants to 
know what tides are. 
                                                
71 This sharp attack on the method Galileo used in developing his incorrect theory of the tides, 
of course, should not be taken as criticism of his other discoveries, discoveries obtained by other 
methods. 
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Galileo suffered opposition to his theory from many quarters—from men such 
as de Dominis, Matthews, and Bacon who insisted on testing proposals against 
well-established observations, from Galileo’s own followers who recognized an 
inconsistency with Galileo’s own theory of inertia, from Kepler who advocated a 
lunar attraction, and even indirectly from the Church. Galileo believed his theory of 
the tides was the clinching evidence validating Copernicus’s heliocentric theory, 
and it was this evidence that he thought justified standing up to the Church’s attack 
on him and on Copernicanism. It is a shame that a natural philosopher so 
committed to observational research in his other work became so stubbornly 
committed to a circular method like regressus on a problem so central to his career 
and life. 
Bacon made none of the historic scientific discoveries that Galileo made, and 
he never returned to in-depth study of the tides. His thoughts on the subject were 
not lost however. As mentioned, in 1653 the unfinished essay was published, in 
Amsterdam in a collection with other unpublished works from the period c. 1611–c. 
1619. In the Novum Organum, Bacon included suggestions for applying his inductive 
method to research on the tides,72 and these were extracted for inclusion, under the 
heading “Ratio inveniendi causas fluxus et refluxus maris,” in a book that we will 
encounter soon, published in Leiden several times starting in 1638. Whether the 
influence was through one of these publications or by independent application of 
                                                
72 Novum Organum, 2.36. 
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the same methodological principles, Bacon’s induction came to underlie future 
science on the tides. One of the great nineteenth-century contributors to tidal 
theory and a developer of the modern harmonic analysis of tides was Lord Kelvin.73 
In an 1882 lecture, he reflected upon the foundations of the science.74 His message 
was that the successful development of tidal theory over the previous two and a half 
centuries was in effect a project of defining what is and what is not a tide. 
Successful understanding came when the cause of the tide could become a defining 
characteristic. As Kelvin did, we nowadays define a tide not just as a periodic rise 
and fall of the sea, but as a “periodic rise and fall of the sea due to the attraction of 
the moon and sun.”75 The cause is included in the definition. Bacon’s inductive 
project has been completed, the essence of the tide identified. We do not now ask 
the inductive question, ‘English tides are caused by the attraction of the moon and 
the sun; so also American tides; so also African tides. Are Chinese tides also caused 
by the attraction of the moon and the sun?’ The answer would be yes, for attraction 
by the moon and the sun is what makes a tide a tide.76 A periodic rising and falling 
of the sea not caused by attraction of the moon and sun (as by seasonal winds) is not 
                                                
73 Cartwright, Tides: A Scientific History, 82–84. 
74 William Thompson, “The Tides: Evening Lecture to the British Association at the 
Southampton Meeting, Friday, August 25th, 1882,” in Harvard Classics, ed. Charles W. Eliot, vol. 
30 (New York: Collier, 1910). 
75 The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide (1999), s.v. “tide.” 
76 We also no longer limit the concept of tides to water. Atmospheric tides are the periodic 
motion of the atmosphere caused by attraction of the moon and sun, and earth tides, the periodic 
deformation of the earth caused by attraction of the moon and sun. 
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a tide. As Kelvin stressed, to determine whether a particular motion of the sea is or 
is not a tide is to determine whether it is caused by attraction of the moon or sun. It 
was Bacon’s method of induction, the method of identifying an essence, that 
became the model for modern tidal theory. 
William Harvey and the ‘Rule of Socrates’ 
The discoveries of William Harvey (1578–1657) are often cited as evidence that 
Baconian induction was not used for the chief scientific advances of the early 
seventeenth century. I want to claim the opposite and to argue, based on a close 
reading of De Generatione Animalium (1851) and on recent scholarship regarding his 
studies of the heart,77 that Harvey’s work on generation of animals and circulation 
of the blood are fine examples of Baconian induction in practice.78 I believe this is 
fairly easy to establish; less easy to determine are the lines of influence, that is, 
whether Harvey got his Baconian induction directly, or even indirectly, from 
                                                
77 Especially Andrew Cunningham, “William Harvey: The Discovery of the Circulation of 
the Blood,” in Man Masters Nature: Twenty-Five Centuries of Science, ed. Roy Porter (New York: G. 
Braziller, 1988), 65–76; and Roger French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 71–93. 
78 Useful discussions of possible Baconian influence on Harvey have appeared in J. Pelseneer, 
“Gilbert, Bacon, Galilée, Képler, Harvey et Descrates: Leurs Relations,” Isis 17, no. 1 (1932): 203; 
Geoffrey Keynes, The Life of William Harvey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 157–161; Walter Pagel, 
William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background (New York: Hafner, 
1967), 21–23; William Hale-White, “Bacon, Gilbert and Harvey: Being the Harveian Oration 
Delivered Before the Royal College of Physicians of London, October 18th, 1927,” in Studies on 
William Harvey, ed. I. Bernard Cohen (New York: Arno Press, 1981), 100-200; and French, William 
Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 325–28. 
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Bacon. Let me first review and then discount the documentary evidence for the 
conventional view, then demonstrate Harvey’s respect for Bacon and use of his 
method, and then lastly address the question of influence.  
The evidence that Harvey dismissed Bacon and his method lies in the material 
on Harvey in John Aubrey’s Short Lives (1813)79 Andrew Wear, in his introduction 
to a recent edition of Harvey’s book on circulation, cites the oft-reported passages 
from Aubrey in the following way. 
Harvey himself never agreed with the new philosophy. John Aubrey 
recalled him as saying of Francis Bacon, the philosopher revered by the 
founders of the Royal Society that ‘“he writes philosophy, like a Lord 
Chancellor” saide he to me, speaking in derision’. Aubrey added that ‘he 
bid me goe to the fountain head and read Aristotle, Cicero, Avicen[na] 
and did call the neoteriques [those who believed in the new philosophies] 
shitt-breeches.’80 
This neatly summarizes what many historians believe of Harvey’s attitude toward 
Bacon, but the summary is misleading.81 It must be remembered that Aubrey’s 
Lives were not completed biographies, but haphazard, unsystematic, and often 
inaccurate notes frequently written decades after the fact and assembled for 
                                                
79 Oliver Lawson Dick, ed., Aubrey’s Brief Lives (Jaffrey, NH: David R. Godine, 1999), 128–33. 
80 William Harvey, The Circulation of the Blood and Other Writings, trans. Kenneth J. Franklin 
(London: Everyman, 1993), xxv. Bracketed insertions are Wear’s. 
81 For development of this theme, independent of but overlapping my own, see Hale-White, 
“Bacon, Gilbert and Harvey: Being the Harveian Oration Delivered Before the Royal College of 
Physicians of London, October 18th, 1927.” 
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publication only posthumously. For biographical details, they must be used with 
caution.82 Citing them out of context makes them even less reliable. The first part 
of the remark above comes from three sentences that read in full,  
He had been Physitian to the Ld Ch. Bacon: whom he esteemed much 
for his witt & style, but would not allow him to be a great Philosopher. 
Said he to me, he writes Philosophy like a Ld Chancellor, speaking in 
derision. I have cured him.83 
It is unclear whether Harvey cured Bacon of some illness or of his bad writing. The 
first is normally presumed, but the structure of the passage suggests otherwise, and 
the development of Bacon’s style would support the alternate. Bacon’s earlier 
works, such as Advancement of Learning, have the tone of a governmental policy 
paper, and his later works are more like Harvey’s own. Harvey’s assessment of 
Bacon’s writing style could have been shared by Bacon’s staunchest advocates, and 
many of the same would have acknowledged that Bacon never achieved the status 
                                                
82 Andrew Clark, Aubrey’s nineteenth-century editor, summarized, “Aubrey’s ‘Lives’ . . . 
will never be a biographical dictionary. Their value lies not in statement of biographical or other 
facts.” Cited by ibid., 34. 
83 My transcription of John Aubrey, MS Aubrey 6, f. 64v-65r, Bodleian Library, Oxford. In 
Aubrey’s notes, the preceding sentence is about Harvey’s attitude toward women, the following one 
about a trip Harvey made in 1649. To the left is the sentence “He was far from bigotry.” As 
mentioned, the Lives are a collection of unrelated recollections. As one example of the imprecision 
of Aubrey’s account, note the tense of the verbs in the quoted passage. Harvey could only have 
recounted this to Aubrey twenty-five years or more after Bacon’s death. Harvey would have said 
“He wrote Philosophy,” not “He writes philosophy,” and “I cured him,” not “I have cured him.” 
Regarding this inconsistency, see Hale-White, “Bacon, Gilbert and Harvey: Being the Harveian 
Oration Delivered Before the Royal College of Physicians of London, October 18th, 1927,” 32.  
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of a great ‘Philosopher,’ having never himself made any great advances in natural 
philosophy. So these two criticisms cannot ncessarily be taken as dismissal of 
Bacon’s method. Finally, Harvey’s comment about the neoteriques being shitt-
breeches comes from a completely separate part of Aubrey’s notes, in which 
Harvey offers advice to Aubrey on Aubrey’s upcoming trip to Italy. There is no 
suggestion that Bacon or any Englishmen are among these neoteriques.84 If other, 
more reliable, first-hand, evidence indicated that Harvey rejected Bacon’s 
methodological doctrines, then Aubrey’s account could add color. But the first-
hand evidence indicates otherwise. 
For the first evidence that Harvey thought his own views on methodology 
were similar to Bacon’s, we may consult a copy of De Generatione Animalium in the 
Pybus Collection in the library of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne.85 It 
belonged to Harvey’s nephew, but it includes a few annotations hand-written in 
Latin by William Harvey himself.86 They include his thoughts on the practices of 
the scholastics. The passage ends, 
The elenchic disputations of the scholastics in which they drag truth by 
the neck to confirm an hypothesis has the result that in this way we can 
prove or defend anything we choose. So do sophists overthrow 
                                                
84 Harvey was probably referring to Italian Paracelsans. 
85 William Harvey, Exercitationes de generatione animalium (London: Du-Gardianis, 1651), 
Newcastle University Library, Pybus Collection Pyb Case 2/iv. 
86 William Harvey, Disputations Touching the Generation of Animals, trans. Gweneth 
Whitteridge (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1981), “Appendix,” 456–57. 
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philosophy and because they are rather useful for shaping the morals and 
manners of the crowd they may well go unpunished, . . .  
This excerpt and the passage leading to it sound eminently Baconian in spirit, like 
something that Bacon could have written in the Advancement of Learning or Novum 
Organum. Indeed, for more on these views, Harvey cites Bacon:  
. . . see Bacon, On difficulties, at the beginning.87  
Now Bacon did not publish anything entitled On difficulties, nor was anything 
published posthumously by that title, so it is unclear to what Harvey is referring. 
But by including ‘at the beginning,’ he indicates that he has a particular text in 
mind. Perhaps he got the title wrong, though I know of no text in which Bacon 
makes exactly the point Harvey does. Perhaps Harvey is thinking of something 
written by someone else, but even so, he thinks his own remarks are Baconian. Or 
perhaps Harvey had access to a manuscript by Bacon now lost, an intriguing 
possibility. Whatever the explanation for the title On difficulties, the passage 
provides evidence that Harvey believed an explication of his own position on 
scholastic methodology could be found in the writings of Francis Bacon.88 
                                                
87 “Scolasticorum elenctica disputatio qua veritatem ad suppositum obtorto ducunt collo, facit 
ut eo modo quod licet probare et defendere possimus. Ita sophistae phylosophiam obruunt et quia ad 
firmandos vulgi mores utiliores inulti sint; vid. Bacon, De difficultatibus, inicio.” Ibid., 456. 
88 I have asked Graham Rees, editor of the Oxford Francis Bacon, if he can tell what passage 
Harvey is citing, and he cannot either. It is possible that the transcription is inaccurate, as Harvey’s 
hand-writing is notoriously illegible, but I have reviewed a high-quality facsimile and see no reason 
to doubt Whitteridge’s reading. Presumably, there is also the possibility that Harvey is referring to 
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For direct evidence of Baconian induction in Harvey’s research we turn to the 
body of De Generatione Animalium. Harvey’s earlier work, De Motu Cordis, was 
published in 1628 (two years after Bacon died). It is a short work, and Harvey, then 
fifty years old, said little in it about his method. He probably began work on De 
Generatione Animalium soon thereafter and continued working on it until around 
1642.89 Harvey was not comfortable that he had adequately answered the questions 
he posed, but he published the work nonetheless in 1651. He wanted to publish it, 
he says in the preface, in order to show others his method. The short preface 
describes that method under three headings, “Of the manner and order of attaining 
knowledge,” “Of the same matter according to Aristotle’s opinion,” and “Of the 
method to be observed in setting forth the knowledge of generation.”90 What 
Harvey says here, especially under the heading about Aristotle, and what Bacon 
says in passages of the Novum Organum are so similar in distinctive content and 
vocabulary that Harvey must be drawing on Bacon’s work or the two must have a 
common source. 
                                                                                                                                       
Roger Bacon (or even some other Bacon), but the whole passage sounds much more seventeenth 
century than thirteenth, and I could find no passage in Roger Bacon entitled De difficultibus. I follow 
Whitteridge’s judgment that Harvey is referring to Francis Bacon. 
89 Introduction, xix–xxv, in Harvey, On the Generation of Animals. 
90 “De modo, & ardine acquirendae cognitionis,” “De iisdem, ad mentem Aristotelis,” “De Methodo in 
cognitione Generationis adhibenda.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B2v, B4v, C2v; Harvey, 
On the Generation of Animals, 10, 14, 17. 
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Harvey first criticizes those who think “the whole of Truth was . . . colonized 
by the Ancients”91 and draws a distinction between discoveries made by chance and 
those—the “more commendable”92—discovered by a methodical investigation of 
nature. He then cites two conflicting passages from Aristotle, one claiming that 
knowledge is a rising from singulars to universals, and another that says knowledge 
is an advance from universals to particulars.93 The passages introduce the common 
distinction, ‘better known to us’ vs. ‘better known to nature,’ and it seems that 
Harvey is headed in the direction of proposing a conventional Paduan regressus.94 
But he does not. Instead he begins a discussion about the nature of universals.95 
Knowledge of particulars, he says, is “clear and distinct,” that of universals 
                                                
91 “omnen certe veritatem a Veteribus occupatam esse.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione 
animalium, B2v; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 9. Cf. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Book 
1. On Harvey’s attitude of natural philosophy as progressive investigation of nature, rather than an 
attempt to recover lost ancient wisdom, see French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, chapter 3. 
92 “magis laudabile.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B2v; Harvey, On the 
Generation of Animals, 9. Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum 1.8 and 1.109. 
93 Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B2v-r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 10. 
The first Aristotelian passage Harvey cites is Physics 1.1. The second passage is a misquotation. It 
comes from an edition by Guilio Pace, a Paduan Aristotelian and regressus theoretician. See the 
citation of Charles B. Schmitt, The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities (London: 
Variorum Reprints, 1984), 305, by French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 40.  
94 French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 59n34, 63. 
95 James G. Lennox, “The Experimental Basis of Conceptual Innovation in William Harvey’s 
De Motu Cordis” (paper presented at the Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Austin, 
TX, November 18–20, 2004), 1–2. 
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“obscure and indistinct.”96 The passage sounds more like English Aristotelians we 
have encountered, such as Everard Digby and John Case than like regressus 
theoreticians Harvey would have met in Padua. The treatment is rather eclectic 
and not fully clear, but in the end Harvey says, “To conclude, sensible objects are 
of themselves and prior to things in the mind; these things of the mind are after 
them and derive from them.”97 The most important part of natural philosophy, 
Harvey is arguing, is to get the concepts right, that is, to make sure the abstract 
notions of natural philosophy are properly formed from sense observations. This, of 
course, is Bacon’s project, and here Harvey’s language turns recognizably 
Baconian. If notions are not formed properly, Harvey says, “we make judgements 
entirely on phantoms and apparitions inhabiting our minds”98 and “will arrive at a 
floating and nebulous opinion.”99 To refer to these false representations, Harvey 
uses the distinctive terms that Bacon used: phantasmata, apparitiones, inania, falsae 
imagines, and Idola, i.e., Idols.100 
                                                
96 “clarum et distinctum” and “obscurum et indistinctum.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione 
animalium, B3v; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 11, replacing Whitteridge’s “confused” with 
“indistinct.” 
97 “Denique, sensibilia sunt per se, & priora: intelligibilia autem, posteriora, & ab illis orta.” 
Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B3r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 12. 
98 “de phantasmatis & apparentiis mente nostra comprehensis, perperam judicabimus.” 
Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B3r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 13. 
99 “opinionem quidem tumidam, & fluctuantem acquires.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione 
animalium, B3r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 13. 
100 Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, B3r, C1r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 
12-3, 16. 
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To describe the proper method of proceeding, Harvey first cites and 
summarizes Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. In this work, Harvey says, Aristotle 
poses and then finally solves a problem. The problem is how we come to know the 
premises upon which syllogism and demonstration are based and, moreover, to 
know that these premises are true and necessary. Harvey then quotes a long passage 
from the final chapter (2.19) of the Posterior Analytics, the passage in which Aristotle 
describes the rise from sense perception to memory to experience to, in Harvey’s 
words, “universal reason, definitions and maxims, or common axioms.”101 This, 
recall, is the passage that Aristotle says is a description of induction. If this method 
is followed, Harvey says, men “by the aid of their own senses [may] abstract 
therefrom true representations of the things themselves,” and will avoid “false 
Idols.”102 
Harvey concludes with a preview of how he has applied his method to the 
current case of the generation of animals. A wide range of animals must be 
investigated, he says, but some are unavailable in sufficient quantities, are too small, 
or are inaccessible to dissection. He has therefore, to the extent possible, chosen to 
examine  
                                                
101 “ratio universalis, definitions, & maxima, sive axiomata communia.” Preface, Harvey, De 
generatione animalium, B4r; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 15. 
102 The full sentence: “Qui enim Autorum verba legentes, rerum ipsarum imagines (eorum 
verbis comprehensas) sensibus propriis non abstrahunt, hi non veras Ideas, sed falsa Idola, & 
phantasmata inania mente concipiunt.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, C1r; Harvey, On 
the Generation of Animals, 16. Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, 1.1–38, especially 1.23 and 1.38 for some of 
the distinctive vocabulary. 
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certain races of oviparous creatures, hens, geese, pigeons, ducks, fish, 
crustaceans, testaceans, soft-bodied fish, frogs and snakes; of insects, 
bees, wasps, butterflies and silkworms; of viviparous creatures, sheep, 
goats, dogs, cats and cloven-hoofed cattle, and in chief, the most perfect 
of them all, man himself.103  
The variety is directly in keeping with a Baconian approach. Harvey continues, 
“Having thoroughly examined and understood all these things, we may next 
contemplate the hidden nature of the vegetative soul, and apprehend the manner 
and order of generation in all creatures, and its causes.”104 That is, by identifying 
the essence of the things under investigation, we may extend our conclusions to all 
creatures, not just those investigated. This kind of inference was central in the 
Novum Organum. Harvey closes by noting that there may not be words for all the 
things he may come upon. If so, he may need to reuse common words and give 
them more precise definitions, or he may need to form entirely new words. He asks 
the reader’s indulgence, for identifying the essential characteristics of things named 
will repay the effort. 
                                                
103 “in oviparorum quidem genere, gallina, anser, columba, anas, pisces, crustata, testacea, 
mollia, ranae, serpents; insecta, ut apes, vespae, papiliones, bombyces: in viviparorum autem censu, 
oves, caprae, canes, feles, jumenta bisulca; &, prae caeteris, animalium omnium perfectissimus, 
homo ipse.” Preface, Harvey, De generatione animalium, C3v; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 
19. 
104 “His perspectis, & cognitis, naturam animae vegetativae abstrusam contemplari; & in 
omnibus animalibus, generationis modum, ordinem, atque caussas intelligere licebit.” Preface, 
Harvey, De generatione animalium, C3v; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 19, substituting 
“nature” for Whitteridge’s “account.” Italics mine. Cf. Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 1.1 641a15–
25. 
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In this preface, though Harvey has described a process like that of the Novum 
Organum, using distinctively Baconian vocabulary, Harvey has not named Bacon. 
That changes at a key point in the body of De generatione animalium. The book has 
seventy-two chapters. Chapter 25105 forms a clear break between a first section and a 
second. In the first section, Harvey provides an account of “where and how an egg 
is made . . . and by what means, in what order and by what stages the foetus or 
chick is fashioned and perfected in the egg.”106 His account is lengthy, detailed, and 
based on careful observations. Although the account is structured around the hen’s 
egg and the growth of the chick, along the way Harvey makes comparisons to the 
reproduction of the hawk, pigeon, ostrich, pheasant, butterfly, worm, snake, bee, 
wasp, shrimp, crayfish, tortoise, mole, hare, deer, horse, man, and many other 
animals. He has organized his analysis differently, but he has done the work Bacon 
does using three tables. Harvey then writes, “All this has perhaps been too wordy 
and long drawn out . . . . And so I think it convenient to explain here what fruit my 
labour has born and, to use the words of our most learned Verulam [i.e., Francis 
Bacon], proceed to my ‘second harvest.’”107 A ‘harvest’ (‘vindemiatio’), recall, is 
                                                
105 Mislabeled “24” in the 1651 London edition, corrected in the 1653 Latin and English 
editions. 
106 “unde, & quomodo oriatur. . . . quo pacto, & ordine, quibusque gradibus, foetus, sive 
pullus in ovo, & ex illo formetur, & perficiatur.” Chapter 1, Harvey, De generatione animalium, D1r; 
Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 22. 
107 “Prolixe forsitan nimis. . . . Quare, quem fructum diligentiae nostrae consequuti simus, hic 
adjungere consentaneum arbitror: atque (ut doctissimi Verulamii nostri verbis utar) vindemiatio 
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Bacon’s unusual word for a definition drawn from whatever observations have been 
made up to that point of the investigation. Harvey has been discussing the egg for 
seventy-four pages and twenty-four chapters, and only now does he get to the topic 
one might have expected at the beginning. The title of the next chapter is “What an 
Egg is.”108 The first twenty-four chapters have been directed toward identifying the 
essence of an egg, at identifying what makes an egg an egg, at identifying what 
Bacon would call the form of an egg. Harvey’s procedure has followed the pattern 
of Baconian induction, and at the critical transition in that procedure, Harvey 
confirms for us that he is self-consciously following the model that Francis Bacon 
presented in his treatise on induction. 
It thus seems that by 1642, when Harvey finished writing De generatione 
animalium, he believed that to some extent he was using Baconian induction. But it 
is not clear whether he thought the method was exclusively Baconian and whether 
he learned it from the Novum Organum. That is, did Harvey learn his Baconian 
induction from Bacon? To answer that question, let us review Harvey’s career.109 
When he was fifteen, Harvey entered Gonville and Caius College, 
Cambridge, a college with a strong tradition of medical study. After six years there, 
                                                                                                                                       
secunda instuenda est.” Harvest for Whitteridge’s vintage for Harvey’s vindemiatio. Italics in original. 
Harvey, De generatione animalium, N2v; Harvey, On the Generation of Animals, 134. 
108 “Quid fit Ovum.” Harvey, De generatione animalium, N2v; Harvey, On the Generation of 
Animals. 
109 Roger French, “Harvey, William (1578–1657),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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he moved to the University of Padua, where he studied for two and a half years 
with Fabricius of Aquapendente (1537–1619). Fabricius believed that he was 
continuing Aristotle’s anatomical research project and understood the core of that 
project to be the determination of what causes any particular bodily organ to be the 
kind of organ it is.110  Fabricius proceeded methodically. He first acquired a 
comprehensive historia based on dissections and observations of the widest possible 
variety of animals possessing that organ. By comparing and contrasting, he 
distinguished which common features were only accidentally or coincidentally so 
and which were essentially so. He held that all four Aristotelian causes have a 
causal role, but the most important is the organ’s function—its action and use. The 
function is the essential characteristic that makes, for example, a stomach a stomach 
or an ear an ear. Fabricius demonstrated the validity of his identification by using 
the function to explain why the organ differed in different animals. By his process 
he used similarities and differences to identify the essence—the function—of the 
organ, and then the function to explain the differences between different kinds of 
the organ. Fabricius faulted his predecessors for focusing on structure instead of 
function and for not considering a sufficiently wide variety of animals. To 
understand the structure of the human stomach, for example, Fabricius held, it was 
necessary to first understand the function that makes any stomach a stomach. This 
                                                
110 Andrew Cunningham, “Fabricius and the ‘Aristotle Project’ in Anatomical Teaching and 
Research at Padua,” in The Medical Renaissance of the Sixteenth Century, ed. A Wear, R. K. French, 
and I. M. Lonie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 195–222; French, William Harvey’s 
Natural Philosophy, 66–68. 
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was a theme in Aristotle’s biological works: to know the function is to know the 
essential cause and to have scientific knowledge. Harvey will later adopt the same 
doctrine in De Generatione Animalium, in his research into the function that causes 
an egg to be an egg. 
Harvey was back in England in 1603 and was granted permission by the 
College of Physicians to begin practicing medicine. King James was now on the 
throne, and Francis Bacon had a position in the new adminstration, but few official 
responsibilities. In that year he began the notes toward what would later become 
the Novum Organum. Harvey had made no noteworthy investigations into the heart. 
In 1604 Harvey married a daughter of the king’s physician. In 1605 Bacon published 
the Advancement of Learning. Separated in age by seventeen years, both Bacon and 
Harvey were seeking their place at court in the same years of James’s reign, and 
both succeeded admirably. In early 1618, Bacon was named Lord Chancellor, and at 
nearly the same time, Harvey was appointed the king’s physician. Even without 
Aubrey’s testimony, we can safely assume Harvey and Bacon, both serving the king 
directly, knew each other. 
Harvey had begun taking a vigorous role in the College of Physicians and 
would continue to do so for the rest of his career. In 1616, at the age of thirty-eight, 
he began delivering lectures there. His lecture notes survive and are a valuable 
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source for understanding Harvey’s methods.111 In their introductory section, 
Harvey says that the anatomist should proceed “secundum Socratis regulam,” i.e., 
“according to the rule of Socrates.”112 What he means by that emerges from an 
examination of the notes, Harvey’s later additions to them, and the tract on the 
circulation of the blood that he later published.113 
Harvey’s assignment is to lecture not on animals in general, but on man, yet 
on the title page of his notes, he writes, quoting Aristotle, that “The inner parts of 
man are uncertain and unknown wherefore we must consider those parts of other 
animals which bear any similarity to those of man.”114 Harvey is lecturing while he 
and his students look at a dissected human cadaver, yet Harvey says that to 
understand what they are looking at, they must consider not only the same organ in 
other cadavers but the same organs in other animals, too. Only then can one know 
the essence of the organ. To understand the human heart, for example, one must 
determine what makes any heart a heart. Harvey holds, with Aristotle, that it is not 
its color, shape, size, or structure but its function that makes a biological organ the 
kind of thing it is. We point to a certain organ in man, a certain organ in deer, and 
in dogs, cats, frogs, fish, and snakes, and we call each of those organs a ‘heart.’ 
                                                
111 Gweneth Whitteridge, The Anatomical Lectures of William Harvey (Edinburgh and 
London: E. & S. Livingstone, 1964).  
112 Quoted and translated in French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 83. 
113 Cunningham, “William Harvey: The Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood”; French, 
William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 71–93. 
114 History of Animals, 1.16 494b19–24, and Parts of Animals, 2.10 656a9–14. Quoted and 
translated in French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 84. 
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Harvey says we do this not because the individual organs have the same color or 
structure, but because they perform the same function. After a series of 
comparisons, experiments, dissections, and vivisections with the most diverse 
creatures, Harvey concluded that that function is to eject blood into the arteries of 
the organism. Every organ, if it is a heart, has that function. If it does not have that 
function it is not a heart. Discovery of the essence, the function, of the heart—not 
the circulation of the blood—was Harvey’s fundamental discovery. He obtained it 
by considering his subject to be not the heart of man but the heart in all animals 
that have one. Note the full title of his seminal book is Anatomical Exercise On the 
Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals.115 Once the function, the essence, of the 
heart (any heart) is identified, it become a straightforward question to ask where all 
the blood goes and where it all comes from. It was a small step to conclude, 
through a combination of observation and reasoning, that the blood is circulating 
out from the heart and back again. What Harvey means by the ‘regula Socratis’ is 
the compare-and-contrast process by which he surveyed the widest possible variety 
of hearts and determined what makes a heart a heart. 
By the time Bacon published the Novum Organum, Harvey was well on his 
way to discovering circulation, if he had not discovered it already. Bacon died in 
1626, his Sylva Sylvarum was published in 1627, and Harvey’s De Motu Cordis was 
published in 1628. By the mid-1640s, a group of talented physicians and natural 
                                                
115 Harvey, De generatione animalium. 
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philosophers, moving in circles in London and Oxford, had come to admire both 
men. In 1642, Harvey at age sixty-four moved to Oxford. By 1650 an informal group 
of his followers had organized themselves into the Experimental Philosophy 
Club.116 They met first at the lodgings of William Petty, then of John Wilkins, and 
then of Robert Boyle. Some members of this evolving club moved to London and 
formed the Royal Society.117 The Society conspicuously adopted the methods of 
Francis Bacon and half of its members were Harveian physicians. Harvey died 
before the Society was founded, but he remained an active leader in the College of 
Physicians nearly till his death. In these years of Harvey’s leadership and influence, 
the College became what his friend and fellow physician William Charleton called 
“Solomon’s House in reality,”118 referring to Bacon’s New Atlantis. In the 1660s, 
Bacon and Harvey were often mentioned together (along with Gilbert) as the 
founders of modern English science.119 Their work was considered of a type. 
Baconians were Harveians, and Harveians were Baconians.  
                                                
116 Robert G. Frank, Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists: A Study of Scientific Ideas 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). 
117 Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660. 
118 Walter Charleton, The Immortality of the Human Soul, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature 
(London: 1657), 34. 
119 Several examples appear in Robert G. Frank, Jr., “The Image of Harvey in 
Commonwealth and Restoration England,” in William Harvey and His Age: The Professional and 
Social Context of the Discovery of the Circulation, ed. Jerome J. Bylebyl (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979), 103–44. 
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There is a small but potentially important difference between what Harvey 
wrote in De Generatione Animalium and what Bacon wrote in the Novum Organum. 
Harvey says that the words ‘second vintage’ are those of ‘our most learned 
Verulam.’ But in his published work Bacon never uses the phrase ‘second vintage.’ 
He discusses the first vintage, but never the second, and the omission is a valid 
source of criticism. A first implies a second, but Bacon says the conclusion reached 
by his induction is certain. How could the first conclusion be certain if it is to be 
superseded by a second? Passages in the Novum Organum and elsewhere suggest 
how Bacon might answer this, but they are only suggestions. Characterization of a 
second vintage is simply not part of the orthodox Baconian doctrine as it survives in 
Bacon’s own writings. Why did Harvey, writing in the 1640s, believe his definition 
of the egg was a second rather than a first vintage, and why did he believe the words 
‘second vintage’ were those of ‘our most learned Verulam’?120 I do not yet see how 
to answer the first question, but to answer the second, it is fair to hypothesize first 
                                                
120 It is possible that the passage in chapter 25 is being misread. By his Latin statement, 
Harvey might mean, ‘I will explain here what fruit my labour has born and, after doing so, proceed to 
my second vintage.’ In this case, the definition of an egg presented in chapter 26 is a first vintage, 
and the second vintage does not appear until chapter 62, where Harvey summarizes, integrates, and 
refines the intervening developments. If this is his intent, and if he really is following Baconian 
doctrine, then chapter 62 could indicate what Bacon himself had in mind for a ‘second vintage.’ But 
regardless whether Harvey thought the second vintage was the definition of an egg in chapter 26 or 
the broader integration in chapter 62, we still want to know why he thought he was using Bacon’s 
phrase. I do not think that Harvey meant Bacon knew only how to get to the first vintage, but that 
he, Harvey, knew how to go beyond that. If he did, I doubt Harvey would have said that ‘second 
vintage’ was Bacon’s phrase. 
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that an (at least slightly) amplified version of Bacon’s doctrine of induction 
circulated among Bacon’s followers of the early 1640s, second that this version was 
either passed on from Bacon orally or in lost texts or was developed by followers 
who believed it was a justified extension, and third that Harvey was familiar with 
and believed he was using this amplified version. Perhaps Harvey himself was the 
conduit passing knowledge of this version of Baconian induction from Bacon 
himself to the natural philosophers who gathered around Harvey in the 1640s. 
Maybe Harvey and Bacon discussed natural philosophy at length—maybe Harvey 
cured Bacon of writing natural philosophy like a government bureaucrat, and 
Bacon taught Harvey how to develop a ‘second vintage.’ Harvey’s use of the phrase 
deserves further study. 
To Harvey, Baconian induction probably looked like just a systematized, 
codified, even formulaic version of the Aristotelian method that Harvey learned 
from Fabricius through countless dissections and vivisections, just a restatement of 
the ‘regula Socratis’ that Socrates had used to identify the essence of love and that 
Harvey used to identify the essence of the heart.121 Harvey probably thought of 
Bacon as a dilettante, sitting in his barrister’s office telling real natural philospher’s 
like himself how to go about their business. But he did not dismiss Bacon. He 
appreciated Bacon’s ability to capture an idea with words like idol and harvest. 
Harvey recognized his own method in Bacon’s. In 1654, the same year Webster 
                                                
121 That Harvey had Socrates’ discussion of love in the Republic in mind, see French, William 
Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 84–85. 
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attacked Cambridge and Oxford professors for not teaching Bacon’s induction and 
Ward and Webster insisted they did, Harvey was elected president of the College 
of Physicians. He was seventy-six and decided he was too old to serve. To the new 
generation of physicians at the college and to natural philophers at Oxford, he was 
now admired—along with Bacon and Gilbert—as one of the founders of their 
revolution. But of these founders, it was Bacon who was the methodologist. Until 
1651 Harvey had published nothing on method. When he did, he implored the 
young not to abandon Aristotle and to look to the Posterior Analytics for how to 
avoid idols. Men in their twenties and thirties were probably glad to learn their 
methods instead from the more practical Novum Organum. Baconian induction was 
a systematized version of Aristotelian and Socratic induction.  Although Harvey 
accepted and used Baconian induction, he had already been introduced to its 
essentials before meeting Bacon or reading anything Bacon wrote. Harvey learned 
the essentials of Baconian induction not from Bacon, but from Fabricius, Aristotle, 
and Socrates. 
Robert Boyle on the Nature of Chemical Qualities 
One of the most influential of this younger generation and one more likely to 
encounter induction in Bacon than in Aristotle was the natural philosopher Robert 
Boyle (1627–1692). Though Francis Bacon’s influence on Boyle is and has been for a 
long time widely accepted, Boyle’s acceptance of Bacon’s induction has received 
little attention. It is well recognized that Boyle accepted Bacon’s insistence on the 
material benefits of knowledge, Bacon’s insistence on the need for a sound 
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observational foundation, and Bacon’s explanation of the role of experiments, but 
what Boyle thought of the specific process that Bacon considered his induction has 
not been studied. In her defense of Boyle’s Baconianism, Rose-Mary Sargent 
explicitly sets induction to the side, and in his study of Bolye’s philosophy, Peter 
Ansley never mentions it.122 I will here propose that Boyle’s most important work is 
an excellent example of Baconian induction in practice. 
In late 1655 or early 1656, Boyle, aged twenty-nine, arrived in Oxford and 
joined the community of natural philosophers, now led by John Wilkins. While 
there, Boyle, with Robert Hooke (1635–1703), constructed an air pump that was an 
improvement over the one that Otto von Guericke invented in Germany in 1650. 
With their pump Boyle and Hooke tested existing hypotheses and came up with 
several of their own involving the nature of air and the behavior of materials and 
objects in a vacuum. Boyle published the results in 1660. Though the pump and 
experiments using it have been the object of considerable scholarly interest in the 
last twenty-five years, Boyle’s New Experiments Physico-Mechanical Touching on the 
Spring of the Air123 was only the first of dozens of works on natural philosophy that 
Boyle published and not the most important. He and Hooke were proceeding along 
a line of inquiry already well scoped by Torricelli, Mersenne, and others. That the 
                                                
122 Rose-Mary Sargent, “Robert Boyle’s Baconian Inheritance: A Response to Laudan’s 
Cartesian Thesis,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 17, no. 4 (1986): 473; Peter R. Ansley, 
Philosophy of Robert Boyle (London: Routledge, 2000). 
123 Robert Boyle, New experiments physico-mechanicall, touching the spring of the air (Oxford: 
Tho. Robinson, 1660). 
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air had ‘spring’ had been discussed since the late 1640s. The important discovery 
known as Boyle’s Law, itself the result of a project well advanced by others, came a 
couple years after New Experiments Physico-Mechanical and was made with the 
sealed-end J-tube, not the air pump.124 Boyle’s most important and fundamental 
work for the history of chemistry was on the nature of chemical qualities, such as 
heat, cold, color, porosity, odor, taste, volatility, corrosiveness, and many others, 
and the method by which any quality should be investigated. Two-thirds of his 
publications were on these subjects. Peter Ansley was correct to write recently, 
When it comes to an assessment of the significance of Boyle’s thought 
for the history of philosophy and the history of science, it is the theory of 
qualities that motivated much of his most important experimental work 
and where he made his most significant contributions to human 
knowledge.125 
                                                
124 I. Bernard Cohen, “Newton, Hooke and Boyle’s Law; Discovered by Power and 
Towneley,” Nature 204 (1964): 618–21; Charles Webster, “The Discovery of Boyle's Law, and the 
Concept of the Elasticity of Air in the Seventeenth Century,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 2 
(1965): 441–502; Joseph Agassi, “Who Discovered Boyle’s Law?” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 8 (1977): 189–250. 
125 Ansley, Philosophy of Robert Boyle, 17. Ansley’s volume is an important contribution to the 
recent scholarship on Boyle. It shares with my analysis a respect for the centrality of qualities in 
Boyle’s natural philosophy. Ansley, however, gives little attention to ‘form,’ (consciously so, p. 12). 
On conceptions of form in early seventeenth century, see Norma E. Emerton, The Scientific 
Reinterpretation of Form (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
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If Boyle deserves to be called the father of modern chemistry, it is not for the 
discovery of Boyle’s Law, but for the radical reconceptualization of qualities that he 
effected. 
By 1661, the year after New Experiments Physico-Mechanical was published, 
Boyle was familiar with some but not all of Bacon’s works.126 In Certain 
Physiological Essays of that year, he wrote that he had “purposely refrained”127 from 
reading large systematic treatments of natural philosophy until he had made a 
sufficient number of experiments and observations of his own. He said that he had 
not read, for example, Gassendi’s Syntagma or Descartes’ Principia, and not even 
Bacon’s Novum Organum. Boyle’s phrasing suggests that a natural philosopher 
might be excused for having not read the first two but would be expected to have 
read the third. He is only now, he says, allowing himself to read these “excellent 
Books.”128 Yet by this time Boyle knew and knew well at least three other books by 
                                                
126 On Boyle’s intellectual development in his mid-twenties (1648–1653), see Michael Hunter, 
“How Boyle Became a Scientist,” in Robert Boyle (1627–91): Scrupulosity and Science (Woodbridge, 
Suffulk, UK: Boydell Press, 2000), 15–50. The question of when Boyle read which of Bacon’s books 
has also been researched by Hideyuki Yoshimoto at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. 
http://members3.jcom.home.ne.jp/hist_science/BaconF.html. 
127 Robert Boyle, Certain physiological essays, written at distant times, and on several Occasions 
(London: Henry Herringman, 1661), 6; Robert Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, ed. Michael Hunter 
and Edward B. Davis, 14 vols. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999), 2:13. As here, citations to Boyle 
are to the original (if published) and occasionally to the corresponding passage (sometimes from a 
different edition) in the Works, edited by Hunter and Davis. 
128 Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 7; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:13. 
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Bacon. The first is the Sylva Sylvarum, published in 1627 and printed at least a 
dozen times by 1661. Of his Physiological Essays, Boyle writes,  
I must inform you that many of the Particulars which we are now 
considering, were in my first Designe collected in order to a 
Continuation of the Lord Verulam’s Sylva Sylvarum, or Natural History. 
And that my intended Centuries might resemble his, to which they were 
to be annexed.129 
Recall that the Sylva Sylvarum or a Naturall History in Ten Centuries was to form 
most of the third part of the Instauratio. In the editor William Rawley’s 
introductory epistle, he explains that Bacon intended the Natural History to be the 
foundation upon which a true philosophy would be erected and that the Novum 
Organum sets down the directions by which it would be. At this point in his career, 
Boyle is intentionally digesting and extending the Sylva Sylarum before proceeding 
to the Novum Organum. Boyle’s study of the Sylva Sylvarum is not superficial. In 
describing a particular experiment involving gold, sulphur, and quicksilver, he 
recalls that Bacon had reported on a similar experiment, though he could not recall 
where.130 By this time, Boyle also knew at least some of De Augmentis Scientiarum, 
for he cited it in an unpublished essay written several years earlier.131 
                                                
129 Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 14; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:17. 
130 Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 68; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:58. In the Sylva 
Sylvarum, the experiment is entry 327 in century IV. 
131 “Of the Study of the Booke of Nature,” Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 14:157. This essay was 
written c. 1650. 
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Also by this time, Boyle appears to have read a work of Bacon’s that Boyle 
calls De Forma Calidi. The work left quite an impression on Boyle, for as we will 
see, he later cites it in a crucial context. But, surprisingly, Bacon never published a 
work by this name. What Boyle is referring to is an essay that appeared in a pocket-
sized duodecimo volume first published in Leiden in 1638, reprinted in 1648, and 
regularly bound with the 1650 Leiden edition of the Novum Organum.132 The 
volume was an odd collection. The title page called it Historia Naturalis & 
Experimentalis de Ventis &c. It included Bacon’s natural and experimental history of 
the winds, published first in 1622 as one of the natural histories that would comprise 
the third part of the Instauratio Magna. But to it, the publisher, Franciscus Hack, 
added three other pieces, all written by Bacon but never intended as independent 
essays. The third was on the proper method for investigating tides, the second was 
on motion, and the first—the one Hack entitled “De Forma Calidi”—was on the 
form of heat. All three were excerpted from the text of the Novum Organum. “De 
Forma Calidi” was the important section of book 2 in which Bacon presents an 
investigation into the nature of heat as an example of a proper induction. The 
                                                
132 Francis Bacon, Historia Naturalis & Experimentalis De Ventis &c. (Leiden: Franciscus 
Hack, 1648); Gibson, Francis Bacon: a bibliography of his works and Baconiana to the year 1750, #109. 
Boyle was once in Leiden, presumably during his trip to the Netherlands from February to April, 
1648. Michael Hunter has remarked on how little attention this important visit has received from 
Boyle scholars. Hunter, “How Boyle Became a Scientist,” 44. Events and optical experiments Boyle 
witnessed there made a lasting impression (Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 7, 25). I do not know 
when in 1648 that year’s edition of this duodecimo came out, but it is tempting to speculate that it 
came out while Boyle was in Leiden. 
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reason to believe that Boyle read this example of induction before reading the 
treatise on induction itself comes from Certain Physiological Essays.133 In that 1661 
volume, Boyle makes two references to passages that appear in the Novum 
Organum. The first is, “It has been truly observ’d by a great Philosopher, That 
Truth does more easily emerge out of Error than Confusion.”134 Bacon makes this 
point in Novum Organum, 2.20. The second is, “Another Experiment much of the 
nature of this is said to be delivered by Sir Francis Bacon, who teaches to coagulate 
whites of Eggs with Spirit of Wine.”135 Bacon discusses this experiment in the 
Novum Organum 2.2.24. This second reference appears in an essay on fluidity and 
firmness written a few years earlier, and the first appears in the same Proemial 
Essay in which Boyle says he has not yet read the Novum Organum. It is not 
impossible that he picked up the first from outside of his reading, but that is even 
less likely for the second. Much more likely is that he read both in the Leiden 
duodecimo. This little volume and “De Forma Calidi” will be important again. For 
now we may simply note that in 1660–61, Boyle knew Bacon as a “profound 
Naturalist,”136 the author of experimental and natural histories on a wide range of 
                                                
133 If my supposition is correct, it partly explains why Boyle seldom uses the word induction. 
He first learned the method by example and tends to refer to it as the method of “De Forma Calidi” 
rather than the method of induction.  
134 “Proemial Essay,” in Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 9; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 
2:12–14. 
135 “The History of Fluidity and Firmness,” in Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 209; Boyle, 
Works of Robert Boyle, 2:170. Italics in original. 
136 Boyle, Certain physiological essays, Sect. 13, p. 115; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:170. 
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natural phenomena,137 histories that Boyle himself sought to emulate, and that 
Boyle knew Bacon’s proposal for a new and true induction from the Novum 
Organum’s example of heat. 
Direct references to Bacon’s methodological writings began to appear in 
Boyle’s works the following year. In Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and 
Weight of the Air (1662), Boyle cites Bacon as the source for the concept of the 
“experimentum crucis” (‘crucial experiment’), an experiment that would determine 
which one of alternate hypotheses is true.138 Bacon had presented this idea, at 
length, in book 2 of the Novum Organum, where he called such evidence not a 
‘crucial experiment,’ but a ‘crucial prerogative instance.’139 Of all Bacon’s 
prerogative instances, this has been the most influential, and has become known by 
Boyle’s modified title. The following year, in 1663, in the Usefulness of Natural 
Philosophy, Boyle cites another Baconian concept, again credits Bacon, and again 
gives it a slightly different name. In book 1 of the Novum Organum (in a passage not 
in the Leiden excerpts) Bacon draws a distinction between fructiferous experiments 
                                                
137 In an unpublished essay written 1652–4, Boyle included Bacon in lists of the leading 
modern natural philosophers. Also in the lists were Bernardino Telesio (1508–88), Sebastiano Basso 
(fl. 2nd half 16th century), Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), Henricus 
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138 Robert Boyle, A defence of the doctrine touching the spring and weight of the air propos’d by Mr. 
R. Boyle in his New physico-mechanical experiments, against the objections of Franciscus Linus (London: 
Richard Davis, 1662), 48; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 3:50. 
139 Novum Organum, 2.36. 
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and luciferous ones, those that yield immediate practical results and those that may 
not have immediate practical use but allow us to identify a cause. Boyle calls the 
first ones lucriferous instead of fructiferous, yielding the pair luciferous and 
lucriferous.140 In this same 1663 text, Boyle also quotes at length from Bacon’s 
Advancement of Learning.141 Boyle did not regularly put quotations on the title pages 
of his natural philosophy books, but when he did, starting in 1664, the quotes were 
usually from Bacon.142 In unpublished notes, written in the 1660s and relating to 
the Usefulness of Natural Philosophy, Boyle shows an increasing and increasingly 
sophisticated appreciation of the content of Novum Organum and of his own 
adoption of its method.143 In Reason and Religion (1675) and Things Above Reason 
(1681), Boyle cites Bacon in discussions of ‘Idols’ and uses the term in the same 
distinctive way that Bacon does, for ‘notions’ improperly formed.144 In summary, 
                                                
140 Robert Boyle, Some considerations touching the usefulnesse of experimental naturall philosophy 
(Oxford: Ric. Davis, 1663), 45; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 3:229. Boyle returns to Bacon’s 
‘fructiferous’ and ‘luciferous’ in Usefulness of Natural Philosophy, II sect. 2 in 1671. It is easy to 
speculate that Boyle picked up lucriferous from his colleagues, before having read the Novum 
Organum itself. 
141 Boyle, Usefulness of natural philosophy, 104–5; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 3:271. 
142 Galen was the only other source. Boyle used the Bible and Seneca for his non-scientific 
works.  
143 Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 13:351, 3. 
144 Robert Boyle, Some considerations about the reconcileableness of reason and religion (London: 
Henry Herringman, 1675), 29–30; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 8:256; and Robert Boyle, 
Experiments, notes, & c. about the mechanical origine or production of divers particular qualities (London: 
R. Davis, 1676), 58; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 9:382. Boyle attributes the quotation on the title 
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during the early 1660s, Boyle gained a more sophisticated understanding of what 
Bacon had presented in the Novum Organum and from then on prominently cited 
distinctive passages from Bacon’s text. Boyle continued to cite observations from 
the Sylva Sylvarum,145 but now, in addition to recognizing Bacon as ‘a profound 
Naturalist,’ Boyle recognizes him as a methodologist and calls him “that Great and 
Solid Philosopher,” “that great Ornament and Guide of Philosophical Historians of 
Nature,” “so Judicious a Friend to Philosophie and Mankind,” and “Great Restorer 
of Physiks,  . . . who trac’d out a most useful way to make discoveries.”146 
After Certain Physiological Essays, the next book of Boyle’s to be published 
was the book often cited as marking the historical break between medieval alchemy 
and modern chemistry, The Sceptical Chymist, or Chymico-Physical Doubts & 
Paradoxes, published in August 1661. Though Lawrence Principe has shown that 
                                                                                                                                       
page of Reason and Religion to the Novum Organum but the passage does not appear there. Its source 
has not been identified. Could it too be from unpublished and now lost Baconian material? 
145 On an experiment involving metals, Century IV, 327; Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 68; 
Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:58. On a getting rose bushes to bloom in autumn, Century V, 13; 
Boyle, Certain physiological essays, 70–71; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 2:59. On freezing of apples and 
eggs, Robert Boyle, New experiments and observations touching cold (London: John Crook, 1665), 52; 
Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 4:542. On “many particulars in husbandry,” including the fertilization 
of vegetables, Century 5, 444; Robert Boyle, Some considerations touching the usefulnesse of experimental 
naturall philosophy, vol. II, sec 2 (Oxford: Ric. Davis, 1671), 5; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 6:409. 
146 Boyle, Usefulness of natural philosophy, 104; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 3:271; Boyle, 
Experiments touching cold, b7v; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 4:213; Boyle, Usefulness of Natural 
Philosophy, II.2, 43; Boyle, Works of Robert Boyle, 6:433; Robert Boyle, The excellency of theology 
compar’d with natural philosophy (London: Henry Herringman, 1674), 170; Boyle, Works of Robert 
Boyle, 8:75. 
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the text is less a break with the past than once thought,147 it is still revolutionary—
maybe not for the affirmations it makes, but for the issue it raises. Boyle proposes 
no firm resolution of the issue until Origine of Formes and Qualities of 1666. Let us 
first consider the problem and then Boyle’s proposed solution. 
The Sceptical Chymist attacks the two prominent competing theories of 
chemistry,148 the Aristotelian doctrine that there are four elements, earth, water, air 
and fire, and the main doctrine of medieval and Renaissance alchemy, the 
Spagyrical doctrine that there are three elements, salt, sulfur, and mercury. Boyle’s 
attack begins on experimental grounds and proceeds to more abstract and 
fundamental issues. In countless experiments, recounted over nearly three hundred 
pages,149 Boyle found no evidence for a small number of elements. It was clear that 
the chemists’ proposal that fire could be used to decompose any material into 
common component elements was wrong.150 Upon separation (by fire or otherwise), 
different materials yielded different numbers of materials. There was no evidence 
that the results were even elements or pre-existing ingredients not created by the 
separation process itself. Some materials, such as many metals, were impervious to 
                                                
147 Lawrence M. Principe, The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and His Alchemical Quest 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27–58. 
148 Though rightly this should read “alchemy/chemistry” or “chymistry,” (see ibid., 8–10), I 
believe little harm is done in the current context by using the more familiar term. 
149 Robert Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, or Chymico-Physical Doubts & Paradoxes. (London: J. 
Crooke, 1661), 1–298. In what follows, I will paraphrase more than might be preferred. Already in the 
Sceptical Chymist, Boyle’s style had become maddeningly prolix. 
150 Bacon too thought decomposition by fire was a fruitless approach. Novum Organum, 2.7. 
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any separation. Although elements were supposedly homogenous, always and in all 
cases the same material, and insusceptible of further decomposition, many 
supposedly elemental materials could in fact be further decomposed. Moreover, 
many supposedly elemental ingredients of different experiments were themselves 
quite different. The salt, for example, that resulted from one separation was plainly 
different from the salt that resulted from another.151 Salt, therefore, was not a 
common, universal, homogenous element. Boyle concluded that there was no 
evidence for a small number of elements out of which all materials are composed. 
These experimental results led Boyle to a more fundamental problem, a 
problem involving the very nature of material properties. Under both the ancient 
Aristotelian doctrine and the medieval chemist’s doctrine, each element has 
distinctive properties, and the presence of these properties in constituent elements 
accounts for the presence of those properties in mixed bodies. In the Aristotelian 
view, if something is wet, that is because it has water in it. It if is heavy, it has earth 
in it. But what accounts for something having, say, flavor?152 The difficulty in 
accounting for properties beyond hot and cold and wet and dry led over time to the 
replacement of the Aristotelian tetrad with the medieval triad. But the underlying 
principle was retained: properties of mixed bodies are properties of their 
constituent elements. Under the medieval triad, if something is flavorful, it contains 
salt, if fluid or ponderous, it contains mercury. Boyle’s experimental results led him 
                                                
151 Boyle, Sceptical Chymist, 247. 
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to challenge not just the Aristotelian tetrad and the medieval triad, but the 
underlying principle as well.153 He stressed that many materials change properties 
without any addition or removal of elements. For example, with time or heat, 
materials within an enclosed chamber can acquire or lose properties. Opaque sand 
and ashes can, without the addition of any other materials, become transparent 
glass. Ice, snow, and hail all melt and become water.154 Silver, when hammered 
becomes springy, when heated becomes flexible.155 The sound of a plucked string 
changes if the string is tightened.156 Egg whites, when beaten, harden. In all these 
cases, no elements are added, none removed, yet the properties changed. Moreover, 
how does one account for qualities such as the sound of a plucked string? Which 
element is sonorous? How does one account for color or motion?157 It cannot be the 
case, Boyle concludes, that the qualities of mixed bodies are simply those of the 
constituent elements, whether earth, water, air, and fire, or mercury, sulfur, and 
salt—at least not if those elements are to be understood as the common and real 
materials that go by those names. 
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Throughout the Middle Ages, this presumption that elements were common 
materials was increasingly weakened.158 Mercury, for example, came to be thought 
of as something other than the common silvery gray liquid metal. Instead it was 
conceived to be a special, pure, even non-material element, a unique combination of 
properties rather than something one can touch and feel. Elemental sulfur was no 
longer common brimstone, but simply the carrier of the properties of odorousness 
and inflammability. To have sulfur as an element came to mean simply that the 
material was odorous and inflammable. But what of all the qualities of perceived 
bodies—transparency, brittleness, particular colors, and so on—that are not 
characteristic of any of the elements? And how could a few elements combine to 
create all the combinations of properties that existed? If elemental sulfur were 
odorous and inflammable, how could there be a material that was odorous but did 
not burn? Boyle described the recent solution to this problem offered by Daniel 
Sennert (1572–1637).159 According to Sennert, there is one element for each possible 
quality. “Where the same Quality is to be met with in many Bodies, it must belong 
to them upon the Account of some one Body whereof they all participate.”160 If 
something is heavy, that is because it has the heaviness element in it, fluid because 
                                                
158 Ibid., 299–346. 
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it has the fluidity element in it, sonorous because it has the sonorous element in it. 
By this doctrine, qualities are substantial. Properties are not properties of 
something; rather they are self-sufficient elements from which material things are 
composed. The basic building blocks of all material things are thus blueness, 
inflammability, heaviness, sweetness, transparency, and so on. All elemental 
qualities have a self-sufficient existence independent of the material things that 
manifest them as properties. Elements thus are not common or even uncommon 
materials, indeed not things of any sort, but attributes. By Sennert’s proposal, 
elements are reified, non-material, independently existing qualities. Boyle thought 
Sennert was taking to a logical extreme the underlying error shared by both the 
Aristotelian advocates of four elements and the Spagyricist advocates of three, the 
principle that the qualities of something are the qualities of its constitutent 
elements. Boyle found both “the Aristotelian and divers other Theories 
incompetent to explicate the Origine of Qualities.”161 He ended The Sceptical 
Chymist with only a tentative suggestion for an alternative proposal. 
Boyle deepened his attack and advanced his own solution in The Origine of 
Forms and Qualities, According to the Corpuscular Philosophy, published five years 
later, in 1666. Although a continuation of topics broached in The Sceptical Chymist, 
it is different in character, vocabulary, and confidence. In his earlier work, Boyle 
confidently provided exhaustive experimental results that indicated the 
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conventional approaches were wrong, but he was hesitant to name their essential 
problem and to propose an alternative. He said that he did not use the term Form in 
discussing his own ideas because it might be understood as Substantial Form, 
something he rejects.162 Boyle did not yet have enough experience with any other 
kind of form, such as the Baconian. In the Origine of Formes,163 he has shed his 
reservations. He now holds that the nature of forms is the unavoidable and 
fundamental issue, that the doctrine of substantial forms is the incorrect and 
harmful position, and that the correct position is one based on a corpuscularian 
philosophy. When Boyle wrote the first work, he was just beginning to read the 
Novum Organum and other systematic treatises, though he had already read book 2 
aphorisms 11–20 excerpted in “De Forma Calidi.” The difference between the 
Sceptical Chymist and the Origine of Forms is a much more confident understanding 
of Scholastic doctrine of substantial forms and a proposal virtually the same as the 
one Bacon presented in book 2, aphorisms 1–10 of the Novum Organum. Let us look 
first at Boyle’s criticism of substantial forms and then his proposal. 
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In Origines of Forms, Boyle rejects the doctrine of substantial forms for three 
reasons: it is unnecessary, useless, and inconsistent.164 First, Boyle says, there is no 
need to appeal to reified, immaterial, unobservable qualities when appeals to 
observed matter and properties of that matter serve all needed purposes. Second, 
the doctrine is useless, even on its advocates’ own terms. For they admit that “true 
Knowledg of [Substantial] Forms is too difficult and abstruse to be attain’d.”165 The 
only thing that can be said about a substantial form is it produces the observed 
property: the rock is heavy because it has heaviness, or earthiness, in it; the log is 
porous because it has porosity; but true knowledge of heaviness, earthiness, and 
porosity are unobtainable. Boyle summarizes, “I do not remember, that either 
Aristotle, (who scarce ever attempted it,) or any of his Followers, has given a solid 
and intelligible solution of any Phenomenon of Nature by the help of substantial 
Forms.”166 The doctrine was intended to help explain but in the end explains 
nothing. Third, Boyle notes, the doctrine is logically inconsistent. For example, 
consider a block of brass cast or turned into some other shape, say, a sphere.167 The 
raw material has the substantial form of cubicity and the result has the substantial 
form of sphericity. The new may have the material of the old, but has a new form. 
“If they will not allow, as indeed they do not, that the substantial Form is made of 
                                                
164 Boyle, Origine of formes, 146–8. In Boyle, Chymist’s Doctrine of Qualities, 33, a fourth is added: 
the doctrine of substantial forms fails to make reliable predictions. 
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166 Ibid., 185. See also the introductory material before page 271. 
167 Ibid., 150–52. 
 350 
any thing that is Material, they must give me leave to believe, that tis produce’d out 
of Nothing,”168 but advocates of substantial forms cannot accept that a substance 
could be produced out of nothing. Boyle recounts several examples in which these 
advocates try to claim that forms and their associated properties are independent of 
matter but end up claiming they are dependent on matter.169 Boyle concludes, 
“Again, what they call a Substance they make indeed an Accident, and . . . 
contradict their own vulgar Doctrine.”170 
In Origine of Formes and Qualities, Boyle offers an alternative proposal. 
Qualities of things, he claims, are produced “by virtue of the Motion, Size, Figure, 
and Contrivance of their own Parts.”171 A cave has the ability to produce echoes 
because of the arrangement of its walls. A watch can tell time because of the “the 
number, the figure, and the coaptation of the Wheels and other parts.”172 A prism 
displays colors because of its shape.173 In some explanations, the relevant parts may 
be small, maybe imperceptibly so. Surfaces, for example, have a certain color 
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because of their texture.174 Ground glass is poisonous because the fine particles cut 
the intestinal lining. Boyle often called his natural philosophy the ‘Mechanical 
Philosophy,’ for he held that properties were produced by mechanical, physical 
means. He also called it the ‘Corpuscularian Philosophy,’ for he hypothesized that 
ultimately, all properties could be explained by the physical properties—the size, 
arrangement, and motion—of very fine, imperceptible particles that he called 
corpuscles,175 and he described many experimental results that could be explained 
by such an hypothesis.176 He considered the proposal for corpuscles merely an 
hypothesis, albeit an increasingly well-supported one.177 He was certain, however, 
that qualities are qualities of something and can be explained by the size, 
arrangement, and motion of the thing’s parts. Qualities, that is, are not substances. 
The ‘form’ of a natural body, Boyle proposes, is  
but an Essential Modification . . . of its Matter, or such a convention of 
the Bigness, Shape, Motion (or Rest,) Scituation and Contexture, 
(together with the thence resulting Qualities) of the small parts that 
                                                
174 Ibid., 328. 
175 Boyle did not call his fine particles ‘atoms’ and did not claim to know how similar these 
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compose the Body, as is necessary to constitute and denominate such a 
particular Body.178  
By ‘denominate[s],’ he means “discriminates it from all other sorts of Bodies.”179 In 
other words, the Form is a “convention of essential accidents,”180 a union of 
qualities, that make something the kind of thing it is. Boyle stressed that he “would 
be understood to mean by it [the word Forme], not a Real Substance distinct from 
Matter, but onely the Matter it self of a Natural Body, consider’d with its peculiar 
manner of Existence.”181 This doctrine of an alternative to that of substantial forms 
was, Boyle held, the “summe of the Controversy betwixt Us and the Schools.”182 
Boyle considered his break with past theories of chemistry to be this doctrine that 
qualities of a body are caused by the size, shape, arrangement, and motion of the 
body’s (possibly imperceptible) parts and that the form or essence of something is 
the union of qualities that make the thing the kind of thing it is. 
Boyle considered discovering the nature of such forms and qualities to be the 
“noblest,” “most important,” “most useful,” “most fundamental,” and “most 
perplexed” part of natural philosophy.183 In the mid-1660s he embarked on a project 
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to identify the essence of important chemical qualities. The project would result in 
a general inventory that Boyle would call a Chymia Philosophica.184 The project was 
never completed as envisioned, but the pursuit remained the core of Boyle’s 
scientific work for at least twenty years. He went on to publish research on many 
material qualities, including colors, heat, cold, rarefaction, volatility, fixity, taste, 
odor, alkalinity and acidity, corrosiveness and corrodibility, solubility, porosity, 
magnetism, electricity, and various qualities of gems, medicines, blood, the air, and 
the seas. In the second edition of the Origine of Forms and Qualities (1667), Boyle 
wrote that the book should be taken as an introduction to all of his works on 
qualities.185 In all these works, his criticism of what had gone before was the same: 
There are no substantial forms, and the accepted notions for chemical qualities are 
poorly defined if not meaningless. A different method must be used to identify 
forms than had been used in the past. 
The proper method for discovering the form of qualities Boyle called 
“experimental induction.”186 In the Preface to the Origine of Forms, he dismissed 
nearly all prior work on the nature of qualities. He did, however, acknowledge an 
exemplar of the correct procedure, “our illustrious Verulam . . . in his short Essay, 
                                                
184 “Advertisements about the experiments and notes regarding chymical properties,” Robert 
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De Forma Calidi,”187 the example that Bacon had given for ‘true induction.’ The 
goal of the Origine of Forms, according to the publisher’s introduction, is “to see the 
noble Project of the famous Verulam . . . receive its full and perfect accomplish-
ment.”188 
Bacon’s example was Boyle’s model, but Boyle did not follow it in a 
mechanical or rote way. Bacon had presented experiments first and then the 
‘harvest,’ the proposal for the essence of the quality under investigation. Boyle often 
presents the harvest first. The experiments follow, rather like a supporting 
appendix. “On Corrosiveness and Corrosibility” (1675) is a good example.189 The 
four differentiae that define the essence of corrosiveness are presented on three 
pages before twenty experiments are presented on forty pages. Boyle also arranges 
his experimental evidence differently. In “De Forma Calidi,” Bacon presented his 
evidence, let us say, vertically. That is, he first presented all instances. He then 
returned to the top of the list and identified corresponding absences for each 
instance. He then returned again to the top and identified corresponding variations. 
Boyle, on the other hand, tends to present his evidence horizontally, as for example 
in New Experiments Touching Cold. He treats expansion of liquids, then contraction, 
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then the measure of expansion and contraction before proceeding to instance, 
absence, and measure of the transmission of cold. Finally, Boyle’s works are always 
incomplete, and he apologizes for that incessantly. The nature of cold he found 
particularly difficult to research. In the preface to his treatise on the subject, he 
writes, “Though a 150 or 200 Experiments . . . allow me to have begun the natural 
History of Cold; yet . . . I look upon what I have done but as a Beginning. . . . I look 
upon these as things, that do rather Promise then Present a Harvest.”190 
In the first ten aphorisms of book 2 of the Novum Organum, Bacon had 
insisted that conventional natural philosophy was unable to provide directions that 
with certainty and liberty would allow someone to effect a desired quality in some 
object. The problem was that the concept for the quality was corrupt. The 
essence—the form—had not been properly identified. “Separation and dissolution 
of bodies . . . through fire”191 were the wrong method. What was needed was 
“reason and true induction.”192 To show the proper method Bacon used the 
example of heat and concluded that heat is a certain kind of motion not of atoms as 
previously understood, but of “true particles as they are found to be.”193 The 
example began in aphorism 11, and this is where Boyle began reading. He returned 
to the earlier part of the text years later, only after reading and digesting the 
example. Boyle came to see that Bacon’s understanding of form and how to identify 
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it was the correct alternative to substantial form as presumed by Aristotelians, 
Spagyrists, and Sennert alike. He asked that his attack on substantial form and his 
proposal that all qualities should be explained in terms of the size, shape, motion, 
and texture of corpuscles be the preface to all the publications on qualities that 
formed the backbone of his life’s work. He considered the identification of the form 
of qualities in terms of corpuscles the most noble, useful, fundamental, and 
important work of a natural philosoper. We now take this for granted. Whether the 
quality under investigation is the color of a laser beam, the adhesiveness of a glue, 
the scent of a flower, the gain of a transistor, or the efficacy of a drug, we seek to 
explain it in terms of the essential characteristics and arrangements of imperceptible 
parts that we now call molecules, atoms, and electrons. Boyle called the process for 
doing this ‘experimental induction,’ and took as a model Bacon’s example of the 
induction of the form of heat. Boyle’s commitment to that model and his 
understanding of it increased after reading, around 1661, that ‘excellent book,’ the 
Novum Organum by ‘that Great and Solid Philosopher’ ‘who trac’d out a most 
useful way to make discoveries.’ 
Conclusion 
Seventeenth-century natural philosophers have made it difficult for us to 
known what they thought of Baconian induction. John Wilkins and Seth Ward 
insisted that it was taught at Oxford but provided no details on what they 
understood it to be or what exactly was taught. William Harvey published the last 
major work of his career to demonstrate his research method. In the middle of that 
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treatise, in a way suggesting his readers would not be surprised, Harvey included a 
reference to Bacon that indicated Harvey thought he was using the method of the 
Novum Organum. Analysis of Harvey’s text indicates that he really was. Yet Harvey 
was a staunch Aristotelian who admonished his readers to follow the method of 
Posterior Analytics, and he completed his most innovative work before the Novum 
Organum was published. Robert Boyle probably presents the most straightforward 
case of Baconian influence, but that influence must be teased from a mass of prolix 
writing. Only once does Boyle call his method ‘experimental induction,’ and it is in 
a context suggesting the reader would already know what that means. Boyle’s first 
exposure to Baconian induction was not the treatise in which it was discussed by 
name, but in illustrative examples extracted therefrom.  
Other practicing natural philosophers of the time can be equally unhelpful. 
John Wallis, though himself more a mathematician, was from 1645 through the 
1660s a leader in the community of natural philosphers that founded the Royal 
Society. In 1655, he published Arithmetica infinitorum, a seminal text in the history of 
infinitesimal mathematics.194 He achieved remarkable mathematical results using a 
method he called ‘induction,’ a method he used without explanation or 
justification. Thirty years later, in Institutio logicae (1687),195 Wallis seems to have 
virtually forgotten his own method. His long chapter on induction is remarkably 
                                                
194 John Wallis, The Arithmetic of Infinitesimals, trans. Jacqueline A. Stedall (New York: 
Springer, 2004). 
195 Wallis, Institutio logicae ad communes usus accommodata. 
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scholastic, explaining the relationship between induction and the syllogistic moods 
Barbara, Darapti, and Felapton.196 Just at the end of the chapter, however, he 
mentions, “There is, however, another [form of inductive] argument . . . of indeed 
great and frequent use. It is the primary instrument of investigation, whenever, by 
examining and observing particulars we arrive at a universal cognition.” It is used 
in “what is called Experimental Philosophy,”197 and its essence is the identfication 
of causes. This induction is “however uncertain on account of the uncertainty of 
the material.”198 In Wallis alone we thus find three conceptions of induction. In 
those on the periphery of natural philosophy, such as the educational reformers 
John Webster and Samuel Hartlib or the historian of the Royal Society Thomas 
Sprat, there is deep commitment to various aspects of Baconian thought, but little 
evidence of any precise understanding of or commitment to Baconian induction. 
We may thus conclude that it is not enough to distinguish the Baconianisms 
of different groups and different times. We must also distinguish varying 
understandings and commitments within those groups. Some within the 
communities of natural philosophers had only a loose understanding of Baconian 
induction and associated it with a general commitment to observation, experiment, 
                                                
196 Ibid., bk. 3, ch. 15, pp. 167–72. 
197 Utraque tamen Argumentatio . . . magni tamen usus est & frequentis. Investigationis, 
praecipuum est Instrumentem; ubi particularia examinando & observando, pervenimus ad 
universalium cognitionem . . . . (quae dicitur) Experimentalis Philosophia.” Ibid., 172. My translation, 
italics in original. 
198 “(utut incerta propter incertitudinem materiae).” Ibid. My translation, italics in original. 
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natural histories, the rejection of past authority, the reform of learning, the 
usefulness of knowledge, or peaceful cooperation among scholars. For many, the 
theoretical and practical details of the Novum Organum ‘flew over men’s heads.’ 
Others, however, understood Baconian induction well and applied it in their 
research. We must include William Harvey and Robert Boyle among them. There 
are likely others. It is also likely that sophisticated and subtle understanding of 
Baconian induction passed among the community without always being associated 
exclusively with Bacon himself. Someone developed standards by which Harvey 
could refer to his proposal as a Baconian second harvest, even though Bacon only 
promised and never published anything on a harvest past the first.  
It is also likely that some of those who understood Bacon’s induction in all its 
theoretical subtlety did not see it as a doctrine sui generis. The Aristotelian John 
Case had already used the term idols to refer to those floating and poorly formed 
concepts endemic to philosophies like those of Everard Digby. Ramists such as 
William Temple and various humanists had already proposed that there was a kind 
of induction unlike that of the scholastics, that there was a kind of induction that 
went back to Cicero and Socrates. It was from Socrates that Aristotle got his idea of 
induction, and it was from principles Bacon found in Aristotle that he developed 
his own. In the end, Francis Bacon’s induction is a systematization and codification 
of regula Socratis. A natural philopher steeped in Aristotelian and other ancient 
study such as William Harvey probably realized that. Maybe academicians like 
Wilkins and Ward did, too. Many talented researchers of the next generation, such 
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as Robert Boyle, probably did not. To them, the search for the essence of 
something by a methodical process of comparing and contrasting was simply the 
fundamental way to gain certain and practical knowledge about the natural world. 
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Epilogue 
 
 
This study has examined the history of the concept of induction from Aristotle to 
Francis Bacon and taken a preliminary look at the practice of Baconian induction 
afterwards. It has not discussed the practice of induction in the earlier period or 
theories of induction in the later. The first topic is a subject for further research, 
research which will greatly benefit from the historical understanding of induction 
presented here. Let me close by offering a small outline of the second topic. 
The history of the idea of induction from late antiquity to early modern 
England has been largely a story of the misreading or selective reading of Aristotle. 
Such misunderstanding did not stop after Francis Bacon. It is, for example, still 
common today to treat Prior Analytics 2.23 as the chief Aristotelian passage on 
induction and to interpret that passage as saying an induction gains force by being 
converted into a deduction through a complete enumeration of particulars. That 
Aristotle held another view of induction in which inductively reached conclusions 
can validly and certainly apply beyond the observed particulars is attributed to 
Aristotle’s being imprecise, confused, or inconsistent. But as we have seen, it was 
not that Aristotle was being inconsistent; it was that Prior Analytics 2.23 was being 
misread. In the history of induction, moreover, not only was Aristotle misread. So 
too was Bacon.  
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William Harvey and Robert Boyle understood Baconian induction to be the 
discovery of what makes some property or thing the kind of property or thing it is, 
i.e., the discovery of its formal cause. Not all natural philosophers understood 
Baconian induction so well. It became widely accepted—and remains so among 
practicing scientists, engineers, and technicians—that to ensure the certainty of an 
inductive inference, one must identify a cause. But Bacon’s insistence on finding a 
formal cause and not merely the material and efficient cause was lost. What Boyle 
feared would happen happened. He was reluctant to use the term form because it 
had become equated with the medieval substantial form. With his theory of 
qualities, he successfully banished substantial forms, but with it went form. 
Henceforth the only causes considered appropriate for scientific inquiry were 
efficient and material causes. 
At some level and for some time, this loss did not much matter. Bacon and 
Boyle had insisted that properties are to be explained by the size, shape, 
arrangement, and behavior of material parts (often imperceptibly small ones). So in 
a sense formal causes could be reduced to material and efficient ones, and to identify 
the latter was to identify the former. But this shift of emphasis eventually destroyed 
the foundation of Baconian induction. Bacon held that a property and its formal 
cause are one and the same thing. What is caused is not something else, but the 
very property itself. As Bacon stressed, heat is not produced by a certain kind of 
motion; heat is that kind of motion and that kind of motion is heat. By the new 
thinking, on the other hand, a cause and what is caused are two separate things, a 
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cause and its effect. Causes came to be compared to the motions inside a clock. A 
clock could be made of several different materials (it could have different material 
causes) and have any of several mechanisms (it could have different efficient causes) 
yet still display the same time. If all we see is the clock’s face, we cannot know the 
material and efficient causes of the hands’ motion. 
In an influential debate over the nature of induction in the mid-nineteenth 
century, William Whewell, in his three volumes The History of the Inductive Sciences 
and three volumes The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,1 took Bacon’s position, 
while John Stuart Mill insisted on the opposing principle, the ‘plurality of causes.’2 
Whewell believed with Bacon—and with Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero, Harvey, and 
Boyle—that the fundamental role of induction is to determine what uniquely makes 
something the kind of thing it is. Mill took the position that, as when we look at a 
clock face, we can never be sure which of several causes are at work in making 
things appear as they do. Mill’s insistence on the plurality of causes helped erode 
not only the understanding of but the respect for Baconian induction. It now 
became easy to treat Baconian induction as an inference on the following model: 
‘The cause is either A, B, or C; it is not A or B; therefore the cause is C.’ The 
conclusion of this syllogism follows if it is certain that the only candidates are A, B, 
                                                
1 William Whewell, History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present times 
(London: J.W. Parker, 1837); William Whewell, The philosophy of the inductive sciences founded upon 
their history, 2 vols. (London: J.W. Parker, 1840). 
2 John Stuart Mill, A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the 
principles of evidence, and methods of scientific investigation (London: J.W. Parker, 1843), bk. 3, ch. 9. 
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and C. Philosophers observed that Bacon said nothing about how to ensure this was 
the case. Thus Baconian induction came to be treated as Aristotelian induction was 
in medieval Scholasticism—as a usually defective form of deduction that could be 
perfected only by a complete enumeration of particulars, and since the particulars 
can rarely be fully enumerated, induction is at best a special case and more 
commonly simply incapable of providing important and certain scientific 
knowledge. 
On induction, Aristotle and Bacon have been misread. So too even has David 
Hume. He is the man most associated with induction, yet he wrote virtually 
nothing on the subject that in his day was known by the term induction. He used 
the word only a few times, always incidentally, never skeptically, and even once or 
twice to support an argument of his own.3 None of the great British theoreticians of 
induction in the mid-nineteenth century, such as Richard Whately, John Herschel, 
Whewell, and Mill, gave Hume much attention. In English, Hume’s name was not 
connected to induction until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Credit 
for fully making the association may go to John Maynard Keynes. Hume may not 
have said anything about induction, but he surely said much about causality, 
including that causes cannot be known with certainty. In 1921, Keynes pointed out 
this implication: If causes cannot be known with certainty, then inductive 
inferences cannot be drawn with certainty, and thus the real object of Hume’s 
                                                
3 For the two uses in the Treatise, see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.2.1.2 p. 23 and 
1.3.7.7 p. 68. 
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attack, even if Hume did not realize it, was induction.4 Once Hume’s attack on 
causality was accepted, the implications for induction were read back into Hume 
and he became known as the great inductive skeptic, even if he did not think of 
himself that way. 
The whole history of induction seems beset with misreading and selective 
reading. Yet we should not conclude that induction is inherently prone to being 
misunderstood. Aristotle’s view went little challenged for eight hundred years. 
Bacon’s was understood by many for at least two hundred. It is rather that the 
acceptance of certain more fundamental premises drives interpreters to force 
induction into a framework the authors did not share. In the case of the 
misinterpretation of late antiquity, those premises were those of Alexandrian 
Neoplatonism. The premises that led Bacon’s induction to be misunderstood 
remain a subject for future research. 
 
                                                
4 Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, 272. 
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